Seems so that in religions and some more idealistic philosophys there is sometimes some hedonophobia.
For example for some Stoics pursueing Pleasure was seen as a vice, i read it often but have now not a good example. Here is some from Seneca, what makes me wonder because in other letters he appreciates Epicurean teachings :
Don, thanks. Another prejudice is that Epicureans friendship means to them to isolate with only some few friends from society.
But I understand friendship (Philia) in Epicureanism as a attitude / virtue like also Aristotles defines it.
And it is a form of love. That would challenge Senecas quote where he mentions that the Stoic school is the most kind:
I read the article today by chance and wanted to start a thread. But looked to see if there was already an article about neuro science and found it with exactly this article 🤗. In positive psychology, a distinction is made between hedonistic, happiness(Pleasure) and Eudaimonia. Do I understand it correctly that Eumonia happiness is also hedonistic happiness at its core? That would really be a point on the side of the Epicureans against the Stoics. Then there would be no essential difference between pleasure and the Stoic joy (chara).
In Stoic groups it is often claimed that Stoics understand Human Nature better and that like in Ciceros „On Ends“(the Stoic parts ) that Pleasure is only a delusionary byproduct of self preservation and that sociability / familiarization ( oikeiosis ) is an essential part of human nature and that Epicureans would deny that humans are social beings. I would like to discuss more about the current view of neuroscience/psychology of human nature to get clear how much it fits with Epicurean Philosophy ( a further example would be the hedonic treadmill)
I've finished the book, but I still have to digest it a bit.
What I like is:
How he shows that Cicero, Plutarch and co. leave out certain teachings of Epicurus and reinforce their prejudices against his teachings or even start them in the first place
It is shown that a political community contains both: security and danger and that motivation and circumstances are important when it comes to the question of political participation (yes for security, no for fame, empty ideas/needs)
Would someone who follows Epicurus' teachings commit injustices if they were never seen?
In the Stoic Oikeiosis doctrine (which Hermachus was inclined towards) one sees others more and more as belonging to oneself and wants their happiness too. But that is another topic, perhaps more theoretical.
It is often said that injustice towards others is more likely to arise from non-necessary needs, which the Epicurean sage does not have.
But what about natural/necessary needs? But this also includes ataraxia. This is also important to the Stoics. Needs for the body or "life" are less important to Stoics than to Epicureans.
But in the end it is always a matter of weighing things up and I still have to think about it a bit.
The book arrived yesterday and I read the introduction and enjoyed it 
.
I'm already looking forward to the rest of the book. I think it clears up some prejudices, what is important because some people feel that the political/social aspects are missing or weak in Epicurus' Philosophy because of the hostile writings from the ancient Academics / Stoics.
For example, Massimo Pigliucci had Stoicism and Epicureanism in mind for his philosophy of life and chose Stoicism because he felt that these aspects were not given enough attention in Epicureanism but in Stoicism.
But you can see the tendency of Modern Stoicism to incorporate Epicurus' aspects into the worldview "Atoms or God => Atoms" and denying the Stoic God or more and more the instrumental character of virtue for example when they promote virtue for joy and tranquility.
Pre-ordered it too
This is a topic on which the Epicurean philosophy often has to face with unfair criticism.
The critic (often Stoics to differentiate the both schools harsh):
"Epicureans are hiding in the garden with a few friends without interest in social/political/humankind issues as a whole because it could mean stress / adversity".
Instead justice/friendship (Philia) are essential virtues in Epicurean Philosophy and they engage when necessary (why engage if unneccesary ? Maybe for admiration / fame / empty ideas ? )
And I see friendship (Philia )in an wider sense like in the definition of Aristoteles (kindness to all humans/creatures) but with a practical limit (for example not for enemies, false friends, too harmful people, it is always balanced with prudence ).
I think prudence (phronesis ? ) and friendship (philia) are the two main virtues in Epicurean Philosophy.
"As Gerard Hughes points out, in Books VIII and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives examples of philia including:
young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), cities with one another (1157a26), political or business contacts (1158a28), parents and children (1158b20), fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious society (1160a19), or of the same tribe (1161b14), a cobbler and the person who buys from him. (1163b35)[2]
All of these different relationships involve getting on well with someone, though Aristotle at times implies that something more like actual liking is required. When he is talking about the character or disposition that falls between obsequiousness or flattery on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other, he says that this state:
has no name, but it would seem to be most like [philia]; for the character of the person in the intermediate state is just what we mean in speaking of a decent friend, except that the friend is also fond of us. (1126b21)
This passage indicates also that, though broad, the notion of philia must be mutual, and thus excludes relationships with inanimate objects, though philia with animals, such as pets, is allowed for (see 1155b27–31) though it considers its existence in the way of inanimate objects could also "inanimately love".
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the activity involved in philia (τὸ φιλεῖν) as:
wanting for someone what one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and being inclined, so far as one can, to do such things for him. (1380b36–1381a2)
John M. Cooper argues that this indicates:
that the central idea of φιλíα is that of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for him (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself). [... Thus] the different forms of φιλíα [as listed above] could be viewed just as different contexts and circumstances in which this kind of mutual well-doing can arise.[3]
Aristotle takes philia to be both necessary as a means to happiness ("no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods" [1155a5–6]) and noble or fine (καλόν) in itself. "
There is only one higher form of "love", "agape" but that is a love for/between humans an (supernatural) gods. Christians try to practice it for example in charity.
But it is maybe more limitless and maybe self-destructive as philia.
And without a supernatural god there is no agape in the sense of the definition. So here too meets (meta-)physics ethics
Thank you, I am german (live near Würzburg where is an Epicurean science center on the university) so it is easy to read for me, perfect 
Hi,
I came to read an article about Hermarchus where it is mentioned that he tried to integrate the Stoic oikeiosis theory.
Here is the link it is without costs when logged/registered in "Academia" :
I find it very interesting because
1. Maybe it would strengthen Epicurean ethics (justice, friendship, kindness, compassion, altruism, other regarding feelings). Very often it is highlighted how selfish/egoistic Epiurean ethics would be (especially from enemies of Epicurean Ph. )
2. He lives in the time of early Stoicism so maybe there are good defensed / disputes with / against the Stoic ethical theory what is often considered more altruistic and more compassionate.
Do we have texts/ resources from him which are easily accessible?
My defense points are mainly these 3 :
1. Yes natural Evolution developed desire and the fulfilling of it (Pleasure / Pain ) for preservation/reproduction. But that (preservation/reproduction are the intrinsic "goals" for our genes.
We are our self and ask for a happy life for our self (eudaimonia) not our genes (which we can give max. 50% further ).
2. Kastastematic Pleasure /Ataraxia/Tranquility : Regards eudaimonia and our value system.
We have no Tranquility when our values are disturbed and our values come from our desires.
Maybe this point could even divorce Epicureanism from other "hedonism" (comparing DeWitts "New Hedonism" in Epicureanism ) which often focus only on kinetic sensual pleasure of the "body".
- Someone has pleasure in feeling pain ? Isn´t it more the release of the pain ? And when it gets destructive an Epicurean would go over these pleasure for kastastematic Pleasure of health.
-Morally bad Pleasure ? => When it would destroy friendship or the justice to others it would destroy our values, securities, good feelings/pleasures with others, chances of reciprocy advantages, bring great disturbances and destroys our kastastematic Pleasure, so an Epicurean would avoid it. Nature gave us for that feelings like compassion, empathy and good feelings(Pleasure) by helping others.
3. Faculty of Pleasure/Pain vs. feeling Pleasure/Pain for things/situations
The faculty of Pleasure/Pain is to be secured (against tranquilizers if not necessary). We want Pain as the guide when we should avoid something and Pleasure when we should pursue something.
It is our navigation system, we should not change /reduce our feelings like the Stoics but navigate in our life for Pleasure / avoiding Pain by being sensible for our feelings.
Hi all,
I´ve found a challenging article which questions the "goodness" of Pleasure and the "badness" of Pain and problems with hedonism.
For example some statements are:
- Pleasure/Pain developed in biological evolution as a means to self-preservation and reprodcution so it is not an ultimate good (yes but that is for the genes not for the happy self (eudaimonia) or ?
- Some have Pleasure in feeling Pain, so Pain cannot be ultimate bad.
...
What is your opinion about the statements and/or defense of Pleasure/Pain.
I have some in my mind but would be interested in responses here in the forum.
It got my attention via an provocative article from the modern Stoic Massimo Pigliucci:
Attached is the PDF.
Thank you for your deep investigation of Ciceros critics, especially about Epicurean justice.
In this subject the Stoics often seems to have the "better ethics" because they emphasize cosmopolitism, altruism, philantropy for all humans, not only friends.
As a defense I only know 2 aspects:
- Injustice leads to disturbance ( guilty conscience, fear of being discovered )
(both not the strongest arguments I think, see platons ring of gyges which makes invisible )
- The Epicurean Sage only pursues natural/necessary desires and there is no need for injustice because these are easy to optain and no one must be harmed.
( But what when in extreme situations, even they are not fulfilled ? )
What I miss is that doing good feels good, reduces stress and sociability is part of human nature (the Stoic had there oikeiosis, I heared Hermachus took over parts of it. But here is a stronger point for Epicureans to emphasize (social) feelings)
So that it is a natural/necessary desire (compassiong, charity) to do good things and to get pleasure from it.
Or maybe that is in the virtue of friendship ?
That justice is limited to strangers and there a limit in doing good being benevolent makes sense to protect from harm from strangers ?
And Friendship/Kindness is for all worthy of it ?
Seneca says of the Stoics this, ( how far goes it in Epicurean Philosophy ? )
‘"No school has more goodness and gentleness; none has more love for human beings, nor more attention to the common good. The goal which it assigns to us is to be useful, to help others, and to take care, not only of ourselves, but of everyone in general and of each one in particular’ (On Clemency 3.3). "
Have all a good and pleasant transition into the New Year
Hi all,
I´ve found the book "Crooked Thinking or Straight Talk?: Modernizing Epicurean Scientific Philosophy" with an interesting Table of contents and a good Reading sample / preface
Does anyone know the book or have any recommendations for it?
Coming from the Stoic camp, I tried to practice this philosophy and searched for exercises and have found this:
"A Handbook for New Stoics: How to Thrive in a World Out of Your Control―52 Week-by-Week Lessons "
Is there something similar there for Epicurean Philosophy ?
The threads in this forum area are very helpful but I am searching for a more bigger "training plan" / framework or something in this direction.
If not I am thinking about to do this lections from the book again but with the Epicurean worldview in mind.
The good thing is, that the authors have a more naturalistic worldview than the Stoic physic and scientific reference.
What would be a comprehensive Epicurean learning/training plan ?
Maybe curriculum like from the Stoics (desire, action, judgment)
Or the fields of philosophy:
( learn basics of canonics scientific epistemology/
naturalistic worldview science /
ethics ( desire, pleasure/pain, virtue, attention/meditation, hedonic calculus, friendship, value clarification,
positiv psychology... )
But maybe I should question the whole project and it makes more sense to be more attentive/prudent in the everyday life.
But would be motivating to have something like the path to become an Epicurean Sage 
Hi everyone.
Do you know how the Epicuean attitude is for a general Philantropy/compassion /sympathy or let´s say "social feelings". 
I see them in the subjects: "justice" and "friendship" or "live honorable".
It seems to me that in "justice" it seems low, and the focus is more to be not disturbed by having done injustice to someone.
A minimum expression.
A maximum expression is in "friendship". But that regards only few people ( or is this a misunderstanding ? )
Is there a middle ground or is "justice" seen broader or include such attitudes like the Stoic justice ?
And many people have compassion towards animals.
In Stoic philosophy or buddhism the compassion aspect and philantropy/altruism seems to have a stronger focus (cosmopolis, oikeiosis, loving kindness wishing to everyone...)
and that such feelings contribute to the own happiness (a common argument that altruism is included in hedonism).
For example a donation to beggars or general charity.
But maybe there are good reasons to see this critical and limit kindness to everyone 
( cosmopolis/war, blind kindness, natural xenophobia, avoiding hostile people, turn the other cheek...)
Thanks.
I think it depends on the circumstances (pain/pleasure) how much if at all the emotions should be controlled/manipulated.
The Stoics are there extreme to want to eliminate the "passions" as illness. (Which is not to say one cannot learn from them (like Seneca learned from both schools))
The Epicureans see them more natural I hink.
Better: Accept the emotions and control the behavior after the emotions prudently (when there is no disease of the soul)
Found this here:
Epicureanism: Philodemus on anger (first part) – Epicurus Today
Philodemus on irrational anger (second part) – Epicurus Today
Epicurean therapy for anger (last part) – see other two parts below – Epicurus Today
It would be interesting to compare that with Stoic advice.
For example, dealing with emotions. That was a core subject in Stoic ehtics/psychology (therapy of the passions).
Stoics tend to see the happy life as erasing frustrations ((a)pathe).
What would be the alternative in Epicurus' philosophy?
What is the difference between the feelings of pleasure/pain and emotions?
Emotions that cause suffering (pain ? )such as anxiety/obsessive-compulsive disorders should probably be countered as the Stoics or CBT envisage, but perhaps in a milder form?
In the end, probably the advice would be to learn the most prudent /wise way to deal with emotions. But which one would that be?
I think Philodemus once wrote about it, right?
Thank you Cassius.
I am reading it and it is very insightful.
It is not the style of Emliy A Austin´s book, and the quality is similarly high
At least in my opinion with good valid references.
The book emphasizes the influence and pro-scientific nature of Epicurean philosophy and how it is at the core of a naturalistic worldview
and how these discoveries advance medicine, chemistry, technology and human prosperity
Some Ideas from my side ( I often change between the stoic / epicurean perspective)
In Epicurean Philosphy virtue and pleasure are bound together.
Is the opposite falsifiable ? Or is virtue alone distinct from pleasure a better goal for life ?
That could be if a Stoic can proof me this thesis:
"Is there virtue or a virtuous act which brings in the short and long run no pleasure and no reduction of any pain ?"
Another question: Is there anywhere a table/summary for defense of pleasure as a goal of life ?
( I know for Epicurus this statement was obvious but even that is a statement and it seems for not clear / obvious for some other philosophies ).
So where go these philosophy wrong and why ( especially the Stoics ? In the naturalist philosophies they are the closest competitor I think ).
Here are some summarized attacks on this goal (pleasure):
By the way does this book from Chrysippus still exist or does anyone know the content or the arguments made there ?
The Stoics defined the goal of life as the attainment of wisdom and virtue. They frequently contrasted this with the common notion that pleasure (hedone) is the most important thing in life. Indeed, Chrysippus wrote one book entitled Proofs that Pleasure is not the End-in-chief of Action and another on Proofs that Pleasure is not a Good, i.e., pleasure is not intrinsically good at all let alone the supreme goal of life.
from:
Stoics advocate more "joy" instead of pleasure" ( only for the wise attainable according to the Stoics), what was there the greek term ? For pleasure it is "hedone".
Hi, Welcome Kungi ,
I also come from the Stoic camp 
I think the Stoics get a problem when defining "Virtue". Between the lines you can read from them, that virtue is good because (tranquility, eudaimonia, harmony ..... (other things like virtue itself).
But if you ask a Stoic directly, this response will come ( virtue for virtue ).
So I tried to find out what there is the core for them.
I´ve got: "Virtue is the rational and social thing which we should do."
Ok but what exactly is it ?
In a book from Donald Robertson ("Stoicism and Art of Happiness" )there it goes a little bit deeper, the answer is: "The beneficial and honourable".
And there it ends.
And for their "indifferents" (preferred/dispreferred): Choosing according the natural value.
By the way pleasure & pain is for Stoics complete indifferent. (In the past I thought pleasure preferred and pain would be dispreferred).
So here is the danger, that someone else will teach you what is "natural" (and the Stoics were often wrong about that, like the church ).
And so these Stoic teachers could use the abstraction and tell their students what is "natural, rational and social".
Like priest who define right/wrong and sin for their people.
And there is no natural limit in abstract objects.
Stoics & Epicureans could only come near each other when the "Beneficial&Honourable" would be equaled with "Pleasure".
(Pleasurable could also be fulfilling activities, character traits, personal values )
This would make sense, for example for health. The self-preservation is beneficial and pleasurable and threats to that are painful.
So I would ask a Stoic: Is there really a "virtue" which involves short and longterm pain and no pleasure. ? And is still a virtue ?
Maybe they would answer: Fulfilling your duty is important but brings maybe no pleasure.
->Response( If the duty isn´t abstract but really important): So not fulfilling the duty would bring pain, so must be avoided. Fulfilling this duty is there a Pleasure, it removes disturbance in the soul.
Conclusion: The virtuous life = pleasant life and vice versa. If Pleasure and real value is bound with these virtues.
Thanks for the response.
So all levels could be compatiple with Epicurean Philosophy (EP), it depends on the content.
And not just only "things/objects" could be desired but also " fullfilling activities".
So values as "self-sufficiency" and even character traits and virtue or virtuous action can be desired when it brings pleasure.
This I thought in the past would be rejected in EP.
But when I include such things and broaden my horizon of pleasure, than many objections against EP fall apart.
For example the often discussed pleasure machine/pill idea:
I would reject it because living a real life with self-sufficiency, agency, freedom, possibility to use virtue, real friends, real experiences and fulfilling activities gives real, sustainable, more and reliable pleasure.
