Posts by Bryan

Great Discussion! Allow me to throw in these quotes as well:

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.36.1023 – 1.37.1054: ^[Obbink] And for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people, they [the kathēgemónes] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived that benefits and harms which are no feebler or even greater than people in general suppose are made complete, not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in return [of] his benefit [here], and these things [the kathēgemónes] say most piously. And in On Gods what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he outlines in some detail. And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people.

And of course we all remember SV65 "it is pointless begging from the gods for what one is sufficiently able to obtain for himself."

P.Oxy 2.215, col. 2, lines 8-16 ^[Chilton] Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus (as men affect to say) what have you to fear in this matter? Do you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them?

Quote from Cassius

This (So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is fit for us to seek, the other to reject) sounds pretty close to something in which "prolepsis" is involved.

I'd say that an anticipation must be involved for every word we use -- we would have no idea what any particular word indicated unless we have some general stereotype that we access before we start thinking or speaking about any object or relationship.

This is also mentioned by Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria, VII.3.5) "for he gave God human form and a place in the spaces between worlds."

And Aetius (Doxography, 2.1.8) gives us, "Epíkouros asserts that the spaces between world-systems are unequal." A world-system, as we know, is a closed system and contains a finite amount of matter, but there is an infinite supply of matter in-between world-systems.

Quote from Cassius

pleasure & pain: These terms can be used to describe BOTH fundamental units of experience themselves, AS WELL AS innate categories of fundamental experiences, depending on the context of the discussion.

Yes I agree. Epicurus employs this flexibility.

Quote from Cassius

"Absence of pain" is simply a way of extending the definition of pleasure to ALL non-painful experiences

And how happy we are to realize this truth -- an instant and constant source of gratitude!

"4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain."

As we know, this is true of active pleasures of variation that we experience after we have established a foundation of static pleasure through philosophy. When an active pleasure is withdrawn, static pleasure remains. And we are of course fully grateful to lose an active pain -- even of not replaced by an active pleasure, because we have our foundation of static pleasure.

As you said, images ("films") are always flowing off of other objects and contacting our body. Our body is able to perceive these films differently in different parts of the body (the nose will smell, the eye will see, the brain will visualize).

It seems to me that repeated contact with these images/films produces an automatic expectation (basic stereotype) of objects and object-interactions that we can access in our mind by focusing on them -- and these stereotypes are the basis of our thought and speech.

Epicurus says (38a) "Seeing [for ourselves] the primary thought for each word, and in no way needing proof, is necessary – if We are to have [something] to which we will refer what is investigated, uncertain, or judged."

Quote from Don

There really is no applicable analogy in modern cosmology

Yes, given our inability to translate it, I suppose we can take refuge in "cosmos" and "cosmoi."

I fully agree using terms from other schools confuses the issue and should probably be avoided... to the extent that cosmos means different things to different people, this will be ground that must be defended, and we will have to educate them about the correct meaning!

(As we know, Epicurus uses "atomos" and translating that as "atom" means we use the word that is not the same as modern science. But, I think you would agree, not using "atom" when translating him certainly gives up too much ground. We can use "atom" in our school, and use in its proper and true meaning. )

Quote from Don

Using "galaxy" obscures the ancient Greek understanding of what a kosmos was.

This is certainly true and I do agree. But then of course Epicurus would have a different view of the meaning of the word compared to his predecessors. LSJ often accommodates Epicurus' variance, but it does so unevenly, as you know. I see that galaxy is too much, and that "world-system" is correct, but I do wish for a more elegant solution. I only want one unnamed thing (that 4th part) and this feels like adding to that list. Perhaps, just cosmos.

Quote from Cassius

people of normal intelligence shouldn't be asked to accept "trust the scientists" or "trust the mathematicians" any more than they accept "trust the priests" as an explanation.

Yes, as we know, authorities and what they say may or may not be helpful, but they are certainly not our measure of truth. Sensation is our measure of truth.

Quote from Don

infinite number of worlds (κόσμοι ἄπειροί kosmoi apeiroi)

I agree we should not "update" or add ideas when translating -- but do we have any good arguments or objections to using "galaxies" for "kosmoi"? (We all know the difficulty with the English "world," which now means only one planet).

Well done, guys! I agree, it is by looking for gods that are more than physical living mammals in outer space that people come to atheism (and rightly so, for what they are looking for, a non-physical being that can create physical matter, cannot exist).

Joshua, you mentioned that many scientifically-minded people accept that aliens must exist; it is statistically guaranteed. This line of thinking is, of course, even more proof of gods—as gods are (by one way of speaking) a class of aliens.

Yes, On Methods of Inference is very difficult and On Nature book 28 is too. I was a bit wary to even bring up this list, because I am not ready to go back into either one just yet!

On a related note, I cannot look at my work for very long without seeing a lot of errors. This is a bit better:

We can be sure Epicurus was aware of such distinctions, but as far as I can tell he was casual in dealing with these categories.

I fully agree with your point, Joshua, about pi. However, I am also thinking that the idea that pi goes on indefinitely seems to come close to infinite divisibility. It seems, from a physicalist perspective, pi does not show anything infinite, but could be viewed as another example of how math/geometry fails to adequately correspond to reality.

Quote from Cassius

"she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds."

"has made, does make, and will make" is probably too formulaic to be evidence either way, but we have:

PD16, "Chance falls upon the wise man briefly: for Reasoning has managed the greatest and most critical things – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage." or

SV10 "Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been."

This last line there is a quote from Hesiod's Theogony line 38. εἰρεῦσαι τά τ᾽ ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα ""declaring the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before"

Quote from Cassius

"answering" may be a better rendering of "respondeant" than Rackham's "exact match or counterpart.

For rēspondĕo, we have:

• To promise a thing in return for something else; to offer or present in return.
• To answer, reply, respond (to a question or any statement, friendly or hostile).
• To give an opinion, advice, decision, response (lawyers, priests, oracles).
• To appear before a tribunal, to answer an accusation, meet a charge.
• To answer to; to meet, agree, accord, or correspond with a thing.
• To return, make a return, yield.

"Exact match or counterpart" does seem interpretive. "Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant" is almost poetic, we have literally "all things correspond as equals to all equal things."

This would not have been so wordy to the Roman ear, as the double use of paria/par is common for rēspondĕo:

"give as good as you get"

"return like for like"

Omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant = Everything alike corresponds to everything alike. Hard to argue against, but not packed with meaning. If tautology is ever appropriate, I suppose it would be for isonomía.

You really have made a beautiful website. It is very well organized, and it is filled only with treasures.

I really appreciate the more accurately transliterated Greek. You used "Loukianos." I think this is excellent. Calling Loukianos "Lucian" is like calling Lucretius "Loucret." But if people only know Lucretius by "Loucret" do we force the issue? -- or do we just use "Loucret" too? I have been indecisive on this point.

Does using Epíkouros add another layer of complexity, or does it get us closer to source? The answer must be that it gets us closer (even if the transition is uncomfortable).

The advice below from book 28 seems close to the point. However, of course, it is about the meanings of words, not accuracy of transliteration.

^{Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 8 col. 5 [Sedley]} It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner, but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind.

Quote from Cassius

Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real."

I agree, continuity is key.

10.50a: "[Impressions] render the image of a single continuous object (and preserve the continuity at a distance from the original source) according to the proportional impingement [of the impressions] from that source – out of the deep vibration of the atoms in that solid object."

Quote from Twentier

example, what if I were to posit that I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure"

Interesting! Just as we look to the blissful beings as models of the good life, we look to miserable beings to foster our gratitude (DRN book 2 opening, etc). To take this to the (speculative) extreme: Comparing myself to beings that do not die but are miserable -- would, even if I were also miserable, make me grateful at least to be mortal!

Quote from Twentier

Demetrios of Lakon wrote a book entitled On the Form of the Gods (is that right?)

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.

Quote from Julia

incorporeal entities ("software") inhabiting fancy bio-mechanical space ships ("hardware"), which repair

Although the only incorporeal entity is the void, which cannot think or do anything at all. Nothing incorporeal can act or be acted upon.

Certainly, the environment supporting gods is naturally occurring between the kosmoi by automatic infinite processes of nature (just as the environment supporting waterfalls is naturally occurring on Earth by automatic finite processes of nature).

Great topic!

It almost seems that the idea of instinct was wrapped into the idea of determinism, which loomed so large that Epicurus feels he needs to assert that we are not all instinct -- but have something in ourselves that can generally transcend instinct.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43): ^[Sedley] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44): ^[Sedley] by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we rebuke, oppose and reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us.

Epicurus, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116: ^[Sedley] If someone won't explain this, and has no auxiliary element or impulse in us which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name. He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion. And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to.

Quote from TauPhi

from the gods or to the gods

Quote from Cassius

it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too... But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia

Yes, I agree all around -- films (τὰ εἴδωλα) come off every object. We can focus on films that come off other objects toward us, but we cannot direct the films that come off us toward other objects.

48b ...for there is a continuous flow from the surface of bodies – not noticeable by decrease due to replenishment – preserving the position in the solid and arrangement of atoms for a long time...

49b For external objects would not imprint their nature of color and shape through the air between us and them... without certain impressions coming to us from the objects (of the same color and of the same shape) according to the size that fits into the vision or mind, by means of swift movements.