Posts by Don

To be frank, my first impression of the copied text is "That's a LOT of buzzwords!" "Lifestyle design"? "... brain-intensive replacement for consumerism with an S-shaped learning curve."? "The Web of Goals can be seen as an evolving life-story that automatically minimizes waste (any kind of negative side-effect) and allows for the maximum possible number of opportunities in a rich world, or maximum resilience in a poor world."? It sounds like a MadLib from a marketing and self-help seminar.

Okay, that's my negative reaction to the presentation of the material.

Now, that being said, if one's plan is to retire early, that's fine. But are you taking pleasure in the journey to get there? If following the tenets of "simple living, minimalism, frugality, DIY ethics, survivalism, car-free living, and others" gives you pleasure, by all means, simplify, learn how to DIY, manage your life car-free, and so on. If it becomes an obligation to live by minimalism and frugality, that's not Epicurean. "Being forced to do something is bad but we are not forced to live with being forced to do something." (My translation of Vatican Saying 9) Epicureanism is about being prudent in your choices and rejections, judging what will or will not happen if your desires are fulfilled or not. The goal is a joyous life. Whether that life is minimal or not, is judged by one's reaction to that lifestyle and whether you can find pleasure in it.

I also don't think it's fair to Epicurus to say he retired early. He founded and served as head of a school. He wrote voluminously. He most likely taught, wrote letters to his friends in far-flung places. Plus he obviously took pleasure in these pursuits. I'm not clear where his money came from to purchase his house and The Garden, possibly an inheritance but also money from students, but he must have been prudent in his finances to be able to will the Garden to his students. Self-sufficiency is not the same as early retirement.

Personally, I think it is more important for me to find pleasure in what I am doing - as much as possible - than to follow some rigorous "brain-intensive" plan. That's not to say I wouldn't make prudent plans if I won the lottery and retired early, but even playing the lottery (infrequently!!) is pleasurable. It gives me a chance to consider "what if?" but I don't dwell on my inevitable loss. And I realize the lottery is not an ERE strategy, but it's probably as close as I'll get to retiring early.

Quote from Godfrey

Just some food for thought. (ouch)

LOL! Well played, Godfrey !

But seriously, I think you're onto something there. It helps to bring things down to everyday experiences. Epicurus was all about writing clearly and making things understandable and not hiding behind fancy, convoluted arguments. You're following in the footsteps of Epicurus here! Pass the chips!

The pivotal word here is ασχολούμενος.

Here is the entry for the root verb ασχολεω at Perseus Digital Library for two dictionaries.

Two pertinent definitions seem to be "to be engaged in one's own business; performance of a public function." I would agree with Elli's "occupied." The word seems to imply that one is engaged in their own business, focused on their work to the exclusion of other pursuits. Not necessarily that they're not taking time for leisure purposefully, but that they're "pre-occupied" with the daily grind.

For more, here's the entry for ασχολος.

And for ασχολία.

Take a look at those and please share your thoughts.

I'm always suspicious of super- words. Dangerously close to supernatural. However, "supersensory" seems to imply a sense "above" the other senses in DeWitt's case. And by "subsensory" idols, he seems to mean "images not able to be perceived by the traditional 5 physical senses."

I wish he'd have spelled it "eidols" or used "images." Idols is such a loaded word.

Here's an interesting article that talks about our other "senses" in addition to taste, smell, etc. I wonder what Epicurus would make of synaesthesia?

I went back to the Letter to Herodotus directly prior to that excerpt from DL X.50 above:

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And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts.

Here the term phantastikē epibolē is not used, and I'm working through the Greek. But the it does say we perceive with the mind and the sense organs.

For not being sure if you could go much further, I think you've done very well!

I do think you're onto something, and the Barwis excerpt appears to me too to be directly relevant to the discussion. Thanks for that!

I plan to delve back into the texts at some point armed with your information here.

Oh! I **really** like where you're going with that, Cassius. I especially liked this section:

Quote from Cassius

But no single mental picture is a "concept" any more than a single photon or processing of light is a "sight." Cameras produce images but don't "think" about them. Our brains/minds presumably assemble all these things through pre-rational processes, and that "pre-rationality" is the essence of what I would think Epicurus would insist is required for a faculty to be described as canonical. Error comes in opinion and the assembling and uses of opinions (the rational process). Whatever anticipations are, I firmly think that Epicurus saw them as "pre-rational," and that would fit a faculty that "automatically" assembles individual mental pictures just like the eyes and the ears assemble light and sounds without "thinking" about them.

(Pours a glass of wine, seats himself in a comfy chair) Please, go on!

Quote from Cassius

I would say one of the most continuously difficult parts is that of separating (1) instances of data provided by the "mental presentations/anticipations" from (2) conceptual reasoning, in which concepts are formed after a lot of thought and deliberation and reasoning. I continue to think that if we were to equate "mental presentations/anticipations" with "concepts" we would be confusing two distinct things (the process vs the result) into a single thing (the concept which the result of thinking) and we'd have a feedback loop which would introduce rationalism into the canon and would be why that Epicurus himself only had THREE legs, but the "other Epicureans (in my view mistakenly) came up with four.

This is why I was so surprised when I realized I saw the three components of the Canon listed and the epibolē were included but not the prolepses. I am convinced the doctrine is talking about the Canon. DL seems to imply that the *Epicureans" added a fourth leg to the Canon but PD 24 seems to imply that aisthēsin, pathē, and epibolē were legitimately a three legged Canon too.

Are the epibolē and prolepses two facets of the same faculty? I believe we've discussed elsewhere on the forum the innate nature of the prolepses. The phrase phantastikē epibolē occurs in DL X.50 and 51

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Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented--which is the cause of error.] [51] "For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results ; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

"Mental picture" is the translation here in 50, and "perception of what is presented" in 51 of phantastikē epibolē. That's the trouble with translations! They can hide the same phrases in the original. And 50 and 51 are from the Letter to Herodotus, so this is Epicurus talking. Plus the fact that he's talking about opinion, falsehood, "when a fact awaits", etc., he's addressing the same concerns that arise in PD 24.

I finally had a chance to finish my commentary on PD 24, posted over on that doctrine's thread on the forum.

Principal Doctrine 24 (PD 24) is one of the more convoluted doctrines with multiple phrases and conjunctions. I would like to provide some commentary and break the doctrine down into manageable words and phrases for everyone to get a more coherent understanding of what Epicurus was communicating. You may also want to take a look at this doctrine’s page on the Epicurus Wiki:

First the original text:

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Εἰ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψει τὸ διεψευσμένον· ὥστ’ ἀνῃρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

Now, let’s break it down before we put it all back together. I’ll provide a (mostly) literal translation then provide commentary. “Phrases or words in quotes” will be followed by [their corresponding original text in brackets to allow you to follow along.]

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Εἰ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν...

Literal: “If” [Εἰ] you throw away “a single perception of the senses” [ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν]…

Note that ἐκβαλεῖς is also the same word used later in the doctrine (...ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.) So, we should be sure to use the same word in our final translation in each location! The word ἐκβαλεῖς literally means “to cast, hurl, or throw away from yourself.” So, think about this as one literally “throwing away” or “discarding” the information you are getting from one of your sensations here. Note also that αἴσθησιν aisthēsin is the same word used when explaining the components of The Canon, the criteria of truth. More on this below.

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...καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη...

Literal: ...and “you do not distinguish” [μὴ διαιρήσεις] between “the holding of an opinion or belief” [τὸ δοξαζόμενον] which is awaiting (confirmation) and what is present “now” [ἤδη]...

τὸ προσμένον gives the sense of waiting on something. It also can be used in the sense of “to wait for one in battle, i.e., to stand one’s ground against.”

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...κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας,...

Literal: ...in accordance with perception of the senses, feeling, and true perceptions of the mind…

There’s a LOT to unpack here! First, I want to call your attention to that list of items:

- τὴν αἴσθησιν tēn aisthēsin “perception of the senses”

- καὶ τὰ πάθη kai ta pathē “and feeling (i.e., pleasure or pain)”

- καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας kai pasan phantastikē epibolēn tēs dianoias “and every true perception of the mind”

The description of the Canon, the criteria of truth, as outlined in Diogenes Laertius’s biography of Epicurus, contains the same list of items:

DL X.31: "Now in The Canon, Epicurus affirms that our “perceptions of the senses” [τὰς αἰσθήσεις] and preconceptions [προλήψεις] and our “feelings” [τὰ πάθη] are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make “perceptions of mental presentations” [τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας] to be also standards."

So, what is being communicated in this phrase is literally Epicurus’s criteria of truth known as The Canon. I personally find it interesting that this list, either written by Epicurus as an epitome or sanctioned by the Garden as a study tool does not include the prolepses but instead includes the phantastikē epibolē. Could the two, in fact, be synonymous? Are the preconceptions identical to the perceptions of the mind? I personally find it better to translate aisthesin as “perception of the senses” to contrast it with the phantasike epibole “perceptions of the mind.” Both are perceptions with one being tangible (e.g., touch, taste, smell, etc.) and one is intangible (the mind). Norman DeWitt wrote a provocative paper entitled "Epicurus, Περί Φαντασιας" where he delved in detail into the phantastikē epibolē tēs dianoias. He didn't make the synonymous claim, that's me. DeWitt translated the “phantastikē epibolē tēs dianoias” "(the incidence of a) true presentation of a single, existent object, though reduced to scale, as it registers itself upon the vision and mind of a sane, sober, and waking person." In any case, I find it intriguing in how the elements of The Canon are presented here in PD 24.

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...συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ,...

Literal: ...and “you will throw into confusion” [συνταράξεις] the remaining perceptions of the senses for a “groundless and empty belief” [ματαίῳ δόξῃ]...

This first word here, our verb - “syntaraxeis” [you will throw into confusion] - begins with συν- syn- which has the sense of “together, with…” and gives this verb the idea of throwing everything all together into confusion as well as to disturb or trouble. Consider this has a similar root to ataraxia “not disturbed or troubled.”

The λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις are the “remaining sensations, the rest of the senses” which are the others which you didn’t throw away: Remember our first line. Compare δόξῃ doxe “belief” also occurs in the word encountered earlier: δοξαζόμενον doxazomenon “to hold an opinion or belief.” A ματαίῳ δόξῃ is one that is groundless, vain, futile, empty, one with nothing to support it, more of an opinion than a true belief.

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...ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.

Literal: ...thereby you throw away [ἐκβαλεῖς] the “entire” [ἅπαν] “the standard of truth” (κριτήριον “criterion”).

And so we come to end of our first sentence! Here we encounter ἐκβαλεῖς from our first line. We’ll use “throw away” here as well. The criterion here, literally the Greek word simply transliterated, is The Canon, the standard of truth, which refers back to our list of the components of The Canon earlier.

So, let’s see what we have so far:

If you throw away a single perception of the senses AND you do not distinguish between a holding an opinion that awaits confirmation and what is present now in accordance with The Canon of truth (perception of the senses, feeling, and perception of the mind), you will throw all your other perceptions into confusion for a groundless opinion, thereby throwing away the entire Canon of truth.

If we break this up a little more, I think we can paraphrase it as:

Let’s say you don’t believe one of your senses, you cast it away from yourself. If you do this, you are throwing away the three legs of The Canon (namely, perceptions of the senses, of the mind, and the feelings of pleasure and pain) that must work together. If you don’t use them all, you won’t be able to tell the difference between an opinion that awaits confirmation (by the other senses) and what you can sense now in the present moment through The Canon. This is a groundless belief that is going to cause you trouble in correctly perceiving your remaining perceptions.

Well, that’s not simpler, but it tries to bring together similar concepts.

Let’s tackle the rest:

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εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις…

Literal: Additionally, if you will “affirm as true” [βεβαιώσεις] everything that is waiting confirmation “in the matters of opinion about thinking” [ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις]...

Note that Epicurus talked about beliefs that were awaiting confirmation in the first part of this doctrine. So, here he’s saying that “Let’s say you affirm as true everything that should be awaiting confirmation by your other legs of The Canon.” It sounds like you’re putting the cart before the horse. How can you affirm something before you have confirmation?

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...καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν,...

Literal: ...and that which does not need a witness…

Here, the contrast is made with those opinions/beliefs that are awaiting confirmation and those which do not need any witness. So, you’re affirming as true BOTH everything that is awaiting confirmation and that which doesn’t (i.e., that which is present to you now in accordance with The Canon).

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...οὐκ ἐκλείψει τὸ διεψευσμένον·

Literal: “You will not abandon” [οὐκ ἐκλείψει] "that which is altogether false" [τὸ διεψευσμένον];...

If you do all those things we just mentioned, you will not abandon “that which is altogether false.” It’s interesting that the verb here - ἐκλείψει ekleipsei - is the same word as English “eclipse” and had similar connotations in the Greek. Consider if you did abandon falsehood, you would blot out the light of falsehood for the light of truth. But, you’re still in darkness if you don’t come to your senses.

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ὥστ’ τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

Literal: ...therefore, you will “retain” [τετηρηκὼς] all “doubt” [ἀμφισβήτησιν] and all judgement [κρίσιν] of what is correct and what is not correct.

I’ve seen one online Greek text that has ἀνῃρηκὼς anerekos “abolish” instead of τετηρηκὼς teterekos “preserve, retain”. This is a CRUCIAL difference, and τετηρηκως is in the Oxford Arundel MS 531 manuscript so I’m accepting that as correct. And teterekos makes more sense when taken in context of the rest of PD 24. We preserve all doubt and judgement, we are not going to make any judgement either way and we're going to preserve our doubt.

I also think it’s interesting and important to note that the same word is used in two places at the end: ὀρθῶς orthos. This is the “orthos” in orthodox, orthogonal, orthodontist, etc. I feel it is significant because it also has the sense of “straight” and The Canon we’ve been referring to is a literal straight-edge, ruler, measuring rod. So, it would be nice to play this up in a translation, but it’s not that easy in English. You could say something like “what is and is not on the straight and narrow” but that’s pushing it.

So, the last section can be paraphrased:

If you affirm everything as true - both those opinions that await confirmation and those here and now evident to your senses - you will not abandon falsehood and retain all doubt and refrain from any judgement as to what is correct and what is not correct.

So, that “groundless belief” appears to be the unwillingness to take a stand and just accept that everything is true. You can’t make a decision! Epicurus seems to be calling us to trust in The Canon as our criteria of truth, to distinguish between what we don’t know right now - what’s awaiting confirmation - and what is evident to our senses right now in the present moment.

I hope this provides food for thought even if it doesn’t clear up the concepts put forward here in PD 24.

Quote from Cassius

Yes but I wonder if that is specific enough. Like in the monkey analogy people seem to default to a position that "anything is possible but the possibility may be infinitesimally small." Well, but that's the question, isn't it? is there really ANY possibility of certain things happening, and can't we be pretty confident in saying that some things can never happen, and shouldn't we try to be rigorous in separating the two? If we think about the monkeys that exist in reality, even given an infinite time I would not expect them by nature to be interested in hitting all the keys randomly and persistently enough to come up with a sonnet.

The "anything is possible" cliche is a dangerous one, I'm thinking.

It sounds like you're advocating the concept of Epicurean limits when talking about probabilities and possibilities. Is this echoing Epicurus's objection to geometry? Geometry can talk about ideal situations and shape but a "perfect" square doesn't really exist. We can use geometry as a tool but shouldn't confuse it for reality.

My sense is that this "monkey theory" in all its forms is an illustration of "just because something can be shown to have a mathematical probability of happening doesn't mean it has a corresponding possibility in reality." Those monkey probabilities are so infinitesimal as to be practically impossible in our cosmos. And whether you accept an infinite universe or a "practically infinite from a human perspective" universe, the chances of monkeys typing Shakespeare is not going to happen by random chance. That's born out by natural selection and evolution. Evolution is not random. Mutations are random but nature "selects" out those that provide an advantage.

Same for the monkeys. If something selects for keeping two and three "correct" letters together from Hamlet and builds in them, maybe it'll happen.

And there's little reason to think there are monkeys identical to our monkeys in an alternate cosmos.

Plus, getting all those monkeys in one place and keeping them at their typewriters for infinity is one grant project I doubt would ever be funded.

All this is to say that micro-applications of this randomness cannot be helpful in theory.

But if you want a copy of Shakespeare's works, visit your local library.

Of course there's a Wikipedia article on the infinite monkey problem.

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The question starts with a typewriter, and a monkey,

This made me smile. One usually doesn't see that combination of words in casual conversation.

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No doubt we could talk about the analogy from many different angles but the heart of the question seems to me to be some defined force of randomness eventually producing a highly organized result which would seem couinterintuitive given the starting point.

I'm sure a mathematician could calculate the probability. How many letters in all of Shakespeare's works, the probability of getting each letter at random, etc. The odds would be astronomical! But given an infinite (literal) amount of time, it could happen.

I completely concur with Cassius . Even if atoms arranged themselves in an identical *pattern* to us, it wouldn't be us. Death is the dissolution of this particular "incarnation" of consciousness. Death is a break. *I* will not exist after I die. There will be no sensation, and so death will be nothing to me. If an arrangement of atoms assembles into this pattern again, that's not *me.*

Monkeys may type Shakespeare, but they're not Shakespeare.

The pattern may copy me, but that's not me.

Oh but I think he's saying that not only are all possible options possible, they actually exist in all possible infinite cosmos. So every explanation actually exists out in the infinite cosmos and that's why Epicurus needed infinite worlds for this to be true.

I'm not saying I agree but that's the author's thesis.

It "feels" important to me that the word μύθος mythos "myth" just means a "tale, story, narrative." Myth implies to us specifically stories about the gods, but I don't think that's what Epicurus intends in his "then you will escape a long way from myth." To paraphrase, you will be far from talking fiction if you follow the Canon etc.

But, here are two of the relevant sections of the Letter to Pythokles:

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[87] "For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts ; for our life has no need now of unreason and false opinion ; our one need is untroubled existence. All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them. But when we pick and choose among them, rejecting one equally consistent with the phenomena, we clearly fall away from the study of nature altogether and tumble into myth. Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see how the former really take place, but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for their occurrence may possibly be due to a variety of causes. [88] However, we must observe each fact as presented, and further separate from it all the facts presented along with it, the occurrence of which from various causes is not contradicted by facts within our experience.

The word used in 87 translated as "facts" is φαίνω and means "that which appears to the senses." The assumptions and laws are arrived at by reason and are man-made. Epicurus is saying we need to not be lured in by fancy arguments or stories or what we think are worthy but by what we perceive by our senses. And then...

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"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating ... in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned.

So, with that last part, I can't rule out the articles authors thesis. Epicurus does say all the alternatives are possible or permissible or allowed. But I want to delve into that a little deeper in context and the original.

I had not heard the argument the author puts forward that Epicurus needed all possible explanations of phenomena to be true throughout the infinite cosmos. The reason for multiple explanations in other threads on this forum seemed to assume that we reserve multiple explanations until we have more sensory input to make a judgement of one over the others. What the author is saying is that the Epicureans demanded dogmatically that all explanations were, in fact, true: if not here in this cosmos, then in one of the other infinite number of cosmoi. That's both an intriguing and somewhat unsettling proposition. It does actually echo the multiple universe theory, but I'm not convinced that's what's going on. So, we're to accept that snow can be caused:

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"Snow may be formed when a fine rain issues from the clouds because the pores are symmetrical and because of the continuous and violent pressure of the winds upon clouds which are suitable ; and then this rain has been frozen on its way because of some violent change to coldness in the regions below the clouds. Or again, by congelation in clouds which have uniform density a fall of snow might occur through the clouds which contain moisture being densely packed in close proximity to each other ; and these clouds produce a sort of compression and cause hail, and this happens mostly in spring. [108] And when frozen clouds rub against each other, this accumulation of snow might be thrown off. And there are other ways in which snow might be formed. (Letter to Pythokles)

... By any and all of these causes throughout the infinite cosmos? That doesn't make sense to me. Later in the Pythokles, Epicurus writes:

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All this, Pythocles, you should keep in mind ; for then you will escape a long way from myth, and you will be able to view in their connexion the instances which are similar to these. But above all give yourself up to the study of first principles and of infinity and of kindred subjects, and further of the standards and of the feelings and of the end for which we choose between them. For to study these subjects together will easily enable you to understand the causes of the particular phenomena. And those who have not fully accepted this, in proportion as they have not done so, will be ill acquainted with these very subjects, nor have they secured the end for which they ought to be studied." (My emphasis added)

My interpretion here is that Epicurus is saying that the study of his philosophy will equip you to "understand the causes of the particular phenomena" and "see connections which are similar" and to reason from analogy with what your senses and the Canon provide you with. I will need to investigate the articles authors citations, so I don't want to dismiss his assertion out of hand on this topic.

I also need to investigate the Stoic refutation the author says is going on. I didn't see much about the Stoics' Logos. Is that what is causing their "centripetal" hexis? I'm intrigued by the paper, but I don't - at first reading - find his arguments compelling.

For those interested, here's the author's webpage at Radboud University. Looks like his PhD thesis was on Epicurean cosmology.

Mathitis Kipouros : I know we strayed from your original question/request. Did you get anything helpful for your toddler? Anything you'd like to revisit?