Posts by Don

Came across this cartoon online the other day and it made me chuckle.

To get a little better insight into Obbink's translation, I looked in my copy of Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus to see where it might be quoted. Surprisingly, I found something helpful both in itself and in making me dive back into specific servings of On Piety one being col 25.

First, Obbink references two other works in regards to column 25: P. Oxy. II 215 col 1,4-24. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papyrus_O…215?wprov=sfla1

[The first part talks about those people who sacrifice only because they fear the gods. The author thinks "in this there is still no firm basis for piety." Then continues.] But you, sir, consider it a thing of the greatest blessedness to discern properly that which we can conceive as the one best thing among existing things. Marvel at this notion and revere it in freedom from fear."

https://archive.org/details/oxyrhy…age/30/mode/2up

That sounds and awful lot like Sedley's idealist view of the Epicurean gods. Whether they exist or not seems to miss the point. "Marvel at the notion" this papyrus says.

There's also Philodemus's own De mus. col. 4,6 (fr. 386 Usener) Philodemus, On Music, Vol. Herc. 1, I c.4,6: (Obbink) "Let it suffice to say now that the divine needs no mark of honour, but that it is natural to honour it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering with each individual usage (to each of the gods in turn) theit traditional sacrifices."

Attalus's site gives this translation:

"Now, these very important things may still be said at the present: that the divine does not need any honor; for us, nevertheless, it’s natural to honor it, above all, with pious convictions, even through the rites of national tradition, each according to his proper part." http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus2.html

I see the "notion" has turned to "conviction" in the second but I can see similarities in those two words. Again, this still seems to echo Sedley's idealist argument to me. The word used in P. Oxy. 215 is διαληψις. This is also used in On Piety in Column 10 and translated as "understanding" specifically as "an understanding according to similarity" when talking about the nature of the gods. I'm okay with any of those translations in context. And that similarity, in some cases, is the formation of the idea of the gods through similar "images" or eidola perceived by the mind.

But to return to Tsouna (finally), she references col 38 of On Piety and says in a note, after admitting that Philodemus's argument can be difficult to understand given the condition of the papyrus and textual difficulties, she notes the main thrust of his argument appears to be:

Epicurus and the founders DO assert that the gods do have harmful or beneficial influences on us; BUT genuine piety not fear is what makes people just (NOT as the theologians who tell scary stories about the gods contend). Also, the gods do not actually "do" or "give" goods and evils to men, nonetheless, they are responsible (αίτιοι) "in a way" and only partially, not wholly. Col. 38 says " Those who keep their oaths and are just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those (gods)."

Tsouna also summarizes Obbink in that he outlines interpretations: the gods are responsible for harms/benefits by being implemented in various physical processes of causation; or that our *ideas* of the gods function as direct causes of harm/benefit for people.

So, again, to me, it seems to come back to the physical existence of the gods doesn't really matter. It is our notion or understanding or conviction of the gods' blessedness etc. that can cause us benefits and an incorrect view of piety that can cause fear and harm.

Still digging in but I felt this was important to get down.

Quote from Don

I plan to go back to investigate that translation of "psychosomatic dispositions" tomorrow.

As I promised myself, I found that "psychosomatic dispositions" in Column 44 translates the word διαθέσεις (diatheseis).

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…y%3Ddia%2Fqesis

So, yes, it does just mean someone's bodily or mental "disposition" so there's no word that's being translated "psychsomatic". Obbink just included that as a modifier to clarify the translation of διαθέσεις.

Interestingly, it does include the sense of arranging things in order. So, column 44 encourages us to guard against all "defilements" (μιαρον miaron http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…try%3Dmiaro%2Fs ) and to use our intellect to "comprehensively" view the best disposition to "fit all that happens to us to blessedness (makariotē-)"

Agreed.

Plus it's not necessarily a more vs better, it is a future vs present. It brings to mind VS35: Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

Quote from Matt

I am even "more" late commenting.

That's the benefits of having a forum for all those asynchronous conversations

I wanted to say that your point about "what a person does with this information" is an important one. Thanks for phrasing it that way!

That's one of the reasons that I'm personally working through Obbink's Philodemus On Piety. I think it's important to get a better idea of both what Epicurus and the founders thought and what they did with it. Did they participate in the festivals? Why? What practical application does the "existence" writ large of the gods have for the early Epicureans? For us?

I find it both a practical as well as a pleasurable academic exercise.

One argument against eternal life being preferable vis a vis pleasure that I read recently was from a Philodemus quote in Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus.

As I remember it (didn't look up but remembering), the argument ran:

An infinite life would allow us to be always looking forward and not paying attention to (or appreciating) pleasures *actually* occurring to us in the present. We could "get away with" not pursuing pleasure in the present but to be always planning for future desires.

I found that intriguing and hadn't read that before.

That's a good question. One point is that he seems to be equating the political charges and comedic portrayals of philosophers, especially Socrates (as the extreme case) but also others that were exiled or punished. My take is that Philodemus seems to feel that comedy playwrights shouldn't be "slandering" philosophers as if philosophers should be respected and immune from lampoon. It seems that he's also implying that Socrates may have brought this on himself by being so public in his questioning and gadflying of the people. He made enemies. Socrates basically made a nuisance of himself, and Philodemus is saying, "See what it got him?!" It also seems like he's saying that "we know what those comedic playwrights are like! Don't play into their hands." So Philodemus is saying that Epicurus was such an upstanding and civic-minded philosopher that he was not subject to comedic ridicule, and we should emulate his example.
On the other hand, Epicurus's insults and name-calling were against rival philosophers and not political figures. So maybe Philodemus felt those kinds of activities were acceptable in defending Epicurus's philosophy against rivals. More of an in-house debate instead of a public "airing of grievances."

As for the comedy, I greatly enjoy Aristophanes. I understand his plays are FULL of contemporary satire directed against "celebrities" of the day, especially Cleon whom Aristophanes despised. I also find it interesting that Socrates himself is supposed to have stood up and taken a bow during performance of The Clouds. Evidently, he enjoyed the notoriety.

Column 71 has some interesting points:

“They [i.e., people manipulated by philosophers ro rulers by means of the poets’ false tales about the gods] will suppose that the gods are terrifying tyrants, and most of all because of their own bad consciences they will expect great misfortunes from them. Thus, as far as we are concerned, on account of the belief which they do no have, they would accomplish nothing [i.e., no proper conception of the gods]. But those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it [i.e., the gods’ happiness] was seen [i.e., in the past experience of humans in cultural history] to come from doing no harm to anyone, they [i.e., readers of the present work] will endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so noble… [most of a column missing, ~60 words, continues at bottom of next column]... to change sides and, not having learnt to be grateful for past goods and to bear up against natural pains and of death [probably continues as not to fear death]...

A few points of interest to discuss here. It appears again to show the gods’ existence in an ambiguous light. We are asked by the author to “imitate” the “blessedness” of the gods “in so far as mortals can.” The word used is μιμεισθαι (mimeisthai) which does indeed mean “to mimic, imitate, represent, portray” but also “of the fine arts, to represent, express by means of imitation, of an actor (or painting, music, sculpture).” I might think of it as “Fake it till you make it”.

The word used for “blessedness” in the original Greek in column 71 is none other than our old friend ευδιμονιαν (eudaimonian)! I would have expected something like μακαριοσ (makarios) as used in KD 1 and elsewhere in Epicurus’s writings, since markios and related words lile markariotes are used in the text of On Piety. For example, in column 24, the author says:

“Therefore they [the kathegemones] simply and necessarily supposed that he [Epicurus] left unquestioned [or “posited” or “allowed the existence of”] the existence of blessed and eternal beings.”

The words translated here as “blessed and eternal beings” are ζωια μακαρια και διαιωνια (beings blessed and everlasting).

The word makarion appears again in a phrase in a fragmented column 43 along with και αφθαρ[τον] (blessed and imperishable). Column 44/45 uses variations on makarios:

“... and to dispel what is foreign to its nature [i.e., a god’s], and to marshal all its overpowering strength, nor in On Gods does he [Epicurus] say anything conflicting withone’s doing these things. And in On Holiness he calls the life of perfection [or ‘completeness’] the most pleasant and most blessed, and instructs us to guard against all defilements, with our intellect comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions, for the sake of fitting al that happens to us to blessedness and especially having it in good order…” [more of column 45, I’ve included in previous posts]

The “life of perfection the most pleasant and most blessed” translates “τον τελειοτητος βιον ‘ηδιστον και μακαριωτατον” ton teleiotetos bion hediston kai makariotaton. “Teleiotetos” is related to “telos”, something’s goal/completion/etc., so I can understand the ambiguous translation. Hediston is related to hedone “pleasure”! And finally we have makariotaton “most blessed.” The last mention of blessedness right before the end is also makariote--.

To return to column 71, the echoes of the Principle Doctrines and other familiar precepts of Epicurus are striking at the end:

- to be grateful for past goods

- to bear up against natural pains

- [to have no fear] of death

- to do no harm

I also expected something like kalos when column 71 says “to make themselves so noble…”; however, the word is “μεγαλοπρεπεις.” “to make oneself a great man, magnificent.; grand, elegant, or splendid in appearance; full of majesty; majestic.” So there’s a lot more going on there than simply “noble.”

I plan to go back to investigate that translation of "psychosomatic dispositions" tomorrow.

Quote from Cassius

Yes I think we are together. I can easily see the Epicureans criticizing attitudes that are excessively or improperly "virtue hating" and "all-harassing" while still agreeing with the criticism of Socrates, since the Epicureans considered Socrates to have been very defective in his teaching and therefore probably worthy of the ridicule he received.

I'm still not sure we're together. Philodemus is describing the comedy playwrights themselves as hating virtue and harassing everybody. Philodemus's tone "momentarily rises in vehemence" (as Obbink notes). The Epicureans are in no way taking a share in this description. Philodemus is disgusted with the comedy writers (whether in reality or just to make a point isn't clear). In some ways Philodemus is equating the political persecution of philosophers and intellectuals with their derision in comedy.

Obbink notes the Epicureans didn't escape completely unscathed by the comic playwrights.

"Epicureans" appear in Hellenistic comedy stereotyped as μάγειροι "the cooks in charge of preparation of private sacrifices" and satirized as pandering to delicacies and fancy tastes.

Obbink notes that there is no clear evidence or instances of "Epicureans" being satirized for their theological views "but rather their attitude towards sacrifice and religious feasting (in the context of Epicurus's stereotyped doctrine of pleasure)."

Obbink notes that Philodemus is claiming that "Epicurus *never* fell prey to comic derision," and Philodemus doesn't "retreat" from that position. "Yet he could have safely argued that comic portrayals never led in Epicurus's case to exile/execution, as he, like many others, believed about Socrates."

Quote from Cassius

Also the point about 'virtue-hating' and "all-harassing" -- I would suspect that might hint toward criticizing 'cynicism' or "nihilism" and that's a very interesting topic in itself.

Just to be clear, "virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth" is Philodemus's description of the comedy writers. So, he's contrasting, for example, the depiction of Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds with the fact that Epicurus never got lampooned by the comedy playwrights because Epicurus was so exemplary a citizen of Athens.

I’m going to return to columns 26-36 that discuss the Epicureans participation in the rites and festivals of ancient Greece. However, columns 36 to 59 talk about the benefits and harms from gods. This topic also appears in the Letter to Menoikeus 124 where the hoi polloi think of the gods bestowing benefits on those they like and harms on those the gods dislike. I originally thought this was an empty opinion; however, it seems, from this section of On Piety, that Epicurus and the kathegemones (“those who led the way,” i.e., the leaders of the school, e.g., Polyaenus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus) also held a version of this view. Note, too, that anywhere there is a reference to Book #, that’s a reference to Epicurus’s magnum opus On Nature.

Obbink’s notes on Column 36, lines 1023-42 (excerpt):

Here the kathegemones are said to have held a doctrine whereby there are produced benefits and harms for good and bad persons respectively [το περαινεσθαι ωφελιας εκ θεων τοις αγαθοις και βλαβας τοις κακοις]. Philodemus paraphrases, saying that for wise and just men (i.e., οι αγαθοι) there is a completion or production (by humans in general) of benefits and harms (from the gods) which are no less or even greater than those harms and benefits which people in general usually assume. The present passage thus adds another dimension to that expressed in Ad. Menoec. 124. For in addition to assuming the account there of why people in general think and talk as though the gods were a source of great harms and benefits (and, in a sense, are right about this), the present passage purports to give a rationale whereby the Epicurean sage will do so as well.

So, to retrace our steps, here are excerpts from lines columns 36 and 37 from the scroll itself:

And for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people they [Epicurus and the kathegemones] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived that benefits and harms which are no feebler [or ‘more deficient’ or ‘weaker’] or even greater [i.e., no weaker {harms} or even greater {benefits}] than people in general suppose [literally ‘attribute’ or ‘attach’ to the gods] are made complete [i.e., ‘are accomplished’ ‘are fulfilled’], not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in return for his benefit [or ‘of his benefit here’], and these things they [i.e., the kathegemones] say most piously. And in On Gods what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he [Epicurus] outlines in some detail. And in book 13 [of On Nature] he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people. And in book 35, in addition to clarifying somewhat this benefit, he says that even on account of thinking [5-7 words missing…]. And in his book On Destiny there is an exposition concerning the assistance [to humans] provided by them [i.e., the gods]. And in his letters to important individuals he is seen to pronounce consistently on this point;...

The topic continues into column 38:

...similarly in Book 6 concerning adjudication [6-8 words missing] and that [he says] those who are oath-keeping [ευορκους] and just are moved by the most virtuous influences [literally ‘vibrations’ ‘repercussions’] both from their own selves and from those [i.e., the gods]. And similiarly in book 8; and [Epicurus and the kathegemones] define the notion of benefit in the same way as Polyaenus in the first book of his Against Aristotle’s On Philosophy declared his opinion that divine nature is the cause for us of these goods; and similarly Hermarchus that …

Now, this goes on like this for awhile, but in column 42 we find out that some theologians and philosophers perpetuated and preserved tales and poems of vengeful, wrathful gods to keep people in general in line:

And preparing an immense deception against the rest, they subsequently rush into terrible, hidden injustices, since they no longer feared anyone believed to be all-knowing. Therefore it was safer to keep silent. Consequently that was what those of the theologians and philosophers who were just did. For the truth did not escape them, but, since they observed that evil deeds were held in check by the tales because foreboding hung over the more foolish of mankind, in order that we might not render life as a whole a beastly form of existence, and since otherwise the hostility …[column missing…]

Now, later columns (44, 45 from my previous posts on 46 and 47) talks about the need to preserve the gods’ blessedness and incorruptibility as being truly pious.

Col. 48 talks about why these views are held:

“it is necessary to declare to them simply and in a fairly direct manner that every person must observe the laws and the customs as long as they (i.e., the laws and the customs) do not command any element of impiety. For the deity, I think, ought to have been deemed surpassing in all things, that is to say, the deity that is evident and honoured in ritual observance (or ‘in intelligent contemplation’), as Epicurus proclaims.”

Keywords here are “ritual observance/intelligent contemplation” translating εν τηι θεωριαι This ambiguous meaning goes back to my new translation of the characteristics of the Epicurean sage, namely this section https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…n-contemplation Some translations of that section of Diogenes Laertius say the sage will enjoy the spectacles more than others. I feel justified in my translation since Obbink here seems to be dealing with the same ambiguous dilemma of the word θεωριαι.

Column 49 gets at why some people said Epicurus wasn’t brought up on charges of impiety like Socrates was:

They [opponents of Epicureans] also claim that Epicurus escaped from the Athenian masses not because [2-4 words missing] he held less impious views, but because his philosophy had escaped the notice of many people.

Just slander? Or a manifestation of the lathe biosas?

Column 51 comes back to Epicurus’s practice:

And with regard to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must be entirely acknowledged that he acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith, and he kept them; and the demonstrations about his life which are in Zeno [one of Philodemus’s teachers] make clear to people this most important testament among his agreements [i.e., Epicurus’s will]. So far in fact was he from being harmful to anyone of mankind that not only did he honour his parents as much as the gods, nor was he fondly disposed only towards his brothers, … [missing pieces up to column 53] …

Column 53 talks about how Epicurus was kind to everyone, didn’t bring any lawsuits, and did not become the butt of writers of comedy! He lived “without falling prey to the virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth of comedy.” “Virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth of comedy” translates the Greek το μισοχρηστον στομα και παντα σινομενον επεσε της κωμωδιας (misokhreston stoma kai panta sinomenon epese tes komodias). I must admit that’s a pretty good epithet to throw at someone! The Greek misokhreston literally means “hating-the-better-sort”.

53 continues in column 54:

And he did not even utter a word against the sophistical orators who made mention of him; so great was the strength of the effective precaution against all things that could possibly annoy anyone in deed or word, or even give the impression of intending to inflict harm. For what some have ventured to say, namely that he went unknown to people, shows first of all that neither he nor his followers were harmfully disposed towards their fellow citizens; and then that no bitter slander or lawsuit on account of a major doctrine …

I should point out that “he went unknown to people” does NOT use any form of lathe biosas in the original Greek text but rather [εγ]ινωσκε[τ]ο. The idea here appears to be to assert how much more Epicurus was an upstanding pious citizen who didn’t bother anyone unlike philosophers like Socrates who got himself charged, tried, and killed. Column 56 even says that Epicurus was “conducting himself so many years in a manner not inactive towards the city [i.e., playing his full part in public life].” Cassius may find that last line interesting in light of the popular apolitical “hiding in a cave” descriptions of Epicurus.

Quote from JJElbert

I might be misremembering slightly! That does look like the right passage.

I thought you were kidding at first, Joshua ! LOL I didn't remember the ball of wool and lead!! That's amazing that he had that kind of insight about mass! Thanks for calling my attention to that!

Quote from Cassius

Don THANK YOU for continuing to posts these details as they are extremely helpful!

You're welcome. I've been having a lot of pleasure doing it, so I'm glad it's helpful.

Quote from Cassius

. If you equate a "concept" with a criterion of truth then you lock yourself forever into a particular opinion which would never again be changeable through that faculty, and that's not the way we view the five senses or the feelings of pain and pleasure, which are continuously reporting whatever they receive regardless of preconceived notions.

This is why I'm so excited about the work of Dr Lisa Feldman Barrett. Her explanation of infants and children forming concepts of concrete and abstract "things" strikes me as that "repeated exposure" idea of prolepses. But those concepts are not immutable. I go back to Philodemus's On Anger where he writes about the ability to control our anger by the exercise of "putting-before-the-eyes" of the consequences of our anger before we're actually angry. This fits nicely with Barrett in that this exercise would change our concept (I'm saying prolepsis) of the emotion of anger so that the next time we construct that emotion from sense data and our innate concept/prolepsis of that emotion, our mind has a different prediction and hence a different - hopefully more appropriate - outcome: ex., Don't lose your mind and yell and swear at the person in traffic (they may be rushing to the hospital).

I've found a lot of echoes of Epicurus in Barrett's work from what I've been reading. It's made me more open to the "repeated exposure" idea of formation of the prolepses.

Quote from JJElbert

Quote

And that's correct (in a vacuum), right? How or why would he intuit that? I think I need to revisit that Letter.

I don't have a citation to hand, but see Lucretius on this point. I think he says that in the absence of air-resistance a ball of wool and a ball of lead will fall at the same speed.

This?

Quote

Which but for voids for bodies to go through 'Tis clear could happen in nowise at all. Again, why see we among objects some Of heavier weight, but of no bulkier size? Indeed, if in a ball of wool there be As much of body as in lump of lead, The two should weigh alike, since body tends To load things downward, while the void abides, By contrary nature, the imponderable. Therefore, an object just as large but lighter Declares infallibly its more of void; Even as the heavier more of matter shows, And how much less of vacant room inside. That which we're seeking with sagacious quest Exists, infallibly, commixed with things- The void, the invisible inane.

Thanks for those insights, Martin ! In light of what you said, I went back to Diogenes to see what the Letter to Herodotus said:

Quote

60] "Further, we must not assert `up' or `down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space --or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity--appear to us to be at the same time `up' and `down' with reference to the same point ; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum. [61] "When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms' own weight counteracting the force of the blow.

It seems a bit more nuanced than I remembered. He seems to say that atoms can move any direction but their downward motion is due to their "weight" which, in a manner of speaking, is correct! The fact that he also says that "Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones," took me by surprise. I didn't remember that. And that's correct (in a vacuum), right? How or why would he intuit that? I think I need to revisit that Letter.

In looking through Obbink’s work, I found mention of some important words in the original Greek text and thought they might shed some light on some of the extant writings of Epicurus where we have questions. Then again maybe not. So, here it goes. For this entry, we’re looking at prolepsis which is mentioned only twice in On Piety.

Column 45, Line 1300
Obbink (starting around line 1280, emphasis added and notes added as parenthetical statements for clarity):
And they (Epicurus and the kathegomenes) are continually saying everywhere (in their writings), lest I go on too long by adding treatises by them (i.e., to put it briefly), that of all existing things it (the divine) is the best and most holy, most worthy of emulation, having dominion over all good things, unburdened by affairs, and exalted and great-minded and great-spirited and ritually pure and purest and propitious. Therefore they say that they alone strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold the most pious views about the gods, and they charge the rest with holding the opposite views, in as much as they (other, non-Epicurean philosophers) teach contrary to the naturally acquired generic conception (prolepsis), and [verb missing] the purest views as regards the ineffable pre-eminence of the strength and perfection of the divine… [gap - 1 col c.90 words]

Unfortunately, Obbink’s note to column 45 doesn’t help much. Here is an excerpt:
“Epic. Ad Moec. states that the assertions of the many about the gods are not derived from [prolepseis]. … prolepsis, a technical term for which Epicurus was notorious, reflects a process of reasoning that forms a major part of Epicurus’ epistemological programme. The source tradition is unambiguous that he thought it was at least possible to have a prolepsis of god or divine nature, but otherwise we do not hear much about it in this treatise, nor does it seem to have played a major role in Philod. De dis … When Philodemus says here that the others teach about the gods in a way that is contrary to the prolepsis of them, the concept is probably deemed to be unproblematic and to be fully sketched out by passages such as KD 1, Ad. Menoec. 123, and the definitions of the pious and impious man above, 1130-65. (i.e., lines 1130-65 in On Piety)

For reference, lines 1130-65 discuss the pious person preserving the immortality and “consummate blessedness of God [i.e., the god, the divine nature] together with all things included by us” and the impious man who “banishes” these qualities from the divine. The pious person “we honour for his piety, whereas the other we despise as manifestly depraved.”

Column 66A, Line 1887
Obbink:
For all (perhaps “infinity”?) [several words missing] is thought of, just as time is defined (or divided or distinguished), as being a naturally formed generic conception (prolepsis); and just as also in book 32 (of Epicurus’s On Nature), he says that because the existence of the gods is apprehended with clarity (i.e., vivid knowledge of the gods), although as a unified entity among underlying existents, and their (gods’) nature is less able to be perceived by thought than other existents, and generally towards [~25 words missing] who towards [one word missing] but of all those [word missing] self-completing [one word missing] all.

I found it interesting that time here is included in the examples of “naturally formed generic conceptions” or prolepses. I thought I remembered that “time does not exist” according to the podcast discussions of DRN Book 1: We're wont, and rightly, to call accidents. | Even time exists not of itself; but sense Reads out of things what happened long ago, | What presses now, and what shall follow after: |No man, we must admit, feels time itself, | Disjoined from motion and repose of things.

So, is the author (Philodemus or Phaedrus) here saying that “time” is also a prolepsis, a preconception that we learn? That would be an interesting development. If prolepses are formed by repeated exposures to a concept or thing, I suppose a concept/prolepsis of time could be formed. Here’s Obbink’s take...

Obbink has this in the notes to column 66A:
“1885-6 καθαπ[ερ ορι]ζεται χρο[νος : here the fact that the gods exist in the first instance as conceptualized by humans is illustrated by comparison to the ontological status of time, which according to Epicurus is not even a per se entity (but rather an accident or attribute of other entities), yet is not in consequence any less real. Rather, it is in an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects. For the status of time as an accidental property of things see Epic. Ad Herod. 68-73; Demetrius of Laconia ap. Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 10.219-27, where time is styled an ‘accident of accidents’; Lucr. I. 459-63.

“1887 προληψιν : formation of the prolepsis of the gods (and the implied lack of it among opponents) is also discussed adobe, 1300, and it (or something very like it) is said to have obtained among the ‘first humans’ in cultural history above at 224-31. On the prolepsis of the gods see further Epic. Ad Herod. 76-7, Ad Menoec. 123-4; Luce. 5.1161-1225, 6.68-79; Cic. De nat. Deor. 1. 43-9.”

I hadn't heard of that one! I've heard of CGPGrey from other sources but never dug into their work. This is a good opportunity. Thanks for the recommendation [runs off to podcast app to search and subscribe...]

That's my take. Epicurus's whole "down" thing never made much sense to me. Once you have swerving and collisions, you've messed up any original parallel trajectories. Okay, an atom moves in a straight line unless acted on (not sure if that's accurate, but I'm not too concerned about that).

In any case, I found the Vsauce video thought-provoking and enjoyable. It's a fun YouTube channel, and we got to see Michael do a program once with Adam Savage of Mythbusters. A fun night of popular science stuff!

Admin Note: On 12/12/24 the name of this thread was expanded so that it can be used to extend conversation on this topic. The original title was simply "Atoms Fall 'Down.'" The title now refers to other aspects of movement at well so we can include reference to the movement of atoms also in the context of bodies and images.

I'm not sure how applicable this might be, but just watched a Vsauce video on the meaning of "Down". Since Epicurus maintained that atoms fall "down" unless they "swerve" I found Michael's explanation of"down" interesting. I never put this much thought into it... Which makes the Vsauce channel so enjoyable!

Here you go: