Posts by Don

Thanks for this lead! Epicurus and His Gods (1955) by C.W. Chilton is available on Internet Archive for borrowing. Chilton mentions that Festugière used some details from Norman DeWitt's "new" book Epicurus and his Philosophy in compiling the life of Epicurus in his book.

@Susan Hill : For what it's worth, I've tried to learn the pipes as well but NEVER got as far as you. I tried to learn on my own (for lack of teachers back in the day) and can sometimes get an almost-recognizable Amazing Grace or Skye Boat Song out of my chanter or small practice set of pipes. By now, I keep my expectations low and just play around with them for fun.

It might be easier for me at this point just to buy a kilt

Good points, Cassius . It seems you took the internal perspective and I took the external perspective in our posts Both can be valuable. I see you saying that we are the only judge of our pleasure; I'm saying we need not be bound to external cultural judgements of the "value" of our pleasure.

Consider this: Those railing against some people "wasting their time" get pleasure from the sense of superiority they feel by telling people they're wasting their time.

However, I would also venture to say that that pleasure taken from feeling superior has a potential of turning into doing harm if they belittle or bully the so-called "time-wasters." I'm thinking of the stereotypical "geek" getting bullied by the "jock."

So, I'm going to also say that I would not recommend that pleasure from superiority and would place it in the category of "the pleasures of the profligate" since that feeling of superiority can lead to harm. There's nothing harmful about a sense of confidence in one's self but not a sense of superiority. This is said explicitly in Diogenes Laertius:

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hatred, jealousy, and contempt are the motives behind the injuries that people cause each other...

There's also a cultural component. For example, video games are a "waste of time" but not sports watching. We're indoctrinated by culture to see value in some pastimes and not others. "Set sail in your own boat, free from all indoctrination."

This same argument is made against creating constructed languages. I've always thought David J. Peterson's Conlang Manifesto was an eloquent "defense" of the art, but this selection came back to me reading this thread:

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I would hope that many would agree that doing something that neither harms the doer nor anyone else is not wrong. That said, creating languages, to my knowledge, has never resulted in the harming of another human being, or of the language creator .... Like any other hobby or activity, the only requirement is a requirement of time, and time management has nothing to do with the activity itself, but only with the one performing it. Thus, it can't be argued that language creation is "a waste of time", it can only be argued that certain people are wasters of time—how they do it is irrelevant.

So, the person "wasting their time" is the only one who can really judge whether their time is being wasted. If they are not harming anyone or being harmed (Where have I heard that? ), where's the harm in what they're doing, literally.

I also saw this one yesterday: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Ca…s_(consul_58_BC)

What caught my eye, in light of the recent discoveries about Julius C and Frances Wright et al, "reportedly a follower of a school of Epicureanism that had been modified to befit politicians, as Epicureanism itself favoured withdrawal from politics." which references "2. For a survey of Roman Epicureans active in politics, see Arnaldo Momigliano, review of Science and Politics in the Ancient World by Benjamin Farrington (London 1939), in Journal of Roman Studies 31 (1941), pp. 151–157."

That sounds like Epicurus's injunction against education as indoctrination.

"Set sail in your own boat, free from all indoctrination!"

I'm certainly hearing strong albeit uncited echoes of Epicurus in Wright from your postings here.

Have you ran across this before: List of Epicurean Philosophers?

On the difficulty of finding a suitable single word English translation of kalos καλός, I offer the following:

See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=kalo/s2

For a better understanding of what κάλος means, see https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalos_kagathos

Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

Synonyms for kalos include:

admirable idem, page 12.

artistic idem, page 42.

auspicious idem, page 53.

beautiful idem, page 68.

buxom idem, page 107.

capital idem, page 111.

comely idem, page 145.

creditable idem, page 183.

elegant idem, page 265.

estimable idem, page 283.

excellent idem, page 288.

exquisite idem, page 296.

fair idem, page 302.

favourable idem, page 311.

fine idem, page 321.

fortunate idem, page 340.

good idem, page 366.

goodly idem, page 367.

handsome idem, page 383.

happy idem, page 384.

high-principled idem, page 400.

honourable idem, page 405.

hopeful idem, page 405.

lovely idem, page 502.

lucky idem, page 504.

noble idem, page 559.

ornamental idem, page 580.

picturesque idem, page 611.

plausible idem, page 618.

pomantic idem, page 625.

principled idem, page 641.

promising idem, page 653.

propitious idem, page 653.

reputable idem, page 699.

righteous idem, page 715.

skilful idem, page 780.

specious idem, page 799.

spruce idem, page 806.

virtuous idem, page 954.

well-favoured idem, page 974.

PS: Just FYI - kalōs καλώς is the adverb (...ly) and kalos καλός is the adjective.

Hmm. I'm intrigued by DeWitt's take but I'm skeptical of his "ending up in sound without sense" translation of "τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν." I see no negation ("without") in that phrase nor the sense of "ending up in" although DeWitt may just be idiosyncratically paraphrasing. My sense though is that he's maybe stretching his paraphrase too far.

I'm also unclear on the "quest for definitions." I get that we shouldn't look for ultimate eternal Platonic meanings for Order, Essence, etc., but agreed upon definitions are essential for communication. If we don't agree on shared definitions, communication is impossible. In light of that, I would say laying out agreed upon definitions would have to be allowable.

So, overall, I'm in agreement with DeWitt on p. 131, I just think he may be stretching his thesis a little to do more work than it has to.

Oh, now I like your explicit statement that words and by extension language itself is a convention. Just like other cultural phenomena, e.g., a group of people make contracts to not harm nor to be harmed... Likewise language evolves in a particular context to facilitate co-existence among people.

I also agree with your last paragraph. So, I don't think we basically disagree. I just don't want to stretch this farther than it needs to be.

My take is that this is saying language is a socially-evolved tool for understanding and communicating reality just like math or geometry. As such, we don't want to hide reality behind complex arguments in any of those spheres, but be as direct as possible. I will say that I could see this being used as an argument for so-called elegant solutions to math and science problems. Using the least amount of argument to explain the most widely applicable solutions.

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I think Epicurus was thinking that all communication through words is inherently limited and fall short of reality, just like math and geometry are inherently limited in what they can do. I believe that this position is one of the most important in the philosophy as providing the antidote to rationalism. No matter how clear we try to make our words or our theorems they will always fall short of reality.

I'm open-minded here, but what leads you to think this? I agree that we experience reality subjectively, but the only medium we have to communicate anything is through shared language. If Epicurus had the realizations he did and only experienced it for himself but didn't use language to communicate it, we wouldn't be discussing any of this.

Now, I will admit that we can communicate with "body language" - a comforting hug, a stern look - and that is immediate if the cultural context is shared. But that can't convey complex ideas from my head to yours. We have to use language, and Epicurus is advocating using the most simple, direct language to accomplish this to cut down the possibility of misunderstanding. Now, we have to interpret his words because we neither live in his cultural context nor speak Ancient Greek as a first language.

I would contend that rationalism makes use of rhetoric and flowery speech to obfuscate reality. Epicurus advocates direct language to uncover and convey reality as it exists. That's still a blow against elevating rationalism but he can't argue against rationalism unless he sets the parameters of what kind of language to use.

Quote from Cassius

I think that's a very useful dive into the meaning of that section, but I do think there will remain an important distinction between the realities of things, which we detect through the senses, and our opinions about them, which can only be expressed through words, and which will always include the possibility of error mixed in to those opinions. Otherwise there would be little need to have made the point, since he had already in section 37 made the point about the importance of clarity.

It's important to remember that section 34 is Diogenes's commentary about the Epicureans, and 37 is Epicurus himself writing to Herodotus. So, when you say "he had already ... made the point..." that's not the case. Epicurus is making the point about clarity of language in 37 for the first time here.

A *VERY* (almost painfully) literal translation of Diogenes's commentary in 34 is:

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τῶν τε ζητήσεων εἶναι τὰς μὲν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν.

And of inquiries (there) are, on the one hand, those concerning of concrete things; on the other hand, those concerning simple language.

(Note that the second is singular, so I am inclined to translate it singular as in language, speech, and not plural as in words.)

There two are listed using μεν...δε.... That's where the "on the one hand... On the other" come in. This is a very common feature of Ancient Greek. If you want to dive a little deeper, here's a good intro to that online.

My conjecture is that Diogenes is setting up a dichotomy of inquiries where Epicurus saw a means to an end. It wasn't inquiries about words, it was inquiries using simple, direct language. The only inquiries about words would be to establish the clear meaning of words so works could be easily understood and not "run on ... ad infinitum." The only way we are going to transmit the truth of our canonical observations and the truth about the nature of things (atoms, void, etc.) is to through the clearest, simplest language possible. Epicurus is saying we don't use flowery rhetoric or poetry (Sorry, Lucretius) because there's a chance the results of our inquiries would not be understood.

In DL X.34, Diogenes describes two kind of inquiry or investigation (ζήτησις "zētēsis") carried out by the Epicureans:

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"there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words."

This translation seemed unsatisfactory to me, so I wanted to delve a little deeper into the original text. However, it appears a note to the text references section 37, which does shed light on the latter part of the sentence in 34:

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DL X .37: "In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. [38] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred."

So it appears the investigation into 'nothing but words" refers to an investigation into the clear meaning of the language used in any inquiry. This also appears to be borne out by the original text. The first kind of investigation is "concerning pragmata" τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων.

πραγμάτων (pragmatōn) is the genitive plural of πρᾶγμα (pragma) and means:

- deed, act, fact

- occurance, matter, affair

- thing, concrete reality

- thing, creature

- thing of consequence or importance

- (in the plural) circumstances, affairs

- (in the plural, in bad sense) trouble, annoyance

So, it would appear the first kind of inquiry is of "things" in concrete reality. We're looking at existence, things as they exist. This could also be investigations into deeds, acts, I.e., the why and how things happen possibly..

The second kind of investigation is concerning "nothing but words" τὰς περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν. This makes it sound trivial, but section 37 gives this form of inquiry more gravitas. It's not "nothing but words" but it's an investigation into understanding the clear meaning of all words and language used to argue a point. This comes out clearer if we look at the definitions of the terms involved:

τὰς περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν

ψιλὴν = psilēn

(Note: this is the latter part of the names of the Greek letters u-psilon and e-psilon)

accusative feminine singular of ψῑλός

- naked, bare

- bald, smooth

- unclad, uncovered

- small, frail, delicate

- simple, plain

- (military) light (troops)

- unarmed

- (of words) without meter (i.e. prose)

- (poetry) without music (Epic vs Lyrical)

- (singing) without music (a capella)

- (music) without singing (instrumentals)

- (grammar) without the rough breathing (i.e. with the smooth breathing)

- (grammar) describing the unaspirated voiceless stops, π (p), τ (t), κ (k), as opposed to the aspirated voiceless stops, φ (ph), χ (kh), θ (th)

φωνήν = phōnēn

accusative singular of φωνή (phōnē, e.g., English telephone)

- sound

- Usually of the human voice: voice, cry, yell

- The voice or cry of animals

- Any articulate sound (especially vowels)

- speech, discourse

- language

So, I would offer that the second kind of investigation is concerned with plain language, unadorned speech, no flowery discourse. Say what you mean, know what you're saying, and make your point.

I'm putting this here as a placeholder, because I'm unclear on what that portion that you underlined actually means. Not just here as you posted, but recently as I've been re-reading DL. I want to dig into the text and get clear what it actually means:

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τῶν τε ζητήσεων εἶναι τὰς μὲν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν.

Fragment 116 says, and according to Attalus's Usener website, from Plutarch:

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Plutarch, Against Colotes, 17, p. 1117A: Such is ... the man who, in in the letter to Anaxarchus can pen such words as these: "But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind."

The pleasures Epicurus calls us to are ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς hedonas sunekheis "constant, continuous, sustained." So I don't think this refers to length of time, but he is calling us to make decisions that lead to one pleasure after another and pleasures or pains that lead to pleasure "down the line" even if not in this present moment. I still maintain this kind of terminology refers to long-term pleasure as opposed to the longest time. I've had this discussion elsewhere on the forum.

Lucian is an interesting author including being called the first sci-fi author. Since he was writing satire, we need to interpret his works carefully. It's sometimes hard to tell when he's reflecting reality, expanding on stereotypes, turning things upside down.

It's been awhile since I read him but this was a good reminder!

Quote from camotero

...indeed it does look like the vallue of truth is relative, which may be something that makes us uncomfortable but it might none the less be true. Perhaps, the question should not be if the value of truth is relative, but rather if the value of us honoring our truth is relative, which it seems to be the case.

Something doesn't feel right to me with that phrase "the value of truth" is "relative." I agree with Cassius that Epicurus would be comfortable saying there is no absolute capital-T Truth. No Platonic ideal of Truth. But I don't think you can really talk about the "value of truth" being relative or absolute. I'm not even sure what the "value of truth" means. There are things that are true and things that are false. And as Lucretius says, if it seems false, arm yourself against it.

However, I think I know what you're getting at in that second part. If by "honoring our truth" you mean proclaiming the truth of atoms and void and pleasure etc. loudly, publicly, and always, I think that would be a mistake. We make choices and rejections based on real situations to aim for pleasurable outcomes. Plus, check out the characteristics of the Epicurean sage in that they will make speeches if requested and other situations. Epicureans will not be the street-corner preacher handing out pamphlets and carrying a sign. We will share our Philosophy both individually and in groups of interested or receptive people, but we don't require people to listen to us. We're practical, prudent, just, and can take advantage of situations that arise to share what we know to be true, not false.

The "natural Philosophers" are those opposed to Epicurus in this instance. He actually wrote a book against them: A Summary of Arguments Against the Physicists/Natural Philosophers. The same word is used for them in both the list of Epicurus's books and in DL X.134: physikōs. In this case, these are the philosophers advocating for Fate.

I found myself thinking of the A, T, C, G letters of DNA that can be rearranged in innumerable ways during this episode.