Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

PD8: " No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures."

and from the letter to Menoeceus:

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided."

LOL! I would cite both those Principal Doctrines to defend my position, too, so we *must* be starting to meet somewhere

I did want to address this part of your post:

Quote from Cassius

If we look at PD10 solely from the "practical" point of view alone, it seems to me that we imply, or at least open up the logical possibility, that pleasure can lose its nature as good in certain contexts -- namely the context in which the cost of such pleasure is large in terms of the pain required in order to achieve it. I would submit that labeling pleasure "good" or "not good" is not at all the same as saying pleasure is to be "chosen" or not chosen," so I am suggesting that Epicurus is telling us to keep these two aspects in mind as distinctly separate.

I don't agree. Looking at it as "practical" provides a concrete example of the philosophy's application to a real-world situation in which people must exercise choices and avoidances as to how to live a pleasurable life. The extravagant pleasures in and of themselves are not "good" or "bad"; they are situationally "choice-worthy" or not. There's no question the "profligate" (I'm really beginning to hate that translation) are experiencing pleasure. Epicurus is not saying some pleasures in and of themselves are good or bad. He explicitly states pleasure is good, The Good. But also explicitly states not all pleasures should be chosen at all times. The import for me of PD 10, PD 8, the Letter, is to reinforce the goal is to lead a pleasurable life. I would cite:

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PD 25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

For me, that dovetails with:

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everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely blessed life.

Epicurus's emphasis, in my opinion, is that the "profligate" experiences pleasure but will not find "the health of the body and the serenity of the soul" nor "a completely blessed life" if they're not also addressing their fear of the gods, of death, of pain. That way of life will not teach you how to rid yourself of those impediments to a completely blessed life filled to its fullness of pleasure.

Here is my initial response to your posts above. Please let me know if I misunderstood or misinterpret anything you wrote :

I think this Doctrine is neither counterfactual nor hypothetical. I think Epicurus is saying exactly what he means to say.

I interpret it to be Epicurus's concrete observation as to the inadequacy of pursuing a life of "sex, drugs, & rock n roll" (to use a shorthand) if one wants to lead a pleasurable life. The "profligate" life provides momentary pleasure but will lead to multiple pains in short order. You are welcome to pursue those pleasures, but Epicurus is not going to encourage or sanction your choice. Not all pleasures should be chosen.

I believe this Doctrine was also a direct counter to any criticism of his school of just being Cyrenaic. He needed to give a firm rebuttal to those who painted the Epicureans with the same brush as the Cyrenaics. It is also my contention that this is the purpose of the Letter to Menoikeus section:

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So when we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean the pleasures of decadent people or the enjoyment of sleep, as is believed by those who are ignorant or who don't understand us or who are ill-disposed to us, but to be free from bodily pain and mental disturbance. For a pleasant life is produced not by drinking and endless parties and enjoying boys and women and consuming fish and other delicacies of an extravagant table, but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul.

This again is Epicurus saying exactly what he means to say: "We do NOT mean the pleasures of decadent people (άσωτος)." He uses the same word to refer to those people in both the Letter and PD 10. He clearly says "a pleasant life is produced NOT by [that lifestyle] but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul." In the Letter, "sober reasoning" translates νήφων λογισμὸς "nēphōn logismos" where nēphōn literally means “to be sober; to drink no wine; to be self-controlled.” That he uses drinking to say what does not produce a pleasurable life, then says being sober does produce a pleasurable life seems to link those two opposing clauses together. One negative, one positive.

To address Elayne specifically, I'm not saying Epicurus is advocating a middle path. I don't believe he has any problem with drinking per se (he wrote a book entitled Symposium after all) but just getting drunk and acting there fool, or with sex (he cannot conceive of the good without it), etc. But a life consisting solely of these specific decadent pleasures taken to extremes will not teach one to lead a pleasurable life.

Quote from Cassius

Anyone who looks at PD10 and insists on saying that the profligate man "cannot" be successful, and analyzing it that way, is in my view not accepting this as the hypothetical it seems clearly intended to be.

So then to finally address your quote here, Cassius , I do not accept that this is a hypothetical and don't believe it should be interpreted that way.

Cassius and Elayne , this is all *very* helpful and let's me see ya'll's thought processes. I greatly appreciate your willingness to continue to engage in this conversation. Let me now quote the areas above where we have agreement:

Quote from Cassius

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure as the ultimate good, which means the ultimate good or goal for which we do everything else to achieve, and which is not in terms an intermediate step toward any higher goal. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in if in fact those activities succeed in bringing them pleasure which they feel to outweigh the pain which may be required to achieve that pleasure. This is because any legitimate censure would have to be based on them failing to achieve the ultimate goal of nature, and if they do in fact achieve that goal, there is no natural grounds for censuring them. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured to the extent that they fail to achieve their goal, which in practical human experience is likely to happen if their profligate ways do not banish the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If their profligate ways included a means of resolving these and all other pains and fears, there would be no proper /natural grounds for censuring them because they were in fact successful in achieving a pleasurable life.

Quote from Elayne

he is saying he hasn't observed such a strategy succeeding. That partying doesn't relieve fears of the supernatural-- according to his observations.

Quote from Elayne

embedded in that formula is also the supremacy of pleasure as the goal, and his condemnation of the strategy because it fails at pleasure.

Now, I can address the places where our interpretations diverge with more specificity.

Thanks for posting these. I've really enjoyed your translation work!

My contention has been that anytime we see το αγαθόν / ταγαθον , it can be translated colloquially as "pleasure" ( literally The Good with capitalization rendering its importance in an English way that's not necessarily possible in the original text since a lot of those manuscripts used an uncial script)

Plus I tend to read το κακόν in these contexts as "pain."

Some popular translations seem to obfuscate the importance of pleasure and pain in the philosophy by using "the good" and "the bad/evil."

This came home to me in looking at the Tetrapharmakos with ταγαθον "the good" and το δεινον "the terrible" easily paraphrased as pleasure and pain.

I look forward to more of your work!!

This new thread grew out of the discussion of Catherine Wilson's article in The Statesman. In that thread, several of us posted differing interpretations of PD 10. Cassius suggested (correctly) that here might be a better spot for that discussion to take place to better focus the other thread. Fully agree! Hence, my starting this new thread over here.

Elayne and ya'll: Let me see if I can correctly summarize your interpretation of PD 10:

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured in so far as they aren't experiencing the fullness of pleasure because they still have the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If they would resolve these pains and fears and come to a correct understanding of these, they could engage in any of the activities which bring them pleasure without anxiety. Please correct or add anything I've gotten wrong or missed. I sincerely want to make sure I fully understand where you're coming from.

Good idea, Cassius . I'm going to move over to the PD10 link to continue that discussion. I really want to understand ya'll's* interpretation of that Doctrine. I'm not saying I agree with it (yet, maybe?), but we may be talking past each other in some ways. I'm going to try and use Daniel Dennett's presentation of Rapoport's Rules. I don't think we're opponents, but I do see us as having different interpretations.

*Note: English really needs an official 2nd person plural pronoun instead of the ambiguity of "you." For now, I'm picking "ya'll"

Quote from Cassius

I suspect Don would say that he agrees with that point, so maybe the issue is more "why do we think there is an issue in how to express this?"

Quick response, short on time right now, but...:

A) Yes, I agree about pleasure.

B) I think y'all are making PD 10 do way more heavy lifting than it has to.

I'll try and add more detail later.

Elayne what I agreed with was your eloquent description of the "things productive of the pleasures of the profligate" being unable to address the anxiety and fear of the gods, death, etc. When Epicurus is saying if those things did teach the limit of desires, we'd have no reason to censure the profligate. The "limit of desires" I take to refer to the desires one choose and those one refects. Not every desire leads to pleasure and so those should be rejected. The word translated as "limit" also can have the connotation of the "perfection" of something. So if those things taught the perfection of desire - how to prudently make choices and rejections - we'd have to need to censure the "lost." The fact that he calls them ἀσώτους along with the commentary on the Menoikeus Letter leads me to believe he's not condoning their choices in any way. I believe he's clearly saying, this isn't the way to choose to live a pleasurable life.

Quote from Elayne

Don you did say PD10 was about taking responsibility though-- but that's only in service of pleasure. So that would not be a reason to turn down a true bliss for you pill in an environment free of threats, if you believed it was as advertised.

Yes. Each of us is responsible for our own pleasure through the choices and avoidances each of us decide to follow.

Quote from Elayne

Don then maybe I misunderstood what you said about "teaching us limits"-- because he didn't use it that way.

PD 10 does explicitly say that "if, further, they [that which is productive of pleasures to profligate persons] taught them to limit their desires [then] we should not have any reason to censure such persons,..."

So, Epicurus is saying the profligate don't learn to limit their desires and so we should have reason to censure them.

It's actually phrased not as an infinitive "to limit" but:

If, furthermore, "that which produces profligate pleasures" taught 'the limit (τὸ πέρας)' of desires/yearnings/lusts' ( τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) etc."

Quote from Elayne

I don't think you understand PD 10. If you take it in context with the entire body of writings, it is very clear Epicurus places nothing above or equal to pleasure. The problem is that the pleasures of the profligates not only produce more pain than pleasure but that they leave anxiety unaddressed, and thus they can't produce complete pleasure. They leave the pain of anxiety. And he is talking about limits not because of the modern concept of "knowing our limits." He is referring to the understanding that once you have removed all pain, you will be full of maximum pleasure, a real and wonderful feeling, and that we are not (as was argued in his time) forced to seek more and more pleasure endlessly, if there is no pain. He is saying complete pleasure can actually happen for humans.

Yes. There's a problem with the pleasures of the profligate, and I think you described that problem well. I'm not seeing where we disagree.

Quote from Cassius

PD10 in my view is as hypothetical or a logical challenge or whatever you would like to call it, set up specifically as an "in your face" statement of the position that the ultimate goal is pleasure, and forcing you to confront what some people are going to think are uncomfortable truths.

I don't see it that way, and I know we had this conversation previously. I don't think Epicurus is dealing in hypotheticals at all in this doctrine. I think he's being very concrete. Especially taking the Letter to Menoikeus along with this, I think he's saying, "Look at those people who stay drunk all night and treat their bodies so badly. Yes, that's pleasure, but they don't consider the consequences of their pleasure. That's not what I'm calling you to do. You can't live a pleasurable life without living nobly, justly, and prudently. The lost are not living nobly, justly, or prudently, and so will find it impossible to live pleasurably."

Oh my! We already have a hypothetical drug and now we're talking about ill-defined gods. Yikes.

My answer is still no. Epicurus wouldn't advocate taking the drug. How would it make me a god? How would my atoms replenish themselves to make me incorruptible?

That's a quick reply. More later.

(1) She's saying Epicurus would say "Don't take the pill."

(2a) Short answer: No.

(2b) Longer answer: The drug's effects, once taken, would serve as a barrier between me and the cosmos and I would no longer be able to prudently make decisions about how to achieve my own pleasure. Prudence is instrumental in achieving the goal of feeling pleasure. Prudence and wisdom don't sit above pleasure. Some might say, "but you've achieved pleasure with the pill." I've achieved pleasure but it's someone else's definition of pleasure. The creator of the drug has decided for me the hormone levels (dopamine, oxytocin, serotonin) that will produce "my" pleasure. I have a similar reason for not wanting to upload my mind into a computer to live forever. Who owns the hardware? What parameters have they programmed into it? Same way with this hypothetical pill (that I'm defining here as producing hormone levels determined by someone else's chemistry). The pill is someone else's hardware. The only way in this universe to achieve pleasure is to make choices and rejections based on one's own senses, one's own reactions of pleasure and pain, and whatever the prolepses are.

My take is that this is the crux of Wilson's argument expressed in the least number of words for her article.

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Most would rather experience hardships, ups and downs, and the pains of off-and-on deprivation that keep our appetites sharp.

The Epicurean can agree entirely. A bliss drug would not be a source of real pleasure because it would wipe out experience. Blissed out, we would not be encountering the world as it is, but a distorted world in which the causes of physical and psychological pleasure as well as pain were obscured.

To bring this back to Wilson, she's not saying experiencing hardship and pain are somehow superior to pleasure. She's saying without encountering the real world, we have no way to make choices of how to achieve pleasure. We don't *want* or desire to experience hardship or pain, but we recognize that the world is full of both. Having the *choice* of either experiencing the world *as it is* and making *my* choices and avoidances based on the input of *my* senses etc. or being "blissed out" on someone else's definition of an abstract ideal "pleasure" for me, I'd choose the " hardships, ups and downs, and the pains of off-and-on deprivation." It's not a Stoic glorification of enduring pain. It's a proclamation of the fact that I have one life to live; it should be lived pleasurably; and the only path I have is for me to make my choices and aim at that goal - directing myself as best I can using the Canonic faculties I've been given by natural evolution.

Quote from Cassius

As to the bliss pill, I also see Elayne's point that the general principle that she's laying out is very wide from the mark. She's choosing to emphasize that the problem would be that "the causes of pain and pleasure would be obscured." Well, why is that a problem? If the bliss pill works, who cares WHY it works -- that's principle doctrine 10 in spades. The clear implication of this phrasing is that it is the KNOWLEDGE of the causes that is of concern to Wilson.

I don't want to go down the "bliss pill" rabbit hole again, but, in principle, I agree with Wilson about this. I continue to assert that PD 10 is about personal responsibility and it's specifically saying the "pleasures of the profligate" are not recommended, and that the most important word in that Doctrine is *if*. If they do these things, then we have no complaints... But those pleasures *don't* provide freedom from fear or teach us limits, etc. That's the point. Plus it has to be taken in context with the Letter to Menoikeus which appears to me to be commentary on PD 10:

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10If the things that produced the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad).

In the Letter to Menoikos: So when we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean the pleasures of decadent people or the enjoyment of sleep, as is believed by those who are ignorant or who don't understand us or who are ill-disposed to us, but to be free from bodily pain and mental disturbance. For a pleasant life is produced not by drinking and endless parties and enjoying boys and women and consuming fish and other delicacies of an extravagant table, but by sober reasoning, searching out the cause of everything we accept or reject, and driving out opinions that cause the greatest trouble in the soul.

If we're on the bliss pill or on the experience machine or constantly intoxicated or eating lotuses, we can't use "sober reasoning" or "search out the cause of everything we accept our reject." Taking the bliss pill could be a personal choice, but I think it would fall under the unrecommended pleasures of the profligate (literally, the lost) and I don't believe Epicurus would endorse that. Pleasure is pleasure, but not every pleasure should be chosen.

I realize I may be a minority opinion, but this is one I haven't been convinced to change yet.

I'll weigh in a little more so Cassius can see if he was right in his understanding of my motives

I'm not a huge Wilson fan, but my perspective is that she should be cut a little slack in this article. She's writing for a popular magazine for a popular audience. Her arguments are not going to be finely detailed or nuanced. I'm sure she had a hard word limit, too.

Wilson says:

If the exercise of our rationality in learning, thinking and communicating were not pleasurable, there would be no point in trying to master any subject or practice.

So, she doesn't say if it's a long-term pleasure or immediate pleasure etc. Just that learning, thinking and communicating can be pleasurable. Maybe she means short term pain of study leading to long term pleasure. Maybe the pleasure of learning something new. Can't tell. I'm willing to defer judgement. The fact that pleasure is said to be worthy in a popular article: good enough for me right now.

The whole "bliss pill"/"experience machine" thing is *always* going to come up in any popular article about pleasure being a worthy goal, so she needed to address it. I think she did an acceptable job in addressing that in a few words. Additionally, I agree with her on the general principle she lays out. I'm not going down that alley here though. Again, word limit. Asked and she answered after a fashion.

Finally, I'm just happy to see Epicurus's name in a popular magazine where it's not some Stoic writing how unworthy pleasure is as a goal then going off on their "following nature" and virtue rant.

First impressions on the article:

I agree with her take on the "bliss pill."

She gets a little utilitarian but that may just be for historical context.

I'm less enamoured of the last two paragraphs. They seemed tacked on to me.

She's not an ideal Epicurean spokesperson but Epicureans aren't into Platonic ideals anyway.

At least someone is getting Epicurean airtime against the Stoics!

Reading Philodemus's On Piety and Obbink's commentary has given me an entirely new perspective on Epicurus's participation in the religious and ritual life of his day. So, with that as preface:

By Zeus! I found JCRAGO 's article an interesting read and overall didn't see anything overly concerning. I think he provides ample justification for the practices he outlines, especially in keeping with Epicurus's and the founders' participation in the festivals and rites of their day and Lucretius's metaphorical language.

That 10th Principle of Atheopaganism he references seems in keeping with Principal Doctrines 31-33 to not harm nor be harmed.

I would have avoided the term "religiosity." That has negative connotations.

I may have additional comments, but - Paian Anax! - I think he may be on to something.

Quote from Elayne

I'm not sure why you don't agree that awareness of having had sequential pleasure would be painful if the person thought they weren't supposed to feel pleasure? That happens all the time with people in repressive religions, with sex. They feel guilty, sometimes simultaneously with pleasure.

Oh, I'm not saying they don't feel pleasure nor that they don't feel guilty/pain.They're human. They sense pleasure and pain. But if they feel pleasure and say they aren't happy, then their pleasure causes them pain in sequence. Or there's a mixture of pleasure and pain, but they can't exist simultaneously in the same moment. I'll posit an alternative though. I could maybe see parallels to people taking pleasure in eating hot peppers. They've acclimated themselves to sense the pain of the burn with pleasure. But I still think that's cognition. Similar to religious guilt where they've trained themselves to interpret pleasure as bad/painful. The pleasure is still there. That's a human sensation. It's in the interpretation where things go awry. They may not be conscious of it since it's so ingrained. But the non-judgemental sensation leads to the subjective "feeling".

Thanks for posting these, Cassius . And thanks to Elli and Elayne for their in-depth responses (some of which I wholeheartedly agree). I'm looking forward to reading the original article.

Quote from Elayne

On atoms meaning elements-- of course, elements are made of atoms (in current usage), not molecules. Maybe I am misunderstanding the suggestion though. Modern atoms would not fit Epicurus' atoms better than elementary particles, because they aren't just "cuttable"-- they can change into each other through radioactive decay.

Modern atoms would not - do not - fit the concept of ancient atoms. That's exactly my point. I'm sure Epicurus didn't know about radioactive decay, so I'll side step that.

Epicurus's and Lucretius's atoms/seeds/particles are fundamental building blocks of the cosmos in their system. They come together in novel ways to make everything. The seeds remain unchanged. My suggestion is that it's easier to think about their "Atomoi" more like our "elements" - carbon "atoms", hydrogen "atoms". I know our atoms are cuttable. (At one point, we didn't think they were but right now that's beside the point I'm trying to make). Leaving aside the cuttability for a moment, Epicurus's "Atomoi" came together in various configurations for a time, composed a compound, then came apart to go form another compound somewhere else. Our modern atoms of elements do this - at a very basic level of popular understanding. The carbon atom in a pencil is the same carbon atom in a diamond. The element atom doesn't change. Likewise, our atoms take on chemical bonds, some stronger, some weaker. I liken this to Lucretius's description of hooked and smooth "seeds". No, there aren't hooked and smooth atoms in our understanding now, but some bonds are stronger than others. They get "entangled" to use an ancient way of thinking: liked a box of fishhooks (or Christmas tree ornament hooks!). Smooth marbles don't become entangled, so - to Epicurus or Lucretius - marbles are like water "Atomoi". Granite is a stronger bond and harder to break apart. That's like the fishhooks being harder to break apart.

I'm trying to make an analogy between the ancient and modern ideas, not to equate one concept with another. That's all.