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Are you all talking about Epicurus.info?
I checked https://whois-web.rrpproxy.net/ for the domain and most of the contact info was redacted for privacy. It looks looks it's registered in the Netherlands and the server names are three women's names but that doesn't mean anything. It looked like it was due for renewal in November 2020.
LOL. I had the exact opposite reaction. I saw the piercing eyes, serious brow, and clarity of the photo picking up the luster of the marble. Every curve of his hair and beard stood out. The fact that you could see it 360° in different lighting attracted me as well.
This image is listed as public domain by the museum that holds it. At some point we should think about a central location for all images of Epicurus known to be in the public domain.
That's a great find!! Looking forward to your project!
There's also the Flickr Commons. I did a quick Epicurus search:
https://www.flickr.com/search/?w=commons&q=Epicurus
I'm not sure why some came up, but there are a couple public domain Epicurus statue drawings.
Oops, I guess it's the copyright holder that owns the rights to make derivative works. Mea culpa.
But you might be able to argue fair use on educational grounds. But honestly, I'm seeing that same image on book jackets and other things. I think you're in the clear 
Disclaimer: i am not a lawyer not do I give legal advice. Sorry, standard librarian disclaimer.
And a timeless quandary; to what extent are photographs of these old sculptures protected by copyright?
Call it fair use (unless you're making money) and derivative works.
I think it comes back to Elayne 's comment about evidence. It's not enough to use reason, we need evidence as "seen" by our senses (and the extension of our senses through instruments etc.).
"strikes me" Well done!
1. Agreed.
2. Partially agree. "Real to us" seems too subjective for everything. There are some things that are "real" or true for the individual but there is also an objective reality we all need to agree on. (We won't get into the ultimate nature of reality here! I'm just talking about the everyday real world in which we move around in here.)
3. Agreed.
4. Agreed. No God needed.
5. Agreed. No need for Platonic Forms.
Some great points to consider, Godfrey and Cassius . Jumping off from your points, here is what I'm beginning to formulate about the prolepses:
I need to think and read more but that gets thinking out there in summary for review.
I just read DeWitt's section of Anticipations and find myself largely in agreement with him. I also see that he did NOT accept the idea of having a prolepsis of an ox, etc., for individual words.
Just finishing lunch break so back to work... But more later!
Don, I wonder if you have the same concern about this as your earlier concern?
Sort of. (Oh, that's helpful, right?)
The more I read the current scholarship (and there seems to be a WIDE spectrum of thoughts) on prolepses, there definitely seems to be a language component. So, a "prolepsis of truth" seems to me to maybe simply be the faculty to recognize a true vs false statement in some way.
My problem, consternation, uneasiness comes in when we have statements like:
Those are not equivalent statements when it comes to determining their being true vs. false.
(1) can be resolved from observation and doesn't really need a prolepsis of "truth" because our senses will resolve whether it's true.
(2) cannot be resolved by observation. That statement is connected to somebody's internal/personal Truth (capital T) and, so, again I don't think it falls under a prolepsis because it would be innate. That seems more like a case of holding an empty or incorrect opinion.
There also seems to be some scholarship that tries to make the prolepsis of the divine (That they are blessed, immortal, etc.) a special case, but I don't think - personally - that Epicurus would create a category - prolepsis - to cover only one case. And if the prolepsis about the gods is innate, I would *think* that all prolepses are innate and pre-rational, especially if they're part of the Canon and used in determining a correct version of reality.
I just found this article by Dr. Voula. It appears to have some good summaries of the current scholarship on the prolepses, and she gives her own take as well. I've only just begun reading, but a couple things jumped out so far including this list:
In the first place, an examination of early Epicurean texts intimates that the range of objects of which we have preconceptions includes: natural kinds, such as man, horse and cow; abstract entities, for instance justice, utility and truth; moral and psychological attitudes like responsibility and agency; and non-perceptible items, such as gods and atoms. Preconceptions of these objects always have an evidential basis. One acquires the preconception of cow through repeated clear impressions of cows, that of justice by perceiving many just acts, that of moral responsibility by being exposed to acts of praise and blame, and the prolēpsis of atoms as constantly moving by observing corpuscula dancing in the light. However, the evidence makes it reasonably clear that only some of our concepts are preconceptions formed in the aforementioned way, while all other concepts are formed by internal mental processes in which the mind plays a role. ‘All notions arise by means of confrontation, analogy, similarity and combination, with some contribution from reasoning as well’ (DL 10.32).
The list is helpful, but I'm not sure I accept the conclusions. I find it interesting that she includes truth in the abstract concepts list! I'd like to know where that comes from in the texts to provide some context.
Prolepses are also described elsewhere as being innate, and, if they're innate, that seems to mean they are inborn. So, Tsouna's contention that they require multiple experiences doesn't seem to line up with that idea of innateness.
Onthe other hand, consider the acquiring of language by babies and toddlers (to look at the prolepses of language, e.g., cow, man, horse, etc.). My contention would be that as we are acquiring the words of our individual language (man, άνθρωπος, l'homme, etc.) we are attaching these to prolepses of the general meaning of man, car, house, tower, etc. These are NOT Platonic Forms but mental images we will immediately access when we again hear or read or imagine those concepts.
But is this prolepses or simply memory? For me, the innateness and reflexive automatic pre-rational access of the prolepses would argue against this kind of formation of prolepses. I'm much more inclined to the instinctual, inborn faculties as being the prolepses.
I'll have to study the texts and the scholarship more, but this is where my head is at right now.
Speaking of sweetness and bitterness.. and revisiting Clear & Vivid with Alan Alda... Here is an episode of that podcast that got me thinking of the prolepsis of sweet = good & bitter = bad. The guest talks about tiny worms that seek out sweet things and avoid bitter things. I think I can see the idea of the proto-prolepsis in the worm but I'm not sure if others would see the sensations or the reactions (pleasure/pain) or all three of the Canon working in concert. I believe this is in the first half of the episode if you get a chance to listen.
I suppose I may be weaseling my way out of providing more of my current understanding of Epicurean prolepses. I'll try to be brief but also put my opinions out there.
First, I thought this article was interesting in drawing distinctions between Stoic and Epicurean prolepsis.
Now, for me, prolepses are engaged at the instinctual level. Research has shown that animals and babies already have a sense of fairness and "justice" if you will. Check these links here, here, and here to start. And we know Epicurus looked to animals and children for confirmation of the basic tenets.
So, my understanding is that prolepses could be thought of as instinctual or innate, inborn faculties that "grasp" more abstract phenomena like justice and our sensations grasp more concrete phenomena like sights, sounds, tactile sensations, etc.
That's why I don't think we need a prolepsis of Truth. Something either agrees with our sensations or it doesn't. I don't think that's the same as recognizing whether something is just or not and hence needing a prolepsis.
Wouldn't this be the prolepsis? In a universe of atoms and void there is no Truth, only truths.
Thanks for that quote, Godfrey ! I would say no, that's not the prolepsis (or a prolepsis), but let me explain.
This was actually the point I was originally trying to make. "The Truth" with a capital T and scare quotes doesn't exist. That seems to me to be a Platonic ideal that has no relation to the real world. I would agree with your quote in that the only things we have are true facts as ascertained by observation and evidence. That way, we don't get into arguments about my Truth vs your Truth. What do the observations say are true facts. Otherwise, we're arguing about internal mental constructs that may or may not be connected to things able to be perceived. If someone believes the existence of God is Truth, can that be observed? Can that be factually ascertained? No? Then it's not a true fact but empty opinion.
I also don't think this recognition of a true fact rises to the level of a prolepsis. Either things correspond to observable phenomena as ascertained by our senses or extensions of our senses (e.g., telescopes, microscopes, instruments, etc.) or they don't. I know the prolepses are a hot topic and I won't go into my (current) understanding of them; but, in summary, I don't think we need to fall back on a prolepsis to determine if an observable fact is true or not. It either corresponds to our observations or it doesn't.
I hope that fleshes out my understanding a little, but I remain open to to reading others takes on this!
I'll do my best
I'm also reading Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and the commentary that you recommended. This does seem to bear directly on the issue at hand, so thanks for that suggestion.
Oh, dear. I did say I was going to respond. I'm going back and listening again to make sure I remember correctly. I'm about 1/2 way through again. Here are some initial thoughts:
I think I'm coming around to the idea that investigation... observation, if you will... of phenomena doesn't have to stop if you're Epicurean. I'm still not sure if I'm onboard with Epicurus and the classical Epicureans being advocates of "science" since science as a method or discipline didn't exist yet. I'm uneasy about imposing anachronistic definitions onto ancient terms, texts, and ideas. That said, Epicurus's φυσιολογίας "physiologias" or the study of Nature/what is natural would imply he wanted an accurate or realistic understanding of natural processes and phenomena. My jury is still out on the implications of this.
I do want to address the conversation in the podcast on truth or Truth with a capital T. I have to disagree with Elayne and others that everyone knows what Truth is. In a quotidian sense, people can understand what true vs false is. "2+2=4" is true. I can count things. "The Earth is flat" is not true but some people will assert that it is true. For them, that statement is true and in some ways Truth. Other people "know" God is real and intercedes in their life and that's True. They would say others who don't believe God is Truth are mistaken (at least). All of humanity does not have a prolepsis of Truth. That would make life easier. Maybe in the most rudimentary sense of true vs false, but I don't think that rises to the level of prolepsis. People know what THEY know is Truth but those other people over there don't know Truth. Unless I've misconstrued the conversation, I think the concept of Truth is much more elusive than some on the panel tried to make it out to be.
PS It appeared to me that Truth was being described as more of a Platonic ideal than as an Epicurean prolepsis in the podcast.
Yes, Godfrey I agree. I can understand the technical issues being discussed by those who challenge "free will" - at least I think I can - but I also observe that those who really get into arguing against "free will" seem to have an agenda with implications that go far more deep than just a desire to be technically correct. Some version of "free will" is something that seems to be just as real to us as pleasure and pain, and from a practical point of view that pretty much ends the discussion of whether it is "real" or not.
I agree, Cassius . I can follow their arguments but I find them unpersuasive most of the time. And I agree that, from a practical perspective, free will is "real."
Godfrey: I recently listened to a podcast with Alan Alda interviewing Brian Greene.
It wasn't the Clear and Vivid episode by any chance, was it? I'm a regular listener of that podcast.
Interesting. It looks like vestigia carries the idea of footprints ("vestigial" marks left over from someone walking):
