Posts by Bryan

Of course, elephant bones were present and recognized as such by those who were familiar with them.

I recently was thinking about "elephantos, India quorum milibus e multis vallo munitur eburno" "Elephants, many thousands of which fortify India with an ivory wall " (DRN 2.537), I always thought this "wall" was just poetic. I still do, but there is this:

Dio Chrysostrom (Discourse 79.4) “Again, if ivory is a marvelous possession and worth fighting for, the Indians are of all men most blest and pre-eminent by far, for in their land the bones of the elephants are tossed aside and no one troubles to go near them, just as in our land the bones of cattle and of asses are treated; they even say that in many places the skulls of the elephants, tusks and all, are built into their house walls”

Quote from Nate

I self-published is a collection lyrical poetry from three albums I wrote:

That is beautiful. However much we may like Latin, I am ready to put my vote for a nice new script for writing English! Honestly, I have always thrown the fictional baby away with the religious bathwater. Having been burnt by the Bible, I spurned all fiction since childhood. I need to get over it and try to read some Tolkien! There are infinite worlds, after all. We know there are worlds similar to ours, but we must also see that there are worlds very dissimilar from ours. It's wild out there.

Quote from Don

This is a highly controversial topic in some circles

Yes it can be a hot topic! I respect those who feel strongly about it, but I do not. We can tolerate academic fussing, but we don't want to get yelled at in Greek about the national spirit. I learned from Smyth, and it seems I have stuck to it, despite being somewhat bothered by the anachronistic φθχ fricatives at times (as you indicated, we can hold onto the 1st c. BC "Pompeian" usage like a life raft).

I compared Smyth to his recommendations from the 6th to the 1st c. BC. I see mostly agreement (to the extent that I am correctly connecting it to the IPA). Good stuff, thanks again for pointing it out!

Comparison with Ranieri's Greek Pronunciation Chronology

Quote from Don

It's just really hard, as an English speaker, to distinguish and produce the required contrast between aspirated and unaspirated stops.

It really is -- and the video does a good job of highlighting those difficulties. I know that many teachers will mention the fact that this was the more nearly correct pronunciation of Attic, but will discard it on the first day in favor of φθχ fricatives. I like the idea, but it is difficult. Attempts to adopt the older pronunciation lead me to the expected awkwardness and errors, mostly over-doing the aspiration to provide a contrast with the unaspirated (a common mistake, as he says).

That is a good chart, thank you for sharing!

Regarding vowels: as I am looking at his chart, although I am consistent, I'd be guilty of the dreaded "anachronistic combinations of phonemes." Is it too sloppy to say that if it was used before the common era it is fair game? Some town could probably be found using that mix.

Quote from Don

It's an interesting thought experiment to consider how "evolved" Epicurus's pronunciation was toward fricativization and other features

Exactly, I think all we can say of the Greek used in the garden is that it was somewhere in the evolution -- even possibly including features more associated with later dates.

Quote from Nate

I published a little Tolkien project a while ago

I am interested, but sincerely ignorant of Tolkien (beyond the fact he is the author of The Lord of the Rings). I just did a quick wikipedia read however - interesting stuff! Is the script of Tengwar actually printed in the books and legible?

This is great. I see that for classical Attic he is recommending light aspirated stops, which is excellent. This chart shows clearly what I think is one of the more complicated parts of pronunciation.

I will throw these in as well:

[ U74 ] Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1114A: When he proposes at the beginning of his treatise that "the nature of existence is atoms and void," he treats that nature as one, dividing it into two parts, one of them actually nothing, but termed by you and your company "intangible," "empty," and "incorporeal."

[ U75 ] Sextus Empiricus, Against the Dogmatists, 3.333: Epíkouros was in the habit of using the terms holon (whole universe) and pan (all existence) equivalently when describing the nature of bodies and of the void. For at one point he says, "the nature of the whole universe is atoms and void."

[ U76 ] Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1112E: When Epíkouros says "nature of existing things is atoms and void," do we taken him to mean that "nature" is distinct from "existing things," or simply indicate "existing things," and nothing more, just as it is his habit for instance to use the expression "the nature of void," for "void," and indeed "the nature of all existence," for "all existence?"

I agree that epibole tes dianoias (mental focus) and prolepseis (anticipations/stereotypes) are two facets of the same faculty. I also agree every sensation (the criteria of reality) is prerational.

All ideas that are based in reality must necessarily be based upon images.

If the idea is not based in reality -- not based on images -- then it is not a prolepsis but a hypolepsis (post conception, afterthought, supposition) [DL 10.124].

Πάσα φανταστική ἐπιβολή is something like “the entire graphic perception” “the full pictorial focus” “the complete visual attention.”

I think the use of φανταστική (‘graphic’) here is only further explaining the process of mental focus; the whole phrase is therefore equivalent to ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (‘the focus of the mind’), which Lucretius translates as animī iniectus ‘a casting of mental energy’ or ‘a throwing out of the attention' [DRN 2.740].

Instead of using the modern analogy of ‘focusing’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a camera), Ἐπίκουρος and Lucretius use the analogy of ‘throwing’ or ‘casting’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a net). The paraphrases animī iniectus and ἡ επιβολή τῆς διανοίας therefore are equivalent to our modern use of ‘attention.’

Basically, we need to distinguish between sensations and ideas. Sensations are true per se, but ideas are only true if they accurately reflect our repeated sensations. If we accept any idea as true per se, without demanding any evidence, we have undermined our sensations which are the only foundation we have to accurately understand our environment.

This is great, thank you!

As Epicurus said "those who have advanced sufficiently in observing the impression of the whole still must remember the arrangement of the whole topic -- therefore we often need the condensed view, but the particulars, not as frequently." [DL 10.35b]

I can confidently give one recommendation — do not watch television! I was fortunate enough to grow up in a house without television and I sill keep a far distance from it just as I would for any other screaming lunatic. Life IS easy and great — but your TV will argue against this fact!

(Giovanni Indelli construction) καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐ μόνον ἔχον ὅρους κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκκαρτέρητον, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὡρίσθαι μέν, ἡμῖν δ' ἄκτητον ἢ δύσκτητον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἢ πεπεράνθαι μέν, ἀνεγκαρτέρητον δ' εἶναι διὰ τὴν πολυχρονιότητα τὸ κακόν.

"since it would be no use for it to be limited - ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὡρίσθαι μέν"

"while also, for us, the good is unattainable or difficult to get - ἡμῖν δ' ἄκτητον ἢ δύσκτητον εἶναι τἀγαθόν"

The word here is ὁρίζω

Therefore "defined" (as in "limited") has the correct sense.

(Voula Tsouna trans.) "…for otherwise it would be of no use that the good should be limited but impossible or difficult for us to attain..."

"Epicur.Fr.2" mentioned in the dictionary entry above is Usener Epicurea U2, which is the same as Diogenes Laertius 10.136 "Peace of mind and freedom from pain (ἀπονία) are pleasures which imply a state of rest..."

This is the only use I see in Diogenes Laertius book 10. Epicurus typically uses a construction with τὸ ἀλγοῦν (pain), for example "ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Ὑπεξαίρεσις - the Removal of all pain," "οὐκ ἔστι τὸ Ἀλγοῦν - there is no pain," (KD3)

"Τhis very thing is the good: Escaping from the bad -- because It is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere when neither what is painful nor what is distressing is any longer making way for it" (Plutarchi Non posse) 1091 A-B

If I were to chart my pleasure, it would most usually be at total pleasure with only occasional dips down due to uncommon circumstances (sickness, unexpected occurrences, etc).

The removal of pain, and the painlessness that results when pain is removed, is exactly what pleasure is.

I achieve full physical pleasure frequently and naturally by the internal process in my body when I have the necessary accommodations of food and shelter.

I achieve full mental pleasure just as naturally and frequently, by realizing the ease of obtaining physical contentment and fostering gratitude for my success in doing so.

In failing to appreciate this fact, the public (even when they are in a painless bodily state) tries to add to their pleasure by engaging in further activities (the things that produce pleasure of degenerates, τὰ Ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν, KD10), which usually leads them to further pains and worries!

KD3 "The limit in the amount of pleasures is the removal of all pain."

KD4 "Pain does not last continuously in the body..."

This is great! The combination of audio and graphics in a short video is more likely to keep people's attention!

Quote from Pacatus

Once the function collapses, the superpositional state will become either A or ~A

Yes, their "collapse" occurs when their math tries to support reality!

(As we know, we have infinite worlds but they cannot be in the same place at the same time.)

Not in a way that I have seen yet, but I am probably just missing something (this image is just an example, and we should probably delete it).

Great quote!

Quote from Cicero On Ends Book 1 - Torquatus Addressing Cicero

...it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts.

Our senses are honest witnesses, but honest witnesses are not always accurate and each one does not have the full story. We have to judge between their testimonies to find the truth and the best way to live given our circumstances.

The senses (sensations of the external world from outside our body) , the feelings (sensations of our body), anticipations (sensations of the external world from inside our body) -- any and all sensations - are honest witness and the basis of our "criteria of truth."

Then we have to apply our attention ἡ ἐπιβολή to them and use our reasoning, ὁ λογισμὸς, to make a choice or form a concept, ἡ νόησις.

Here is the one I have played with the last few days: https://wepik.com/ai#rs=menu.

I have been going through DRN and having it create images from translations of Lucretius. You can add text, but it does not generate text well at all.

Yes, you are correct. Modern physics mostly allows for superposition, but Epicureanism, of course, never does. My analysis is from the Epicurean perspective (to the best of my ability). Thank you for your comment!

On one hand we have outlined the likely possibilities, and should probably suspend judgment.

But just for fun:

Quote from Don

You can't have something that has both lesser and greater density?

I agree that "something simultaneously having both greater and lesser density within a defined space" is an example of something that is neither visible to the senses nor the mind (being a paradox of superposition, it is not perceptible to the mind, it is inconceivable).

Beyond paradoxes, everything we talk about will have to be perceptible - if not by the senses (perceptible) then at least by the mind (conceivable). Then we always have to reason how well the reception, ἡ λῆψις, corresponds to the actual external reality, so that we do not have a generally false stereotype, ἡ ὑπόληψις, but instead a generally true stereotype, ἡ πρόληψις.

In this case we are looking for something specifically that is not perceptible "by the 5 senses" as the text says (οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν) but is perceptible by the mind. Although translucent things may not be visible by a focus of the senses (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθήσεων) they must be visible by a focus with the mind (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῇ διανοίᾳ) - because we can get a mental image of "a translucent object" whereas we cannot of "something simultaneously having both greater and lesser density within a defined space" - which is equivalent to imagining two atoms at the same point at the same time.

Thank you for talking this out with me. This is the only instance where I broke from the provided Greek text. I really tried to make διφυὲς work!

If we accept that it is οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν then we have greatly reduced our options. Lucretius does talk about eidola with double natures (centaurs) not corresponding to external reality, but I do not think that fits this context, because the gods exist but the centaurs do not.

(5.1240) But there were no centaurs. And animals
with a double nature, a dual body
assembled from limbs of different beings,

so that the powers in this and that part

could be sufficiently alike—such creatures
could not exist at any time.

But we need something that exists but is not visible by ἡ ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθήσεων (a focus of the senses) but is visible by ἡ ἐπιβολή τῇ διανοίᾳ (a focus with the mind)... which seems like another sign pointing to διαφανές.

Another argument is that it could be standing for that which has μακαριότητα and ἀφθαρσίαν, which is a technically true statement, and fits the above demand of only being visible by the mind...

Oh, that is just Cicero and his discussion in De Natura Deorum "membris hominis praeditum omnibus usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quendam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem nihil agentem."

διφυὲς did not make any sense to me, and διαφανές is used by the good Robert Philippson (https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Robert_Philippson) and Vincenzo de Falco.