Posts by Don

Quote from Elayne

I am going to be bold and say that for any specific behavior/virtue you want to name as universally leading to a maximally pleasurable human life, I can name an exception.

Whether you can name an exception to an action in a specific circumstance doesn't really prove anything. Acting justly, prudently, and morally *is* contextual. It may be that the same action in a different situation would not be acting prudently, justly, or morally.

Maybe I should say that in a specific situation, there are actions within that given scenario that would lead to a more pleasurable life for (almost) anyone. The identical action in a different situation may not lead to a more pleasurable life. Therefore, there are no absolute or uniquely virtuous actions; only virtuous actions contextually for a given circumstance.

Quote from Elayne

People resist understanding that nothing defines pleasure other than the direct experience. Maximum pleasure is not modified or limited by definitions or concepts-- it simply occurs or does not.

There's nothing to argue about here in that pleasure or pain *are* direct experience, just like the senses. Pain and pleasure are two non-rational/pre-cognitive guides we use to make choices and rejections.

How do you define what Epicurus meant by the "limit of pleasure" or the "maximum pleasure"? Can you expand on what you mean by it "simply occurs or does not"? And if it "simply occurs or does not" what use is it to make choices or rejections in an effort to bring the maximally pleasurable life about?

Quote from Elayne

When you said honesty wasn't the most important virtue in my hypothetical but protecting the friend was, that is exactly the kind of thing virtue ethicists say-- while failing to acknowledge that the actual deciding factor is pleasure, not protection of another.

Let me rephrase then: The pain I would feel if my friend were harmed is actually the deciding factor.

Quote from Elayne

In PD5, Epicurus does not idealize the words prudently, morally, and justly. He doesn't put forth a concept of prudence that would result in the same action for every human in every situation.

I never said he idealized those "virtues" as capital-V Virtues.

In fact, that's exactly why he did NOT write:

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It is not possible to live a pleasurable life without Wisdom, Morality, and Justice; and it is impossible to live with Wisdom, Morality, and Justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.

as if they were Platonic ideals or absolutes. He used adverbs to clearly show he was not talking about specific actions but rather acting prudently, morally, and justly in any given situation.

Quote from Elayne

No, a descriptor is not the same as a qualifier. A qualifier, as you accurately say, limits or modifies -- and I am doing neither. If my description were a qualifier, it would mean that I am _not_ only doing as I please but am limiting or modifying my scope of action beyond doing as I please. And that's not the case.

I still think we're splitting hairs. I'm using modifier, descriptor, and qualifier as synonyms. Maybe that's sloppy, maybe not. You're using each with a specific narrow definition from what I can see. This could spiral down a sophist rabbit hole, so I'm content to abandon this particular thread.

I do want to respond to your other points, but that'll be a bit later.

I'll admit the Stoic mention was a throwaway line. I freely admit I shouldn't have thrown that in there because i don't know enough about the Stoics to say that unequivocally. I'mma gonna take that back. So...

Quote from Cassius

Unless I am shown that i need to revise my understanding of the Stoics or others on this point I think that I'm probably correct,

I'll concede this, but...

Quote from Cassius

and this isn't just a minor point but perhaps why we keep sparring over PD10. Truly I think that Epicurus held that the word virtue and all of its particular instances has NO MEANING unless it actually leads to pleasure, so he basically held the word to be without content except as defined in a particular circumstance,

I don't think PD10 has anything to do with virtue. Let me be clear. The cautions Epicurus lays out in opposition to the profligate life in PD10 has *nothing* to do with whether it's "virtuous" or not. Zero. And there's no question whether the "lost" in PD10 experiences pleasure. They do. The reason that those life choices can be cautioned against is that they do not - from observation over time and multiple instances - do not reliably lead to a lifetime of pleasure. Trying to say that they do or can is living in a utopian hypothetical fantasy world. And Epicurus urged people to live in the real natural material cosmos. You can experience pleasure for a bit if you do this, but that path is not choice-worthy. You have been warned.

The enslavement of other humans was widespread and accepted as "natural" in the ancient (and not so ancient world):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/slavery…sophers_1.shtml

At least Epicurus held out the idea that what was considered "just" in one place and era need not be considered just for all places and all time. Plus Epicurus accepted all people into the Garden when that kind of thing was unheard of: free, enslaved; men, women. That's one of the things that first attracted me to his philosophy.

Quote from Protonus

I assume that the context means "each of us dies without truly living" by postponing joy?

That's probably not a bad way of summarizing. We only have one life and are not both twice. If you don't experience a pleasurable life now, you've missed your opportunity.

Welcome to the discussion, Protonus !

I do believe also that just not many people are aware of Epicureanism as an option.

The Stoic "indifference" and thus dichotomy of control even has antecedents in Epicurus's philosophy. I think it's a Greek thing and not unique to the Stoics.

But I think Epicurus is on sounder footing overall with respect to this and ... Well, everything else, too:

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Letter to Menoikeus (Diogenes Laertius, book X: 127): Remember that what will be is not completely within our control nor completely outside our control, so that we will not completely expect it to happen nor be completely disappointed if it does not happen.

And...

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Vatican Saying 14: We are born only once and cannot be born twice, and must forever live no more. You don't control tomorrow, yet you postpone joy. Life is ruined by putting things off, and each of us dies without truly living. [Emphasis added]

And...

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Vatican Saying 64: The esteem of others is outside our control; we must attend instead to healing ourselves.

Quote from Elayne

It would be weird to remove my awareness of future consequences from actions in the present--

I think it would be weird, too, so I'm curious where you're getting that from what's posted. From my perspective, the "awareness of future consequences" is the heart of any practice of Epicuren philosophy. That's the basis for all choices and rejections: how do actions in the present affect my current and future experience of pleasure.

Quote from Elayne

I disagree strongly about any implied absolute meaning for virtue common to all humans. If Epicurus was saying that, and I don't think he was, he would have been wrong.

So, do you disagree with PD 5 then? Why does Epicurus single out living prudently, morally, and justly if not recognizing them as "virtues" consistent with a pleasurable life across a wide swath of people? These traits lead - by observation - to more pleasurable living. Why wouldn't he endorse them?

Quote from Elayne

There can't biologically be one set of behaviors leading to a pleasurable life for every single human.

That's just not true. There are any number of behaviors that will consistently and verifiably lead to a more pleasurable life for any organism. Nature gives plenty of examples of behaviors that make an organism "fit" that are applicable across populations. Humans are no exception. I'm not saying every human being is going to have every common behavior, but I think you're going overboard to say there aren't *any* common behaviors that would be conducive to a pleasurable life. A pleasurable life is free from anxiety, want, pain, etc. There are common actions to take to achieve that.

Quote from Elayne

And even for a single human, it's not wise to make any fixed virtue that could override pleasure-- there can be extenuating circumstances, such as the classic murderer asking for your friend's whereabouts. So no virtue like honesty is fixed. Everything is relative to pleasure.

I don't have any argument with this. I'm not advocating overriding pleasure by virtue. Virtue is *always* in service to pleasure. There isn't any absolute virtue that's followed 100% of the time. Virtuous activity and the degree to which it's carried out is always relative to the situation and context. Stoics would say that. Epicureans would say that. In any case, honesty isn't the appropriate virtue here in your scenario anyway. You're throwing up a red herring. Here the virtuous act is protecting your friend. Anyone who says that being 100% truthful at all times is living in a utopian fantasy.

Quote from Elayne

For most of us, natural empathy provides the pro-social pleasure motive. For some, fear of consequences provides the reason to abstain from harming others, which Epicurus mentioned multiple times. However, it is easy to observe that some high functioning low empathy humans have enough financial resources to protect themselves from at least some degree of asocial if not downright anti-social living. And _if_ they have pleasurable lives that way, free from both anxiety and painful punishment, only they can give testimony. It's definitely risky to live outside the typical human virtue preferences, but it can be done. Those are the folks I try to avoid strenuously!

I understand your saying "only they can give testimony," but people can convince themselves - or try to convince others - of most anything. I would find it difficult to accept the idea that a misanthropic, antisocial person feels pleasure at their lives. That's a lot of psychological pain to work through. But it's also not my place to worry about them unless I have to interact with them... Which, as you say, it is best to simply avoid them per Epicurus's advice.

Quote from Cassius

If in fact, per PD10, he achieves pleasure, then in fact there is nothing to criticize.

I knew PD10 was going to come up. I know we've tangled on this before, and while I accept your premise you present here, I reject that that is what Epicurus was saying. He did not observe that the person described in PD10 *would* realistically "achieve" nor *could* expect to achieve pleasure. I believe Epicurus was saying exactly what he meant here (after looking at the verb forms used) and in the Menoikeus Letter. I'm going to be obstinate on this point. To use an Epicurean pun: I'm pig-headed in this.

Quote from Cassius

If applied as written, this gives an automatic veto power over your conduct to the unqualified "outside observer" and that would be deferring to an outside force that has no more natural or idealist authority than anything Plato or Moses came up with.

I should be more clear. I'm not implying veto power to anyone. What I'm saying is that if the Epicurean acts virtuously from a desire for their own pleasure, the outside observer sees this and assumes (incorrectly!) that the Epicurean is acting virtuously for virtue's sake. The 3rd party assumes a particular motivation for the virtuous behavior they observe. That motivation, however, is not the Epicurean's motivation. The outward appearance may be similar to the Stoic's or Peripatetic's, but the actions spring from a completely different set of motivations.

And the Epicurean need not dissuade the 3rd party from their assumptions. That's the 3rd party's problem.

Quote from Cassius

In other words, I think the key is that you do not give unqualified "Others" veto power over the goals you choose for your life.

Oh, yeah. I knew 39 was all queued up. And I agree with this, as what I stated above may imply.

Overall, I don't have much to quibble with in your response unless I'm missing something... Other than our divergent interpretations of PD10.

I suspected my post would elicit some discussion. This is good! I don't have time this morning to respond to everything, but wanted to comment specifically to Elayne 's comment:

Quote from Elayne

Don that's not a qualifier-- it's just a description of what I like to do, not a restraint separate from my pleasure.

I think we're splitting hairs. Merriam-Webster's definition of qualifier is:

a word (such as an adjective) or word group that limits or modifies the meaning of another word (such as a noun) or word group

That's what your phrase is doing.

I do exactly plan on doing as I please.

What do you do?

That which involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others.

I don't have any problem with that sentiment. In fact it's laudable, not that you should care what I think. But it definitely qualifies/describes what you please to do. You can't say "no qualifiers" and then add a statement defining what you please to do means to you.

PS: I should add that I realize that your qualifier/modifier is contextual. If someone is harming someone you care about (or you're being harmed yourself), you would have no qualms about NOT concerning yourself with the pleasure of the other, the attacker in this case. Nor would I.

It sounds to me like Elayne is embodying KD5:

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KD5: It is not possible to live a pleasurable life without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.

Virtues like empathy, compassion, altruism are not ends unto themselves but are traits that can spring from our desire for -- and can lead to -- our personal experience of pleasure. We don't practice virtues (however that's defined) because it's the "right" thing to do; we practice virtues because it leads to a pleasurable life.

As I understand Elayne 's post (please correct me if I'm misinterpreting):

Quote from Elayne

Well... I do exactly plan on doing as I please, with no qualifiers! It's just that what I please involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others, not that I'm trying to avoid causing trouble or disrupting my schedule for reasons unrelated to pleasure.

It actually seems you are in fact adding qualifiers right away:

I do exactly plan on doing as I please which involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others.

Which seems to uphold the tenets of KD5. Elayne is not going to purposefully cause pain to others because she takes pleasure in the pleasure of others.

Likewise, if we value our own pleasure, the most intelligent choice is to be kind to others since that engenders goodwill, creates bonds of friendship and love (among colleagues, partners, family members, etc.), and so increases the likelihood that our personal pleasure is more secure. This use of intelligent choice seems to me to be acting virtuously. Elayne even says:

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[Person B] should want me to be selfish for their own sake!

This seems to be similar to what the psychologists, Buddhists, et al. call "selfish altruism" or "intelligent selfishness":

• https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/m…lating-kindness
• https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/in-con…shness-altruism
• https://www.skepticspath.org/blog/how-to-be…ish-dalai-lama/

Which leads me to ask: What if someone does what the average person would call selfish "morally reprehensible" actions but derives personal pleasure from them?

I'll fully agree that Epicurus's philosophy does not endorse Platonic ideals. There is no "ideal" form of beauty, chairs, Truth, etc. The philosophy clearly states that there is no absolute god-given moral authority, it's based on societal agreements and "don't harm; don't be harmed." Plus he wrote "all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good [good, blessing, benefit, useful to us], not all pleasure is choiceworthy."

He doesn't say it's right, morally or ethically good, just basically that all pleasure is "positive" but just because it's positive doesn't make it choice-worthy. And pain is not always to be fled from. In fact, the pleasure "choice" and pain "shunned" use the same roots that Epicurus consistently uses where "choice" and "avoidances" show up in translations.

Epicurus clearly tried to break sharply away from "virtue for virtue's sake." Virtue, he taught, was instrumental to pleasure and thus to leading a pleasurable life. So, it seems to me that Epicureans are still going to act virtuously to the outside observer. The inner motivation is going to be far different than the Stoic or Aristotelian, but the visible form/action is going to be similar.

I get the impression from time to time that some people want to say there's no absolute moral authority to define morality in Epicurean philosophy, so anything goes as long as the person is experiencing Pleasure in the moment.

I don't accept this. A pleasurable life is the goal. Epicurus says that's only possible if you act virtuously; and vice versa: if you act virtuously, you'll have a better chance of living pleasurably.

People who take pleasure in what the average human would find morally or ethically repugnant aren't living according to Epicurean principles and so we would have reason to intervene and attempt to get them to change. Just because they are feeling pleasure doesn't make their life choice-worthy. I wrestle with this, but the more I think about it, the more I'm coming to these conclusions.

I like this better than the Tetrapharmakos "symbol" I've seen online that mashes the tau Τ and phi Φ of that word.

Quote from JJElbert

Wait a minute...🤔

From Don –ἀοχλησία is "freedom from disturbance"...

And ἐκκλησία is "a political or religious assembly"....

Do I detect a pun here? 🙃

LOL. Well, if there wasn't one, there is one now! Well played!!

I thought I'd add a link to my section on the characteristics of the sage, specifically about sexual desire:

https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…l-relationships

The section of the podcast talking about not succumbing to lust brought my translation to mind.

Just needed to say, Joshua , I always enjoy reading your insightful comments. Thanks!!

Quote from Titus

Do I just want to expand my knowledge about philosophy? Or do I want to find new friends/contacts?

I think hear what you're saying, Titus

Speaking personally, I have found this forum (and by extension, the podcast) to have been absolutely critical to my endeavor to consider Epicureanism as a viable path of philosophical exploration. I've only been involved here for a little over a year, but I've come to value the contacts I've made and to look forward to "talking" with them... Albeit asynchronously the vast majority of the time.

So, to respond to your specific questions: I think you can do both. Ideally, one increases the other. The more friends/contacts you make, the deeper one's knowledge of philosophy becomes.

Here's my interpretation of KD29:

29Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ <καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ> καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

DB - Of the cravings, first there are those that are natural and required [to live], then there are those that are natural but not required, and, finally, there are those that are neither natural nor required which come to be along with empty beliefs ( κενὴν δόξαν (kenēn doxan) beliefs devoid of merit).

Additionally...

127g. καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον; (kai tōn physikōn hai men anangkaiai, hai de physikai monon;) "And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the only natural ones."

ἀναγκαίων (anangkaiōn) "necessary, essential"

127h. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, (tōn d' anangkaiōn hai men pros eudaimonian eisin anangkaiai,)

"then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia;"

127i. αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

ἀοχλησία "freedom from disturbance"

“then, those [necessary] for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those [necessary] for life itself.”

There are some translations that interpret αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν to mean things like clothing and shelter - those things that provide "freedom from disturbance" for the body, that is for one's physical existence. That isn't literally what is written so that is simply one interpretation. Those necessary for life itself are, one might suppose, those at the base of Maslow's hierarchy of needs: food, water, shelter, sleep, air, etc. Those necessary for eudaimonia may be even a little more open to interpretation but still have to be based on Epicurus's philosophy.

I think Elayne is onto something here.

It's important to note that Epicurus didn't say desires could be categorized into "natural" and "unnatural" although that's an easy dichotomy to make in English. He called the desires in the Letter to Menoikeus:

μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί
"On the one hand, (some are the) φυσικαί; on the other hand, (others are) the κεναί"

φυσικαί (physikai - compare English physical, physics, etc) = natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native; physical, having to do with the study of the material world (Antonyms: διδακτός (didaktós), νομικός (nomikós))

κεναί is our old familiar kenos = empty; vain, fruitless; exhausted, void, destitute (Antonyms: μεστός (mestós), πλήρης (plḗrēs))

I find it interesting that Epicurus didn't use a common set of antonyms: natural/unnatural; but emphasized the source of desires. Some derive from natural sources, some arise from fruitless sources that can never be quenched.