Posts by Pacatus

To my (likely limited) knowledge, strict libertarian free will entails that our agency (decisions/actions) are so unconstrained that, in any exact same situation, one could have always chosen differently. This implies that both exogenous circumstance and endogenous circumstances (e.g., my state of mind, education, ability to observe and analyze) are the same, and yet I could have chosen differently in any and every case. Now, if all those circumstances are strictly determinative, then the only way I could have chosen differently is if my choices are random. That is why I reject strict libertarian free will (again, as I understand it). I don’t see Epicurus as a strict free-will libertarian.

That does not mean the only alternative is strict determination. Some constraints (both exogenous and endogenous) may be determinative, others not. In some cases, in some ways, I might have been able to choose otherwise. In some cases, not. Some constraints might be sufficiently determinative as to present mitigating circumstances (ethically); others not so much.

So, I take a kind of middle ground about questions of what could be and what might have been possible.

Just thinking “out loud” here –

Assuming for the sake of discussion that we all have the same understanding of what “good” means, it seems the sort of “meta-ethical” questions are: (1) Why does one want to be good? And (2) – more to the ethical point – why ought one (anyone) want to be good? All ethics is about how one gets from an “is” to an “ought.”

From an instrumental point of view, an agent’s “good” behavior would aim at some goal: In order to achieve G, one ought (that is, one’s best course of action is) to do A. For the Hellenistic schools (e.g. the Stoics and Epicureans), following Aristotle, there is an ultimate goal (a telos, and end-value in itself) – which is eudaimonia (happy or satisfied well-being) – which all interim goals support, and toward which appropriate actions (virtues) are aimed. They disagreed on what is necessary for that telos. But both the Stoics and the Epicureans agree that some measure of social justice is entailed (I don’t think the Pyrrhonian skeptics go there).

The only non-instrumental view I am aware of is deontology: that is, moral rules are exogenously given – either in terms of some divine command theory, or some ideal categorical imperative (e.g., Kant – although that seems to be ultimately based on its own instrumentality: a universal desire to do one’s duty; but that may also be metaphysically given). But maybe there is some evolutionarily determined “given” (or givens) that dictates at least some oughts?

An Epicurean might say that any satisfaction about being/doing good (say, because one has followed Stoic virtues or obeyed some exogenous moral commands) just is (a) pleasure. And what are the grounds for suggesting that one would (or ought to) feel dissatisfied for doing so – in determining if one has acted ethically/morally? I would suggest that, from an Epicurean view, it is our evolutionary human nature that provides the guidance (in terms of pleasure/pain – both physical and mental – assessed by our sense, feelings and intuition;* and abetted by reason).

Again: All ethics is about getting from an “is” to an “ought.” And the Epicurean view (to my mind) readily includes a host of social justice considerations (consideration of “the other”) in the mix.

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OK: My brain is now a scrambled omelet.

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* I am using “intuition” here – as a translation of prolepsis – in the sense of “a: the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference; or b: immediate apprehension or cognition” (Merriam-Webster)

Quote from Don

Their contention is that if we knew the position of every atom and the physical laws that pertained to them, it would be possible to accurately know what would happen next ad infinitum.

Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

Now I want to hear from Martin!

Quote from Kalosyni

Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

Including believing and saying “There’s no such thing as free will.” Or that there is. Or believing that Epicureanism is a better philosophy than Stoicism, and why; or vice versa.

Quote from Kalosyni

Or can we say "free will" = a individual's ability to choose.

For me, that’s just what it is -- even in the face of constraints that limit our choices and how we are able choose.

Quote from Cassius

"Your "virtue" is the handmaiden of pleasure no matter what you say, buddy!"

My favorite!

As I’ve probably noted before, I do not tend to absorb knowledge as well through listening as reading. Others are the opposite. And “concretizing” a verbal discussion into written text can have its own problems. With that said, it would be tragic had I missed this podcast (and a couple of others that I’ve listened to so far) because of my own limitations in that regard.

With that said: (1) I was reminded – especially by Dr. Glidden’s remarks on the fact that our prolepseis can be mistaken, coupled with their place in the canon – of the distinction by the Pyrrhonians between “criteria for truth” (which they found suspect – at least with regard to certain knowledge about “nonevident matters”) and “criteria for agency.” That latter may be uncertain, but can be the best evidence we have to make choices and act upon. It strikes me that, based on Dr. Glidden’s analysis, the prolepseis might fall into that second category.

And (2) the question of “cognitive” versus “noncognitive” is something that I’ve encountered in moral theory. Moral cognitivism is (at the base level I can comprehend) the idea that we can derive proper moral views via thinking and reason (as well a some sort of cognitive validation of articulated rule-based moral creeds). Moral noncognitivism is the idea that we first react emotively – for example visceral repugnance in the face of cruelty to a child. We may try to articulate cognitive reasons for that response (perhaps so that we might convince others), but it is that response itself that drives the very process.

I tend toward moral noncognitivism (again, at the base level I understand it), but it strikes me that prolepsis might explain why so many of those noncognitive (or precognitive) reactions seem to be observed across diverse cultures generally – and why people who have opposite reactions (e.g. enjoying such acts of cruelty) tend to get diagnosed as “pathological.”

Just, really, thinking “out loud” …

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Note: I take “cognitive” here to mean generally what is given as the first definition in Merriam-Webster: “1: of, relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activity (such as thinking, reasoning, or remembering).”

Cassius

Yes! I only want to add that VS40 is employing deductive logic (here a kind of reductio ad absurdum) in a way that illustrates one of the things deductive logic is good at: illustrating incoherent thinking. However, it is possible to construct a valid deductive syllogism that leads to an empirical falsity (i.e. the syllogism is valid, but not sound).

Empirical arguments (e.g. from the senses, feelings and prolepseis) depend largely on inference from revealed facts: inductive logic. Although none of that was formalized in Greek thinking of the time, Epicurus seems (to me at least) to have been a kind pf precursor on that path.

Cassius

That’s a good post, and I generally agree. But –

Just like Epicurus’ natural physicalism, a fundamental understanding of how (let alone if) we choose seems basic. Under strict determinism, those who (for example) follow Epicurus and those who follow (say) the Stoics are simply determined to do so – without any actual choice based on study and reflection.

The same for strict randomness: those who are Epicureans and those who are Stoics are just so – randomly (even if they think they have reasonably chosen).

So I do think these are important philosophical questions. (And, as I hope I have made clear, I reject both those polar extremes.)

I recall some old philosophical discussions of compatibilism that scrambled my brain.

Basically, I take its foundation to be that although some things are determined beyond our control (and affect the range of available choices in any situation), we are still ethically responsible for our choices because – within those constraints – we do choose (even if those constraints can be mitigating factors, ethically speaking).

Quote from Onenski

That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?

I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.

I think Epicurus thought that some things are determined and some are not (e.g. the "swerve"). Some things are up to us and some are not. If nothing at all is causally determined, then it all becomes random.

Just thinking "out loud" here, but strict determinism and strict randomness would have the same problems (both epistemologically and ethically).

Onenski

“Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent.

The term I learned in economics is “constrained choice” – which I suspect is closer to another version of free will called “compatibilism”: Yes we choose. But our choices are constrained by our resources, by circumstances and our own abilities – some of which are determined (e.g. by evolution), and some of which result from our own (past) choices.

And strict determinism would mean that our (under that principle, illusory) perception that we do choose is also determined. So it would seem to be a vicious circle: “Why do you think it’s all determined?” “Because I believe determinism is correct.” “Why do you think that?” “Because it’s determined …”

Somehow, I uploaded only one of the two essays (albeit twice) I came across. The other is this one:

Happy Twentieth! - TheHumanist.com

While reading Stephen Greenblatt’s award-winning book, The Swerve, three years ago, I stumbled on a delightful fact. It seems that devotees of the Greek…

thehumanist.com

And Kalosyni I agree with you about not calling Eikas a sabbath, but I found the analogy intriguing. Do other philosophies have a similar day of festivity, outside of religion?

Thank you Cassius ! And happy Eikas to you also -- and all here!

While doing some casual research on Eikas, I came upon the following two brief essays – in addition to discussions on here – which I enjoyed. The second one is, unfortunately, riddled with ads – but I was struck by the reference (quoting the SOFE folk) to Eikas as a kind of “sabbath.”

Eikas: The Dinner Party as Philosophy

Paste Magazine is your source for the best music, movies, TV, comedy, videogames, books, comics, craft beer, politics and more. Discover your favorite albums…

www.pastemagazine.com

Kudos, Kalosyni ! Well-chosen images, well-read -- and a simple introduction to the pleasure/pain principle that would be hard to beat: neither too simplistic nor too complicated for the beginner. Well done!

Welcome!

@Nate

Thanks! What I like about this one is the sense of a relaxed serenity.

@Nate

I also really like Genevra's portrait of "Epicurus in the Garden" on page 114 of your book (paperback version arrived today! ). Any chance you could add that one to the thread here? Many thanks!

Welcome!

Welcome!

"Why then, do I dwell at such length on pleasure? Because the fact that old age feels little longing for sensual pleasures not only is no cause for reproach, but rather is ground for the highest praise."

Well, I’m nearly ten years older than Cicero was when he died – so maybe he never experienced the sensual pleasure of knowing that your aging prostate still allows great relief when you first wake in the morning!

With that bit of crudity aside – and recognizing that “sensual” pleasures were not the be-all / end-all for Epicurus – I still enjoy cooking and eating simple meals, the fruit of the grape, the touch of one I love … and many other sensual pleasures. Does the range of such pleasures diminish with age? Absolutely! But I don’t find that to be cause of either distress or celebration. Besides, you can still find other pleasures.

Poor Cicero!