Posts by Don

Just downloaded it from my library's Hoopla Digital collection. Looking forward to reading (and commenting).

Poking around on the internet today and came across a 2017 paper abstract on the etymology of the word/name επίκουρος. Looks like researcher traces it back to Indo-European. Granted, a little in the weeds but figured I'd share since we have a vested interest in someone named that

I also was watching a video* recently where the person was pronouncing Epicurus/Επίκουρος with stress on the second syllable: -pi- "e-PI-cur-us". Usually, I hear it and pronounce it "e-pi-CUR-us" when Anglicizing it. I had never heard that other pronunciation before and looked back at the original Greek and, sure enough, the acute accent mark (high tone) is on the -pi-/-πι-. That gives a whole different "flavor" to the sound of our founder's name. Give it a try.

Just found these interesting and thought I'd share.

*I'm not advocating the video content just found the pronunciation novel.

Quote from azbcethananderson

is empathy pleasurable? if its painful, which one is more valuable, empathy or pleasure?

The individual would have to answer that question for themselves. If one derives pleasure from being empathetic, it's pleasurable. However, this also connects with Principal Doctrine 31:

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31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.

Is empathy necessary if our concern is to not be harmed or not harming another? It also depends how "empathy" is defined. It also connects to our choices and rejections. How do we choose to treat others for pleasurable long term consequences for ourselves. I would argue that we will have better outcomes if we treat others well. It may appear to be empathy from the outside, but maybe it's just the best choices for us in the long run.

Good questions! I'll look forward to others weighing in on this thread.

Thanks for the article link! Frankly, I would have preferred DeWitt include that in his book rather than the "Titles and Ranks" section. There were similarities in this essay to some content in Voila Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus. This is no surprise since they're dealing with the same source material. Enjoyable reading.

I find myself pining for a published collection of DeWitt's essays. I firmly grasp DeWitt's importance to understanding Epicurus and his philosophy, and his scholarship is evident at all turns; however, for my taste, he's much better in the short, bright bursts of his essays than the overwrought prose and historical fiction of his book. Sigh.

And so we arrive in Athens!

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p. 90: This would afford explanation of the affectionate missive which detractors quoted to disparage Epicurus: "Glory be, darling Leontion, with what jubilation you filled us when we read your precious note."4

Footnote 4 cites Diogenes Laertius (DL) 10.5.:

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DL 10.5: "O Lord Apollo, my dear little Leontion, with what tumultuous applause we were inspired as we read your letter."

Παιὰν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἵου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον:

It's interesting that in the last chapter, DeWitt wrote about Epicurus's adding mentions of the gods in his letters, using this exact example: Παιὰν ἄναξ Paian anax. DeWitt is consistent in his "Glory be" translation here. Paian anax is a reference to Apollo and DeWitt's translation removes us from the cultural context of Epicurus's world. I realize DeWitt is paraphrasing, but "Glory be" seems to miss the flavor of Epicurus's style. This is especially true since Paian has a deeper connotation regarding it's use as an epithet of Apollo. The title connotes Apollo as savior, yes, but more as the "healer" or physician of the gods. It was also used as an address to other gods after deliverance from a catastrophe. So, Epicurus's own view of his philosophy as "medicine" in this context is interesting. Epicurus himself is a healer of sorts. Same for anax, lord/master, which also connotes a "master of the house" which Epicurus was as well. DeWitt says that the phrase Paian anax was a favorite one with Epicurus. Did Epicurus see Paian anax in some way referring to himself as physician to his students and Lord of his house? Is that why it was a favorite?

On p. 92, we have an interesting section:

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P. 92: The two properties were not contiguous and there is evidence for believing that Epicurus, whose health was uncertain, sometimes fared back and forth in a three-wheeled chair.13

Footnote 13 refers to DeWitt's own article: "Epicurus' Three-Wheeled Chair" Norman W. DeWitt. Classical Philology. 35:2 (Apr., 1940), pp. 183-185 (3 pages) In it, he parses DL 10.5, specifically:

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...πρὸς δὲ Θεμίσταν τὴν Λεοντέως γυναῖκα Οἷός τε φησίν εἰμί, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρός με ἀφίκησθε, αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμίστα παρακαλῆτε, ὠθεῖσθαι.

and to be more precise, DeWitt is most interested in the word τρικύλιστος which he (in his article) translates as a "three-wheeled chair" pushed by someone and steered by Epicurus due to his ill health. DeWitt makes a fairly compelling case in his artice (Another reason I like his articles - overall - more than his book). He mentions that some translators try to make it sound like Epicurus is hurrying or doing some gyrations: "to spin thrice (τρι/three) on my own axis and be propelled" (Hicks). But DeWitt makes the case that the τρικύλιστος (trikylistos) would have been pushed (Hicks: "be propelled" translating

ὠθεῖσθαι "(to be) pushed"). According to DeWitt, τρικύλιστος doesn't occur anywhere else and so is open to interpretation within the context.

On p. 93, DeWitt begins talking about the "Ranks and Titles" within the Garden and school of Epicurus. He begins:

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The title chosen for himself as head was hegemon,18 which Cicero rendered by dux, "leader" or "guide."

Footnote 18 refers to DL 10.20:

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[20] "Ποιείσθωσαν δὲ μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἕρμαρχον *κύριον τῶν προσόδων*, ἵνα μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγηρακότος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ καταλελειμμένου **ἡγεμόνος** τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν ἕκαστα γίνηται.

[20] "Let them make Hermarchus *trustee of the funds* along with themselves, in order that everything may be done in concert with him, who has grown old with me in philosophy and is left at the head of the School.

The phrase that DeWitt appears to be saying that Epicurus "himself" chose "as head was hegemon." The text appears to be ἡγεμόνος τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων "hegemonos ton symphilosophounton" which appears to simply mean "leader of those join in the love and pursuit of wisdom." Hegemonos (or hegemon) appears to simply be a "one who leads or guides the way." It seems to me as Epicurus in his will is just saying "make Hermarchus the leader." I'm not entirely convinced that it was a "title" that Epicurus chose for himself. He was simply the leader of the group and needed to name someone to lead them after he died. Because later on on page 93, DeWitt states, with no citation:

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Instructors of all grades were consequently designated by titles that mean "leader" or "guide."

But that's what "hegemon" means. You can't say Epicurus chose "hegemon" which means "leader" or "guide" as a title for himself and then say all instructors were called "leaders" or "guides" without saying what the original Greek was! That doesn't seem like playing fair.

On 94, we then read:

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Next in rank to the supreme leader stood the three men Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus. The title bestowed upon them was kathegemones. 24

Footnote 24 references Philod., On Anger, frag. 45.1; On Management, col. 12.20; Rhet., vol. i, col. 23.22, p. 49 (Sudhaus). and, unfortunately, I don't have access to Philodemus. However, it would appear to be καθηγεμόνος One of the definitions in LSJ is simply "of the founders of the Epicurean school", but the basic definition is "leader, guide." Which are the *same* English words as we saw back on p. 93 when DeWitt says "Instructors of all grades were consequently designated by titles that mean "leader" or "guide."" We seem to going in circles on these! All in all, I'm a little dubious on the "Ranks and Titles" section.

Which moves us along to p. 95 with the mention of Epicurus's slave Mys:

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Since the school was also a publishing concern, the staff must have included a number of literate slaves to serve as secretaries and copyists. The oversight of these would undoubtedly have fallen to the talented slave whose name was Μῦς Mys. His position was comparable to that of Tiro in the household of Cicero. He was rewarded by freedom at the master's death, and tradition reports him as a philosopher in his own right.32

Footnote 32 references D.L. 10.3, 21. DL 10.3 simply says Mys's name and his status as Epicurus's slave. DL 21 simply names the slaves that Epicurus freed in his will: "Of my slaves I manumit Mys, Nicias, Lycon, and I also give Phaedrium her liberty." Again, I *really* wish DeWitt would give a citation for something as pivotal as Mys was a "philosopher in his own right." I have no reason to doubt DeWitt, but it would be great if he backed something up like that with a citation.

On p. 96, DeWitt writes:

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Since so many women shared the life of the school, it must be assumed that the number of female slaves was proportionate. The oversight of these would have fallen to one Phaedrium, since she was singled out for manumission in the will of the master.38

Footnote 38 again references DL 10.21, again *just* the list of slaves given their freedom on Epicurus's death. Mys supervising the copyists and Phaedrium overseeing the female slaves is pure assumption and colorful historical fiction-writing on DeWitt's part, painting the picture he wants to portray with respect to the management of the Garden. The citations do not back up these roles.

That whole section brings up the topic of slavery in the Garden. We know Epicurus owned slaves. How does that square with the idea of "natural justice" and PD 37? That's a topic for another thread, but one I wrestle with in relation to Epicurus.

p.101 has:

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There is, however, still something to be added. During the first three centuries of Christianity the representations of Christ exhibit a youthful and beardless face, not unlike that of Apollo. The bearded portraits began to appear at a later date and simultaneously with the absorption of the Epicurean sect into the Christian environment. These new pictures of Christ exhibit a similarity to those of Epicurus, then growing obsolete. This similarity is such as to be manifest to the most disinterested observer.

No, I don't buy this, and it's not "manifest to the most disinterested observer." For one glaring difference, the earliest "portraits" of a bearded Jesus have very long hair. The Wikipedia article on the depiction of Jesus shows one of the earliest bearded images from the late 4th century. The long flowing locks are quite visible. That's not Epicurus. The article does a fairly good job of outlining the various theories of where this bearded depiction comes from, and it's not copies of Epicurus. The references in that article, too, also point to numerous options for where the bearded depiction comes from.

On p. 103, DeWitt asserts that:

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Epicureanism was the prevalent philosophy in New Testament days.

I'm skeptical, especially with no citation to back it up. This "article" online references several academic papers and gives an interesting look at "ways to at the least approximately quantify the philosophical landscape of the Greco-Roman world." Worth taking a look at.

On p. 104/5, DeWitt talks about the choice of the 20th as the day of honoring Epicurus:

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It was a sacred day in a cult of Apollo and it was on the twentieth that the final rites of initiation were performed in the mysteries of Demeter.

I have no reason to doubt the Apollo reference. I'll accept DeWitt's scholarship on this, but I find it interesting, if this is indeed the case, in light of what I found about Epicurus's use of Paian Anax in his letters and its relation to Apollo.

And, finally, DeWitt's contention that the communal meals of 20th were used as the pattern for the Christian agape feasts... I don't accept that. Communal meals were not uncommon in ancient world, and it's not necessary to ascribe this to Epicureans See this history of the Love Feasts on Internet Archive.

And so I have to end - unfortunately, again! - in opposition to DeWitt's Christianity/Epicureanism theme. I'm looking forward to getting into his examination of the doctrines of the philosophy and getting away from the history. It was fascinating, and in places enlightening, but there was a lot of historical fiction-writing to add color to his story as he wanted to tell it. But that's simply a lot of what it was from my perspective.

This was an interesting chapter with much to dig into, both DeWitt's text itself and intriguing references. I found this enjoyable... except for those last couple pages. Consider that a teaser. Here we go...

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p. 73: This is not the limit of our information, however. It is fairly plain that Epicurus chose for his assault upon the Mytilenean philosophers one of the more irritating of all forms of argument, the "sorites syllogism."

I had no idea what the "sorites syllogism" was. Wikipedia had a basic introduction to polysyllogism. "A sorites is a specific kind of polysyllogism in which the predicate of each proposition is the subject of the next premise."

On p. 78, DeWitt talks about Origen writing about Epicurus penchant "to sprinkle his writings liberally with the names of the Greek gods. I found this intriguing and followed up on the citation for that sentence has (Footnote 27). Footnote 27 cites Usener 389:

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U389: Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 26, 2 p. 779A: And moreover he {Epicurus} inserts in his own books countless oaths and adjurations addressed to those who are nothing to us, swearing continually "No, by Zeus," and "Yes, by Zeus," and adjuring his readers and opponents in argument "in the name of the gods," having, I suppose, no fear himself of perjury nor trying to frighten them, but uttering this as an empty, and false, and idle, and unmeaning appendage to his speeches, just as he might hawk and spit, and turn his face, and wave his hand. Such an unintelligible and empty piece of acting on his part was his mentioning the name of the gods.

Usener fragment 389 (i.e., footnote 27) doesn't cite Origen, but DeWitt may be referring to others nearby in the Usener list which cite Origen:

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U390: Origen, Against Celsus, VII.66, [p. 386 Hoesch.]: And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epicurus and Democritus. For there is no falsehood or pretense in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God.

On Page 79 there is a lengthy paragraph that talks about Theodorus, "an egotistical and insolent hedonist of Cyrene." Footnote 32 refers to Epicurus "filching part of his [Theodorus's] doctrine." The footnotes in this section cite Diogenes Laertius 2.97:

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"The Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject."

That paragraph also mentions Hipparchia (footnote 33: DL 6.97) who, though not an Epicurean, sounds interesting after looking at her section in Diogenes Laertius:

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DL 6.97: "...[Hipparchia] appeared at the banquet given by Lysimachus, and there put down Theodorus, known as the atheist, by means of the following sophism. Any action which would not be called wrong if done by Theodorus, would not be called wrong if done by Hipparchia. Now Theodorus does no wrong when he strikes himself : therefore neither does Hipparchia do wrong when she strikes Theodorus. He had no reply wherewith to meet the argument, but tried to strip her of her cloak. But Hipparchia showed no sign of alarm or of the perturbation natural in a woman."

On p. 83, DeWitt provides an example of one of my frustrations with him. He states a "fact" without any citations to sources:

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P. 83 Quote: "Epicurus even went so far as to declare that only those who spoke Greek were capable of philosophizing, and Philodemus would have it that the gods themselves spoke some form of the Greek language."

Why couldn't he put a footnote in there? Those both seem like a pretty big deal in light of the evangelical nature of Epicurean philosophy. DeWitt's articles are referenced to a fault. This book, however, has him simply stating things that are obviously from somewhere. It's just aggravating.

This was also the first chapter where I highlighted a reference to Croenert. (p. 83, footnote 54, Croenert, p.4-8):

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"Extant in papyri are also remnants of attacks upon the Lysis and the Euthydemus of Plato."

This refers to Kolotes Und Menedemos (1906) by Wilhelm Crönert which is available on Internet Archive. I don't read German, unfortunately, but it looks like it could be interesting.

And, finally, we come to my pet peeve with DeWitt with his Epicureanism hidden in Christianity proclivities. It just all seems so superfluous in this particular work. Which is why DeWitt decided to write the St. Paul one, I'm sure. He had much more to say (unfortunately). In any case, I highlighted two sections in particular. First:

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P. 85: "It may be observed in passing that St. Paul quoted the words Peace and Safety as catchwords of the Epicureans, to whom he refused the honor of mention by name. 69 In this collocation Peace signified harmonious relations with neighbors while Safety meant the security of the man as a citizen, the sort of safety that Paul himself enjoyed by virtue of Roman citizenship."

This drives me crazy! Paul doesn't mention who is speaking by name. So HOW does DeWitt have such certainty that he's referring to Epicureans?? I can read that passage of Paul's and have a completely different interpretation if Epicureans aren't mentioned!! The text is I Thessalonians 5:3. See also this in Speech-in-Character, Diatribe, and Romans 3:1-9: Who’s Speaking When and Why It Matters by Justin King for different interpretations.

And, this section in DeWitt:

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P.88: "Thus the epistles of Epicurus seem to have been unique and must have furnished the model for New Testament writers. One immediate purpose of the latter was to create for the benefit of converts from Epicureanism a substitute literature which should preserve the form of the texts with which they were familiar. Common to both was the practice of addressing each epistle to an individual or a group, though the intention was that copies should be distributed among circles of adherents everywhere."

Maybe I'm missing something here, but, to me, this appears to just be letter writing that DeWitt is referring to! You address it to a person or group. There was a robust letter writing tradition in the ancient world even as a literary genre. One need look no further than the Letters of Seneca (4 BC - 65 AD). DeWitt makes it sound like Epicurus invented letter writing.

I hated to end this section on a downer when I found so much else interesting in this chapter. DeWitt's scholarship is evident in his works, but I still find some of his habits frustrating.

Looking forward to Chapter 5. Onto Athens!

Thanks, Martin, for those insights using the original German. This demonstrates again how important it is to go back sometimes to non-English original texts, whether written in German, Latin, Greek, etc., to really understand what authors are trying to say.

Sorry, Cassius ! I thought the two were together in the original article! I didn't intend to be critical of you.

But, yes, I agree. That second one is spot on!

bodily comfort and peace of mind: τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν.

I'm not sure why Dimitriadis chose to use that excerpt from the Letter to Menoikos since the word ataraxia αταραξία itself doesn't appear there. I think I understand his basic argument, but I would think a better quote would have been one where the word under discussion was actually used by Epicurus. I realize it does say "freedom from turmoil in the mind" using other terms than ataraxia itself, but I found it an interesting choice.

Is ataraxia possibly just a quality of the mind and not a goal? A description just using available vocabulary that people would readily understand? The person who follows Epicurus's teachings can hope to feel this quality of mind (and the feeling of freedom from pain in the body) by striving to make sound choices and rejections but that quality is not in and of itself a goal or end, not a telos. Just something that arises naturally as part of Epicurean practice.

I'm glad you started this, Cassius . This has been a hang-up for me with regards to Epicurus' teachings.

On the one hand, one would think Epicurus would want to get the most accurate view of the universe - το παν - available through the senses with regard to the "sciences."

On the other, I get the impression from some readings that once you get a "good enough" explanation of, say, meteorological phenomena (ex., DRN VI:96-160, different possible causes of thunder), you accept one and move on. That part makes it sound like Epicurus or Lucretius were not advocates of any kind of deep "research" for lack of a better word right now.

I find it hard to reconcile these two so I'm looking forward to more in this thread.

Here's her record from Find-A-Grave with a photo of her stone.

Quote from JJElbert

Frances Wright's grave is in Cincinnati.

Oh my! I didn't realize that! Thanks, Joshua ! In addition to my other duties at the library, I'm also the coordinator of the Ohio Center for the Book. I'll be adding Frances Wright to our Ohio author mini-biographies now! She was not in our list!

Consider that Epicurus himself more than likely walked across the grounds of the Acropolis in Athens and around the (real) Parthenon. He said that Epicureans could enjoy public spectacles more than other people (I believe he said that) and so more than likely participated in things like the Panathenaic Festivals and other ceremonies on the Acropolis. And I can imagine him appreciating the view from the summit at least. Think about that if you travel to Nashville and circumambulate the "Parthenon" there.

There's also the Getty Villa copied from the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum. Walk (virtually) in the footsteps of Philodemus?

When talking about expectations, I would assume that some people can't wrap their heads around Epicurus's distrust (Is that the right word?) of Reason. It's such a mainstay of Western philosophy as it's come down thru the Socratic/Platonic lineage. Epicurus saw the application of prudence to be positive, but it's not part of the Canon. And I think many people can't get over that. Getting people to see that Reason and our cognitive assessments can deceive us could be jarring. We use our "higher" reasoning but should be wary of it.

IF I've characterized Epicurean philosophy circle.

The Wikipedia article on Pain and Pleasure gives a very basic overview of the physiology in this area. The whole idea of nociceptors and dopamine seems like that whole immediate contact with the world without judgement that we've been talking around. Elayne may have more insight into this area.

I know Epicurus had no knowledge of this physiology but he did have his experience and knew they're was some kind of pre-judgemental component of pleasure and pain. Might be another way to get at these concepts.

Quote from Cassius

If Bailey's "internal sensations" is referring to the same subject, then maybe what we're missing is a word or terminology that ties pleasure and pain more tightly to some kind of "internal natural guidance system" that does in fact stand shoulder to shoulder as an equivalent with "divine inspiration" or "logic" as a concept in the fight to determine what is the proper goal of life. As it is, when we talk of "pleasure" the connotation is so tightly tied to "chocolate cake" and the like that it is hard to see the forest for the trees. When we explain to people that "pleasure and pain" are the guides to life, it would be nice to have an articulate way to explain to them that Epicurus was not meaning to list PARTICULAR pleasures or pains, but was referring to the overall mechanism given to us by nature to fulfill that guidance role.

It seems hugely important to me to be able to start with the observation that Diogenes Laertius made that "the feelings are two - pleasure and pain" in order to explain the whole issue of absence of neutral states, limits of pleasure, and especially how the presence of one equals in quantity the absence of the other.

I bet that the ambiguity that we experience in the term "feeling" would almost without a doubt have been addressed and explained by Epicurus if we had more of the texts. On that same point, my bet is also that certain aspects of this, like with the issue of "preconceptions" are buried unrecognized in plain view in front of us in Lucretius - we just fail to recognize it.

If you're referring to your first clip as Bailey and "internal sensations", yes, that's the same pathē.

I think you're onto something. Maximizing Pleasure is the goal, but we use both pathē to make our choices and rejections (okay, avoidances, but I dislike that translation). One feeling without the other as part of the Canon is like trying to ride a bicycle with one wheel.

This abstract I found online I found interesting:

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In the first chapter, which is new to this edition, Konstan calls on psychology to flesh out the Epicurean understanding of empty fears and irrational desires—ancient psychology, that is: a science of the soul. Konstan’s reading of the relation between sensation (aisthēseis), the passions (pathē) of pleasure and pain, and belief (doxa) in Epicurean doctrine is unorthodox but thorough. Rather than mapping pathē onto either the soul as a whole or the body, Konstan assigns pathē to the non-rational part of the soul, the seat of sensation. He locates the emotions, which “do not seem to have a special name in Epicurean theory,” in the rational part (11). Crucial to this schema is Konstan’s claim, based on Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura and Diogenes Laertius’s doxography of Epicurus, that Epicureans did not consider emotions such as fear and joy to be pathē at all, since emotions depend on memory and reasoning, whereas pathē do not. The upshot is that fear, as a rational emotion, involves belief and evaluation, and is therefore susceptible to error; whence the psychological roots of pernicious “empty beliefs.”

This is possible direction to talk of unifying the pathē into one description.

From what I can see, all those "feelings" are translating πάθη pathe (citations are to Diogenes Laertius sections in Chapt. X of Lives):

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X.31: Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth

ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη

X.63: Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings...

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συνορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη

X.68: If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions...

Ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις

X.73: No further proof is required : we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest

καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιλογισμοῦ, ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις, καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν, ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα πάλιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντες, καθ᾽ ὃ χρόνον ὀνομάζομεν. (πάθεσι is just the dative form)

X.147 PD 24: If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.

PD 24: Εἴ τιν᾽ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον: ὡς τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

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Quote from Cassius

I think the place to start there would be Diogenes Laertius when he says "the feelings are two" and I think there is a reference in the letter to Herodotus where the same word is apparently used.

You know me, doesn't take much to get me to look something like that up

Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο "and they say the Πάθη are two."

Here's the link to the Greek Word Study Tool for that word at the Perseus Digital Library. There's also this from Wiktionary.

I find it interesting that "what happens" seems to be a common definition:

• (in neutral sense) what is done or what happens to a person
• (in negative sense) suffering, misfortune

I did find this page on Google Books that discusses pathe and includes a snippet about Epicurus and the Stoics.

This is definitely one of those instances that the connotations of the word don't necessarily map well - one-to-one - with English.

Quote from Cassius

(1) In item three, the "BUT." I explain it the same way, but why is our description so focused on "buts" which imply that what we have said before is not clear. Why is it not clear enough to say "choose pleasure and avoid pain" without having to emphasize the BUT DON'T choose unwisely (or some variation). We end up looking like the "wisdom" is the end goal rather than the pleasure, and we end up sounding sometimes like we are talking to stubborn children. Is it really necessary, once we say that pleasure is the good, to have to harp on the fact that some pleasures are going to come at a cost that is not worth that pleasure? (To repeat, I am not complaining about your formulation, I am complaining about our not being in a position to have this more easily understood).

I hear you. It would be nice to put that more positively or integrated instead of X... BUT Y... It looks like we're hedging our bets or something.

I must admit that I think I'm liking DeWitt's contention that the summum bonum of Epicureanism is life itself and that the telos/goal is pleasure. I'm still wrapping my brain around that idea but feel that I like it.. I think. Maybe that's a way to go? Maybe we're starting too far along the path so we have to use the BUTs...

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(2) Your item 6 ("thus leading to pain")

This is another part of the "rhetoric" issue we face. The act of being alive "leads to pain" so we cannot expect to pursue many of the pleasures we value most without some cost in pain. So the continuing underlying issue is HOW we stack the pleasure up against the pain and decide how much pain is worthwhile.

Excellent point! The "HOW" could lead to those "recipes". I've also seen the HOW as exemplified by the Principle Doctrines and other list type epitomes. The problem is there is no one HOW for everyone but (AH! There's that BUT!) we can provide principles you can apply to your life.