Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

they are manners of experiencing pleasure

Like different flavors of ice cream?

Quote from Cassius

Stable

and "without pain" and "without disturbance" I think are adverbs

ataraxia and aponia are nouns not adverbs. They are states, best translated into English by words ending in -ness, e.g., painlessness or calmness.

In looking (briefly) at some of the translations of katastematic, it seems to me that balanced or steady would be a better definition than "static." It comes from καθιστημι according to LSJ with connotations like restore, return, set in order, etc. So it's not a static state, it's a return to order (ataraxia and aponia) after the "excitement" of euphrosyne and khara.

Quote from Cassius

What is the definition you're working with for 'homeostasis"

Basically, the body's systems in equilibrium.

If I remember correctly, a common Epicurean theme is sailing calm waters and safe harbors. Ataraxia itself has an "untroubled waters" connotation.

I find it intriguing that homeostasis and katastematic have the same roots in light of my question above:

Is homeostasis similar to Epicurus's concepts of ataraxia and aponia?

Quote from Cassius

Reason is by no means its own reward, and it should not be worshiped as a goal or an end in itself,

But pleasure IS its own reward and is a goal in itself... which is what makes it the greatest good. Couldn't resist poking that bear again

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-athletes-way/202001/the-neuroscience-seeking-pleasure-and-avoiding-pain

Here's another article from the popular magazine Psychology Today. I found the last section intriguing in light of the Stoic tendency/practice of enduring pain to "overcome" it.

I'm also wondering if the usual translations of choice and avoidance is more due to modern nomenclature than Epicurus's original wording which was more choose and flee from.

In 'Dopamine Nation,' Overabundance Keeps Us Craving More

Psychiatrist Anna Lembke's new book explores the brain's connection between pleasure and pain. It also helps explain addictions — not just to drugs and…

www.npr.org

An intriguing episode of NPR's Fresh Air with Dr. Anna Lembke.

I was initially pulled in by the pleasure and pain in the title and found some very interesting points for discussion here on the forum.

Dr. Lembke clearly states evolution has given us pleasure and pain to guide us in what to pursue and what to avoid. I found her choice of words interesting.

Is homeostasis similar to Epicurus's concepts of ataraxia and aponia? Did Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett also talk about homeostasis?

I had never heard the term anhedonia "absence of joy."

Lembke's "Radical honesty" sounds a lot like Epicurean frank speech.

Side note: One aspect of Epicureanism I find intriguing is that it deals with a real, physiological phenomenon - pleasure and pain - that can be researched. Stoics don't have that. Platonists don't have that. I don't know if that's a strength or not (I'm inclined to think it is), but the fact that I can find science videos and podcasts relevant to the philosophy is interesting.

Thoughts?

Lucretius V.526-33

This only do I show, and follow on
To assign unto the motions of the stars
Even several causes which 'tis possible
Exist throughout the universal All;
Of which yet one must be the cause even here
Which maketh motion for our constellations.
Yet to decide which one of them it be
Is not the least the business of a man
Advancing step by cautious step, as I.

http://wiki.epicurism.info/Philodemus/

According to this, there are at least 3 books in On Signs and Methods of Inference contained in PHerc 1065.

It also lists On Methods of Inference (1978)

Is Delacy a full translation of PHerc 1065?

I'd suggest we take a closer look at the paper by Manetti.

PS According to chapter 2 of Delacy, his work does appear to be a translation of PHerc 1065. If you read that chapter, it also seems to allude to the On Signs alternative title.

Quote from Cassius

The major advantage of calling these people "Megarians" is that in "American" that sounds like they are some evil nation from some faraway planet!

Well, probably to an Athenian, those people in Megara were from some evil nation when it came to their philosophical school.

Mandeville, Bernard | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I get the impression that he was "Epicurean" in only the most basic or stereotypical sense.

At the risk of posting another Wikipedia link, here is a summary of the Megarian school:

Megarian school - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

along with some external links

Quote from camotero

Quote from Godfrey

Of course this begs the question: "how do you define prudence or critical thinking?" Film at 11

I couldn't find this you're refering to Godfrey in the videos I posted; or do you mean another film?

It's an American figure of speech;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Film_at_11#%3A%7E%3Atext%3D%22Film_at_11%22_or_%22%2Cwas_regularly_recorded_on_film.?wprov=sfla1

I just found these two that might be helpful with regard to signs:

David Sedley: On Signs

On signs

On signs

www.academia.edu

A lengthy review of a book on Philodemus's On Signs

Philodemus De signis: An important ancient semiotic debate

Philodemus De signis: An important ancient semiotic debate

www.academia.edu

Well, you know I'm not going to take the test until I've thoroughly read all those, right? This is a good incentive!

Thank you, Martin! What Martin is saying was my impression as well. Epicurus was fully against using logic and rhetoric and argument to obfuscate the truth or to mislead people. People "gifted" with the ability to make fine speeches or craft elaborate but empty arguments can convince unsuspecting or uncritical people of anything.

Quote from camotero

"How do we know something is true? I can feel when something is true". I don't think this is true, but I'm open to be corrected. I'm pretty sure the person who said this didn't mean it and said it rhetorically or lightly as no one objected it. But as I said, I don't think you can feel truth. You may have true feelings. But the truth about something has to be established (and agreed upon to be able to move forward) logically, albeit after the senses gave us content to reason about, and after we've tested out reasoning with those same senses.

Your quote here Mathitis Kipouros reminded of this thread that I had started awhile ago: Facts don't care about your feelings

That footnote 50 after Socrates refers to Cicero's Brutus (85.292):

Quote

"But I made some remarks," said Atticus, "which I had several times a mind to mention; only I was loath to interrupt you. As your discourse, however, seems to be drawing towards an end, I think I may venture to out with them."—"By all means," replied I.—"I readily grant, then," said he, "that there is something very humourous and elegant in that continued Irony, which Socrates employs to so much advantage in the dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines. For when a dispute commences on the nature of wisdom, he professes, with a great deal of humour and ingenuity, to have no pretensions to it himself; while, with a kind of concealed raillery, he ascribes the highest degree of it to those who had the arrogance to lay an open claim to it. Thus, in Plato, he extols Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and several others, to the skies: but represents himself as a mere ignorant. This in him was peculiarly becoming; nor can I agree with Epicurus, who thinks it censurable. But in a professed History, (for such, in fact, is the account you have been giving us of the Roman Orators) I shall leave you to judge, whether an application of the Irony is not equally reprehensible, as it would be in giving a judicial evidence."—"Pray, what are you driving at," said I,— "for I cannot comprehend you."

Here's one section of DeWitt that addresses what I remembered about Socrates and about dialectic. Interestingly, logic doesn't appear in the index to Epicurus and His Philosophy:

Quote

As for the third branch of Platonic studies, dialectic, the evidence for Epicurus' familiarity with it is the express and almost total rejection of it. The grounds of this rejection were both ethical and intellectual. It is on record that he condemned the irony of Socrates.50 It is not difficult to discern the reasons for this. The pretence of ignorance is a form of dishonesty and inconsistent with that absolute frankness (parresia) by which Epicurus set great store, as will be shown under the head of the New Virtues. Yet even assuming that Socrates felt himself to be genuinely ignorant of the nature of piety or justice, he was deliberately concealing his mastery of a devastating skill in debate, which could only result in the humiliation of the hapless interlocutor in the presence of witnesses. This was totally opposed to that disinterested concern (kedemonia) for the good of the instructed which was required of the Epicurean teacher. If Cicero disagreed with Epicurus about the condemnation of irony, this was but natural, because, whether as trial lawyer or political orator, the ability to make his victim writhe under mental punishment was a precious part of his equipment. In the judgment of Epicurus the Second Philippic of Cicero and the speech of Demosthenes On the Crown would have seemed to represent oratory at its ethical worst, whether because of cruelty of intention on the part of the speakers or the love of havoc on the part of the listeners. A second evil of dialectic was the tendency to become eristic and argue for victory instead of truth. This was incompatible with the Epicurean considerateness (epieikeia) for the feelings of others, which fore- shadowed the Golden Rule of Christianity. It was thus no accident that Epicurus, in the manifest division of labor which prevailed in the mature organization of the Garden School, reserved for himself the task of refuting the Megarians,51 with whom eristic was a specialty. Only the head of the school seemed capable of dealing with methods so contrary in spirit to the new philosophy. The intellectual grounds for rejecting dialectic were equally funda- mental. Epicurus denied categorically each of its four assumptions, first, that reason was the criterion, second, that sensations were undependable, third, that phenomena were shifting and deceptive, and fourth, that the only real and eternal existences were the ideas. The reality of the ideas he denied on the ground that nothing exists except atoms and empty space. In place of reason he declared Nature to furnish criteria of truth and he held the Sensations, supplemented by the Feelings and innate notions (Anticipations), to be direct and immediate contacts with external reality, whether physical or social. Thus dialectic became a superfluity. The rejection of Plato's teachings is almost total.