Posts by Don

I've seen this quote online, and it summarizes my unease with the use of the word "feelings" in the Canon. I know I've brought this up ad nauseum but it's one aspect of Epicureanism that keep rearing its head at me and insists on being addressed before I can swim completely pleasurably in Epicurean waters. I'll be frank. This is the aspect that makes me still eye Aristotle as an alternative. I don't like that, and I still find aspects of Aristotle troubling.

That thread quote is exactly my issue. Saying "feelings" makes me think we're "going with our gut" which I believe leads us down the road to "I feel it's true so it's true." I can't abide by that.

Please talk me off the Aristotelian ledge! Epicurus wasn't saying our feelings determine facts, right? We still gather objective facts about reality through our senses and mental capacity and judge our reaction to it by pleasure and pain. Is that it? Because if it's "going with your gut" and "truthiness", Aristotle is winking at me over here.

Okay, now it's a challenge

Letter to Menoikeus, DL, X: 127: Remember that what will be is not completely within our control nor completely outside our control, so that we will not completely expect it to happen nor be completely disappointed if it does not happen.

This could be evidence of Cassius 's conviction that Epicureans weren't wallflowers and that some took part civic and political life.

Well, that's interesting! I want to look at that article but here's one from the Center for Hellenic Studies https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/di…-matthias-haake The word Epicurean comes up many times.

It does look like the priests were more government functionary than spiritual mentors. I see mention of the imperial cult.

Thanks for the info!!

That's howi read it. If you look at the last lines of "verse" 76, Epicurus is talking about the μετεώροις (meteōrois) "astronomical phenomena in the heavens above" so stars, planets, etc. No being controls or ordains them because those beings are blessed and incorruptible and that control is counter to those characteristics. And the planets don't take these movements up themselves under their own control. We must believe that their motion is a result of their "agglomeration" of matter during the "birth-process" of the universe: ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει (en tē kosmou genesei) literally, "during the genesis of the cosmos". I find some poetry in Epicurus's words there

I'll admit I was being deliberately provocative with "doing it wrong."

So, from what I'm reading there in your post, Cassius (and correct me!):

You're not discounting the idea that humans have experiences for which they feel they can only describe using culturally-derived religious or spiritual language.

These experiences can be personally profound and potentially life-changing.

However...

If the experiences are still tied to or interpreted through "empty opinions" they have the potential to reinforce negative religious activities or perspectives.

These "empty opinions" would include:

- an eternal soul existing independently of the body

- an eternal soul susceptible to eternal reward or punishment

- a creator god outside of the cosmos

- the ability to propitiate the gods by prayer or sacrifice

My question would be then: Can Epicurus's teachings provide an alternate framework within which to interpret these real experiences without denigrating or belittling the person who experiences them? These experiences seem to me to be part of the way humans would come into contact with the meaning of the quote of Epicurus: "θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν." Literally, "On the one hand, gods exist (or there are gods)" [but not as the hoi polloi believe]

Quote from Cassius

So to repeat the main point of this post, I find the term "spiritual experiences" without further definition to be an obstacle to further clarity here

I think I see your point. To muddy the water even more , i would say that (1) these are real experiences felt by persons and that (2) the experiences themselves are typically described using religious language. The only vocabulary available to people for much of history to describe these overwhelming and transformative experiences was language of a religious nature. The experiences were sometimes brought on by or the result of religious practice: intense prayer, deep meditation, etc. Although they could also be brought on spontaneously (e.g., Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus). Human nature has the natural capacity to experience these kinds of experiences. These are experienced as unusual, extraordinary, or significant. As such, humans try to incorporate them into an existing paradigm to make sense of them. The very significance of them calls for a significant explication. The only vocabulary that rises to the level of the overwhelming power of these experiences to the individual in most cultures is religious or spiritual vocabulary. The religious practitioner can replicate the experience with regular practice. I'm thinking specifically of the Tibetan monks or the Sufi dervishes. They believe and sense that they are communing with the divine. This brings them pleasure. I personally don't believe they are communing with a divine *presence* but they*are* experiencing a genuine sensation of bliss. Isn't bliss (μακάριον blissfulness, blessedness) a defining characteristic of the Epicurean gods? Is this the same bliss experienced by dervishes and monks? If the religious practitioner is experiencing pleasure and bliss, do we tell them "No, you're not actually experiencing pleasure and bliss. You're doing it wrong!" If they don't have fear of their God, are they doing it wrong? I don't know, but that's my food for thought off the top of my head for now.

Here are some thoughts:

I have no doubt that there is something people experience that can be called a "religious" or "spiritual experience."

I have no doubt that this can be felt to be profound and life-changing.

I have no doubt that one can feel overwhelming senses of awe and something that can be termed reverence in certain circumstances. I've felt it myself.

There is ample evidence that expressing "spiritual" feelings in a community setting or through individual practices can be fulfilling. This seems to be at the root of some "Religion for Atheists" movements or secular spiritual communities or even some Unitarian Universalist congregations.

However, I don't think that interpreting a religious experience as evidence of a connection with a divine entity or consciousness is the only interpretation that places value on the experience. I think specifically of research done with highly skilled meditators:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1697747/

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/08/140813103138.htm

https://www.livescience.com/buddhist-monk-…tion-brain.html

While medicine and science may have things to say about these studies, the monks involved in them see their meditation as a spiritual practice, a way to connect to their own Buddhamind. It is an expression of their religion, and furthermore this practice, it appears, brings them pleasure and well-being (daresay I mention eudaimonia).

I think you're absolutely right, @Susan Hill , that denigrating or dismissing the experience as a delusion or "merely" a "brain event" is not useful. But the event did happen in the brain as evidenced by those studies I referenced.

You mentioned:

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Throughout history, people have had euphoric spiritual experiences that are often considered among the most significant and meaningful in their lives. Those experiences demand to be integrated into some sort of explanation that does not dismiss their reality or validity, or else those powerful feelings become deeply disturbing.

I have no problem saying that those experiences are real and valid as experiences. But what would make them disturbing? Just to be clear: Are you saying that dismissing them or denigrating them or calling them "merely a brain event" is what leads to the person experiencing them to be disturbed? Is the person coming at this experience from a context of fear of God? If so, that's a problem that Epicurus addresses. This is the problem with near death experiences of hell. These can also be spiritual/religious experiences with negative effects:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6173534/

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/the…rent-seeing-it/

Additionally, I'm finding it difficult to reconcile the Epicurean definition of a god with the idea that a person could have "communication" with them unless I'm misconstruing where we're going. By definition, the gods in Epicureanism are not concerned with us, aren't motivated by gratitude or anger, and what benefit we receive "from" them is due to our own reverence and emulation of their bliss. It's not a reciprocal relationship.

Susan, you also said:

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People long for some way of connecting with the divine. If there are practices that offer this type of pleasure without harm, like some mild forms of meditation, or spiritual reading, or singing songs, or celebrating holy-days, why look down our noses at that? Perhaps it involves a little bit of the “idealism” approach, using a “mind-hack” to gain pleasure, but there is nothing inherently dangerous about that.

Now, this I have no problem getting behind. I'm just not sure I am fully behind the wording of "connecting with the divine." I'm working through that, and it depends on how we define that phrase. But practices like say mindfulness meditation, I have no problem seeing that integrated into an Epicurean practice. I'm still reading through Sedley's translation and commentary on Epicurus's On Nature, Book 28, but at the end he writes:

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"try ten thousand times Over to commit to memory what I and Metrodorus here have just said."

Epicurus stressed the need to memorize his works, to have them ready at hand (well, mind). That's a form of meditation - deep study, repetition, etc. I wouldn't even popularize it by saying "mind-hack." I do think most humans have a need to connect to something "bigger than themselves" but that doesn't need to be the divine in the sense of an outside entity or consciousness. Epicurus - and also Lucretius - showed a way to see the evanescence of life itself, in the play of atoms in the void, as something to be in awe of. To take pleasure in our very existence. To see the gods - whether "real" or "idealized" - as worthy of emulation and as being able to have a life as "worthy of the gods."

I apologize if I've misunderstood or misconstrued any of your points. I do sincerely see this as a very important topic to discuss.

FYI I admit I haven't read the whole article here, but here's the Wikipedia article on Scientism with 65 references and several external links https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism?wprov=sfla1

I've liked your post and think you've argued your case strongly. I also always appreciate references, as Cassius is aware. I do have some thoughts on your points, both pro and not so pro, and I'll try to share those asap.

Have you seen Sedley's paper on Epicurus's On Nature, Book 28? it includes commentary and translation from the Herculaneum scroll. I downloaded it from Academia. Not finished reading yet, but it has some very interesting parts about prolepses, epibolē, eidola (images), memory, and more. Directly relevant to the current conversation!

Quote from Elayne

There was _not_ evidence regarding what the smallest particles looked like, at least not that I've seen so far. That's why both Martin and I said whoa, just a minute, in those sections.

I had the exact opposite reaction to those sections. I admit there aren't hooked atoms and smooth atoms as far as shape, but it seems to me that Epicurus and Lucretius got the actions of the atoms/seeds/particles right. They didn't have any other way of describing it so they went with shape. But the carbon of diamond is held in a rigid crystalline structure, difficult to disentangle: like fish hooks tangled in a box. Atoms in water are moving around randomly, sliding around against each other smoothly.

It doesn't matter to me if they got the shape wrong, but the analogy to how particles move - we might have to look at our level of molecules or atoms, not quarks or strings - seems remarkably close to our understanding at the level of atoms coming together to form compounds.

I was going to bring up the problem of eyewitness testimony, Cassius . You beat me to it.

Quote from Cassius

I dunno, I think you guys are off in useless speculation. Why would you care about arcane rules of reasoning like limits and boundaries, and how to weigh conflicting evidence? Don't you know that you're supposed to leave that to the Academic Experts, and that the only thing that matters about Epicurus is that the greatest pleasure is the absence of pain? Don't you know realize that all you have to know to be a true Epicurean is that you need to barricade yourself in a cave, drink only water and eat only a little cheese, reduce your bodily experiences to the smallest possible amount, concentrate on asceticism, and ignore the rest of the word?

Boy you guys have been drinking from the wrong fountain!

LOL

As for the Tetrapharmakos, I find it a helpful condensation of the teachings. Dare I say a "dumbed down" popular version, but helpful. An analogy I thought of is the Bible school song:

Jesus loves me

This i know

For the Bible tells me so.

Or something along those lines or the summary of the Christian creed in I Corinthians 15:3-10 or the Apostle's Creed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostles%27_Creed?wprov=sfla1

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All of this keeps constantly bouncing me back and forth between the divinity and the "methods of inference" discussion. I don't think we have any choice in much of what we do but to rely on "experts." I certainly don't know a word of Greek myself. But even worse than that is that we have to trust that the texts are not corrupted, and in many cases we have no idea about the chain of transmission.

Cmon, Cassius , you know some Greek! Don't be so hard on yourself eudaimonia, ataraxia, ....

But I hear you on the fragmentary nature of our sources. That's why that digitized Diogenes Laertius manuscript at Oxford is so helpful. The Herculaneum papyri especially are problematic, both from a preservation perspective and from a public access perspective. That seems to be some closely guarded scholarship there!

Biblical scholars have similar issues; however, it doesn't seem to slow them down. That's one of the reasons I like Bart Ehrman so much! He doesn't shy away from sharing the difficulties in biblical scholarship, but he's also not shy about sharing conclusions and how he gets there.

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1) Epicurus' own words take precedence over all other source material. Anywhere Epicurus leaves room for different interpretations is not narrowed down by commentary from other sources, such as Philodemus or DeWitt. Neither will individual quotes be taken out of context with his whole body of work.

I just read this a little closer and need to convey concerns about Philodemus and Dewitt being mentioned as examples of "other sources."

I firmly agree that Epicurus's extant works take precedence. No question. It's hard to know what Epicurus wrote if it is quoted in a hostile source like a rival pagan writer or early Christian, but the Letters and Herculaneum scrolls that survive are number one.

However, I would consider Philodemus as a primary source of classical Epicureanism with his direct links to the Garden in Athens. I would place Philodemus higher as a reliable source than Cicero certainly. Cicero is helpful, but he had an agenda to write his version of Epicurean doctrine and then contest against it. Philodemus had an agenda but it was transmitting and documenting Epicurus's philosophy to the best of his ability and understanding. And again, Philodemus was a student of Zeno of Sidon who was the successor of Epicurus in Athens.

All the modern academics and commentators - Dewitt included - are looking through a glass darkly and are definitely secondary sources. I understand we have to rely on their scholarship and translations, but I would not include Philodemus among them as just an "other source."

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From Philodemus "On Piety", referring to Epicurus' "On Nature", Bk. 13. Translation from "The Epicurus Reader" by Brad Inwood: "In book 13 [he mentions] the congeniality which god feels for some and the alienation [for others]."

This sounds also like the section of the Letter to Menoikeus that is notoriously difficult to translate (not just by me, but by others)

124c. ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παν τὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται,

Again, γάρ "for, because"...

ταῖς ἰδίαις = tais idiais (dative)

"to/for the peculiar, distinct, personal … "

οἰκειούμενοι = oikeioumenoi "to be familiarized to; become familiar with" (Note: again connected with the οικείος "house, family, household, private sphere.")

διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς = dia pantos aretais "through/by means of all ἀρεταῖς" ἀρεταῖς is the plural of ἀρετή = aretē which is usually translated "virtue" especially in works of other schools of philosophy. However, its semantic spectrum is a little wider than this:

goodness, excellence

manliness, prowess, rank, valour

virtue

character, reputation, glory, fame, dignity, distinction

miracle, wonder

More on the difficulty of translating this passage below, but suffice it to say that we should regroup in smaller passages. So, so far we have:

ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς… "Because those who are familiar with each other through all excellences and goodness

ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, = homoious apodekhontai, τούς ὁμοίους (accusative) "those who are like, resembling" ἀποδέχονται "admit, accept, demonstrate" (3d person plural)

"Because those who are familiar with each other through all excellences and goodness (the gods) accept those who resemble themselves.."

124d. πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες. = pan to mē toiouton hōs allotrion nomizontes. πᾶν "all, everything" τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον "one not of this sort" ὡς "like, as" ἀλλότριον "foreign, strange, alien" (accusative) νομῐ́ζοντες = "believing" (masculine nominative/vocative plural of νομῐ́ζων)

124b-d isn't the easiest section to parse, evidently for both myself and scholars. According to Peter Saint-Andre: "This is a puzzling sentence. Some translators understand it as applying to "the gods" from the previous sentence, with the sense that the gods would not interfere in human affairs because they don't care about ("consider as alien") mortal creatures who are so different from themselves. Other translators understand it as applying to "most people" from the previous sentence, with the sense that most people assume that immortal beings so different from themselves must want to interfere in human affairs. I lean toward the former interpretation." I am inclined to agree with Saint-Andre's position here and have used a variation on this understanding to get the literal translation below.

Since 124a-d finish the topic started in 123, let's bring together that section before proceeding:

Greek: οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις: ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι τε τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.

Literal translation: "For they are not prolepses, but the judgements of the hoi polloi concerning the gods [are] false hasty assumptions. Thence, the greatest evils are brought to the wicked from the gods as well as the greatest aid to the good. Because they (the hoi polloi) are believing that those who are familiar with each other through all excellences and goodness (the gods) accept those who resemble themselves; all those not of their sort (are) strange and alien."

I take this to mean the gods, as conceived of by the hoi polloi, believe that they gods - who are full of all excellences and virtue - grant favors and aid to good humans because they are like themselves; those who are evil, the gods reject as foreign and strange.

The fact that Epicurus then uses ὑπεγράφη hypegraphē which has an etymology of tracing an image I find quite intriguing.

Oh my, that pro-con reverse-a-palooza sounds like a lot of work. I see where you're going - and can appreciate the sentiment - but that's getting to a conference presentation level of work.