Posts by Pacatus

Quote from Don

It could be instructive to see how modern neuroscience explains the pleasure/displeasure aspect of affect.

Just from recall, but -- although himself not an expert in the field -- I think Haris Dimitriadis delved into that stuff quite a bit ...

Quote from Nate

The placebo effect is a measurably powerful phenomena that can be exploited as an emotional tool.

Yes the placebo effect can be powerful, and often works therapeutically. The trick may be then to convince the patient that the placebo was effective just because of their own psychic-somatic connections, and to help them (e.g. via counseling/therapy) to access those connections.

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An old joke:

A patient returns to the doctor to request a refill on his prescription –

The doctor says: “Well, I have to tell you – what I prescribed in your case was just a placebo.”

Patient: “Does that mean you won’t refill the prescription?”

Doctor: “You do understand what a placebo is, don’t you?”

Patient: “Yes, I do. But they work, and I need the prescription refilled …”

Bryan

Thank you for indulging me. My understanding would be that, once the function collapses, the superpositional state will become either A or ~A (Schrödinger’s cat is either alive or not). And, in a many worlds’ interpretation, it might become A in one (logical) world and ~A in another.

Just for my own (idle) edification, is that generally correct?

Bryan

I don’t have any background here, but I thought that in a superposition the ultimate state is indeterminate (metaphorically “both and neither”) until the function collapses?

Outside the idea of superposition (which I am in no way dismissing – except perhaps with regards to ancient philosophy) it seems that there is not a paradox but a logical contradiction – i.e. in violation of the law of noncontradiction: ~(A & ~A), in the same state at the same time. (Unless, of course, one is just talking about a mixture of, say, atoms of greater and lesser density ...)

Take this whole post as a question …

I myself tend to the leaky vessel side -- or, as my brother once quipped: "Mind like a steel -- sieve."

I’d like to add that, at the other end of the spectrum, one can have such a closed-fist mind that all they have is conviction: their “truth” is the only acceptable “truth,” must be all the “truth” and nothing but the “truth.” Evolving evidence be damned. (For example, certain scriptural-literalist religious fundamentalists.) The possibility of alternative explanations (ala Epicurus) rejected out of hand.

“You can have such an open mind that it is too porous to hold a conviction.” George Crane (1901–1995) *

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In another context, this reminded me of Lucretius on gratitude:

“Then again, to keep feeding an ungrateful mind with good things, without ever being able to fill it and satisfy its appetite—as is the case with the seasons of the year, when they come around with their fruits and manifold delights and yet never satisfy our appetite for the fruits of life—this, in my opinion, is what is meant by the story of those maidens in the flower of their age pouring water into a riddled vessel that cannot possibly be filled.”

Lucretius; Ferguson Smith, Martin. On the Nature of Things (III: 1003 - 1010). Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.

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* It seems Crane was something of a hack, as well as misogynist – but, as they say, even a blind squirrel can find an acorn once in awhile. I came upon the quote elsewhere.

Don :

This old man, trying to secure anchor in a pleasant harbor, wishes to express his gratitude and thanksgiving for the essay you linked in post #7 of this thread (as well as for the thread, and your opening comments).

[As I read it, I recalled a friend whose 12-step sponsor asked him to keep regular journal entries of things for which he was grateful: a diary to remind him of the therapeutic value of an “attitude of gratitude”. I am not a journaler – but I do keep reminders of such things on my computer.]

Thank you.

Quote from Cassius

Most of us are lucky enough to live at a time and place where we can pick and choose our friends and go our own way relatively easily. However I don't think that will remain the case forever. The tensions of the world that we won't discuss due to the politics rule have placed "censorship" issues front and center, and pressures that may be used today for purposes we find agreeable can very easily grow into pressures that can be used against anyone who dissents from the "party line."

First off, I want to say that I have (reluctantly ) come to appreciate the limits on political argument here. It helps create a more tension-free space in which to share (and even cordially argue) on deeper matters.

With that said, I have come to think that “the Garden” can only survive under three alternative scenarios:

1. Whatever despotic regime (“the party line”) controls society (the extended polis) happens to appreciate Epicurean philosophy (which I find to be a doubtful happenstance).

2. The Garden goes underground as long as necessary (which seems to have some history behind it as a scenario).

3. A sufficient level of pluralism prevails in the relevant polis/society.

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As I recall her editor’s unease over the word “pleasure” in Dr. Austin’s book title, I wonder in what libraries (and for whom) it might fall onto the proscribed list – without even being read by the censors.

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BTW, Cassius : I would've given your post from which I quoted more thumbs up if I could have.

From the Wiki article Cassius linked:

“She is often viewed as having provided Romans with fairer taxation, improved education, assisted the poor, and created tolerance in Roman society.”

“While Plotina was a widow, her best-documented act took place. During the year 121, while the emperor Hadrian was inspecting the provinces, Plotina engaged him in a series of letters to discuss who should be the new head of the Epicurean school of philosophy in Athens. She petitioned for a change in the law, so that Popillius Theotimus, the acting head of the school, could become the official head; in response, Hadrian agreed with her argument, and the relevant letters were preserved in a series of inscriptions. Freisenbruch notes, ‘In stark contrast to her passive anonymity in the literary record, this inscription from Athens recasts Plotina as a highly educated woman, active on behalf of causes close to her heart and with the kind of access to the emperor once enjoyed by Livia.’"[11]

Pompeia Plotina - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A powerful, confident, intelligent woman, then – active behind the scenes.

Re: rumors surrounding her role in securing Hadrian’s succession:

“It may also reflect male Roman displeasure that an empress – let alone any woman – could presume to meddle in Rome's political affairs.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trajan

Ah, how the times, they do not change!

Bravo! I got the Kindle version, but I can see that -- like with poetry -- a physical text is desirable. I'll keep checking Amazon.

It’s a Michael Cacoyannis (Zorba the Greek) film (from the play by Euripides), and stars Irene Pappas as Clytemnestra (I don’t know the other actors). It has an 84% rating on Rotten Tomatoes. It seems pretty clearly a dark film (given its subject), which means I’ll probably refrain these days.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iphigenia_(film)

This is the framed print on the wall above by desk. (The photo is not very clear, nor does it capture the size.) But there it is, for daily inspiration.

Cardinal utility was unusable because nobody could figure out how to measure/calculate “utils” (Don's hedons and dolors) as units of utility.

Relative preference is from the viewpoint of the individual. Given cost and resource constraints, how will a rational agent choose among the options (preferences) s/he faces? That, of course, is problematic of itself (including the whole notion of what “rational” means -- edit: in neoclassical economics it has to do with "efficiency" defined in terms of utility maximization -- Ugh!).

The purpose of the analysis is as a theoretical framework – to which empirical testing can be applied – for analyzing how people (consumers) generally make decisions.

Look, I am not defending neoclassical microeconomics. I had philosophical problems with it when I was in grad school, and left it behind. I’m just doing my best to give an explanation within a brief space. And just wanted to point out that, within economics as a social science, that notion of units of pleasure/happiness (cardinal utility) – whether hedons, dolors or utils – was really let go. (If you find a way to calculate such units, there is a Nobel prize awaiting you. )

And “the greatest good for the greatest number” has always seemed simplistic to me, at best. I think that social welfare is an idea worth addressing, but it is fraught with nuance and subject to broad, especially political, disagreement. I have offered thoughts on it here before. I am content to now think that my responses do not require me to eschew Epicurean philosophy at any turn (Dr. Boeri, and our discussions around his thesis, was most helpful for me on that).

Welcome!

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

I am wondering what exactly do we mean by logic,

Just thinking …

The above is a valid deductive inference (syllogism) because the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. But it only becomes true if, in fact, there was a man named Socrates.

I’m not sure how much the ancients knew of inductive logic?

Quote from Don

Oh, no, no. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy.

I forgot this, and just wanted to say that, although Utilitarianism influenced neoclassical economics (efficient choice based on “marginal utility”), the notion of cardinal utility (“utils”) was dropped. Constrained choice, based on relative preference, became the model. And in no way am I advocating for that former utilitarian position.

Pleasurable as this discussion is, it is starting to remind me of the story in his Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein is discussing epistemology in the garden with another philosopher, and the man points to a tree and says: “That is, in fact, a tree. I know it’s a tree! I can say I know it's a tree!”

At that moment, Wittgenstein notices that a passerby has stopped and looks at them with a confused expression. And Wittgenstein says to him: “Don’t worry. This fellow’s not insane. We’re just doing philosophy.”

And I'm pretty sure we're not insane!

Quote from Don

I think that, in broad strokes, is how life works. We may literally have infinite choices in each moment, but the choices we are most likely going to make in any given moment probably are constrained but our character, our philosophy of life, our social context, etc. Do I have the capacity to abandon my family and move to the woods? Will I choose to do that? Do I want to do that? No.

I'm not sure yet whether I disagree.

Do we choose? Yes.

Do we ever make choices that are not constrained by circumstance, resources, personal history, intellectual/emotional development, etc.? No.

That is why so-called "libertarian free will" fails: Given all those conditions, there is no basis to think I could have ever "chosen differently" in exactly the same case -- unless choice reduces to randomness, which I think not.

Does any of that change how I think of pleasurable alternatives, or variety in choice? No. But variety can be thought of (thinking "out loud" again) as simply loosening the choice constraints. And that offers more options for pleasure. (Though I still think that sometimes the activity of choosing itself -- which entails having alternatives -- can be pleasurable in itself.)

Quote from Don

However, many other previous choices provide the choices you are offered. I don't think the choices you make "in the moment" are determined. There may be a higher probability of predicting what you'll based on your past behavior, current emotional state, previous choices, etc. But once a decision is made, those other branches are pruned, leading down a path to other decisions. The environment within which those other decisions are made is made by the choices you make now and in the future.

But that seems still a form of complex determinism -- just with branching chains of causation, each one sensitive to what came before: sensitivity to initial conditions. No choices are made sans some environmental conditions (why economists -- my background -- talk about "constrained choice").