Posts by Bryan

We'll need to keep in mind that "religio" is a "bad" word in Lucretius, with implications of being bound up by nonsense, (ligō = “to bind”)

To support my last post above, I wanted to share this book that goes over the explanation of the model.

It is a fully physical theory of gravity that explains what we observe -- and the operations of our technology -- without needing support from the pure-math ideas of spacetime, vacuum fluctuations, virtual particles, etc.

This model was directly inspired by Epicurus (Nicolas Fatio was a careful reader of Lucretius) and also has a long list of supporting physicists up to the present that can see how it is more nearly correct than the explanations provided by general relativity and quantum field theory:

Le Sage's theory of gravitation - Wikipedia

Quote from Cassius

Porch. You hold toil to be an evil?

Epicurus. I do.

Porch. And pleasure a good?

Epicurus. Unquestionably.

Porch. Do you recognize the distinction between differentia and indifferentia? Between praeposita and rejecta?

Epicurus. Why, certainly.

Hermes. Madam, this discussion must cease; the jury say they do not understand word-chopping. They will now give their votes.

Porch. Ah; I should have won, if I could have tried him with my third figure of self-evidents.

Justice. Who wins?

Hermes. Unanimous verdict for Pleasure.

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As my post above on ἡ λεπτότης shows, "subtlety" is a word used by Epicurus in discussing physics -- but not (except for this example of the manuscript's version of VS 63) when discussing morals.

Among the examples, this quote below must be the best, because Epicurus stacks near synonyms, and in doing better shows us what he thought of the word:

"...It has the force to eject air, [while] carrying [the air] over – and It is evident that this same Force also exists even in the films: for if only a hard Object had the force to produce ejections ¬ but a Film did not [have the force to produce ejections] – then only hard Objects would have the force to be quickly carried in the ejecting way ¬ but the films would not [have the force to be quickly carried], at least [not] in the ejecting [way]: however, in what is completely encompassed around immediately from the ready void, through the settlements into narrowness, subtlety, and minuteness……"

[Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 10 (column 111inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 5 (column 112sup)] "^{…[ἀέ]ρα ἐξ̣ω̣[θεῖ]ν [δυνα]τὸν περαιοῖ, φα̣[ν]ερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ [α]ὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στ̣ερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς | ἐξ̣ώσεις π[οιεῖσ]θαι, τὸ δ̣' εἴδωλο[ν μή], ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ̣[ξ]ω̣στικὸν τρ̣όπον τὰ στερέμνια μόνον ταχέ̣ως δύνασθαι φέρεσ[θ]αι, [τ]ὰ̣ δὲ εἴδωλα μή, κατ̣ά γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κό[ν], κα[τ]ὰ μέντοι τὸ περ̣ι̣λαμβανόμενον εὐθὺ[ς ἐξ] ἑτ[ο]ίμου κε̣νοῦ διὰ τ[ὰς] συνιζήσεις τὰς ε[ἰς στ]ενότητα καὶ λεπτ̣[ό]τ̣ητα καὶ μι[κρ]ότη[τ]α…}"

We could draw a line from "subtlety" to "simple living" if it was otherwise established, but I do not see that it is.

The closest I have is in The Double Indictment (section 2) Lucian has Zeus complain "I myself have to do any number of tasks that are almost impossible to carry out on account of their subtlety (ὑπὸ λεπτότητος)" -- which may be enough to draw it all together and preserve the manuscripts reading.

I can't justify the decisions made here, although I was thinking of those processional roads with flanking identical herms/statues.

For ΚΔ 40, we have a slightly different word τὸ πίστωμα (instead of ἡ πίστις), and we have the privative version of ἡ πίστις (ἡ ἀπιστία) in VS 56.

This is excellent -- great idea to have each one link to the specific papyri.info page!

P.Herc. 908 may actually be by Demetrius Lacon. The content is interesting -- the topic is on sex, and it is very medical/gynecological (rather than moral/ethical).

Quote from Rolf

I experience no pain from not watching the movie

Of course boredom is a pain. Once your body is well-served, we are not expected to just stare at a wall for the rest of the day!

If a movie is your focus, just make sure it is enjoyable in the short and long term.

"Again, in the work On Fulfillment, [Epicurus] speaks in such a way 'for I myself am not able to conceive the good – removing the pleasures from flavor, or removing those from Aphrodisian activities, or removing those from auditory experiences, or removing those pleasurable movements from form in accordance with appearance'" (Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, 7.11, 280A)

From that basis, Epicurus (as we would expect) recommended mostly studying philosophy and physics in one's free time.

"...I recommending continuous activity in natural science and pacify myself particularly with such a life..." 10.37a

That same word for "fortune" (LSJ "the act of a god") also is used for "chance" (LSJ "chance, regarded as an impersonal cause")

I also wanted to point out that the beginning of this saying -- "I have thoroughly anticipated you / Προκατείλημμαί σε" -- is built from the same stem as the the word for anticipations.

Quote from Eikadistes

is doing so διά (diá) "by way of", "on account of", or "due to" something being "indefinite"

Here I think we have the feminine abstract noun "ἡ ἀοριστία, indefiniteness" itself -- but it is an odd one, and I only have examples of the adjective being used elsewhere.

For example (of the adjective):

Porphyry of Tyre (_fl. 275 ^CE), Letter to Marcella, 29.459-461

"ἐφʼ ὅσον δ’ ἂν Ἀμηχανῇς: Λήθῃ τῆς φύσεως Ἀμηχανεῖς· σαυτῷ γὰρ ἀορίστους φόβους καὶ ἐπιθυμίας Προσβάλλεις"

"to the extent that you have no means: you have no means because you fail to notice nature – for you apply undefined fears and desires upon yourself"

----------------

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37) et alia

^{…{[μ]νήμ̣η̣ ἢ τὸ τε̣͂ι [μνή]μηι πά}θος ἀνάλογον ὧν ἔδει μ̣ᾶλλον ἐνεγείνετο πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμ̣ένον καὶ τὰ πάντα {ἐξελέγχον τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης κα̣ὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα –– αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ {τούτου μνήμ̣η̣ ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμηι κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνεγε}γέν[νη]το εὐθὺς, τὰ δ' ηὔξητο τὴν [ἀρχὴ]ν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν.}

…Memory, or the Experience of those [movements] analogous to memory. It would have been more necessary that [the memory] was implanted in relation to what [experience] was being defined – even with Everything refuting out the reference [to the definition] as it was being produced ¬ and not in relation to the undefined things, that are also in need of distinction. but again, this Memory of [an experience] or a Movement analogous to memory: with Some [aspect of memory] having been generated together directly [from experiences] – while Other [aspects of memory] had increased, although they have a foundation and a cause [from former experiences].

--------------------------------

For ἐκπίπτειν of course we also have:

ΚΔ 15. ὁ τῆς φύσεως Πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν – ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

The wealth of nature is limited and well acquirable – but the [wealth] of empty judgments falls out into infinity.

Thank you Don, for all the excellent work above.

I agree that it would be best to follow the manuscript and make ἡ λεπτότης work. I wanted to look at the other instances of ἡ λεπτότης by Epicurus.

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 7 (column 116sup):

…πρ[ὸς τοῖς στε]ρεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός, πλὴν οὐχὶ τῶι ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν ε[ἰς] βάθος πε[ποιῆσ]θα[ι, ἀλ]λὰ τῶι [τὴν] τοῦ [ἔνδ]οθεν [κενο]ῦ διά[στ]ασιν τὴν [α]ὐτὴν ἔχειν, λέγειν τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως πως ὡς δ̣ιὰ̣ τ̣ὴν λεπτότη̣τ̣α ῥαδίως δι[ὰ π]αντ[ὸς] πόρου [περ]αι[οῦν ἔδει], οὐδ' ἐν[θ]υ[μούμενοι…

…while [the film] even acquired the same dimensions in depth in relation to the hard objects [that were its source] ¬ except with [the film] having been made deeply not by many bodies – but by having the same dimensions of the inner void. They unreasonably dare to say that, somehow, because of the subtlety [of the films], it would be necessary [for the films] to easily pass through every passageway, without [those who say this] reflecting that…

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 10 (column 111inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 5 (column 112sup)

^{…[ἀέ]ρα ἐξ̣ω̣[θεῖ]ν [δυνα]τὸν περαιοῖ, φα̣[ν]ερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ [α]ὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στ̣ερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς | ἐξ̣ώσεις π[οιεῖσ]θαι, τὸ δ̣' εἴδωλο[ν μή], ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ̣[ξ]ω̣στικὸν τρ̣όπον τὰ στερέμνια μόνον ταχέ̣ως δύνασθαι φέρεσ[θ]αι, [τ]ὰ̣ δὲ εἴδωλα μή, κατ̣ά γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κό[ν], κα[τ]ὰ μέντοι τὸ περ̣ι̣λαμβανόμενον εὐθὺ[ς ἐξ] ἑτ[ο]ίμου κε̣νοῦ διὰ τ[ὰς] συνιζήσεις τὰς ε[ἰς στ]ενότητα καὶ λεπτ̣[ό]τ̣ητα καὶ μι[κρ]ότη[τ]α…}

...It has the force to eject air, [while] carrying [the air] over – and It is evident that this same Force also exists even in the films: for if only a hard Object had the force to produce ejections ¬ but a Film did not [have the force to produce ejections] – then only hard Objects would have the force to be quickly carried in the ejecting way ¬ but the films would not [have the force to be quickly carried], at least [not] in the ejecting [way]: however, in what is completely encompassed around immediately from the ready void, through the settlements into narrowness, subtlety , and minuteness…

-----------------------------------------

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 1 (column 93sup)

^{…περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτῆτ[ος] νῦν λέγειν ἐπιχ[ειρ]ήσομεν· πρῶτον μὲν̣ γ̣ὰρ̣ ἡ λεπτότης, μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέ[χο]υσα, ταχυτῆτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τ[ὴ]ν [φ]ο[ρ]ὰν ἀνυπέρβλ̣[η]τον [ἐ]νδε[ί]κνυται…}

…but We will venture to speak now about the speed that exists in the transmission [of the films]: first, their Subtleness – because it is far different than the subtlety [derived] from the senses – is indicated in the unsurpassable speed of the films in regards to their transmission…

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 26, 27sup

^{…δή, φημί, β̣[λ]έ[π]οντες καὶ τῶν εἰδώλ[ω]ν ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐγχ̣ειροῦσ̣ι̣ν [κ]α̣τ̣[α]δο[ξ]άζε̣[ιν] [διὰ τὴν ὁμ]ω̣ν[υ]μ̣ί̣αν τ̣ὴν δὴ τῆς λεπτότητος, {τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσθ̣ε̣ωρ[ο]ῦντες [missing word] μ̣[ή]τε α̣ὐ̣τὰ μᾶ̣λλο[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς δ]ύνασ̣θαι ποιεῖσ[θα]ι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμ]ν[ίων φύσε]ω[ν] σ̣υ̣νβέ̣βη̣[κ]ε̣ν ἤ̣π[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς̣ διὰ τῶν [χειρῶ]ν συγκρίσεις, ἂν μή [τ]ις τὸν τρόπον [τ]ῆς̣ δ[ια]δύσεω[ς,] [ὃν] ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν̣, δ[ει]κνύη δυ[νατὸ]ν αὐ̣το̣ῖς̣ [ὑπάρ]χ̣[ειν ὄντα]·}}

Indeed, I say to these [people]: while they are still observing the films, they attempt to thoroughly judge this very thing [i.e., transfer of temperature] through the sameness of names – in fact, They are not also envisioning the difference in the subtlety of these things. These [hot and cold particles] are not more able to make penetrations through the nature of hard objects than they [are able to] endure their rebounding through the compounds of [our] hands. unless Someone proves that this way of penetration, which We ourselves have described, is able to exist for those [films].

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Lives 10.47b

εἶθ᾽ ὅτι τὰ Εἴδωλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται Οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων

accordingly, Nothing among visible things contests that Films are endowed with unsurpassable subtlety

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Lives 10.46a

καὶ μὴν καὶ, Τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονεςτοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσί ¬ λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων:

and indeed, impressions exist in a similar shape as solid objects ¬ although they are far different from what is apparent in [their] subtlety:

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Plato (_fl.c. 388 ^BCE), Republic, 7.523E

καὶ ὡσαύτως, πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα, ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα, ἡ Ἁφή;

and likewise, does Touch [perceive] thickness and subtlety ¬ or softness and hardness?

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ἡ λεπτομέρεια is also worth considering:

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 4 (column 37)

_{…ἐξέφευ̣[γε] τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος στο[λ]ήν, λεπτομερὲς πα[ν]τελῶς αὐτὸ ὂν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν ἀθροισμῶι λαμβάνεσθαι συναγωγὴν ἐπιδεχομένωι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐμβρείθεια ποσὴ τις στολὴν ἐπιδέχεται οὔτ[ε] λεπτομέρεια, ἀλλὰ συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου συντελεστικὴ γί[ν]εται· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτ̣ο γελοίως ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας ἀναλελόγισται καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταμένως τἀφανὲς δι̣ὰ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογί[ζ]εσθαι· καὶ ἡ γῆ δὲ π[ά]λιν̣ οὐ[κ] ἐ[κ τοῦ] αὐτ̣[οῦ τ]ρόπου δ̣ύν[αται]…}

…[flowing upwards, the Form of flames] flows out from the pressure beneath the air, being absolutely of a subtle composition itself, and not having the force beneath the air to be taken into an aggregation that permits a gathering. for neither does any measurable Density [on its own] permit pressure [to form] – nor does its subtle composition [on its own, permit pressure to form]: but some measurable Symmetry [of density and subtlety] does become contributive to such a [formation of pressure as seen in flames].

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 (columns 24fin, 25),
P.Herc. 993 col. 14 (column 117inf), P.Herc. 1149 col. 9 (column 118sup).

^{{ο̣ὐ[κ ἔστι] συμ[φυῆ] τα[ῦτα] δ̣ή, φημί, τού[του, ἀ]λλὰ [μόν]ον τ̣[ῶν [ἐ]πιτ̣ηδ̣[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τ[ι]νὰ φύσε̣[ι], ἀ̣λλὰ π[ολ]λ̣οὺς κ̣αὶ̣ [ἄλ]λο̣[υ]ς̣ ἄ̣λ̣λως̣,} [λέ]γω δ' οἷο̣ν̣ [πυρὸς καὶ] πνε̣ύμα[τος καὶ τ]ῶν τοιουτο[τρόπω]ν· ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλωι τρόπωι | τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχ[ο]ντα ἤπερ ἐν ὧι αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν [ἀ]λλη[λοῦ]χοι φύσεις, [ἔ]νδοθε[ν δὲ] πολύκενοι, δύ[να]νται τὰς [διεκδύσεις δ]ιὰ τῶν στερεμνί[ω]ν φύσε[ω]ν λαμβάνειν·}

I say, these [abilities of traveling through hard objects] are not inherent to [film], but only [inherent] to suitable things not having a certain singular shaped configuration by nature – rather, [these abilities are inherent to things having] many other [shapes] also. I mean, for instance, [particles] of fire and of [cool] wind and such types of things: for These [hot and cold particles], because they have a subtle composition in a different manner than that in which [their] external interconnected Natures [exist], but [with their nature also being] porous within, have the force to acquire their emergence through the natures of hard objects.

Quote from Rolf

What about things like nuclear fusion and fission where mass (particles) is transformed into energy? Doesn’t this contradict the Epicurean view that matter is eternal and indestructible?

When matter is broken down so small that it is past the ability of any machine to measure it as a physical unit – machines can still measure the force of that matter. (Just like we cannot see the particles in wind with our eyes, but we can feel their force.)

This does not prove matter is fundamentally destructible, but only proves that matter gets so small that its physical extension becomes undetectable to us. (It really is a similar error, which scientists no longer make, to actually thinking that air has no particles in it, beyond those we can see with our eyes).

Quote from Rolf

How could quantum computers exist and function if the underlying quantum mechanics were false? Does the probabilistic and indeterminate nature of these computations not contradict the Epicurean view that reality is wholly knowable and predictable?

Given most interpretations refuse to admit a level of physical existence too small to be measured, they prefer to rely on math. The function of the computers is of course real – as is the observations of superpositions and entanglement – but to the extent anyone gives non-physical explanations for these functions and observations is the extent that they are leaving reality for mathematical fictions.

It is between "the entanglements" that real atoms lie – and they provide the physical explanation. What is observed is easily explained by the interactions of these true atoms and the wakes they produce.

Quote from Rolf

the double slit experiment, which shows that particles are not always solid particles but also waves.

The big mystery of the wave pattern can again be explained by accepting the existence a substrate that is not directly perceptible by machines.

What looks like a wave pattern coming ‘out of nowhere’ is really coming from the effect that the ‘oceans’ of these invisible atoms and their wakes have upon the matter we can detect. If someone takes an electron or something else that can be detected as the basis of matter, then the extra movement will always seem like it comes out of nowhere.

Great episode -- Thank you!

Quote from Cassius

which is the place I've heard a variation of that view before:

And is ultimately the primary source and confirming bias for Joshua Rothman's New Yorker article and why David Benatar is presented to the public. Once again, just like with physics, much of "modern morality" is just their religious ideas, but packaged to look modern and secular. (Something new was needed once the Christianity scam failed in certain sectors!)

Quote from Rolf

What is it that allows you to have faith in the physics of Epicurus but not the physics of certain modern scientists?

I would say it is about the fundamental assumptions. There will always be thinkers looking for the real fundamental truth in something other than the realm of the senses -- be it in Platonic forms, or in omnipresence of Yahweh, or in mathematics.

If someone says they have a particular knowledge that you cannot access -- but from their knowledge they then teach you something that contradicts your experience, then they have all the intellectual power. They may as well have hypnotized you!

They can then say absurd things such as "matter has no fundamental form" or that "matter can generate from no matter" -- which comes from religious assumptions and is supported by self-referencing mathematics not scientific real-life observations.

In this way they cover your eyes and remove all your footing.

For ὁ μακαρισμός, beyond the difficulty with the main stem " μακαρ" (discussed above), there really is another puzzle with the "ισ."

This is the same difference that changes "wise man" to "sophist," so it is a significant addition.

It is due to this addition of "ισ" that LSJ adds "pronouncing" to the definition of ὁ μακαρισμός, i.e., "pronouncing happy" which makes sense. It almost seems to mean "the hailing toward blessing" or "the pronouncement of blessedness."

Quote from DaveT

none of us, (except perhaps Martin ) have any capacity to judge the credibility of those giants of modern physics you refer to above.

That position resembles accepting a priestly class -- yielding intellectual authority to those established by state, custom, and finance to declare that something contrary to our own experience is the real truth.

Quote from Cassius

Mysticism was argued against by Albert Einstein

This is of course referring to Eastern mysticism, as Einstein did fully integrate Jewish mysticism -- from the spontaneous creation of matter to the formlessness of matter -- all of which fully accords with the fundamental "physical" teachings of the Talmud. This confirmation bias is still a powerful force.

To add a bit more:

The issue is not using mathematics or updating the physics. The issue is what you accept as your fundamental basis.

Newton used mathematics and "updated" physics in a way that is fully consistent with Epicurean philosophy, because he endeavored to explain what is observable -- his fundamental basis is what is observable.

All new inventions can be explained using a fully physical model. Taking credit for new technology is the prerogative those currently in charge.

Any "science" that uses math to try to explain away the observable is doing something fundamentally different -- and this path can lead to any conclusion. Even such things as the universe just popping into existence, or that matter is not fundamentally physical.

I shared a section of this in relation to the size of the sun, but it is all rather critical material, Sextus Empiricus (_fl.c. 200 ^CE), Against the Professions 7 (Against the Logicians/Dogmatists 1) 203 - 216:

Epicurus says that of the two things which are linked with one another – appearance and judgment– of these, the appearance, which he also calls "detectible reality," always exists as true. For just as the primary Experiences (that is, Pleasure and Suffering) are composed from certain productive things and in accordance with the very productive things themselves (such as Pleasure from what is pleasant – and Pain from what is painful) ¬ and is it not possible that what produces pleasure is not pleasant, nor what results in pain does not exist as painful.

But [it is] necessary that both what causes pleasure is pleasant and what causes pain is underlyingly painful by nature: so also in the case of the appearances – given that they exist around us as experiences. What produces each of the [appearances] is in every way and altogether capable of appearing – which cannot, being capable of appearing, not exist in truth such as it appears… …to establish what produces an appearance.

It is also necessary to reason analogously in regards to the [sensations] according to [the details of] each – for what is visible not only appears visible ¬ but is also such a thing as the kind of thing it appears [to be].

And what is audible does not only appear audible ¬ but actually in truth exists as such: and likewise for the other [senses]: all appearances, therefore, turn out to be true.

And according to reason: for, if an appearance is called true, say the Epicureans, whenever it is produced from something existing and in accordance with the very thing that exists – and [given that] every appearance is composed from something existing that is capable of appearing and in accordance with what is capable of appearing itself – [then] by natural necessity, every appearance is true.

But the difference regarding the appearances that seem to fall upon [us] from the same sensible thing (such as from a visible one) deceives some people – according to which the original source is apparent as either differently colored, or differently shaped, or otherwise completely changed.

[Epicureans] conjectured that, of appearances differing and conflicting in this way, it is necessary that a certain [appearance] is true ¬ but the other [appearance], from opposing things, happens to be false (which is naïve and [a sign] of men not fully perceiving the nature in the things that exist).

(let us make the reasoning based on visible things in this way) the hard object is not seen as a whole ¬ but [only] the color of the hard object.

Of the color, one [part] is on the hard object itself (just as in things seen from nearby and from a moderate separation) – the other [part is] outside the hard object and underlying in the adjacent locations (just as with things envisioned from a distant separation).

But this, being completely changed in the intervening [space] and taking on a particular shape, delivers such an appearance as the kind of thing which it also itself underlies in truth.

In just the same way, therefore, neither is the sound thoroughly heard in a bronze instrument that is being struck, nor the [sound] in the mouth of the man who shouted ¬ but rather the [sound] that is falling upon our sensation.

And just as no one says that a person hearing a sound from a small distance hears falsely – just because after he has come nearby he instead receives it as louder: in this way I would not say that vision gives a false report because from a far separation it sees the tower as small and round ¬ but from nearby as larger and tetragonal.

But rather [vision] truly reports – because even when the sensible object is apparent to [vision] as small and of a certain shape: it really is small and of a certain shape – due to the transmission through the air, as the edges of the films are being broken off.

And when [it appears] again large and differently shaped, [it is] again similarly large and differently shaped ¬ since by now both [appearances] are not established as the same thing.

For this is what remains of distorted judgment: to believe that the appearance envisioned from nearby and from far off was the same.

But it exists as the particularly of sensation instead to receive only what is present and moving it – such as color – and not to thoroughly separate that what is here is one thing ¬ but what is underlying there is another thing.

Therefore, the appearances, for these reasons, are all true ¬ the judgments, however, are not all true – but, they have some difference.

For, of these [judgments], some were true, but others false: since our distinctions [between true and false] are established upon appearances – and we distinguish some things correctly, others wretchedly (either by adding and attributing something to the appearances ¬ or by removing something from them – and generally give a false report against unreasoning sensation).

So then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by detectible reality ¬ false are those contested and not attested by detectible reality.

Attestation is the comprehension through detectible reality of what is judged [actually] being the kind of thing it was once judged [to be]: such as, when Plato is approaching from afar, I imagine and judge, due to the separation, that it is Plato ¬ but when he has approached, it was confirmed that it is Plato, with the separation between having been removed – and it was attested through detectible reality itself.

Non-contestation is conformity of what is unclear – but has been postulated and judged – with what appears: such as Epicurus saying that void exists, which is the very thing that is unclear ¬ this is confirmed through a detectible situation – movement.

For if the void does not exist, movement should not exist – with the moving body not having a location into which it will be transferred, because of everything being full and solid: so that what is apparent (that movement does exist) does not contest the unclear thing that has been judged.

But contestation is something opposed to non-contestation – for there was a joint-refutation of the visible thing with the unclear thing that was postulated. As for example the Stoic says that the void does not exist – asserting something unclear – and with this having been so postulated, what is apparent (movement, I mean) should be jointly refuted. For if the void does not exist, then, by natural necessity, movement is not produced – according to the way [of thinking] already previously made clear by us.

And so likewise, non-attestation is opposed to attestation: for it is as an underlying occurrence through the detectible reality of what is being judged not existing as such a thing as the exact kind of thing it was judged [to be].

Just as, when someone is approaching from far off, because of the separation we imagine it to be Plato ¬ but when the separation has been reduced: we know by detectible reality that it is not Plato. Thus something like this comes to be non-attestation: for what is judged was not attested by what is apparent.

Therefore, attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something being true ¬ but non-attestation and contestation of being false: while the basis and foundation of all things is detectible reality.