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That leads to quite a different understanding than "Aristippus sets as the goal of life a constant round of active pleasures." Looks like a fruitful paper!
I've really found Sedley to be my go-to modern scholar, much more so than even Dewitt (Shhh! Don't tell Cassius !)
I have some issues with the Mt. SAC summary of Epicurus's philosophy. I tried to dig up another source for comparison:
According to Aelian (VH 14.6 = SSR 174, part),
Aristippus…advised people not to pain themselves either in memory of what is past or in anticipation of future events (μήτε τοῖς παρελθοῦσιν ἐπικάμνειν μήτε τῶν ἐπιόντων προκάμνειν).…His advice was to keep one’s thought focused on the day, and in fact on that part of the day in which one was carrying out this or that action or thought. For only the present is ours, he said, unlike what is already over and what is still awaited, of which the former has perished, while with the latter it is unclear whether it will be.
About half way through, will listen in commute home.
I'm beginning to think the biological "homeostasis" is the (or is akin to the) Epicurean "health of the body and serenity of the mind."
Thoughts, Godfrey ?
PD03 isn't an unattainable goal, I think we've all had moments of experiencing the limit. But if we were able to live constantly in that state, then we'd be like the gods!
Ok I think I can give you that one. 
It's just not an attainable permanent state.
Just started listening to this, but it's quite interesting so far. I'll be interested if Godfrey has lapped me We seem to listen to similar podcasts.
I get the impression that Domasio is using "feelings" like Lisa Feldman Barrett is using the word "emotions."
Hmm. I not sure PD03 is counterfactual as much as it is an unattainable goal (unless you're a god!). If a person was exclusively experiencing no pain in their body or mind anywhere, they would, by definition, be experiencing nothing but pleasure. Once that state (again only attainable by a god) is reached, pleasure cannot be "increased" but simply varied.
I freely admit I may be using "unattainable goal" to mean the same thing as Godfrey's "counterfactual" like the rank/compare debate I just had with Cassius.
I'm using Nathan's compilation again for reference here:
ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.
“The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.” Yonge (1853)
“The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)
“The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.” (Hicks 1925)
“The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)
“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or acombination of them.” (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 226, 241; 1954)
“The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers.” Geer (1964)
“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)
“The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these.” O'Connor (1993)
“The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together.” Anderson (2004)
“Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both.” Makridis (2005)
“The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.” Strodach (2012)
“The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two.” Mensch (2018)
Over the millennia and through various languages and various intentions, that word "pleasure" has taken on a life of its own. Kind of like the word "Epicurean"
I would agree. Pleasure, especially in Christian theology, seems to have become equated with sin and vice. Suffering and pain would be rewarded in the afterlife, unless you ended up in the Bad Place or even Purgatory where you had to be purged and purified of your sin. Did/do they use the word "pleasure" even to refer to the Good Place? Or talk around it with words like bliss or rejoicing or something?
It is very interesting to me how when we spoke on the podcast we seemed to more easily agree that we were on the same page, but in putting the positions down in writing we seem to find agreement harder.
Honestly, the time delay in writing and the inability to actually have a conversation might be part of it.
Plus I let my passions get the better of me on that post. I'm gonna give a little mea culpa on that one.
Maybe you would prefer to use another word than "ranking" because you think all rankings require an outside standard, but that would again be a definitional choice on which to be clear and it's not my understanding that the word "ranking" and the "process of ranking' must require an absolute standard - it seems to me the word can be used properly referring only to our own individual standard that is in fact contextual, as you say, and changes even within us over time and circumstance.
Okay, yes yes. I think we are understanding the word "rank" in two different senses. That's seems to be the crux of my issue. Not that rank doesn't have the two senses but we're let's say talking past each other. That's the issue with posting rather than talking! That could have been resolved in a back and forth in two minutes rather than multiple posts over a week.
To me the word "rank" is a fixed order. I got no problem with "comparing" two or more options on the fly with the caveat of comparing them again later. So if you use "rank" I'm going to substitute "compare."
So, with reading your thoughtful, methodical post above it seems we ARE in agreement. Whew! LOL! Thank you for your patience!!
I would say that this is one of those areas where once we identify an absurdity (the assertion that all pleasures are identical in every respect) we immediately reject it as having possibly been Epicurus' position and we immediately go elsewhere looking for a proper understanding of his assertions.
That was my point in an earlier post. Epicurus is saying in PD09 "If X were the case, then Y" but he's asserting a counterfactual. PD09 has to do with the impossibility of equating all the possible pleasureable activities in which humans can engage. They're all distinct, but similar in that they bring pleasure. They can't be condensed etc however. There are many pleasures which we can desire and these desires must be chosen or rejected based on measuring them against the criteria of whether those desires fulfilled will lead to a more pleasurable life or not. Not measured against a hierarchy somewhere.
I've also come to think that PD09 is directly related to PD10. That's another counterfactual "If X were the case, then Y." PD09 establishes there are myriad pleasures. PD10 established those pleasures enjoyed by the profligate ARE pleasurable but not necessarily choice-worthy because they don't dispel fears of death, etc., and do not lead to a more pleasureable life.
I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them.
No, no, no. I thought we had agreed on this one. We choose by applying whether a specific pleasurable activity leads to a more pleasurable life. We don't need to consult a list or ranking or hierarchy. We should not "rank" pleasurable activities in the abstract. There is no absolute hierarchy for all time of pleasures even for the individual.
All we can say is right here, right now, this activity option before me would lead to a more pleasurable life, therefore, at this time, I will choose to engage in this. This activity which I desire to engage in in the future may be pleasurable in that future moment, but will in the end bring more pain into my life. Therefore, I reject it. I reject that anyone can sit down, go through a list of let's say 100 pleasures and rank them and adhere to that list for all time at every moment throughout their life. What is choice-worthy is contextual, dependent on circumstances, and what is choice-worthy now may not be when circumstances are similar in the future.
So considering things for their long term pleasure...
A habit of eating candy has a high likelihood of resulting in tooth decay and a trip to the dentist (not fun!).
Exactly! There's nothing "morally" wrong with getting pleasure from eating candy from time to time. You can make that "calculation" and choose that pleasure. That adds variety to your pleasure if the candy was easily gotten. If you eat candy at every meal and between, that may be pleasurable in the moment, but over time it's going to provide more pain to your life than pleasure.
Instead of "moral rightness or wrongness" would replace that with "joy and enjoyment vs. "pain".
I could concur with that, I think. Epicurus dealt in justice as a contract, so that morality of the Utilitarians seems problematic to me.
The felicific calculus is an algorithm formulated by utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1747–1832) for calculating the degree or amount of pleasure that a specific action is likely to induce.
Bentham was definitely influenced by Epicurus's philosophy, but Bentham was not an Epicurean. I think we are talking about making a sort of "calculus" in the broad sense, but as I remember the Utilitarian felicific calculus is much more analytical and literally a calculation of adding up hedons (units of pleasure) and the pain units (word escapes me). The circumstances aren't a bad list of characteristics to consider, but I'm skeptical they can really be quantified like the Utilitarians want to.
That is EXACTLY what I am saying!
Alright! Look at that. And it only took several days and a number of posts 
And then the appropriate decision for that person is to pursue that decision with all the energy they can muster:-)
Well, that part sounds like a lot of work. 
Is that the pain to endure for a "greater" pleasure?
I think in regard to that distinction we are really talking subtle preferences in words.
Subtle but important. I think we're getting somewhere now though!
I use "better" when I mean to refer to some kind of intrinsic "nobler" or "worthier," and I am not meaning to refer to that in terms of pleasure, so I don't call one pleasure "better" than another unless I am trying to be very clear that "better" is subjective and really means something else (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling.)
Cool. Okay, I think I'm good with that. So, "better" is just a subjective feeling and not a value judgement. "I like to eat chocolate better than coffee candy" is a fine sentence to use in everyday life. Or even "Chocolate candy is better than coffee candy" is fine as well as a subjective emotional personal reaction to an experience. And you're using "greater" as a synonym for "better" in this narrow, subjective sense? If that's your take, we're sympatico here.
I clearly and emphatically in my own life would rank the pleasure of pursuing philosophy or the hobby in a hiearchy such that I devote much more time and attention to it than to eating candy.
Ah! Here we go! The ranking is where our two roads are diverging. Why do you insist a "ranking" is necessary? (Are you?)
You mention that the pleasure of pursuing philosophy is "higher" in your hierarchy of pleasurable activities than eating candy? As if it was predetermined or (gasp) ordained that this is so.
I would say you've simply determined, through reasoned, prudent application of seeing the goal as the pursuit of a pleasurable life, that the pleasure of studying philosophy will lead more assuredly and more efficaciously to a pleasurable life than the mere eating of candy will. You still enjoy eating candy, right? It's still pleasurable? You are just going to devote more time to something (i.e., philosophy) that will be of more help in leading you toward the goal of having a pleasurable life than you will indulging in some candy now and then.
My point is that it doesn't matter where a specific pleasurable activity falls in some conceptual hierarchy that you might sit down and construct. I realize you haven't (I'm assuming) sat down and categorized ALL the possible pleasures in your life into a concrete, written hierarchy that you consult in making a decision. You determine, at any given minute, this is a choice I can make that will lead to a pleasurable life. The hard thing is to do this deliberately, prudently, and consciously and not be buffeted by the winds of fate and chance, pushed along mindlessly. That's where I get that Epicureanism is a philosophy of personal responsibility for one's actions and decisions.
Now, if saying the pursuit of philosophy is a "greater" pleasure than eating candy is your shorthand for that wordy paragraph, we're on the same page. 
If not, let the games continue
My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure
I have absolutely no problem with that statement so I wonder what you think is the best way to state what it appears to you we are disagreeing about(?)
Good question
My interpretation of what you're saying (and PLEASE correct me if I'm misinterpreting!) is that your position is that some pleasures are "better"/"greater" than others: e g., Eating chocolate candies is "better" than eating coffee candies (for you). Pleasures can be "ranked."
My position is that ranking pleasures into a hierarchy is a pointless exercise. All things which give pleasure give pleasure, period, by definition. BUT, and this is Epicurus's innovation, they also differ from each other, including importantly the context within which the pleasure is experienced. Pleasure is a common characteristic of pleasurable experiences. We are attracted by pleasure. Pleasure is a good thing. But those who denigrate pleasure try to reduce it to a monolithic hornets nest of vice and something to be shunned and mistrusted. Epicurus says, "No, pleasure is pleasurable. Duh! Why would we reject it?" BUT just because all pleasure is pleasurable, doesn't mean you have to experience EVERY pleasurable thing.
The ONLY thing that matters is the pleasure-giving experience in front of you at any given moment - or that is planned for in the future - and the choice of whether or not to pursue or reject THAT pleasure using the criteria of whether or not THAT pleasure leads to a more pleasurable life experience or not. It's contextual. This pleasure may be indulged in now here, but at another time and place it should be rejected or delayed.
PS: In just reading the De Finibus sections you've laid out for Ep. 94, I think "Torquatus" is laying out this same argument.
I thought it might be helpful to use Nathan's compilation of PD9 (below). There is surprising consistency among translations on this one.
I wanted to specifically address Cassius's:
there is clearly a "common denominator" among pleasures, and yet I do not think it is maintainable that all pleasures are the same in every respect - only in some respects.
My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure.
My contention is that Epicurus, uses the "if" here at the beginning of PD9 like he uses it in PD10: If X was the case, then Y. But he implies that (I would argue from the Greek tenses/moods/grammar), from observation, we know Y is not the case (Y=pleasures don't differ; the life of the profligate dispels fears). So, things that bring pleasure are the same in that they bring pleasure, but there are many things that bring pleasure, and the job of the human is to make choices among those myriad pleasures that will lead to a pleasureable life... Which makes PD9 a perfect segue to PD10 come to think of it! Just realized that as I was writing. 
PS: So, those who attack Epicurus's philosophy for making pleasure the "highest good" are lumping all pleasures together. Epicurus is making the point that all pleasure is good (If you could lump all the pleasures together...) BUT, by the observable fact that pleasures differ, we have to decide which pleasures to choose and which pleasures to reject if we are to lead the most pleasureable life possible for us.
PD9
“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man’s nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)
“If every pleasure could be intensifed so that it lasted and infuenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)
“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235; 1954)
“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)
“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)
“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)
“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)
“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another." Mensch (2018)
LOL. We really need someone else to weigh in on this dialogue. I think we've got a log jam!
No each of those situations would have their unique aspects, but I would have no trouble ranking the respective pleasures and choosing between them as greater or lesser pleasures.
Oh, I'm not asking you to rank them. Just the chocolate one. Would you have the same thought of pleasure imagining eating - or take the same pleasure in eating - as you would at sitting at leisure in the yard?
What if, at leisure, and there was no chocolate available, only caramel (one step down on your "ranking")? Would the pleasure you derive match or be qualitatively less than if you had chocolate?
I've gone as far as I care to at this point so I'll stop this, because my aversion to hypotheticals is beginning to pain me, too.
My contention is that there is no absolute standard by which to measure your "greater" and "lesser" so it's all contextual to the individual experience whether for the individual or across individuals.
The only standard is living a pleasurable life writ large as to whether to pursue or reject a given pleasurable activity. Talk of "greater" or "lesser pleasures" is counterproductive in my opinion. The only decision that matters is the one in front of you at any given time.
it is possible for any individual or group of individuals to perceive the experience of pleasure as greater or lesser, and to that I would say "surely so."
Ah! But does even your own personal perception of the experience hold for every situation? Here I go with the hypotheticals again
If someone were to wake you in the middle of
the night and ask if you wanted a chocolate candy, would it be as pleasurable as if you were at leisure in the backyard with an open bag?
If you were sick with a stomach ache, would the thought of eating the chocolate candy be as pleasurable?
