Posts by Don

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Strange as these doctrines may seem, they were combined with definite previews of Christianity. The idea of love between man and God would not have seemed a novelty to Epicureans. They were taught "that the gods were friends of the wise and the wise were friends of the gods." Friendship and love were one for the Greeks, though denoted by different words in Latin and English.

Okay, this is a prime example of why Dewitt drives me crazy in this book. His lack of a source for his quote of "the gods were friends of the wise and the wise were friends of the gods" does not allow us to see the context of the quote.

Plus his assertion that "Friendship and love were one for the Greeks" is self-serving to his quote about the gods and the wise being friends, which makes me dubious.

Of course, the Greeks had a different semantic spectrum when it came to love... And most everything else when compared to modern English words and idioms.

I find this a fascinating thread and plan to weigh in more, but I had to get my DeWitt frustration off my chest. (Sorry, Cassius )

Quote from Godfrey

6. In a sentence the author uses the phrase “concepts born of sensation” (followed by προληψεις [prolepseis] and a citation that I don’t understand) (page 58)

I had to investigate. It's appears the Life citations are to the verses in Diogenes Laertius, Book X, Life (of Epicurus). But they don't fall exactly every time. I'm using the one posted to Perseus Digital Library. But that has to be it after checking several, so take the verse number and +/- 1 verse. Could be here using a different translation.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=a(rmoni/a

I'm only about 1/2 through the episode, but it seems from LSJ that ἁρμονία harmonia is a joining together or a joint. So the harmonia/harmony being opposed is the idea that the "soul" is joined together with the body, it's something from outside the body that gets joined to the body. The Epicurean view is that the "soul" arises with the body from physical materials.

I agree with Elayne and Charles that you feel strong emotions in the chest.

Made an interesting discovery in verse 126 this morning:

126c and 126d exemplify why it's important to look at the words Epicurus used and not just modern English translations. Take a look at the final phrases of each: 126c. ...ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἱρεῖται, "choosing that which brings the greatest pleasure" 126d. …ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται. "enjoying the fruits of that which brings the greatest pleasure." Both of these use the word ἥδιστον = hēdiston which is the superlative of ἡδύς = hēdus "pleasant" which is related to ηδονή = hēdonē "pleasure". By variously translating these two occurrences of the same exact word as "most pleasing/brings the greatest joy," "most delicious/happiest," "nicest/most agreeable," or "most enjoyable" (for both), the fact that Epicurus used the same word is lost. Only Yonge uses "most pleasant" for both. Epicurus teaches that pleasure is the greatest good, and by refusing to translate words like ἥδιστον more literally as "(that which) brings the most pleasure" it would appear that translators are consciously shying away from acknowledging that pleasure was Epicurus's goal. When Epicurus says pleasure, he means pleasure. Translators should not equivocate or obfuscate. They should strive to illuminate and communicate. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=h%28%2Fdiston&la=greek&can=h%28%2Fdiston1&prior=to\n&d=Perseus:text:1999.01.0257:book=10:chapter=1&i=2#lexicon

She also mentions Star Trek in that podcast episode, too, so I thought of you, Cassius

Speaking of Lucian: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0910n6s

Just discovered and listened to Natalie Haynes Stands Up for the Classics and this episode extolling the importance of Lucian. She doesn't mention his Epicureanism but it's obviously a fan of Lucian. Enjoyable light-hearted romp through classical history.

I've come up with a first draft of verse 124. I'm convinced that pleasure and pain are the best translations of the "good things" (αγαθοί) and "the bad things" (κακοί) in the first part of the second section. I've included reasons in my text. I also found it interesting that the actual phrase used for the masses is literally "hoi polloi."

I'm sharing the rough literal first draft of a translation below and I'll try and work up a pdf of all the steps soon:

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"For they are not prolepses, but the judgements of the hoi polloi concerning the gods [are] false hasty assumptions. Thence, the greatest evils are brought to the wicked from the gods as well as the greatest aid to the good. Because they (the hoi polloi) are believing that those who are familiar with each other through all excellences and goodness (the gods) accept those who resemble themselves; all those not of their sort (are) strange and alien."

"So, accustom yourself in believing that, for us, death is nothing; since all pleasure and pain are in perception of the senses and the mind; and death is the absolute negation of perception. So, correct understanding is that death is nothing for us, and this is what makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not gaining an endless lifetime for oneself but taking away the yearning for immortality."

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And may we say that this has been proven? Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

Epicurus:

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LOL!

Quote from Godfrey

Continuing on the tangent, the article that I linked to at the beginning of the thread The Polytheism of the Epicureans is a good and fairly brief presentation of the realist viewpoint. I've tended to follow the idealist take, but this got me thinking...

I'm intrigued again Godfrey (Don runs off to read and re-read that article...)

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Epicurus uses "imperishable" specifically to describe the gods. He may use those terms elsewhere, but that's what I'm remembering right now.

Yep. There's just too many clear statements in the texts to think he was being totally allegorical.

Oh, I don't think he was (necessarily) being allegorical. He clearly states in Menoikeus: θεοί εισιν. "Gods exist. There are gods."

But I'm not convinced that the general concept of gods within Epicurean circles was of living beings. Doesn't Sedley talk about the gods being mental constructs? I'm leaning more in that direction. Just because they're mental constructs doesn't mean they don't exist. Natural justice exists. Friendship exists. Why not the gods in the same way?

Talk about a tangent!!

Quote from Cassius

Congratulations, Don! That is every bit as opaque to me as when Elli tried to explain it to me! That means your explanation is every bit as clear to me as that of a natural born Greek! I suppose I was raised on too many "It's Greek to me!'" jokes! OK it is slowly dawning on me - maybe.

LOL

Quote from Susan Hill

Quote from Cassius

of course we're not talking about individual consciousnesses having any continuance; that's specifically ruled out by other Epicurean theory

Didn’t Epicurus outline a physics for immortal gods?

I've found it interesting in my work on the Menoikeus letter (and in KD1) that Epicurus uses "imperishable" specifically to describe the gods. He may use those terms elsewhere, but that's what I'm remembering right now.

You're welcome to see my post and errata on that in the other thread. Here's an excerpt:

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ἄφθαρτον = aphtharton LSJ gives the definition of "incorruptible, eternal, immortal, uncorrupted, undecaying" and gives references to Epicurus, Philodemus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda. At its root, the word is α- "not" + Φθαρτον "destructible, perishable." LSJ states Φθαρτον is the opposite of ἀίδιος = aidios "everlasting, eternal" (related to ἀεί "ever, always") which poses an interesting question: Why did Epicurus choose to use ἄφθαρτον instead of ἀίδιος or ἀθάνατος? Φθαρτον is related to θνητός = thnētos "liable to death, mortal, opposite: ἀθάνατος [athanatos]" (LSJ) Φθαρτον is connected to the verb φθείρω = phtheirō "destroy, pass away, cease to be, perish." It seems that Epicurus didn't want to evoke that the gods were simply immortal or eternal but that he wanted to impress upon us the sense that they would not pass away or cease to be. This is in contrast to everything else composed of atoms and void. Everything else is subject to be Φθαρτον; only the gods are ἄφθαρτον! How can this be? Could it be that they are ἄφθαρτον precisely because they are mental perceptions, because we do have a Prolepsis of them (More on this difficult term later!)

I'm also not entirely convinced that the gods exist as a mental perception only. That's why they'd be imperishable. Still working my way through that!

Quote from Cassius

If you understand how "Babis" is derived from that Greek word, please explain it to me! Elli tried to several times, but it never stuck with me.

I'll take that challenge too.

μπ mp is pronounced like "b" in modern Greek.

(β b is pronounced like "v" βιβλία biblia "vivlia)

η ē in Ancient Greek is now pronounced like I ("ee")

So, Μπάμπης Mpampes = "Babis"

Oh, Babis is their name!! Babis the Epicurean! Now it makes sense! I was trying to figure out what a Μπάμπης was!

That's.... quite the cover photo. Now I *really* want to dig in

Quote from Cassius

Yes that's possible Don, and maybe Diogenes Laertius was just confused. Or maybe you can examine that sentence and find a way that it doesnt add up to their being four.

Challenge accepted!

Quote from Cassius

As I read what Epicurus was saying, they are one of the three legs of the canon of truth (and I say with DeWitt that Epicurus was right, and there are only three, not four).

Personally, I'm still not convinced that the prolepses and mental perceptions aren't the same "leg" of the Canon called by different names.

I'd say byproduct of natural selection. Providence has too much the ring of the supernatural to me.

Quote from Susan Hill

So you could argue, the young are not good Epicureans, dispute their hedonism, because they lack experience in what will reliably and safely confer pleasure or pain.

And I think this is why Epicurus says in the Letter to Menoikeus that the one who is young can get the benefits of growing old by being fearless in looking ahead and weighing the consequences of their actions in the future, i.e., seeing themselves as being older.

Quote from Martin

With respect to what is pleasure and what is pain, we trust our emotions.

The way that's worded, it sounds to me like you're adding another layer to the criteria of truth by saying "we trust our emotions." The reaction of pleasure and pain is precognitive. Our experience of pleasure or pain shouldn't be mediated by another layer of reason or anything else. The pathē are two. Period. Yes, we can take that initial "reaction" into account in our determination of what to choose and what to reject, but the pleasure or pain reaction is not meant to be second-guessed.