Is this a correct understanding of how to interpret how Epicurus referred to 'god(s)'?
That's my understanding, but certainly not the universal understanding here in our little virtual Garden.
Is this a correct understanding of how to interpret how Epicurus referred to 'god(s)'?
That's my understanding, but certainly not the universal understanding here in our little virtual Garden.
I'm wondering if this is a point of difference between Epicurus (3rd-4th c BCE, Greek) and Lucretius (1st c BCE, Roman) if we accept the authenticity of Epicurus' letters in Diogenes Laertius (3rd c CE).
Epicurus' will clearly states that he wants burnt sacrifices offered for his family: "make separate provision (1) for the funeral offerings (enagisma) to my father, mother, and brothers."
Philodemus also discussed Epicurus taking part in the festivals and Mysteries. So, even if Epicurus kept idiosyncratic meanings of these festivals, sacrifices, and rites in his mind, he obviously was taking an active role in them.
Genesia (and Epops) – Hellenion
A festival dedicated to remembering the dead
Also the funerary offerings Epicurus mandated for parents and brothers is ἐνάγισμα, (enagisma) offering sacrifice to the dead, opp. θύω (to the gods). See
QuoteHeroes (ἥρωες, fem. ἡρωῖναι, ἡρώισσαι) were a class of beings worshipped by the Greeks, generally conceived as the powerful dead, and often as forming a class intermediate between gods and men. Hero-cult was apparently unknown to the Mycenaeans; features suggestive of the fully developed phenomenon have been found in 10th-cent. bce contexts, but it is not until the 8th cent. that such cults become widespread and normal. The reasons for its rise have been much debated, but seem likely to be somehow connected with more general social changes at that date.Although Greek authors expect the phrase ‘heroic honours’ to convey something definite, there was in practice much variation in the type of cult given to heroes. At one end of the spectrum it could have a strong resemblance to the offerings given to a dead relative; at the other, it might be barely distinguishable from worship paid to a god. Many late sources suggest features for heroic sacrifice which set it apart from the usual form of sacrifice to a god: holocaust sacrifice on a low altar, using dark animals, performed at night. But often only one of these markers is used in a particular rite, and that rite is not invariably addressed to a hero. The form of sacrifice known as enagismos (or enagisma), also used in offerings to the dead and probably indicating a form in which the victim is completely destroyed and there is no participatory feast, is found in heroic cult not infrequently, but by no means universally.
Planning yes, but schedule unknown. It's a big effort. However I am coming around to the idea that the podcast audio versions can serve as a "first draft" that when edited further turn into really good articles with wider impact. So yes I am going to work on more of these!
FWIW: We use Temi/Rev for our transcription on our podcast: https://www.rev.com/pricing
Quote from CassiusCicero is mischaracterizing what Epicure says about pleasure, and secondly he’s mischaracterizing what Epicure says about doing everything for your own advantage. Epicurus never says that the Epicurean standard is pleasure, and anyone who’s at all familiar with what Epicurus does say knows how much emphasis Epicurus places on his friends and the pleasure of his friends, and how much we value that type of pleasure which comes from engagement in society and working with light minded people. Epicurus is not always looking to his own advantage.
This could be a matter of semantics, but I'm going to push back ever so slightly on the "Epicurus is not always looking to his own advantage." Pleasure is subjective. The only standard we have to assess if we're living happily/pleasurably is ourselves. We can only, in the end, "look to" our own happiness/pleasure. That isn't to say we don't care about other people. Our friends' happiness affects our own happiness, but it still means we help them in service to a wise selfishness for ourselves. They happy = I happy.
Substack transcript version of this podcast available here:
https://epicureanfriends.substack.com/p/is-it-truly-impossible-as-cicero
Oh! This makes searching for particular parts SO much easier! Thanks for this! Are you planning on posting episodes going forward?
I will admit I didn't read this entire thread, but that's never slowed me down before.
Traditions like Halowe'en, Samhain, and El Dia de la Muertos have to do (in part) with remembering the dead and breaking down the barrier between the living and the dead, and making offerings and dedications to those who've passed. I would argue that Epicurus was doing exactly these things (okay, maybe not exactly) in his mandated regular "*funeral offerings* to my father, mother, and brothers" and for Metrodorus. That word used in Greek refers to rites associated with burnt offerings. This aspect of this holiday seems right in line with the Garden: reliving pleasant memories of those who have died.
The trick or treating and parties are just having fun, so if they provide pleasure with a minimum of pain, why not participate in the popular civic festival.
Welcome aboard!
FYI
DCLP/Trismegistos 62382 = LDAB 3547
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DCLP/Trismegistos 62384 = LDAB 3549
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DCLP/Trismegistos 62386 = LDAB 3551
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These plus additional fragments:
PS: I realize this is not a translation but I'm posting here to give us an idea of the amount of the text of On God's that has survived from the ancient world not counting any cited fragments quoted by other ancient authors.
As Joshua notes, I certainly agree that Cicero believes he had his good intentions and is sincere. But he certainly also throws up strawman arguments against the Garden with no attempts to steelman anything.
Fair enough. I certainly see where you're coming from.
I personally find it hard to believe Epicurus and his school really thought that the sun was about the size of a football when he wrote it "may be a little larger or a little smaller, or precisely as great as it is seen to be." They could see the sun set behind the hills or fall over the horizon where they had seen ships pass into the distance. The sun "as it is seen to be" is larger than one of those ships of it's in the distance or larger than the hill it is passing behind. That's why Gellar-Goad's article at least made me take a second look at what those texts could be saying. The school said to trust the senses, and my senses would tell me the sun is bigger than a hill or boat at least. The moon obscures the sun during an eclipse, and the moon is bigger than the hills too. Or maybe I'm biased by the modern knowledge I can't unknow?
That said, I certainly don't discount the possibility that they could have just got it wrong.
My favorite part of Epicureanism is probably the Tetra pharmakos "Fourfold Cure" (I know Cassian expressed a disliked for it, but i myself consider to be a nice summary of Epicurean philosophy).
I completely agree with you on having an affinity for the Tetrapharmakos. I like that it is a documented connection to the ancient Epicurean community. Granted, it's not clear from Philodemus' work if he was approving or disapproving of its use, but there's no doubt that it was being used in Epicurean communities as the philosophy distilled down to one of its smallest summaries.
i ended up understanding him more fully and now am a full Epicurean (except for you know antiquated scientific views like the size of the sun as most of you are i hope).
You may find Gellar-Goad's article on "the size of the sun" an interest counterpoint to that "as most of you are I hope." ![]()
It's a provocative article, and one that's got a lot of discussion on the forum. I'll admit that I had never thought of the "size of the sun" issue in this way before, offhandedly dismissing it as "Oh, Epicurus can't be right about everything." Gellar-Goad brings an intriguing (and fairly convincing) argument against that perspective.
QuoteThe Epicureans did not believe that the sun was the size of a human foot. They distinguished between the sun’s actual size and the size of its appearance, the latter of which was the only magnitude measurable from earth with the technology available. In this matter as almost everywhere else, the Epicureans appealed to the truth of sense-perception – with the important caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which itself is not guaranteed to be true.
...
In closing I argue that the size of the sun is an Epicurean shibboleth. In Epicurus, in Lucretius and in Demetrius, we see the same nostrum repeated, with progressive elaborations that do not fully clarify the basic precept. The persistence of Epicureans in this formulation is not so much the result of reflexive dogma or pseudo-intellectual obscurantism as it is a passphrase, a litmus test. Think like an Epicurean, and you will figure out that the sun’s appearance and the sun itself are two related but distinct things with two different sizes; that you must keep the infallible data of the senses, tactile as well as visual, in proper perspective when making judgments about your perception; and that the available data is insufficient to estimate the sun’s magnitude to an acceptable degree of confidence. Think that Epicureans believe the sun’s diameter is a foot, that they are absurd, and you have exposed yourself as un-Epicurean.
There's also an extensive thread about that, too: "Lucretius on the Size of the Sun", by T.H.M. Gellar-Goad
I would also like to ask a question for those who don't mind on "atoms and void". From what i can tell science tells us that the space between atoms is not really "empty space" but more like energy (electromagnetic, gravitational energy, quantum waves) which provided no friction and has no form, thus allowing movement. Do you all consider this to be a kind of "Epicurean void" or do you still believe in the classical void that there's empty space in-between?
My perspective on "atoms and void" are that, most importantly, Epicurus was not - and could not be - talking about the modern Standard Model of particle physics. The parallels between Epicurus' "ἄτομος" and the modern "atom" should not be taken too literally. They can be taken figuratively or metaphorically though.
Epicurus use of the term ἄτομος (atomos) conveyed that there were indivisible fundamental material "things" that were not capable of being cut/divided into smaller pieces that made up all the material things we see around us throughout the cosmos and, indeed, the entire universe. Not tinier and tinier replicas of the things themselves (bones are not made of tiny bones) or similar ideas. He didn't see only four elements: fire, earth, air, water, with one being predominant. Epicurus genius insight was that these atomoi could make up an infinite number of different things, things that would be eventually broken down into their constitute atomoi, reconstituted as something else, and the cycle goes on and on ad infinitum, forward and back.
The modern Standard Theory has gone beyond Epicurus, but - from my perspective again - has built on Epicurus' ideas (via Lucretius primarily and the Renaissance scholars that read him). As the CERN site says: "The theories and discoveries of thousands of physicists since the 1930s have resulted in a remarkable insight into the fundamental structure of matter: everything in the universe is found to be made from a few basic building blocks called fundamental particles, governed by four fundamental forces." On face value, that insight is remarkably similar - in the BROADEST and most GENERAL sense - to Epicurus' insights 2,000+ years ago. But only in the BROADEST and most GENERAL way. I can't emphasize that enough.
So, to be an Epicurean - again from my perspective - means to accept that we live in a physical, material universe made up of fundamental particles governed by understandable principles. We should not feel compelled to adhere to ideas that are millennia old. But in the broadest sense, I have no problem with the idea of "atoms and void" as a general metaphorical phrase as long as I understand it to be pointing to fundamental particles making up the physical universe, moving through "space" however you'd like to understand that.
Welcome aboard!
Raise a glass "to the founder of the feast!!"
Thanks to you, Cassius, for being vigilant and for springing into action. ΚΥΔΟΣ! Kudos!
Some may object to my saying mortals can never be free from all pain and say something like What's the use of Epicurus' philosophy then.
It's the foundation that it's built on that matters.
If I remember correctly, the Stoics didn't think a normal human could be completely virtuous either, and yet they followed the teachings of their school.
Epicurus posited the limit of pleasure as absence of all pain and made cogent arguments in support of that thus giving the heave-ho to his rivals on their turf. Take that, Skeptics and Platonists!
I believe we can experience absence of pain in some aspects of our life, especially rooting out fear and anxiety of death, gods, etc. We can experience episodes of no pain in parts of our body from time to time. The strategy is to keep our eyes on the prize as it were. A happy life using pleasure as the North Star, steering toward that, using choices and rejections skillfully, sailing through storms when necessary, enjoying the calm seas when available, standing in awe of the stars in the sky, and delighting in the warm sun on our faces under a clear blue sky.
Welcome aboard!
Glad to see the forum is showing up in Google searches!
DeWitt is complete, but I personally get bogged down by his style sometimes. If you do happen to get tired, I highly recommend taking a break and reading Emily Austin's Living for Pleasure. It's a more approachable, conversational style for an introduction to the philosophy.
Torquatus is making these statements very "flatly," He's speaking almost literally "The absence of pain is pleasure - in fact it's the highest pleasure." And I'd say that Epicurus is doing the same thing in the letter to Menoeceus. There's an explanation for the different perspectives, but I don't think we are yet articulating that explanation as Epicurus would.
On Ends, I. 38 Itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit.
I. 38 Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree.
That line there: A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel pleasure or pain. That's the essence of Epicurus' "contention" - or pointing out the facts, if I may - that if you're alive you're either feeling pleasure or pain.
The absence of pain then, by definition, means totally filled with pleasure.
The obstacle seems to be Epicurus choice of hedone in Greek, translated literally as pleasure in English and translated literally as voluptas in Latin. I will grant that Epicurus expanded what even his contemporaries well before Cicero thought hedone was. But it seems to me he had no better word to convey what he was getting at. I would say a "better" choice of words in English may have been "positive" and "negative" feelings but those connotations didn't really exist in Epicurus' language. The closest to "positive" is θετικός but that has more a "fit" argument or "affirmative" not positive in the sense of a "positive" feeling as we understand it. If we take that alternative tack, Epicurus is saying the absence of all negative feeling yields the highest limit of all positive feeling. Okay, that could still be misconstrued, but it at least uses more complementary words.
I. 39 sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere,
I. 39 Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest pleasure be to feel no pain, ...
But can mortals actually achieve no pain at all in any amount? I remain skeptical of this. Diogenes Laertius writes that the Garden taught that [X.121] Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures. And I would add "the addition and subtraction of pains." It is the theoretical limit of pleasure (No Pain) that allows it to contend with "Virtue" (don't get me started) to be the Summum Bonum/Telos.
I. 57 O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam! cum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis; non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste iusteque vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste, nisi iucunde.
I. 57 "Here is indeed a royal road to happiness — open, simple, and direct! For clearly man can have no greater good than complete freedom from pain and sorrow coupled with the enjoyment of the highest bodily and mental pleasures. Notice then how the theory embraces every possible enhancement of life, every aid to the attainment of that Chief Good which is our object. Epicurus, the man whom you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honourably and justly, and no one wisely, honourably and justly without living pleasantly.
That "coupled with" to me sounds like joining katastematic and kinetic pleasure: complete freedom from pain and sorrow (ataraxia and aponia) + the enjoyment of the greatest bodily and mental pleasures (kharis and euphrosyne) . perfrŭor = to enjoy fully or thoroughly.
It's getting late and I'm starting to ramble. Consider this food for thought. Until tomorrow.