Posts by Pacatus

Interesting: Heraclitus was known as the weeping philosopher (grieving the state of the world), while Democritus was known as the laughing philosopher (with some argument over whether that was a mocking laughter at the state of the world, or – my preferred interpretation – trying to inject some cheer into the world, since cheerfulness was a main virtue for Democritus).

Perhaps, for Epicurus, a visage that captures at once his sadness at “what a mess the standard philosophers and religions had made of the world;” his sincere (serious) determination to right those wrongs as best he can, out of compassion for humanity; and a bit of a good-humored smile and twinkle in the eyes that reflect that compassion and kindness. At least, that’s the way I like to see it. And in that vein, I think that Genevra Catalano’s (Nate’s wife’s) rendering of the elder Epicurus (on the right of the three renderings I posted above) captures all of that the best. (The one on the left is by Allesandro Tomassi, and I posted it before with attribution; it reminds me of a person wise beyond his years that I briefly knew.)

Note: Catalano’s "Epicurus Dines" (also available on Etsy) shows a more pensive Epicurus.

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Democritus:

“Best is for a person to live a cheerful life as little distressed as possible.”

“A life without festivity is a long road without an inn.”

“cheerfulness”: Democritus’ Greek word was euthumia, which could also mean tranquility and contentment (cheerfulness is the predominant translation). Cheerfulness becomes a practice and a discipline that is seldom effortless.

I doubt that any one image can capture anything close to "the whole of the man." I use mostly the three below (in no particular order), depending on my mood or intuition of the moment:

frank1syl

Can we talk about pleasure versus displeasure in making lists? (Okay, bad joke.)

Every action you list, but for shunning by her family, is up to her – including refusing to argue back, even if that means walking away each and every time. (I’ve been in some very fraught and emotionally debilitating situations that I had to leave; hopefully, I would handle them better today – generally by being willing to leave sooner.) But I want to point out that 2. involves a question of self-honesty or pretense, and potentially damaging cognitive dissonance. So I don’t think that feigning accord is a sustainable option for anyone’s wellbeing.

With that said, I don’t see how the pleasure of staying with what you’ve implied are, essentially, an emotionally abusive family could possibly outweigh the pain – unless they desist from their behavior when Sally is around.

Quote from BrainToBeing

I think constantly in terms of "we" rather than "me". And, in the consideration of "we" I need to ask who would pay the price if I think only of me. So, for example, when practicing medicine I very clearly knew the agenda was to do what was appropriate for the patient, and not just beneficial to my pleasure.

So, are you really thinking in terms of “we” – which, by definition, also includes you (because “we” is relational)? Or are you saying that you think “constantly” only of others – and not yourself at all? (Rhetorical question: I don’t think you’re saying that at all.)

Does caring for others by practicing medicine (as opposed to practicing medicine just to enrich yourself) cause you to feel generally dissatisfied with your life? Does it displease you? I doubt it. Do mutually self-affirming and caring (loving) relationships bother you because the “we” includes you and your pleasure, as well as that of the other? I doubt it. Do you enjoy loving the people you love in those “we” relationships? I suspect so.

Epicurus extolled friendship. Friendship is a “we” relation. I think it’s foolish (and delusive) to imagine we can extend that “we relation” without bounds. Even if we’re thinking globally, we still act locally (and no one has a god’s-eye “view from nowhere”) – or else we likely end up flailing impotently. You may have a concern for all humanity, but you treat one patient at a time. But I also think it’s foolish to try to limit our concerns (for some of the “public goods” reasons I alluded to) to our own little band. So, we do recognize that we are necessarily and inescapably part of larger social “we” relations. And we inescapably end up weighing the effects of our choices on our nearer “we’s” relative to the larger “we’s”. (In your profession, maybe the word “triage” is sometimes applicable?)

Although ideals and other abstractions (like “virtue”) can be seductive, all our choices are always concrete:

“When it comes to shaping one’s personal behavior, all the rules of morality, as precise as they may be, remain abstract in the face of the infinite complexity of the concrete.”

—Hans Urs von Balthasar, Roman Catholic theologian

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Am I virtuous? I don’t know. Am I less kind and compassionate in my behavior than when I was steeped in idealist Christian/Kantian virtue-morality? It doesn’t seem so. Am I less concerned about “social justice” issues? I don’t think so (though, in my elder years, I am less directly active). Do I care if anyone thinks I’m not sufficiently virtuous/righteous/good? Not really. I just don’t think in those terms anymore. Do I “feel good” about my choices after (Hemingway)? Sometimes yes, sometimes no; when “no,” I try to ask why and amend – and do better next time. But that “feeling good” just is pleasure. Call it conscience if you wish; the feeling is the guide, the rationales (important as they are) come after.

Like TauPhi , I’m just a guy on the internet drawing on Epicurean philosophy – as best I understand it – to inform my own choices. I may understand it differently tomorrow. In the end, Epicurus – like all the Hellenistic schools – thought of philosophy as a process of therapy, not just an intellectual exercise.

Quote from Don

From my perspective, that is actually the point. Don't dismiss those weeds too lightly. Are you able or willing to admit to yourself that doing what you felt was "right" was pleasurable to you. Feeling that you did the correct action *was* pleasurable. If you want to say that doing what you felt was right brought you a sense of satisfaction, I can see that. But satisfaction is a type of pleasure in long run.

Don : And that is an example of choosing a particular mental pleasure as outweighing any pains that might be involved. Does the Stoic feel displeasure/dissatisfaction – or displeased/disgusted with herself – in following her virtue-ideals? I sincerely doubt it. That does not mean that she might not experience great suffering in the instance (even unto death).

But (as I think has already been mentioned) the articulable “why” for such choices may come after an innate (evolutionary) urge to which we are responding – based on our survival needs as largely social animals.

In the social context, it is difficult to maximize the chances of living a life of wellbeing without some sort of social compact to neither harm nor be harmed. We can argue over whether such choices are (or “should be”) made out of long-term personal interest or some categorically-commanded virtue-ideal (or some evolutionarily embedded feeling-response we might call conscience) – but Epicureanism is certainly (to my view) affirming of policies that would come under the headings of social justice or social wellbeing (which does not necessarily imply some simplistic utilitarian formula). And that means making choices that take into account the wellbeing of others (not of our particular group) – and a weighing of choices, just as in a personal hedonic calculus. Also, some goods are public goods (e.g., public health efforts to prevent the spread of infectious disease), such that denying them to someone else may well cause me harm/ill-being (e.g., I , or people I care about, do get infected).

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Of course, it’s easy to sling judgments back and forth:

“You’re not enough of a virtuous person if you think that way! You’re just selfish – even when you’re doing something for others!”

“And you’re deluded if you think you get no – at least a priori – satisfaction from your virtue claims! When was the last time you berated yourself for being so good?!”

“What do you mean I’m evolutionarily wired for certain virtues? I have free will!”

“And what about sadists?! And masochists?!”

And on and on and on …

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Myself when young did eagerly frequent

Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument

About it and about: but evermore

Came out by the same door where in I went.

– Edward FitzGerald: The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám; Fifth Edition, Quatrain XXVII

O, now to let those arguments go by

as I hear the call of a gentler band:

I offer wine and laughter ere we die –

and, if you need, a free and open hand.

Quote from Don

"Happy" carries so much semantic baggage in English it can get in the way.

Whilst I agree about the semantic difficulties with the word “happy/happiness,” I think that eudaimonia cannot be a strictly objective state – such that, say, you might claim that Pacatus is clearly in a state of eudaimonia/well-being, even though Pacatus might not be aware of that at all. So, I think there has to be a subjective element – such that I feel that state of well-being, which is a feeling of pleasure/pleasantness. And, semantic difficulties aside, I know when I feel happy, just as I know when I’m feeling enjoyment or contentment – they are all useful words in conventional discourse (where we don’t need to parse things so precisely, which itself might be off-putting to someone not steeped in the "academic" discourse). So, I use the phrase “happy well-being” for myself.

NOTE: I had a philosopher friend, who did his dissertation on the Nicomachean Ethics, who insisted the best rendering of eudaimonia was "flourishing" -- but that strikes me as even more problematic than "happy."

Quote from BrainToBeing

If you look at the actual anatomy of information processing you will discover that as information comes in through the senses it literally passes by - for first appreciation - the limbic (emotive) system.

Just a lay-schlock’s question from recall: does this relate to Antonio Damasio’s research, finding that emotion (“the feeling of what happens”) – far from being something that ought to be removed from cognitive analysis and decision-making (ala, say, the Stoics) – is essential to proper cognitive functioning?

[I’m not sure I’ve even put that well; don’t let it derail the rest of the discussion here.]

Welcome, Frank!

Quote from BrainToBeing

While our technology has evolved dramatically, our philosophy has not kept pace.

“We are being destroyed by our knowledge, which has made us drunk with our power. And we shall not be saved without wisdom.” Will Durant (1885–1981)

Ironically, financial anxiety was much higher in the years we had an income three times greater than today (we live in a small apartment now, on a fixed income; but are fortunate enough to have saved some assets). Partly because we were hit with some high-cost situations – but mostly because we were not at all frugal, and had running debt we tried to juggle. Some of that changed during our life-simplification years in the country.

Although we use credit cards to pay regular bills, we pay that off every month and never carry a balance – so we are effectively debt free. Our celebrations are simpler in fare, but just as festive in spirit. We just live in a simpler, more frugal comfort. Any brief anxieties are situational and short-lived (and, for me, as often as not knee-jerk reactivity – still a bit ingrained – but which I am able to dispel rather quickly).

As for guilt-anxiety – I pretty much let that go. Regrets can either be amended or not, that’s all. If so, I try to do that; if not, it’s sad but can’t be helped – so no sense clinging to it.

Edward Fitzgerald himself thought of Khayyam as an Epicurean (as Kalosyni noted above) rather than a Sufi, like Rumi or Hafiz; and rejected the notion that Omar’s references to wine (for example) ought to be spiritualized – in spite of attempts to do so. Omar was influenced by Lucretius, though his own poetry was more lyric than narrative-didactic (though the lessons are there).

“Khayyam is famous for having sort of Epicurean themes in his poems and meditations on mortality and death and how to live a life that is meaningful … in the face of uncertainly, really, and mortality and temporality.” Austin O’Malley (scholar of classical Persian, University of Arizona)

Omar’s references to God can be taken as (sometimes humorously) metaphorical in many ways – but definitely not as a divine persona that meddles in human affairs.

Fitzgerald’s renderings have been criticized by academics – but one is hard-pressed to find a translation equal in lyric profundity (at least in my limited experience).

At bottom, I do not find Khayyam (or Epicurus) to be pessimistic at all – and suppose that those who do, find anything outside the comfort-zone of idealism (religious or philosophical) somehow pessimistic to them.

I want to add, as a "late edit" to my last post that the Mr. Monk quote is not an expression of doubt, simply a nod to objective (albeit unlikely) possibility: i.e., recognition that one is not omniscient. In other words, it is not a statement of skepticism (per Don 's "Epicurean Sage" essay that he linked in post #4 above).

Don I simply take it as a correct and valid belief that hedone, aponia and ataraxia (taken together) are not merely the keys to eudaimonia – but define the very contours of eudaimonia. Not because Epicurus said so, but because the arguments he presented conform to the most reasonable (to me) assessment of the evidence from nature and science – and I cannot imagine what else eudaimonia could be (other than some abstract ideal notion, which is simply taken as axiomatic, beyond the reach of empirical investigation). As Mr. Monk always said: “I could be wrong – but I don’t think so.”

[Note: I am (slowly) re-reading Haris Dimitriadis’ chapter on “The Biology of Happiness”: Chapter 3 of his Epicurus and the Pleasant Life: the Philosophy of Nature.]

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Mr. Monk: from the TV detective series "Monk."

From the paper cited by Don in post #2: “The outcome of clearer editions has been to show that Philodemus made signiicant contributions to the development of Epicurean doctrines, which in turn has led to the realisation that Epicureans were not nearly as dogmatic and unchanging as our hostile sources had led us to believe.”

It seems clear that the author is using “dogmatic” in the pejorative sense of "disposed to make positive assertions without presenting arguments or evidence” (from the 17th century), and not in the original sense of holding opinions/beliefs (such as that it is possible to know things about the real world: knowledge – as opposed to the dogma of the Academic Skeptics that knowledge was impossible, or the agnosticism on the subject of Pyrrhonians). In the original sense, there seems to have been no connotation that such beliefs could not require evidentiary grounding – which, in the context of Epicurus’ teachings, is provided by the senses, feelings and prolepsis.

And Philodemus, at least, allowed for analogical inference from sense-experience to what is not so sensed (and that might be viewed as a precursor to modern inductive reasoning and logical inference).

dogmatic | Etymology of dogmatic by etymonline

DOGMATIC: "disposed to make positive assertions without presenting arguments or evidence;" 1706, "pertaining to or… See origin and meaning of dogmatic.

www.etymonline.com

δόγμα - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

Quote from Don

It could be instructive to see how modern neuroscience explains the pleasure/displeasure aspect of affect.

Just from recall, but -- although himself not an expert in the field -- I think Haris Dimitriadis delved into that stuff quite a bit ...

Quote from Nate

The placebo effect is a measurably powerful phenomena that can be exploited as an emotional tool.

Yes the placebo effect can be powerful, and often works therapeutically. The trick may be then to convince the patient that the placebo was effective just because of their own psychic-somatic connections, and to help them (e.g. via counseling/therapy) to access those connections.

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An old joke:

A patient returns to the doctor to request a refill on his prescription –

The doctor says: “Well, I have to tell you – what I prescribed in your case was just a placebo.”

Patient: “Does that mean you won’t refill the prescription?”

Doctor: “You do understand what a placebo is, don’t you?”

Patient: “Yes, I do. But they work, and I need the prescription refilled …”

Bryan

Thank you for indulging me. My understanding would be that, once the function collapses, the superpositional state will become either A or ~A (Schrödinger’s cat is either alive or not). And, in a many worlds’ interpretation, it might become A in one (logical) world and ~A in another.

Just for my own (idle) edification, is that generally correct?

Bryan

I don’t have any background here, but I thought that in a superposition the ultimate state is indeterminate (metaphorically “both and neither”) until the function collapses?

Outside the idea of superposition (which I am in no way dismissing – except perhaps with regards to ancient philosophy) it seems that there is not a paradox but a logical contradiction – i.e. in violation of the law of noncontradiction: ~(A & ~A), in the same state at the same time. (Unless, of course, one is just talking about a mixture of, say, atoms of greater and lesser density ...)

Take this whole post as a question …

I myself tend to the leaky vessel side -- or, as my brother once quipped: "Mind like a steel -- sieve."

I’d like to add that, at the other end of the spectrum, one can have such a closed-fist mind that all they have is conviction: their “truth” is the only acceptable “truth,” must be all the “truth” and nothing but the “truth.” Evolving evidence be damned. (For example, certain scriptural-literalist religious fundamentalists.) The possibility of alternative explanations (ala Epicurus) rejected out of hand.