Posts by Don

Yes, Very different. But that can be a contentious matter.

Learning modern Greek isn't a bad idea as a start. Just realize that the grammar and even meanings of words won't translate (no pun intended) into understanding ancient Greek.

Here's another translation of that Seneca quote, starting a lttle earlier in the letter (LXVI.8-9 )

"Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect."

Seneca is saying that a virtue is limitless, it is infinite in that nothing can be added to it *because* it has no limits. If something could be added, it wouldn't be infinite. It seems to me it's the "adding" part that is important. Epicurus comes along and says pleasure has a limit (the removal of all pain) but, by definition, once all pain is removed and pleasure is complete, no more pleasure can be added. Therefore, as Senea says "the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight,..." Epicurus answers that by saying pleasure cannot rise to greater heights than the absence of all pain, therefore, pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain.

To me, VS33 speaks to this "perfection" of the gods, using Zeus as the stand-in for the divine nature. To me, VS33 doesn't speak to the perpetuity of feeling not hungry, not thirsty, not shivering in the cold; BUT if you have experienced the state of being satisfied - not being hungry, thirsty, or shivering in the cold - you have competed with Zeus for well-being.

VS 33. The body yells out not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not shuddering in the cold; for anyone who has these things and who has confidence in continuing to have them in the future, they may compete with Zeus for well-being. (my own translation)

σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]

φωνή f (genitive φωνῆς); first declension

• sound
• Usually of the human voice: voice, cry, yell
• The voice or cry of animals
• Any articulate sound (especially vowels)
• speech, discourse; language

εὐδαιμονίας - eudaimonias "well-being" (usually rendered "happiness" but I don't like that )

μάχομαι

• (with dative) I make war, fight, battle
• I quarrel, wrangle, dispute
• I contend, compete

μαχέσαιτο appears to me to be "The POTENTIAL OPTATIVE expresses the opinion of the speaker about the possibility or likelihood of an action"

Here's Luke Ranieri's Introduction to the Greek Alphabet using reconstructed Ancient Greek pronunciation all in Ancient Greek (part of the Ancient Greek in Action series of videos). This is in his Lucian pronunciation of around the 1st c. CE (based on how Lucian of Samosata would have *maybe* pronounced his Greek). Watch till the end to hear Ranieri sing an Alphabet Song in Ancient Greek

Erasmian pronunciation is the default for many books teaching Ancient Greek; however, there are better methods now (i.e., more closely approximating Ancient Greek pronunciation). Erasmian - developed originally by Erasmus of Rotterdam - is an academic mishmash of convenient pronunciations in one's native language: English "Erasmian" is different from French "Erasmian" from German "Erasmian." It doesn't really try to approximate ancient Greek pronunciation nor does it attempt to be. The vowels especially are a mess, to my understanding. Long and short vowels are supposed to be distinguished by actual time or length of pronunciation, not different sounds. For example, eta Η η is held longer (let's say twice as long) than epsilon E ε. Short alpha Αα is held half as long as long alpha, and so on. All that's not to say Erasmian isn't alright to start with! But approximating the ancient pronuncation, to me, is just so much cooler LOL

Here's one from the JACT Summer School, JACT is the publisher of the Reading Greek series of books:

Quote from Cassius

Even if someone decides that the disagree so firmly with a key Epicurean tenet that they just can't see calling themselves an Epicurean

I don't *think* this is directed at me, but I'm going to use that as a jumping off point anyway to expand on my comments about the swerve on the public thread. I stand by my assertion (my dogmatic assertion) that there is no such thing as "the swerve" because atoms don't act like Democritus and Epicurus thought they did. The Standard Model doesn't leave a place for "the swerve" although, like I said, a rough analogy can be made to overlay it on indeterminacy at the quantum level... but the overlay certainly doesn't fit well.

However, I also do not see the swerve as a "key Epicurean tenet." It's barely mentioned in the extant texts. There's Lucretius and Cicero, and I don't think Cicero relates the swerve to free will, just the impossibility of uncaused action on the part of atoms.

Quote from Cambridge

"Lucretius presents the most extended consideration we have by an Epicurean of the swerve and freedom (DRN II 251–93). It comes immediately after his argument that the swerve must exist in order for atoms to collide. Atoms naturally fall straight downwards, and they also move because of collisions and entanglements with other atoms. However, there is a third cause of atomic motion, a random swerve to the side by one spatial minimum, which saves us from what Lucretius calls the “decrees of fate”. "

However, if we want to explore "how" the swerve functions within the system of Epicurean philosophy: Lucretius talks about the swerve at the atomic level, but then goes into talking about horses at the starting gate of a race. This excerpt from Lucretius doesn't satisfy me:

Quote

But that man's mind itself in all it does
Hath not a fixed necessity within,
Nor is not, like a conquered thing, compelled
To bear and suffer,- this state comes to man
From that slight swervement of the elements
In no fixed line of space, in no fixed time.

A random swervement seems unlikely to lead to the ability of a "man's mind" to make a choice. If the description here is correct, our choices are random - which seems to me to possibly be worse than determined. If choices are random like the swerve, how could one be held responsible? How could praise and blame be attached to them? We would have no more control over them than random coin flips or rolls of the dice. **Maybe** by analogy.... atoms can swerve "on their own", humans can make choices "on their own"... but I don't see how the random swerve can be the mechanism of free choices.

Quote from Cassius

Incremental advances in "scientific" textbooks do not upend basic philosophical conclusions about the nature of life and death, and yet I agree that Epicurus would be the first to accept and incorporate new discoveries.

I fully agree. My contention is that those "basic philosophical conclusions" that make up Epicurean philosophy include (but aren't limited to):

• The universe is material in nature, made of particles and space.
• There are no gods to provide benefit or punishment. We're on our own.
• Pleasure is the "thing" to which all other "things" point.. The endpoint of all actions if asking "Why do you do that?" is pleasure.
• Things like virtue, honor, knowledge, etc. are instrumental ways to achieve pleasure but they aren't the endpoint.
• We live finite lives. Wishing for eternal living wishes one's life away. Live in the here and now, plan for the future but don't be constrained by it, remember pleasant memories of the past, work to make pleasant memories in the future. This life is all we have.
  • We don't exist. We exist. We exist no longer. No reason to fret.

BUT... when it comes to making pronouncements about atoms and physics, we leave the specific details in the past and work with what we have now. Talk of "atoms and void" is certainly acceptable shorthand for a material universe. But if we insist on atoms falling "straight down" and randomly swerving the minutest distance, we will fail to translate Epicurus's core true meaning into a modern vernacular. We cannot be constrained to interpret the philosophy as if we are living in a world 2,300 years old or even 1,900 years old. My contention is that we do Epicurus's insight and foresight and genius a disservice if we do that. I truly believe his philsophy is evergreen and THE most applicable to a modern world, in contrast to the Stoics and their Logos (conveniently left out by modern followers of that philsophy). I think we can re-interpret and update some of Epicurus's terminology and physics and understanding of "how things work" without losing any of the vitality and applicability of his philosophy.

Quote from Cassius

If We Agree For The Sake of Argument That "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good," then let's ask "What *Should* We Consider To Be The Proper Relationship Between The Perfect And The Good?"

I'm sorry to be pedantic, but - same as the other thread - I think that's an improper way of thinking about the question. The aphorism is indeed "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good." However, a better way to think of this is "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good Enough." I don't think this saying has anything to say about The Good (telos, tagathon) in the philosophical sense. From my perspective, it has to do with procrastinating in action until a "perfect" solution or course of action or choice can be devised. To me, it says we can't wait around for the "perfect" but should take action where a "good enough" course can be charted. There's time to revise, regroup, rethink later. Get on with it! It's better to have a working solution than to wait until all the planets align and a perfect course is laid. There is no such as perfection in our human world. Don't waste time waiting around for it.

Quote from Cassius

Given The Stress That Many Greek Philosophers' Placed On "Virtue" or a perfect view of "The Good" As The Ultimate Goal, To What Extent Would An Epicurus Have Considered That Approach An "Unnatural and Unnecessary Desire?"

From my perspective, you're asking the question incorrectly.

The Good (τἀγαθόν tagathon lit. The Good), using Aristotle's definition from Nicomachean Ethics - and the one I have no doubt to which Epicurus was responding - is "the Good is That at which all things aim.”

If you are not aiming at pleasure - since that is "That at which all things aim" - you're going about life all wrong. If you're aiming at "virtue" as your telos, your ultimate goal, you're missing the mark. I don't think he would have called aiming at virtue an "unnatural and unnecessary desire." I think he would have called it an empty belief. If you believe you should be living for virtue, you are under an erroneous empty belief. You're aiming for the instrument and not the goal. Virtues are steps on the ladder, at the top of which is pleasure. If you're only looking at the steps, you never get to the top of the ladder. The "desire" to see virtue as "The Good" is simply based on a mistaken belief.

Quote from Onenski

The capacity, for example, for self control can be explained as the outcome of your personal history under certain circumstances, I invite you to read Walter Mischel's "The Marshmallow Test"

Thanks! Book is on reserve.

Would you correct l characterize Mischel as deterministic or doesn't that label fit his presentation?

My opinion is that we have to acknowledge that there is no such thing as "the swerve."

It was an innovative thought experiment by Epicurus (and Lucretius who mentions it) given the atomic parameters he was working with at the time. Yes, it has parallels or we can overlay the *basic* idea onto modern quantum physics, but the overlay doesn't fit perfectly because it wasn't designed to! But atoms do not move like Epicurus and Democritus thought/said they did. Quantum particles do not move like that. Plus, Epicurus could very well have thought that atomic motions could engender free will because everything was atomic movement, including sensations. And, yes, we know that chemical and biological processes are at the heart of sensation, but they're NOT like Epicurus proposed them. We don't intercept atoms from outside us into channels in our ψυχη (psyche) leading to memories and thoughts. Again, we can make analogies and see Epicurus's atomic movements and swerves as precursors or metaphors of how actually "the way things are." But we are not constrained by Epicurus's physics! Science has come a long way in the last 2300 years, and using outdated terms and ideas to argue for free will is not going to get us anywhere in the year 2024 CE. We need to work with the material world at hand as it is currently understood. That's why I find Mitchell intriguing... and no I haven't had a chance to read any of his stuff in the last couple hours. This is just a visceral reaction to our continuing to talk about whether the swerve leads to free will. Unfortunately, I find it similar to discussing whether God has anything to do with our free will. That's it for me right now.

Epicurus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm some ways, Epicurus's position on choice and free will and determinism is δογματικός (dogmatikos), not being afraid to declare a position.

In light of Sapolsky and Dennett and the rest, a big part of me wants more than to simply declare a position. That's why Mitchell is intriguing to me. I'm planning on exploring his stuff before weighing back in (too much, that is).

I continue to find pleasure in this discussion and appreciate everyone's willingness to share their views. In light of that, let me share some of my own thoughts on this:

The word Metaphysical

Several of you have used this word, and I will admit I find it ill-defined. To me, the word smacks of "woo" as in "mystical, supernatural, or unscientific." Merriam-Webster has one definition that tells me "a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being and that includes ontology, cosmology, and often epistemology." If I remember correctly, Aristotle used it in his works to simply refer to the topics that weren't Physics... Oh, I don't remember correctly. It dates to 70 BCE and ordering of books covering "the science of what is beyond the physical." In any case, I find it unhelpful when it can be so vague and can be imbued with hazy meanings.

Quote from Bryan

I experience having free will and I am not sympathetic to arguments that are counter to repeated experience. It is not a matter of logic but simple immediate proof.

Quote from Godfrey

determinism is counter to lived experience.

I know where you're coming from, but we also experience the oar as being bent when we see it in the water. IF we investigate further, we do find the oar isn't bent (or the tower isn't round to use the classical example). So, I don't see anything inherently incorrect about examining free will and digging deeper more additional experience and investigation. And, yes, I agree that we have "repeated experience" of free will, but we also experience the oar as bent and the tower as round repeatedly and have to catch ourselves to remember other past repeated experiences. The "feeling" of free will is one sensation that could be backed up - or some say refuted - by examining it from other perspectives and experiences. I'm still inclined to free will, but these recent books and this discussion are helpful in making me defend my experience and making me question *why* I might maintain that free will exists.

Quote from Onenski

Some philosophers (like Saul Smilansky), however, have concluded that effectively free will skepticism leads to immoral behavior or meaningless lives. In their opinion, we should maintain free will illusion.

This seems to be similar to Dennet's compatibilism: the free will "illusion" has practical benefit so we should continue to live "as if" "free will" is a real thing... even though they don't believe there is such as a thing. Additionally, I find the whole "absence of free will" (just another way, to my thinking, as saying "there is no god") leading to immoral behavior or meaningless lives a fallacy. Which fallacy, I couldn't say (sorry.. .that's an area of study I need to explore!) Dennett tells a similar fable of the "nefarious neurosurgeon" to illustrate the point. I see the point of the story, but it smacks of the "people can't be good without God" argument.

Quote from Onenski

For them, we can't feel resentment when someone hurts us, or gratitude when someone benefits us.

Sapolsky goes down that road, too, but admits he can't maintain it for more than (something like, in his words) 30 seconds at a time every few months. We naturally feel resentment and gratitude naturally arises unbidden (for the "average" human). Other non-human primates appear to express "gratitude," they groom each other, they appear to comfort each other. Emotions, to me, appear to be on a spectrum from rudimentary in less complex animals to chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans. Even if there is "no free will" and actions are determined, nature/evolution has endowed life with the capacity to feel there is and to express and feel emotions.

Quote from Onenski

Finally, how do an epicurean find eudaimonia?: recognizing his place in the universe, studying nature, moderating desires, looking for pleasures, avoiding pain/suffering, feeling satisfied, enjoying time with friends. Is that contradictory with free will skepticism?

I would fully agree that that's how an epicurean finds eudaimonia "well-being." Trying to answer the second part is harder for me. As I understand "free will skepticism" isn't necessarily "determinism" per se. One source simply says "“Free will skepticism” refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action – i.e. the free will – required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. " If that's the case, I would say "free will skepticism" (which implies to me "hard determinism") would be incompatible with Epicurean philosophy. At the root of Epicurean philosophy is that humans have the agency to choose the direction they take their life - to make "choices and rejections" - and praise and blame can be affixed to the choices people take. I see Epicurean philosophy as a philosophy of personal responsibility - we are responsible for the choices we take. Free will skepticism is the exact opposite of that.

That said, the things that Onenski lists (recognizing his place in the universe, studying nature, moderating desires, looking for pleasures, avoiding pain/suffering, feeling satisfied, enjoying time with friends) are all aspects of an Epicurean eudaimonic life. The questions are: How are those things pursued? Why do we pursue those things? Do we make choices to pursue avenues that will lead to this kind of life? Or are we, as Sapolsky and the free will skeptics say, simply the kind of person that would "choose" these things based soley on our genetics, environment, childhood, pre-wired neural activity, etc., and that we cannot in any way be credited with pursuing "good" decisions anymore than we can be blamed for "bad" decisions? There is no personal responsibility for the free will skeptic. If you're leading a eudaimonic life, that's just the life you *had* to lead. If you've done things that hurt others, you have no real responsibilty for those actions, but we need to sequester you from the rest of society for other people to get on with their pre-determined lives.

I'm going to have to explore Mitchell more, and this whole topic. But I don't think these are necessarily "metaphysical" questions. I think we can explore, study, scan, etc., etc., and at some point come up with answers. Maybe we don't have "free will" - we certainly have constrained choices! I "freely" admit that. But I don't think we can state definitely - a la Sapolsky and others - that we've determined there is no free will.. at least at this point in time.

Remember... Happiness = ευδαιμονία (eudaimonia) in Epicurus. Eidaimonia does not carry the same semantic connotations that "happiness" does in English. I truly dislike that translation

What Latin word does Cicero use?

Quote from Cassius

the swerve of the atom giving rise to "choice"

I'll have to read your Sedley and Long papers again, but I don't see how the "swerve" - by definition a random event if I understand - can lead to a macro level volitional "choice" exercised by an free agent on the individual level.

I'm reading Mitchell's blog.

Undetermined - a response to Robert Sapolsky. Part 1 - a tale of two neuroscientists

Free will is in the air. Among neuroscientists at least, the question of whether we are in control of our actions has been attracting renewe...

www.wiringthebrain.com

I was originally attracted to Dennett's compatibilism stance, because I wanted to keep my free will but was enamored of the scientific (read: deterministic) arguments. However, that stance seems less tenable now to me. It's still a deterministic wolf in free will clothes.

Mitchell, on the other hand, seems just as hard-nosed scientifically as Sapolsky and Dennett but appears at first blush to provide a mechanism for free will, or more accurately maybe free agency. That line, which I am still very much exploring, seems more "compatible" with Epicurus' position.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

I've prattled on long enough for now... Satisfied, Cassius

Yes, very satisfied, thank you!

I do hope my good-natured invocation of your name in my post came across that way Thanks for the nudge!

I've been looking around about Kevin J Mitchell and found this review of his book with links to blog posts of his reacting to Sapolsky:

Book review – Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will

A tightly argued and compelling case in favour of free will, Free Agents provides thought-provoking ideas that are relevant far beyond this debate.

inquisitivebiologist.com

Mitchell's position seems very interesting and possibly fruitful. Nothing more from me at the moment, but posting here to share.

I noticed waay back on post #34, Cassius called me out for re-initiating this thread and then stepping back, grabbing popcorn, and watching it all unfold. In deference to him, I feel I should weigh in BUT I have greatly enjoyed the erudite and in-depth discussion taking place!! You all have *obviously* given this topic a great deal of thought. And I *fully* concur and applaud Cassius's "administrative note" to keep everything in context. My nudge just.. yesterday?...way back on post @20 has generated...I'd even say "caused" ... some wonderful and thought-provoking posts and far exceeded what I had anticipated. Thank you all!

And, thank you to Kalosyni for posting the info about Kevin J. Mitchell. I was completely unaware of him, but I'll have to put his book Free Agents on my list now!

I'm afraid my contribution is going to be woefully inadequate to this conversation, but I'll lay my cards on the table...first general, then specifically Epicurean...

There is nothing that doesn't have a cause. There is no uncaused caused or an effect that comes into being sui generis with no antecedent cause. That just seems simple physical reality to me. However, everything has numerous - if not infinite - causes. All those lines of causation collide and contribute to any physical, material phenomenon... from the toppling of a particular tree in a particular forest to the decisions I make. I like the words used earlier (by Pacatus ?) that the "choices" (and I'll use "scare quotes" for now) we make are constrained choices. Theoretically, I have an infinite or at least innumerable options to choose from at any given moment. As I write this, I could decide:

• just to randomly punch the keys and produce gibberish
• or to stop typing and to not hit send
• or to throw my laptop across the room
• or to attempt to chew the corner off my screen or...

but I feel I am a rational being with something to relate to my Epicurean friends on the forum, and so I continue to type and relay my thoughts. My choices are, in practice, not infinite or innumerable but constrained to a finite selection of realistic choices I could be predicted to take. Does that make them "determined"? Can they be predicted? Maybe, within a statistical margin of error...but does that mean they're determined? I guess it depends on your definition of "determined."

I feel there was discussion on the difference between deterministic and fatalistic. I think that remains significant. Even Sapolsky allows for change...although I admit I'm not sure I followed his argument. Change seems to go against his other parts of his argument. If by determined, we mean causes with effects, that's true to some extent. If by fated, we mean the outcome could have been no other than it was... that one I have problems with... but I can't necessarily articulate (at this point) why.

Take the view from the other end of my choices or the effects... looking back over my own life and those of my relatives and ancestors, I can see the effects of individual choices on the future lives of myself and those others. But those past decisions, even now, don't feel determined. Some feel random. But others feel like there was a "decision" that was weighed and made. Again, causes leading to effects becoming causes of future events leading to... you get the idea.

So... that all didn't get us anywhere... "Thanks, Don."

But I also promised some Epicurean thoughts...

We've seen Epicurus's message to Menoikeus: "Remember that what will be is not completely within our control nor completely outside our control, so that we will not completely expect it to happen nor be completely disappointed if it does not happen." (127, Saint-Andre) This, to me, recognizes the element of indeterminacy of our lives. Somethings are going to happen to us that we have no control over; and somethings will not happen for us regardless of whether want it or not.

We also read in verses 134-135 about Fate not being a god because Fate does things haphazardly and randomly. Epicurus also clearly states that we can assign praise and blame to people's actions, directly opposite of the direction Sapolsky wants to go. BUT Sapolsky and Epicurus both agree that bad actors - people who do things against the social contract - need to be removed from society for the good of the other members of society. Sapolsky just thinks there shouldn't be blame assigned to the actions.

The character of Torquatus in On Ends also has a pertinent quote (emphasis added): "In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures (i.e., chooses) pains to avoid worse pains." The Epicurean position is clearly that we are not constrained in our ability to make choices... but it seems to me that those choices are predicated on the character of the individual, the taking into account the future effects of those choices which will, in turn, be the *causes* of those future pleasures or pains. The choices we make are *still* constrained by taking into account what we desire weighed against the future states those choices will engender.

I've prattled on long enough for now... Satisfied, Cassius

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Kalosyni I have not read Harris's book. On my list but not yet.

Hey Don - You started this latest iteration of the Determinism saga and then you never weighed in yourself!!!

Sorry. Things came up. It's turned into a little of "Let the games begin!" It's on my agenda for this evening.

Kalosyni I have not read Harris's book. On my list but not yet.

Here's a debate between Dennett and Sapolsky. Skimmed thru but applicable.

I'm going to resurrect this thread since I think there are some good, thought-provoking points, and it mentions Sapolsky who recently came out with an even more provocative book than Behave:

Determined
A SCIENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT FREE WILL

Determined by Robert M. Sapolsky: 9780525560975 | PenguinRandomHouse.com: Books

The instant New York Times bestseller “Excellent…Outstanding for its breadth of research, the liveliness of the writing, and the depth of humanity it…

www.penguinrandomhouse.com

There's also a recent Clear and Vivid episode:

Robert Sapolsky: You Have No Choice - Clear+Vivid with Alan Alda

Learn to connect better with others in every area of your life. Immerse yourself in spirited conversations with people who know how hard it is, and yet how…

pca.st

The points earlier in the thread of determinism vs fatalism are very pertinent to this discussion. So, here we go again.... Discuss.... More later from me.

If they could proide Greek transcripts, run them through Google Translate at least.