Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

the picture involves the bliss pill issues - in the end we are concerned about living happily, not necessarily having the ability to give the most "accurate" recitation of the details.

Your comment here hints at something I've been planning on writing a longer post about so I'll *try* to be brief here.

When we all use catchphrases like "The goal is pleasure" it can easily be misinterpreted that we mean "the goal is to walk around all day with warm, fuzzy feelings" or "the goal is to exist in a blissful haze." That's not the goal of Epicurus's philosophy. At least not the way I understand it. The goal or telos is to live the most pleasurable life. That's not the same as warm fuzzy blissed out feelings every minute of the day. That's why we endure pains for pleasure that will result from those painful choices. That's why we remember past pleasures when things aren't necessarily going well. Using the catchy motto "pleasure is the goal" was used to caricature Epicurus's philosophy in his own lifetime. The idea that "the goal is to walk around all day with warm, fuzzy feelings" approach is Cyrenaic not Epicurean, and Epicurus fought hard against those stereotypes. When we use "pleasure is the goal" it can easily be misinterpreted as well as "Capital-P Pleasure is the goal" like there's some Platonic ideal form of Pleasure that we're aiming for. I wouldn't want people to think that if they're not experiencing Pleasure that they're doing it wrong. This may also be why people redefine pleasure - to try to attain that mistaken Platonic ideal. That's not the Garden path either.

I'm also concerned Cassius by your "not necessarily having the ability to give the most "accurate" recitation of the details." This seems to me to open the door to some problems and I'd like to hear or read more about what you actually mean here before I go off on a tangent.

We may be talking past each other again.

Let's get specific: I'm listening to 27:30 -- 30:27 including when Charles says it "feels like evidence" and Elayne says "that feeling of correctness is usually pleasurable". My point was that the Flat-earther's "pleasurable" feeling of "correctness" is probably just as pleasurable for them as yours is for you. People cherry picking facts when they have that "pleasurable" feeling of "correctness" is exactly my concern. That "pleasure" reaction needs to be tethered to corroboration from the senses to be a valid criteria for truth. Which I think you're saying, but of what value - other than its pleasure - is that feeling of "correctness" then?

Quote from Elayne

This knowing sensation is a subjective experience that has been studied. It can be produced directly with brain stimulation, minus any content. The sensation of knowing is neurological but doesn't necessarily correlate with accuracy.

This sounds fascinating. Do you have any citations or names of researchers or studies for us to follow-up on?

Quote from Elayne

I report that for me, the sensation of knowing has a sort of "rightness" that I classify as pleasurable. Similar sensation to a picture being lined up evenly on a wall or the sensation of symmetry in justice. I experience it as satisfying. That doesn't mean I actually am correct.

So, I'm still confused then. If you're just saying you have a "sensation of knowing" that's "pleasurable" and that it doesn't mean what you know is correct, then it's not evidence of anything if someone is trying to change your mind. It's just a pleasurable feeling. It seems to me that holding a warm, fuzzy blanket and feeling pleasure at that while someone explains something would - for purposes of accepting an argument - would be the same.

Quote from Elayne

It's just a known human phenomenon which was relevant to our discussion of how an individual decides what amount of certainty is enough to act on. It's a subjective decision influenced by feelings. There is no way to find a fixed rule. What confidence interval do you want before you are going to try a new drug, for instance?

The key term here is "decide" - that's choice and avoidance - which involves using reason to assess the evidence from your sensory input, initial reaction of pleasure or pain, and mental anticipations. I'm still cautious of phrases like "influenced by feelings." Are you talking emotions? From my perspective, emotions are not what Epicurus talks about. The emotions - fear, anger, sadness, love, contentment - are how we mentally process the reaction of pleasure or pain. Decision making while subjective is a cognitive process.

I'm not sure I'm onboard with the idea of the pleasurable "feeling when you 'know' something" paradigm y'all have been discussing. Are you saying that's a criteria of what's real or true? That seems to be cutting out 2/3 of the Canon. Or are you saying that that pleasurable reaction is just part of confirmation of being true. This all seems to go back to my "facts don't care about feelings" thread.

I may be misunderstanding the episode, so here's my take on what I've heard. Please correct me if I misunderstood.

When a Flat-earther says, "I 'know' the Earth is flat" they no doubt feel pleasure at "knowing" they're "right" because their belief is echoed by their friends, it's "corroborated" by all the "sources" shared within that community, it makes them feel like they're in on a big truth that other people don't realize, etc.

But they're not truly applying observation through the senses, and so are missing that component of the Canon.

So, their feeling of "pleasure at knowing" is not the same as - or of the same use in the Canon - as someone who knows something that actually aligns with reality?

This specific Flat-earther knowledge pleasure may be one that shouldn't be chosen until it is weighed against the sensations. Maybe? The pleasure of "knowing the Earth is flat" can lead to pain if there is derision from outside the group -- although that could also be a pleasure in "knowing" you're in the In group and know the "truth" about the Earth. It could also lead to pain if you finally accept the Earth is not flat and feel you've been duped.

I'm just having a hard time understanding the importance of "that pleasure of knowing" being canonical. Or wasn't it meant to be?

In light of this optative verb in KD 10, I think it's important to contrast this with the If... Then.... statements in KD 7. As a refresher:

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Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate. (Emphasis added)

Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.

In KD 7, the are no funky moods/tenses/aspects. The if's are followed by an aorist indicative verb and active indicative, respectively. Straightforward statements of fact. So, the idea that a person could indeed find security in being well esteemed or widely admired is not seen as an impossibility. This dovetails nicely with Cassius 's fervent conviction that Epicureans *could* find security in a public political life. It may be more difficult, and Epicurus seemed to warn people to be careful of entering that arena, but it wasn't out of the question. There was no sense of impossibility or unreality to the idea.

However, I'm contending that that optative verb in KD 10 supports my contention that we can *desire* to not hold the lifestyle of "those who are past any hope of recovery" against them but we really *know* that that's not going to happen. In this life, as reality is lived, the "profligate" lifestyle will NOT alleviate the fears of death, the gods, etc.

Quote from Bryan

ΜΕΜΨΑΙΜΕΘΑ “(then we would not) blame” μέμφομαι–μέμφεσθαι: hold (acc.) against (dat.); here, “we would (not) have held (ὅ τι) against (αὐτοῖς).”

I just came across a helpful fact:

μεμψαιμεθα is in the first person middle plural optative. The optative mood "expresses something that would happen in a hypothetical situation in the future." It is conditional: If (εἰ) X were the case, then we would not blame (μεμψαιμεθα). The Ingenious Language, a recent book by Andrea Marcolongo on Ancient Greek, has one chapter dedicated almost exclusively to the optative mood and its shades of meaning. My understanding (and I'm still processing it and rereading) is that the optative is used in many cases to express desire, usually desire that cannot be fulfilled: "I wish for this but know it is not going to happen." It is a mood reflecting the unreality of a situation.

These are the kinds of fine detail that consistently keep pulling me back into deeper study of the ancient Greek texts! I barely have my toes wet in the sand and SO want to go scuba diving!!

(Full disclosure: I've found Wiktionary (especially the smart phone app) to be a wonderful tool in parsing some of the Greek syntax. The app along with a Greek keyboard has been indispensable. I just (1) didn't want to give the impression I had more knowledge then I do, and (2) provide tips to anyone else who wants to dig into the texts. Sapere aude )

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(Seneca’s Letters – Book II – Letter LXXXV)

Epicurus also decides that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for the happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy.

It's not a matter of balance. "Virtues" are instrumental.

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Fragment 70. Beauty and virtue and such are worthy of honor, if they bring joy; but if not then bid them farewell!

https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive…ppiness/617847/

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I have found that most of the serious approaches to happiness can be mapped onto two ancient traditions, promoted by the Greek philosophers Epicurus and Epictetus. In a nutshell, they focus on enjoyment and virtue, respectively.

etc...

Quote from Bryan

TOYC ΑCΩΤΟΥC “profligates” οἱ ἄσωτοι–τῶν ἀσώτων: libertines, spendthrifts; a lost case; from ἄσωτος–ἀσώτη–ἄσωτον: having no hope of safety, in desperate case, abandoned, past any hope of recovery. ἄσωτος

I think that source definition is so important in this. When "profligate" is being used in translation, it sounds like a moral or ethical chastisement only. And that may be part of it BUT saying these decisions to live that lifestyle put them as "having no hope of safety, in desperate case, abandoned, past any hope of recovery" puts a more "these are obviously negative choices to make" spin on it.

https://www.archaeology.org/slideshow/3332…oanda-slideshow

Curious to see what anyone's take is on this TED-Ed video on Nozick's "experience machine" and the (professed) short-comings of hedonism.

At the risk of wading in late to this discussion, I just would like to offer the following reminder. And I apologize if this had already been covered. I admit I haven't closely read all 60+ posts.

As a start, arguing over Epicurus's saying "nothing comes from nothing" is specious. Epicurus never said, "Nothing comes from nothing." That's what English translators have made him say. As I've mentioned ad nauseum, Epicurus didn't speak English or Latin.

His Letter to Herodotus states:

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πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

"First,... nothing comes into being from that which doesn't exist."

οὐδὲν

ὄντος

To me, this is broad enough to cover everything y'all have been discussing on that point. He doesn't say "Nothing comes from nothing" although one can paraphrase it that way in English. However, that's not literally what it says. He says "οὐδὲν - no-thing" comes from "that which is not existing (τοῦ μὴ ("not") ὄντος (ontos 'being, existing'))." (Note: ὄντος is related to English ontology, ontological.) Atoms, energy, fields, space-time all *exist.* When one throws in "ex nihilo", Epicurus didn't say that either. That's an interpretation, a translation. There has to be something for something else to come into being from it. Dawkins even emphasizes this about new species in that video. You need a starter for new species. Things come from other existing things. Period.

It might be good to go back to each of those twelve statements to see what Epicurus actually said before planting a flag on either side of any debate.

Plus, taking Epicurus in context is important. What was he arguing against? What is the *import* of his statements (i.e., no supernatural realm)? Was he closer to our understanding than his peers? Was he "on the right track"? etc.

Plus plus, I don't think that list exists as a list anywhere but in DeWitt. Does it? Diogenes Laertius mentioned Epicurus's "Twelve Rudiments" but that work is lost. I don't think we know for certain what twelve points were in that work. Please correct me if I missed something from another source!! My understanding is that the Herodotus letter is as close as we get, and DeWitt's Twelve don't seem to match up neatly one-to-one in order with that letter. I've tried.

I think you're going to have to look at Dewitt and see what he's referring to with "first principles". Does me mean like "axioms"? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom

Okay, more it would be interesting if we could find a comparison between dianoia and logismos.

As a start, here's dianoia from LSJ:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…3Ddia%2Fnoia%5E

Agreed.

I see him against the enculturation or education of the assembly-line variety that obscures one's ability to learn from nature and observation. But I may be fantasizing.

Hmmm...

Logismos appears to be just the mental faculty to "reason" things out in everyday life. I think of it as the decision-making ability of the mind. Logismos would be the colloquial name of the ability people use when someone has made a "reasonable" decision. I **think** it would equate to your "everyday" understanding of the word "logic" you've been using, Cassius .

I would concur with your last two paragraphs. I think Epicurus would include formal logic within the paideia (enculturation; instruction; indoctrination) he criticised, ex. "Set sail in your own little boat, free from all paideia."

Here's the LSJ entry for λογισμός (logismos) http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=logismo/s

As you'll see, it references PD 16 specifically (Epicur. Sent. 16) as "reasoning power." This does not refer to "formal" logic. Here's an article about Aristotle's formal logic:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/

The word most often used there is sullogismos συλλογισμός

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…ry=sullogismo/s

This has more to do with calculation, computation.

Okay, I have no strong feelings in pushing that analogy. I do contend that anger can be pleasurable (as Elayne said above), but again I haven't no strong urge to flog the social media analogy.

I have to go back and re-read Tsouna's chapter on anger and pick out any excerpts from Philodemus's On Anger or start another thread if Godfrey is interested in exploring that.

This bliss pill/PD 10 thread has unfortunately taken on the odor of a Platonic dialogue to me, and I freely admit I've contributed to the stench. I feel it's turned into a lot of wordplay, Socrates-esque gadflying, and argument for arguments sake. Y'all may have a different take, but the pleasure is decreasing. Plus, I think the practical benefit is decreasing the longer it goes on. I don't necessarily think Epicurus would be pleased. I think I'm going to tap out, but feel free to continue in my absence on this particular topic.

Quote from Don

When choosing a course of action, which choice gives you pleasure?

I will admit I've actually done this in making life decisions, specifically career choices. And I think I've made the right decision. Reason has entered in and made need second guess, but I still think I made correct initial decisions then was able to reason out that it was correct for these additional reasons.

Quote from Cassius

"When making decisions, don't use logic and reason, use the Epicurean canon."

Thoughts off the top of my head:

1) Nobody outside a small circle knows what the "Epicurean canon" is. Avoid jargon.

2) Epicurus taught to use words that everyone agrees on the definition.

3) Use the word logic OR reason, not both.

4) I actually like Elayne 's use of "evidence." But...

5) Joshua brings up a VERY good example of misunderstood evidence. How to correct that?

6) What is the intent of using the word "decision"? Do you actually mean that or are you asking people to live their life based on the canon? When you say "make decisions" it sounds like discrete individual instances. Is that what you mean? Or do you mean something more general?

7) How about these?:

- When choosing a course of action, which choice gives you pleasure?

- You can *think* a choice to death. Instead... What's there feeling you get from your choice? Is it positive? Good, *now* think about the ramifications. Is it negative? It's probably not the right choice.

Okay, so nothing seismic there, but that's my contribution off the cuff.

Quote from Godfrey

Addiction is desire, not pleasure or pain. Thinking of or satisfying a desire results in pleasure or pain.

Don that's interesting that you mention anger in this context; I've been starting to think about it in light of current events and I'm curious what Epicurean writings have to say about it, particularly righteous anger. I can't think of any offhand except maybe Philodemus, who I haven't read.

Hmmm. Okay, but the addiction is caused by pleasure initially then causes pain followed by pleasure in a vicious circle. Right?

Voula Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus has a good chapter on anger.