Posts by Don

Excellent points and questions! These kinds of discussions are why I think it's so important to not only debate different translations but how to interpret the original language as well. This is just a first response. I'm not addressing directly yet your "How much time DO I need?" but that's important as well. The only thing on that which comes to mind is the beginning of the letter to Menoikos: Let no one put off the love and practice of wisdom [note] when young, nor grow tired of it when old.That doesn't address duration but only "Don't waste it while you have it!" I'll cogitate some more on this one.

To address the "best life," your question made me curious if the phrases ἀρίστου βίου "the best life" and παντελῆ βίον "the complete life" show up anywhere else in the works, essentially asking Epicurus to define his terms (although he may dislike that characterisation).

Interestingly, as far as I can tell, those two phrases only occur as phrases in PD 20. However, παντελῆ shows up one more time in the next PD:

PD 21: Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων. Hicks translation: He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by conflict and struggle.

Here we also again find the "limits of life" (τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου) as well as "the whole of life complete and perfect" (τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ). So, from this, I interpret the "complete life" to be described by Epicurus as one in which one "has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by conflict and struggle." One is maximizing pleasure and minimizing conflict and struggle. That's the best life. And we achieve it through applying the Canon.

Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος ἀρέσκοι ἄν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη· <οὐ> μὴν ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονὴν οὔθ’ ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν.

Saint-Andre translation: The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time. But the mind, reasoning out the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet the mind does not flee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it has missed any aspect of the best life.

Ἡ σὰρξ isn't just "the flesh." Liddell and Scott give the additional definition, citing the Vatican Sayings: II. "the flesh, as the seat of the affections and lusts, fleshly nature, “ἐν τῇ ς. ἡ ἡδονή” Epicur. Sent.18, cf. Sent.Vat. 33." So, Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα can be translated as "Our 'fleshly nature' assumes as its due that the bounds of pleasure are infinite (without bounds)…" The flesh feels it is *due* infinite pleasures, and that ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος ἀρέσκοι ἄν. … only infinite time will satisfy them...

ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν Here we find the part preceded by δὲ so this part will contrast with the first part's μὲν section. Contrasting with σὰρξ/σαρκὸς, διάνοια is intelligence, understanding. τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος are the fleshly nature's goals (τέλους) and boundaries/limits (πέρατος, the word we saw in the first sentence). Nussbaum's Therapy of Desire translates this passage as "Reason… by driving out the fear of eternity (τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους), makes life complete." "Life complete" is conveyed by τὸν παντελῆ βίον. I contend that this is one of the more important phrases in the original Greek. This is the kind of life that is produced by following the Epicurean path. Again, we have to delve into Epicurus' words to really appreciate what he's saying. Παντελῆ derives from παν "all, every" + τέλος "goal, end" but not just any goal or end, the ultimate, fully-accomplished end of something, its fully-realized purpose. So, Epicurus is calling us to a life where he believes we can find that every goal is accomplished, every purpose fulfilled IF we understand the limits of pleasure and desire. That will provide us with τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου "the best life" of all the possible ways of living. Pleasure remains pleasure, but, if we were ruled entirely by our σαρξ we would feel we deserve - indeed, are due! - infinite pleasure which entails the requirement that we need infinite time and must therefore see death as an evil. However, our διάνοια allows us to make choices and rejections based on a goal of leading both the complete and the best life right here and right now.

Quote from Cassius

Also, it seems to me that Marcus Aurelius is usually portrayed with actual "curls" rather than just wavy hair. This figure we are talking about comes pretty close to that, but I don't think the face and neck structure really looks like Aurelius.

Of course, we're also most likely dealing with an 18th-century jeweler's interpretation of an ancient Greek portrait trying to appeal to his customer's expectations filtered through...

Customer wants portrait ring of X. Jeweller: "Oh yeah, that's totally a portrait of X on that ring."

You get the idea.

Quote from Cassius

Eugenios you are clearly in another league in your research abilities - thank you! What is your view on the resemblance and whether that is intended to be Epicurus? I looked at it again and it still seems to me that the figure looks "stockier" than Epicurus is generally portrayed, but I am still on the fence. You?

You're too kind. I'm just a librarian. I can't help myself

Far be it from me to second guess the museum, but… To me, the beard doesn't seem full enough for Epicurus. Here are some images for comparison I found:

• 19th c. Epicurus ring
• Of course, this and many other examples of Epicurus rings from our own website here
• Marcus Aurelius ring and another Marcus ring. These actually look more like the museum ring with the curly hair and short beard.

All this isn't to say that the museum doesn't know for a fact that the ring is Epicurus. They may very well have proof or more provenance that I haven't found. But the Marcus connection would make sense with Bligh's military career, too.

Joshua made some very good points in the post above worth exploring.

Thoughts?

Thanks, SamJ ! Thatt is interesting. I also found the museum's webpage for the artifact. Oddly, it doesn't mention the Epicurus connection there. I was hoping for a definite "here's why we think that."

Here's the link for the letter that accompanied the ring.

Elen síla lummen' omentielvo, melkor ... If I remember my Quenya

I *think* I know the answer, but I'm going to throw this out there on this thread. No doubt I will engender some responses.

Here is my query:

IF our "Choices and Rejections" make it possible for us to discern and decide which pleasures to choose and which pains to reject (and vice versa), is the "faculty" that *allows* us to make those choices and rejections (wisdom? prudence?) more important than the pleasures themselves? Or are the pleasures themselves (once they are chosen) that will lead to more pleasures the important part?

In other words: The Goal, the Telos, the Greatest Good is Pleasure; BUT the way to achieve the goal - the way to walk the path - is through the wisdom to make those choices and rejections. Pleasure = Goal; Wisdom (to make choices/rejections) = Instrumental Means... like Virtue is a Means to the Goal.

Have I answered my own question? Thoughts?

I find Elli 's article fascinating. I had never considered the possibility that Epicurus' vomiting could have been a symptom and not just a fabrication of his detractors. That would have been a perfect opportunity for selective truth-telling on the part of Timocrates and others. People could say, "Oh yeah, I have seen Epicurus doing that. So *that's* what he's up to! That Timocrates was one of them for awhile. He should know. Those Epicureans are so debauched!" And getting insight into what it might have been like for him living with chronic kidney disease does she light on some of the teachings.

Quote from Cassius

Yes, and when we get to that point it will be oh-so-easy for the antiEpicureans to simply push a button and all but erase Epicurean history from human consciousness.

Well, *that* certainly sent a chill down my spine!

I guess it all depends then on how we specifically define "experience machine." It seems the Experience Machine is in the same realm as unicorns and centaurs.

Quote from Elayne

Our ability to perceive through our senses is critical to being able to choose pleasure. In making this imaginary choice, a person typically tries to "double" themselves-- but they can't fully double. They can't really let go of the pre-machine condition of knowing that life would be going on without them-- that they wouldn't really be seeing their friends, only imagining it. That they would miss out on the pleasure of knowing they are really there for their friends-- the pleasure of _being_ a friend. That creates a pain in the imagination which can't be removed in the hypothetical. It has nothing to do with valuing something other than pleasure. It is an inability to believe there would not be a feeling of painful loss in the machine. A sort of anticipatory loss. And no matter how many times you reassure a person that they won't know they've lost reality, they can't imagine it. So a normal person will not choose the machine.

Well, this thread started to fill up quickly!

I would agree with this line of reasoning from Elayne (if I understand where she's coming from). To respond to Cassius from my original post and to rephrase some of my own terminology, I don't think I'm, in retrospect, advocating for "true" vs "false" pleasures. What I was trying to get at were pleasures received through the senses of taste, touch, smell, etc., as opposed to pleasures implanted directly in the brain, bypassing the senses entirely. If I remember correctly, Epicurus could not conceive of pleasures without these sensory inputs and likewise the pleasurable life cannot be lived "without living wisely and well and justly". The Machine takes away the ability to both sense things and to live "wisely and well and justly." This doesn't make Wisdom superior to Pleasure, it removes the entire possibility of sensing pleasure in any meaningful way. Epicurus says that one sense cannot override or contradict another sense (I believe) so what the Machine is doing is tricking the nose into believing it is smelling, the eyes into believing they are seeing, etc. But the "mind"'s purpose is in comprehending ideas and concepts (mental images). I realize the brain senses everything but the Machine isn't sensing molecules of scent or light rays entering the eyes. That's the distinction I was attempting to get at with "true" vs "false."

Enjoying the discussion!

I am so glad you started this thread! The Experience Machine argument against Epicureans has always struck me as specious, and I appreciate the opportunity for us to discuss it.
I would argue that if I was a Cyrenaic, I may indeed hook myself up to the Experience Machine.
However, my perspective has always been that Epicurus calls us to experience pleasure by using our feelings of pleasure and pain to choose or reject actions based on our experience of the physical universe informed by our senses and prolepses. We exercise our free will in making those choices and rejections based on that sensory input to maximize pleasure in our lives.
The Experience Machine is merely a simulation of the universe that doesn't provide "real" pleasure or pain but merely the illusion of pleasure. If our physical body is floating in some vat of goo with wires hooked up to our brains *feeding* us sensory pleasures that the Machine is choosing for us, that doesn't strike me as true pleasure. We also don't have real friendships in this scenario. We have simulated friendships with "friends" designed by the Machine.
Ah! But then is the ability to choose and reject the highest good? Is the Faculty of Free Will to Make Choices and Rejections itself the Highest Good? I would say no, but I'm willing to entertain that that appears to be open to discussion. I counter that the very act of choosing is itself a pleasure.
I'm looking forward to reading everyone's posts!

Quote from Cassius

Also, Eugenios, just in case you have not seen this link: http://epikur-wuerzburg.de/aktivitaeten/thv/

This is great! I have not seen this. Thanks!!

For anyone who wants to see another drawing of the actual papyrus on which the tetrapharmakos is written, check out this link to Internet Archive. This is the entire papyrus (drawn presumably from the original in Herculaneum before it crumbled no doubt). The subscript (title: PHILODEMOU PROS TOUS ...) is on p. 158 of the digitized book. The tetrapharmakos page is on 126. For some reason, the book seems to go backwards. STILL looking for an accessible translation of the whole scroll in English (or even any other language for that matter). I have citations but no one is providing any of them online. The hunt continues.

I hear you! "Mysterious ways" and all that. Happy Twentieth!!

Quote

KD 16 Βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.

KD 16 Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason. (Saint-Andre translation)

Have you seen this:

http://mediterraneannetworks.weebly.com/exclusive-phil…epicureans.html

I have no idea who this person is, but it appears they're quoting directly from PHerc 1005 using their own translation (as they state), presumably using those images of the manuscript online or using Angeli's transcription possibly. Here's the About page for the website (university students created the site?).

The intriguing excerpt that jumped out at me about the content of PHerc 1005 was:

Quote

Philodemus is outraged by certain Epicureans who had not read complete texts by the founder, but only summeries:

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγνωσμένος ἢ καὶ διιστορη̣μένος ὑ̣π’ ἡμῶν, ὃς καί φησι εἶν̣[α]ι̣ ὁ̣ γνήσιος ἀναγνώ̣[σ]τ̣ης ἐ̣π̣ὶ γραφὰς [ἐγλεκ]τὰς κα[ὶ πλ]ήθη συγγρ̣α̣[μμ]άτων, κἂν βάλ̣ηι̣ [γ]ε̣ [κα]λῶς, ἀνείληφε πολ[λὰ]ς̣ ἐγλογὰς καὶ τῶν μ[ὲ]ν̣ ἐπὶ μέρους διανο[η]μάτων ἀπειρότατός ἐστιν. ἃ δὲ προστάττεται ποι̣εῖν, ἐπὶ κεφάλαι[α βλέ]πει, καθάπερ ὃν λ[έγου]σιν ἐκ βυβλίου κυβ[ερνήτ]η̣ν̣ καὶ διὰ παντ[ός - - -]

He who claims to know us and to be instructed by us, who claims to be a genuine reader of various writings and of complete books, even if he says something correctly, he has only memorized various quotations and does not know the multitude of our thoughts. What he has to do, he looks up in summeries, like people who believe that they [can learn to be] steersman from books and [can cross every ocean].

Phil. PHerc. 1005 Col. 4.2-18. The text in the brackets is my own attempt to fill in the gaps in the papyrus. All translations on this page are my own.

It is not possible, Philodemus argues, to be a decent philosopher without reading the founder's original texts, in the same way that nobody can learn to steer a ship without practical experience. Somewhat ironically, Philodemus tries to encourage people to read the original texts with an example where reading lots of books is counteractive. In addition, further in this text Philodemus writes that not reading enough is unforgivable for Epicureans:

ἀλλὰ τὸ σχετλιώτατ̣ο̣[ν] ἐκεῖν̓ ἐστὶν̣ [ἐ]πὶ τοῖς πλείοσιν τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ὃ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βυβλί[ο]ις ἀ[νε]ν̣εργησίαν ἀπαραίτητο[ν ποιεῖ...]

but the most shocking thing of most Epicureans is the unforgivable inactivity in regards to the books...

Phil. PHerc. 1005 col. 14.13-18.

Philodemus is not satisfied with second-hand knowledge of the doctrine. For him, it is a requirement that every Epicurean is well-versed in the writings of their master: these are, after all, the ties that bind the community together. According to Philodemus, someone cannot be an Epicurean if he has not read the founding texts. This attitude would have dire consequences: books were expensive in antiquity, and aside from the writings of Amafinius (which, according to Cicero, were not of any value), there were no philosophical texts in Latin. It was necessary to be proficient in Greek in order to read the works of Epicurus, if one was able to read at all. With these requirements, Philodemus was effectively excluding the larger part of the Italian population from 'his' philosophy.

An important question in this is whether Philodemus wanted to actively exclude the new converts from his philosophical network. Was he really worried that people who did not know the original writings would damage the orthodoxy of the doctrine, or was he afraid that the reputation of the Epicureans, including himself, as members of an intellectual elite was be at stake? Would Philodemus have wanted the whole world to be Epicurean, or did he value being a member of an exclusive community? We will never be able to completely determine which it is, but I myself suspect that Philodemus was torn between the two. It is never be possible to be completely selfless, but Philodemus was trying his best to live after the teachings of his master.

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And I concur with your concerns, Cassius . From the sounds of it in these reviews, no one knows what the title was, and ΠΡΟC can mean both "to/towards" or "against (in a hostile sense)" but my understanding (rudimentary as it is) is that the latter meaning has the accusative case after it which is indeed ΤΟΥC (plural, accusative article: "the" [group of people]). And so Philodemus is writing a treatise "against" those people... Whether those people are fellow Epicureans or not, that's a scholarly question.

So, you're right to ask: Is the Tetrapharmakos a verse showing how it SHOULD be done or an example of a "watered down" version he disapproves of? My very basic beginner ancient Greek is nowhere near good enough to guess at an answer to that!!

I think this link is as close as we'll get to the manuscript itself. My understanding is that that is a transcription of the actual manuscript page itself with the Tetrapharmakos verses. As for the rest of the manuscript.

This is the rest of PHerc. 1005.

And this is the specific page with the title/subscription:

ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ

ΠΡΟCΤΟΥC

Philodemou (Of Philodemus)

Pros Toys (Against the...)

You can see the last word has been torn from the bottom so ANY conjecture on what the final word of the title is just that: conjecture.

Quote from Cassius

Another related question: What is the authority for referring to this as the "tetrapharmakos"?

The word itself appears in the image of PHerc. 1005 on the Wikipedia page. On the first line of the image of the manuscript after the first hole on the left are the letters:

( )ΤΕΤΡΦΑΡ.ΜΑ

ΚΟCΑΦΟΒΟΝΟΘΕΟCΑΝ

which is

Tetrapharma...

kos.Aphobon.ho.theos.an...

So the term is right there introducing the first line of the of the four verses.

Spaced out and transliterated in upper/lower case for easier reading, the letters on the image on the scroll would be:
Tetrapharmakos
Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, (transliterated: Aphobon ho theos)
ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος (anupopton ho thanatos)
καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, (kai tagathon [to + agathon] men eukteton)
τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον (to de deinon euekkartereton)

My own literal translation (with more alternatives shared below):
God is no cause for fear.
Death is free from risk.
The Highest Good is easily procured,
While the Terrible is easy to endure.

Line by line:
Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός,
1a. Ἄφοβος causing no fear, free from fear (a + phobon)
1b. ὁ θεός with the singular article, god/God BUT Liddell & Scott give an interesting alternative definition at 1.d. ὁ θ., of natural phenomena. So, an interesting *possibility* would be, paraphrasing, "We have nothing to fear from the gods or natural phenomenon."

ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος

2a. ἀνύποπτος LSJ: without suspicion; i.e., free from risk
2b. θάνατος death

καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, (NOTE: καὶ = and; μὲν... δὲ... in lines 3 & 4 simply show those two phrases are connected. Clunky translations would be "One the one hand,...; on the other hand,...)

3a. τἀγαθὸν can be thought of as “the highest good” "The Good" (to + agathon) So, is this actually refer to Pleasure, "The Highest Good" "Pleasure is easy to obtain"?
3c. εὔκτητον “honestly acquired” per LSJ (Phld.Sto.339.4.), easily gotten. From: εὔ-κτητος, ον “good, well” + “that may be gotten”

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον
4a. τὸ (δὲ) δεινὸν “fearful, terrible; danger, suffering, horror” (TRIVIA: This "deino" is the "dino" in "dinosaur = terrible lizard")
4b. εὐεκκαρτέρητον “easy to endure”
As above is "τὸ δεινὸν to deinon" The Terrible referring to Pain? Pleasure is easy to obtain, and Pain can be endured.?

So another alternative:

There is nothing to fear from gods or natural phenomenon,

There is no afterlife of which to be suspicious,

And Pleasure is easy to obtain,

while Pain can be easily endured.

Food for thought.

Cassius has also expressed interest in finding out more about PHerc 1005 in which the tetrapharmakos is found. The following provide some context for the work and was found in two reviews of Anna Angeli's work in JSTOR:

The following citation and excerpt were in Italian. I used Google Translate (see below)

1st Work from JSTOR:
Review
Reviewed Work(s): L'ira. volume V, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Filodemo, Giovanni Indelli and
Marcello Gigante; Frammenti. volume VI, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Ermarco, Francesca Longo Auricchio and Marcello Gigante; Agli Amici di Scuola (P. Herc. 1005). volume VII, (ed. Bibliopolis) by null Filodemo, Anna Angeli and Marcello Gigante; La poesia. volume IX, (ed. Bibliopolis) by Demetrio Lacone, Costantina Romeo and Marcello Gigante
Review by: Elisabetta Martelli
Source: Aegyptus, Anno 69, No. 1/2 (gennaio-dicembre 1989), pp. 288-293
Published by: Vita e Pensiero – Pubblicazioni dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41217138

Excerpt from 291-2 using Google Translate for Italian > English

In her Introduction, Angeli deals with the difficult task of reconstructing the subject, structure, doctrine, title and dating of Philodemus' Ad Contubernales treatise, preserved by P. Herc. 1005 with serious gaps especially in the initial part (p. 25 ff.). The work has a controversial content, as revealed not only by the contents, but also by the subscription, of which only "Philodemou Pros tous .." survives. A careful investigation on several fronts allows the scholar to exclude a controversy by Philodemus against philosophers from other schools, and leads her to glimpse a lively debate within the Epicurean school itself; confirming an intuition already of Gigante, Angeli admits as possible the integration "Pros tous [synethes]", or "Pros tous I [hetairous]", or similar; worthy of note is the accepted hypothesis that "Pros" can be interpreted with the meaning of ad, rather than with the value of adversus (pp. 71-75); the work is dated around the middle of the first century. B.C. Angeli dedicates large sections of her research to the study of the three topics around which it is possible to reconstruct the controversy of Philodemus against classmates. The first argument concerns the accusation, evidently addressed to the Epicureans of the school of Athens, of venerating the figure of the wise philosopher as the mass of men venerates the gods; Angeli presents it in a chapter entitled "Logoi eis apeiron ekpiptontes", with the aim of underlining the logical and gnoseological principle to which Philodemus refers to refute the accusation (fr. 77), according to a typically epicurean procedure; in conclusion, Philodemus shows the interlocutor critic that the reverence towards the wise is fully licit, and was born as an act of gratitude for the benefits received from his philosophical teachings, while the reprehensible cult of the gods, proper to the mass, arises from the false prejudice that from them descend the good to which man aspires and the unexpected evil; the debate is felt by the scholar as a sign of the need for a part of Epicureanism of the first century. B.C. to limit the religious characterization of the cult to the essay proper to the school (pp. 29-37). The second topic concerns the nature of the summaries, epitomes and maxims, which played a large part in the spread of Epicureanism on the initiative of the Master himself, but which in the course of time inevitably led to a certain trivialization and simplification of the doctrine; the debate on this theme is reconstructed with great detail by Angeli, according to which it testifies, already for the second half of the second century. BC, a strand of Greek Epicureanism that spread the doctrine among ever wider social strata, but with tools not approved by the Athens school. The famous maxim of tetrapharmakoe mentioned in col. V 1-6, is finally attributed to Philodemus himself, rather than Epicurus (pp. 37-61). The third argument enters into the merits of Epicurus' struggle against traditional "paideia", and of the subsequent problem of characterizing doctrine as a democratic or aristocratic philosophy, strongly felt by the Epicureans themselves; Philodemus clashes with the other Epicureans precisely on the system's diffusion program (pp. 61-70).

2nd excerpt from JSTOR:
Review
Reviewed Work(s): Filodemo, Agli Amici di Scuola (Pherc. 1005) by Anna Angeli; Demetrio
Lacone, Aporie Testuali ed Esegetiche in Epicuro (Pherc. 1012) by Enzo Puglia; Demetrio
Lacone, La Poesia (Pherc. 188 e 1014) by Costantina Romeo; Carneisco, Il Secondo Libro del
Filista (Pherc. 1027) by Mario Capasso
Review by: Phillip de Lacy
Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 111, No. 4 (Winter, 1990), pp. 573-577
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/295250

The latest of these texts is 1005 (vol. 7), a work of Philodemus. By the time of Philodemus, early first century B.C., the Epicureans were adapting their teachings to changing times and circumstances. Questions of orthodoxy arose, and Philodemus participated in the resultant controversies. In 1005 he accuses certain unnamed Epicureans of failing to follow the teaching of Epicurus, and in support of his position he quotes and explicates passages from Epicurus' writings. Angeli, who gives in her introduction a good account of the history of controversy within the school, presents a text that differs at many points from that of E Sbordone (Naples, 1947). She rejects outright some of Sbordone's restorations, including those that appear as fragments 262 and 263 in the second edition of Arrighetti's Epicuro. Others are greatly altered. An important passage in 1005 is Philodemus' quotation from a letter almost certainly by Epicurus that mentions Aristotle's Analytics and Physics, frag. 13 Sbordone, frag. 127 Arrighetti, and now frag. 111 Angeli. Aristotle is still there, but Crates has disappeared, Aristippus is now author of a work Su Socrate, and there is a new entry, Speusippus' Encomium of Plato. Angeli's comment on this passage is seven pages long, and indeed her restoration is attractive, except that one might question whether Aristippus' work had the title "Peri Sokratous"; see the lists of Aristippus' writings in Diog. Laer. ii. 84-85.
The title that Angeli gives to the papyrus is also questionable. All that remains of the subscription is "Philodemou Pros tous". Taking "pros" as expressing opposition, Sbordone, and Vogliano before him, supplied "sophistas". Angeli, however, believing that Philodemus is addressing his associates, supplies "hetairous". But the Epicureans, so far as I can discover, did not address each other as hetairoi. In Epicurus, frag. 119 Arrighetti, hetairos does not refer to a member of the school, and the hetairos of Diogenes of Oenoanda (frag. 16 11 Chilton) is beginning the study of philosophy and is not committed to Epicureanism. The feminine hetaira, courtesan, was used in attacks on the school (see Plut. Mor 1129B, Diog. Laer. x.6), and Angeli introduces ieaita as a conjecture in 1005.
The similar entry in Usener's Glossarium Epicureum is also a conjecture. But even if these conjectures should be correct, they give no support to the view that the Epicureans addressed each other as hetairoi. When Epicurus wrote to his followers he called them philoi.
Another uncertainty bearing on Angeli's title is the question whether in this papyrus Philodemus is addressing one person or a group. Some of the second-person forms are singular, some plural. Angeli's solution is that he is addressing a group but sometimes limits his address to one member of the group. Possibly, but since JtQ6g is ambiguous, it is better to leave the question of the title unanswered.