Posts by Bryan

Quote from Don

It's just really hard, as an English speaker, to distinguish and produce the required contrast between aspirated and unaspirated stops.

It really is -- and the video does a good job of highlighting those difficulties. I know that many teachers will mention the fact that this was the more nearly correct pronunciation of Attic, but will discard it on the first day in favor of φθχ fricatives. I like the idea, but it is difficult. Attempts to adopt the older pronunciation lead me to the expected awkwardness and errors, mostly over-doing the aspiration to provide a contrast with the unaspirated (a common mistake, as he says).

That is a good chart, thank you for sharing!

Regarding vowels: as I am looking at his chart, although I am consistent, I'd be guilty of the dreaded "anachronistic combinations of phonemes." Is it too sloppy to say that if it was used before the common era it is fair game? Some town could probably be found using that mix.

Quote from Don

It's an interesting thought experiment to consider how "evolved" Epicurus's pronunciation was toward fricativization and other features

Exactly, I think all we can say of the Greek used in the garden is that it was somewhere in the evolution -- even possibly including features more associated with later dates.

Quote from Nate

I published a little Tolkien project a while ago

I am interested, but sincerely ignorant of Tolkien (beyond the fact he is the author of The Lord of the Rings). I just did a quick wikipedia read however - interesting stuff! Is the script of Tengwar actually printed in the books and legible?

This is great. I see that for classical Attic he is recommending light aspirated stops, which is excellent. This chart shows clearly what I think is one of the more complicated parts of pronunciation.

I will throw these in as well:

[ U74 ] Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1114A: When he proposes at the beginning of his treatise that "the nature of existence is atoms and void," he treats that nature as one, dividing it into two parts, one of them actually nothing, but termed by you and your company "intangible," "empty," and "incorporeal."

[ U75 ] Sextus Empiricus, Against the Dogmatists, 3.333: Epíkouros was in the habit of using the terms holon (whole universe) and pan (all existence) equivalently when describing the nature of bodies and of the void. For at one point he says, "the nature of the whole universe is atoms and void."

[ U76 ] Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1112E: When Epíkouros says "nature of existing things is atoms and void," do we taken him to mean that "nature" is distinct from "existing things," or simply indicate "existing things," and nothing more, just as it is his habit for instance to use the expression "the nature of void," for "void," and indeed "the nature of all existence," for "all existence?"

I agree that epibole tes dianoias (mental focus) and prolepseis (anticipations/stereotypes) are two facets of the same faculty. I also agree every sensation (the criteria of reality) is prerational.

All ideas that are based in reality must necessarily be based upon images.

If the idea is not based in reality -- not based on images -- then it is not a prolepsis but a hypolepsis (post conception, afterthought, supposition) [DL 10.124].

Πάσα φανταστική ἐπιβολή is something like “the entire graphic perception” “the full pictorial focus” “the complete visual attention.”

I think the use of φανταστική (‘graphic’) here is only further explaining the process of mental focus; the whole phrase is therefore equivalent to ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (‘the focus of the mind’), which Lucretius translates as animī iniectus ‘a casting of mental energy’ or ‘a throwing out of the attention' [DRN 2.740].

Instead of using the modern analogy of ‘focusing’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a camera), Ἐπίκουρος and Lucretius use the analogy of ‘throwing’ or ‘casting’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a net). The paraphrases animī iniectus and ἡ επιβολή τῆς διανοίας therefore are equivalent to our modern use of ‘attention.’

Basically, we need to distinguish between sensations and ideas. Sensations are true per se, but ideas are only true if they accurately reflect our repeated sensations. If we accept any idea as true per se, without demanding any evidence, we have undermined our sensations which are the only foundation we have to accurately understand our environment.

This is great, thank you!

As Epicurus said "those who have advanced sufficiently in observing the impression of the whole still must remember the arrangement of the whole topic -- therefore we often need the condensed view, but the particulars, not as frequently." [DL 10.35b]

I can confidently give one recommendation — do not watch television! I was fortunate enough to grow up in a house without television and I sill keep a far distance from it just as I would for any other screaming lunatic. Life IS easy and great — but your TV will argue against this fact!

(Giovanni Indelli construction) καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐ μόνον ἔχον ὅρους κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκκαρτέρητον, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὡρίσθαι μέν, ἡμῖν δ' ἄκτητον ἢ δύσκτητον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἢ πεπεράνθαι μέν, ἀνεγκαρτέρητον δ' εἶναι διὰ τὴν πολυχρονιότητα τὸ κακόν.

"since it would be no use for it to be limited - ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὡρίσθαι μέν"

"while also, for us, the good is unattainable or difficult to get - ἡμῖν δ' ἄκτητον ἢ δύσκτητον εἶναι τἀγαθόν"

The word here is ὁρίζω

Therefore "defined" (as in "limited") has the correct sense.

(Voula Tsouna trans.) "…for otherwise it would be of no use that the good should be limited but impossible or difficult for us to attain..."

"Epicur.Fr.2" mentioned in the dictionary entry above is Usener Epicurea U2, which is the same as Diogenes Laertius 10.136 "Peace of mind and freedom from pain (ἀπονία) are pleasures which imply a state of rest..."

This is the only use I see in Diogenes Laertius book 10. Epicurus typically uses a construction with τὸ ἀλγοῦν (pain), for example "ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Ὑπεξαίρεσις - the Removal of all pain," "οὐκ ἔστι τὸ Ἀλγοῦν - there is no pain," (KD3)

"Τhis very thing is the good: Escaping from the bad -- because It is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere when neither what is painful nor what is distressing is any longer making way for it" (Plutarchi Non posse) 1091 A-B

If I were to chart my pleasure, it would most usually be at total pleasure with only occasional dips down due to uncommon circumstances (sickness, unexpected occurrences, etc).

The removal of pain, and the painlessness that results when pain is removed, is exactly what pleasure is.

I achieve full physical pleasure frequently and naturally by the internal process in my body when I have the necessary accommodations of food and shelter.

I achieve full mental pleasure just as naturally and frequently, by realizing the ease of obtaining physical contentment and fostering gratitude for my success in doing so.

In failing to appreciate this fact, the public (even when they are in a painless bodily state) tries to add to their pleasure by engaging in further activities (the things that produce pleasure of degenerates, τὰ Ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν, KD10), which usually leads them to further pains and worries!

KD3 "The limit in the amount of pleasures is the removal of all pain."

KD4 "Pain does not last continuously in the body..."

This is great! The combination of audio and graphics in a short video is more likely to keep people's attention!

Quote from Pacatus

Once the function collapses, the superpositional state will become either A or ~A

Yes, their "collapse" occurs when their math tries to support reality!

(As we know, we have infinite worlds but they cannot be in the same place at the same time.)

Not in a way that I have seen yet, but I am probably just missing something (this image is just an example, and we should probably delete it).

Great quote!

Quote from Cicero On Ends Book 1 - Torquatus Addressing Cicero

...it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts.

Our senses are honest witnesses, but honest witnesses are not always accurate and each one does not have the full story. We have to judge between their testimonies to find the truth and the best way to live given our circumstances.

The senses (sensations of the external world from outside our body) , the feelings (sensations of our body), anticipations (sensations of the external world from inside our body) -- any and all sensations - are honest witness and the basis of our "criteria of truth."

Then we have to apply our attention ἡ ἐπιβολή to them and use our reasoning, ὁ λογισμὸς, to make a choice or form a concept, ἡ νόησις.

Here is the one I have played with the last few days: https://wepik.com/ai#rs=menu.

I have been going through DRN and having it create images from translations of Lucretius. You can add text, but it does not generate text well at all.

Yes, you are correct. Modern physics mostly allows for superposition, but Epicureanism, of course, never does. My analysis is from the Epicurean perspective (to the best of my ability). Thank you for your comment!

On one hand we have outlined the likely possibilities, and should probably suspend judgment.

But just for fun:

Quote from Don

You can't have something that has both lesser and greater density?

I agree that "something simultaneously having both greater and lesser density within a defined space" is an example of something that is neither visible to the senses nor the mind (being a paradox of superposition, it is not perceptible to the mind, it is inconceivable).

Beyond paradoxes, everything we talk about will have to be perceptible - if not by the senses (perceptible) then at least by the mind (conceivable). Then we always have to reason how well the reception, ἡ λῆψις, corresponds to the actual external reality, so that we do not have a generally false stereotype, ἡ ὑπόληψις, but instead a generally true stereotype, ἡ πρόληψις.

In this case we are looking for something specifically that is not perceptible "by the 5 senses" as the text says (οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν) but is perceptible by the mind. Although translucent things may not be visible by a focus of the senses (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθήσεων) they must be visible by a focus with the mind (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῇ διανοίᾳ) - because we can get a mental image of "a translucent object" whereas we cannot of "something simultaneously having both greater and lesser density within a defined space" - which is equivalent to imagining two atoms at the same point at the same time.

Thank you for talking this out with me. This is the only instance where I broke from the provided Greek text. I really tried to make διφυὲς work!

If we accept that it is οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν then we have greatly reduced our options. Lucretius does talk about eidola with double natures (centaurs) not corresponding to external reality, but I do not think that fits this context, because the gods exist but the centaurs do not.

(5.1240) But there were no centaurs. And animals
with a double nature, a dual body
assembled from limbs of different beings,

so that the powers in this and that part

could be sufficiently alike—such creatures
could not exist at any time.

But we need something that exists but is not visible by ἡ ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθήσεων (a focus of the senses) but is visible by ἡ ἐπιβολή τῇ διανοίᾳ (a focus with the mind)... which seems like another sign pointing to διαφανές.

Another argument is that it could be standing for that which has μακαριότητα and ἀφθαρσίαν, which is a technically true statement, and fits the above demand of only being visible by the mind...

Oh, that is just Cicero and his discussion in De Natura Deorum "membris hominis praeditum omnibus usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quendam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem nihil agentem."

διφυὲς did not make any sense to me, and διαφανές is used by the good Robert Philippson (https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Robert_Philippson) and Vincenzo de Falco.

Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy, unnecessary. (Ioannes Stobaeus Anthology, XVII.23)

We cannot say that the good which has rounded out a happy life, the good for which Epicurus rendered thanks in the last words he uttered, is not equal to the greatest. (Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.47)

But what epithet do they deserve – with your "roars" of ecstasy and "cries of thanksgiving" and tumultuous "bursts of applause" and "reverential demonstrations," and the whole apparatus of adoration that you all resort to in supplicating and hymning the man who summons you to sustained and frequent pleasures? (Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1117A)

[Epicurus] writes this to his friends about himself: "The way in which you have provided for me in the matter of sending the grain was godlike and magnificent, and you have given tokens of your regard form me that reach to high heaven." So if someone had taken that corn ration of his bread-stuff from our philosopher’s letter, the expressions of gratitude would have conveyed the impression that it was written in thanksgiving for the freedom or deliverance of the whole Greek nation or of the Athenian state. (Plutarch, Contra Epicuri Beatitudinem, 1097C)

Here is a version of PHerc 1055, which is attributed to our Demetrius. (Possibly for the first time in English. Comments and critiques are welcome. Greek is in the attachment.)

11. Clearly, men preserve the memories of what has been impressed in childhood. Because the soul remains, extending throughout the body, it grows entirely during childhood...

12. It is possible to preserve some of the bodies, and it is evident that memories are also preserved due to these previously imparted motions to the generative faculties of the mind...

13. He says that memories are preserved (in general, as much authority as we have over these matters to speak) although the material that forms the intellect is completely transformed.

14. Because of this, [the mind] possesses a direct reception of similar things, and when these are examined closely, they are not difficult to restore, and by such restorations, we leave god in a human form - because clearly we connect [the form of a human] to a god.

15. Since we do not find reason in any other form apart from a human form, it is evident that we should leave a god in an anthropomorphic form so that, even with reason, he may have substance (so that he has a real existence along with the rational faculty). Therefore, we say that [a god] is anthropomorphic...

16. He [Bion] does not grasp our point even when he leads to it. For they say that if god is anthropomorphic because it has reasoning and shared vitality, we associate with god many other common properties of forms, such as hands, fingers...

17. ...[god] has a similar soul [to man]. Therefore, it is not necessary that if any animals have such a form that a god also has that form. But it will have the faculty of reasoning and, in addition to these common properties, it will also have many other properties in the highest degree...

18. "If indeed,” he [Bion] says, “it has a human form, it is clear that it will have eyes, so it will also suffer from ophthalmia, and it will be affected similarly by the remaining senses." But this itself is similar to nonsense.

19. Therefore, it is completely convincing – as it comes from Bion, who first according to Theophrastus adorned philosophy with flowers – but what he left is unadorned due to his ignorance of the nature of things. This is, in fact, the argument: “we say that each species of living being has its own form in its own species…”

20. We say that “god is not the universe nor tireless sun or the full moon” but it is not possible to say this to a Stoic or a Peripatetic! For how does that which is spherical have its own form? Otherwise, those saying that [god is spherical] do not see that because it is proper for the nature of things…

21. Greater density and lesser density areas differ to the extent that the [greater density] is composed of more atoms, the [lesser density] of fewer atoms. As a consequence of this, that which is denser and capable of generating sensation, produces it – and conversely, that which is less dense and does not produce sensation, cannot set it into motion.

22. We should not exclude the things excluded from sight – because nothing perceptible is immortal. The density (of visible things) opposes this, receiving strong blows. And again, nothing translucent (διαφανές) is perceptible [ie visible by the 5 senses]. Since that which produces large counterforces with great weight for what is perceptible...

23. Of the things said in this way about Bion’s thinking, I will establish this: Since every kind of living being has its own form within its own genus, but not in every way at once – so this same thing that happens in what is visible also happens in what is observable by reasoning.

24. Given that visible things harmonize with what is observable by reasoning, as we demonstrated previously, when what is visible does not oppose [what is observable by reasoning], this is also easily understood – and those things which were then discussed are circulated. Regarding these questions, dear Kointos, I have thoroughly applied myself…

25. But we say that the form of a god is not like what other philosophers attribute. Certainly, they would have seen that [a god] has shapes that are not spherical nor has judgments or angry dispositions or pettiness, but forms that stand apart in the sublime and dispositions rejecting everything lower – all directed towards its own bliss (μακαριότητα) and imperishability (ἀφθαρσίαν).