Posts by Don

Quote from Kalosyni

The felicific calculus is an algorithm formulated by utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1747–1832) for calculating the degree or amount of pleasure that a specific action is likely to induce.

Bentham was definitely influenced by Epicurus's philosophy, but Bentham was not an Epicurean. I think we are talking about making a sort of "calculus" in the broad sense, but as I remember the Utilitarian felicific calculus is much more analytical and literally a calculation of adding up hedons (units of pleasure) and the pain units (word escapes me). The circumstances aren't a bad list of characteristics to consider, but I'm skeptical they can really be quantified like the Utilitarians want to.

Quote from Cassius

That is EXACTLY what I am saying!

Alright! Look at that. And it only took several days and a number of posts

Quote from Cassius

And then the appropriate decision for that person is to pursue that decision with all the energy they can muster:-)

Well, that part sounds like a lot of work. Is that the pain to endure for a "greater" pleasure?

Quote from Cassius

I think in regard to that distinction we are really talking subtle preferences in words.

Subtle but important. I think we're getting somewhere now though!

Quote from Cassius

I use "better" when I mean to refer to some kind of intrinsic "nobler" or "worthier," and I am not meaning to refer to that in terms of pleasure, so I don't call one pleasure "better" than another unless I am trying to be very clear that "better" is subjective and really means something else (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling.)

Cool. Okay, I think I'm good with that. So, "better" is just a subjective feeling and not a value judgement. "I like to eat chocolate better than coffee candy" is a fine sentence to use in everyday life. Or even "Chocolate candy is better than coffee candy" is fine as well as a subjective emotional personal reaction to an experience. And you're using "greater" as a synonym for "better" in this narrow, subjective sense? If that's your take, we're sympatico here.

Quote from Cassius

I clearly and emphatically in my own life would rank the pleasure of pursuing philosophy or the hobby in a hiearchy such that I devote much more time and attention to it than to eating candy.

Ah! Here we go! The ranking is where our two roads are diverging. Why do you insist a "ranking" is necessary? (Are you?)

You mention that the pleasure of pursuing philosophy is "higher" in your hierarchy of pleasurable activities than eating candy? As if it was predetermined or (gasp) ordained that this is so.

I would say you've simply determined, through reasoned, prudent application of seeing the goal as the pursuit of a pleasurable life, that the pleasure of studying philosophy will lead more assuredly and more efficaciously to a pleasurable life than the mere eating of candy will. You still enjoy eating candy, right? It's still pleasurable? You are just going to devote more time to something (i.e., philosophy) that will be of more help in leading you toward the goal of having a pleasurable life than you will indulging in some candy now and then.

My point is that it doesn't matter where a specific pleasurable activity falls in some conceptual hierarchy that you might sit down and construct. I realize you haven't (I'm assuming) sat down and categorized ALL the possible pleasures in your life into a concrete, written hierarchy that you consult in making a decision. You determine, at any given minute, this is a choice I can make that will lead to a pleasurable life. The hard thing is to do this deliberately, prudently, and consciously and not be buffeted by the winds of fate and chance, pushed along mindlessly. That's where I get that Epicureanism is a philosophy of personal responsibility for one's actions and decisions.

Now, if saying the pursuit of philosophy is a "greater" pleasure than eating candy is your shorthand for that wordy paragraph, we're on the same page. If not, let the games continue

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure

I have absolutely no problem with that statement so I wonder what you think is the best way to state what it appears to you we are disagreeing about(?)

Good question

My interpretation of what you're saying (and PLEASE correct me if I'm misinterpreting!) is that your position is that some pleasures are "better"/"greater" than others: e g., Eating chocolate candies is "better" than eating coffee candies (for you). Pleasures can be "ranked."

My position is that ranking pleasures into a hierarchy is a pointless exercise. All things which give pleasure give pleasure, period, by definition. BUT, and this is Epicurus's innovation, they also differ from each other, including importantly the context within which the pleasure is experienced. Pleasure is a common characteristic of pleasurable experiences. We are attracted by pleasure. Pleasure is a good thing. But those who denigrate pleasure try to reduce it to a monolithic hornets nest of vice and something to be shunned and mistrusted. Epicurus says, "No, pleasure is pleasurable. Duh! Why would we reject it?" BUT just because all pleasure is pleasurable, doesn't mean you have to experience EVERY pleasurable thing.

The ONLY thing that matters is the pleasure-giving experience in front of you at any given moment - or that is planned for in the future - and the choice of whether or not to pursue or reject THAT pleasure using the criteria of whether or not THAT pleasure leads to a more pleasurable life experience or not. It's contextual. This pleasure may be indulged in now here, but at another time and place it should be rejected or delayed.

PS: In just reading the De Finibus sections you've laid out for Ep. 94, I think "Torquatus" is laying out this same argument.

I thought it might be helpful to use Nathan's compilation of PD9 (below). There is surprising consistency among translations on this one.

I wanted to specifically address Cassius's:

Quote from Cassius

there is clearly a "common denominator" among pleasures, and yet I do not think it is maintainable that all pleasures are the same in every respect - only in some respects.

My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure.

My contention is that Epicurus, uses the "if" here at the beginning of PD9 like he uses it in PD10: If X was the case, then Y. But he implies that (I would argue from the Greek tenses/moods/grammar), from observation, we know Y is not the case (Y=pleasures don't differ; the life of the profligate dispels fears). So, things that bring pleasure are the same in that they bring pleasure, but there are many things that bring pleasure, and the job of the human is to make choices among those myriad pleasures that will lead to a pleasureable life... Which makes PD9 a perfect segue to PD10 come to think of it! Just realized that as I was writing.

PS: So, those who attack Epicurus's philosophy for making pleasure the "highest good" are lumping all pleasures together. Epicurus is making the point that all pleasure is good (If you could lump all the pleasures together...) BUT, by the observable fact that pleasures differ, we have to decide which pleasures to choose and which pleasures to reject if we are to lead the most pleasureable life possible for us.

PD9

“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man’s nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)

“If every pleasure could be intensifed so that it lasted and infuenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235; 1954)

“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)

“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)

“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)

“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)

“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another." Mensch (2018)

LOL. We really need someone else to weigh in on this dialogue. I think we've got a log jam!

Quote from Cassius

No each of those situations would have their unique aspects, but I would have no trouble ranking the respective pleasures and choosing between them as greater or lesser pleasures.

Oh, I'm not asking you to rank them. Just the chocolate one. Would you have the same thought of pleasure imagining eating - or take the same pleasure in eating - as you would at sitting at leisure in the yard?

What if, at leisure, and there was no chocolate available, only caramel (one step down on your "ranking")? Would the pleasure you derive match or be qualitatively less than if you had chocolate?

I've gone as far as I care to at this point so I'll stop this, because my aversion to hypotheticals is beginning to pain me, too.

My contention is that there is no absolute standard by which to measure your "greater" and "lesser" so it's all contextual to the individual experience whether for the individual or across individuals.

The only standard is living a pleasurable life writ large as to whether to pursue or reject a given pleasurable activity. Talk of "greater" or "lesser pleasures" is counterproductive in my opinion. The only decision that matters is the one in front of you at any given time.

Quote from Cassius

it is possible for any individual or group of individuals to perceive the experience of pleasure as greater or lesser, and to that I would say "surely so."

Ah! But does even your own personal perception of the experience hold for every situation? Here I go with the hypotheticals again

If someone were to wake you in the middle of

the night and ask if you wanted a chocolate candy, would it be as pleasurable as if you were at leisure in the backyard with an open bag?

If you were sick with a stomach ache, would the thought of eating the chocolate candy be as pleasurable?

Okay, we're getting somewhere (and you're making me hungry for Peanut M&Ms... My go-to confection )

So, we've established:

Eating "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius pleasure.

I would also say:

Thinking about eating "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius pleasure.

And,

Thinking about eating Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius more pleasure than thinking about eating Coffee "Soft Caramel Candies".

Let's just take those two for now.

What does having "more pleasure" mean?

I know you can categorize them, put them in order, etc. You say

Quote from Cassius

I have no problem considering the flavor, intensity, texture (some are softer than others), staying power (some dissolve faster than others) all of which let me easily categorize them as greater or lesser pleasures.

Those are all aspects of the experience of eating or anticipating eating the candy.

But what do you mean when you say or think: This gives me "more pleasure"?

This is a "greater" pleasure?

This is a "lesser" pleasure?

Is it the duration of the pleasure?

Is it a memory that wells up in relation to chocolate vs coffee?

I would suggest you're not actually describing a greater or lesser "pleasure" but something else.

The pleasurable feeling itself may be long and intense, it may be short and almost unnoticeable, it may need delayed, it may be immediate. You have a different emotional reaction to each of those experiences. You enjoy each one differently. Just like you can have different reactions to different mental or sensual (of the sense) activities which produce pleasure. The pleasure experienced is a good thing. The pleasure brings you joy. But the pleasurable feeling is the guide as to whether you'll pursue the choice to eat them.

On the other hand, if someone held you at gunpoint and made you eat 100 bags of Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies", that would no longer be pleasurable. You may even grow to dislike the Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies" because of painful memories. The pleasure of eating the candy is not inherent in the candy itself. The feeling is entirely contextual and subjective. So, there's no absolute greater or lesser value to the pleasure derived from the candy that is valid for every circumstance.

And yes I realize I'm using a hypothetical.

FYI: I'm not trying to be argumentive However, I honestly think your answer to those questions may move us along in the conversation.

Let me ask this:

Why are they "more pleasurable" to you?

What does "more pleasurable" mean to you?

btw: I'm not arguing against feeling that some activities are subjectively more pleasurable than others. But that doesn't make them "better" or "greater" or "higher." So, I want to read what you mean when you use the words "more pleasurable."

Oops, forgot the last statement:

"some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."

No. All things which bring pleasure are good, a priori (I think I'm using that right).

It's not a matter of being "more pleasing" or "greater."

The criteria is whether the thing that brings pleasureable feelings does so with a minimum of pain attached. If it does, weigh that in your consideration of the choice to pursue it.

Getting into greater or lesser pleasurable activities seems to me to be going down the kinetic/katastematic rabbit hole. I think those distinctions are simply a way to look at different pleasurable things and are not value judgements. Better/worse, greater/lesser seems to be trying to put value judgments on them. The pleasures of the profligate are not lesser, worse pleasures. They are simply not choice-worthy if one wants to lead a pleasure-filled life.

I'll leave Torquatus and his son for when we get to that section.

Quote from Cassius

My position at the moment remains that philosophically "all pleasure is good" and "all goods are good," but that from the "perspective of real life," "some things that are good are better than others" and therefore "some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."

I get the impression that this is a word game rabbit hole you're falling into.

I'll suggest step one is to begin using "good thing" when were talking about activities. There is no capital-G Platonic Good, and I think using words like "all goods" starts to imply there is Good. As Epicurus said, "I spit on the good/noble/kalos of it doesn't bring pleasure."

Let me look at each of your statements:

philosophically "all pleasure is good"

I would say, practically, "everything that elicits a pleasurable response is good."

Why? Because pleasure is a positive feeling.

"all goods are good,"

All good things are good things. That's just a tautology, so that's like saying "things that are positive are positive." Things are only good, according to Epicurus, inasmuch as they bring pleasure. That's why it's the standard.

"some things that are good are better than others"

Again, good things are only good inasmuch as they bring pleasure. You seem to be trying to make a value judgment among "good things" as well as "things that bring pleasure". That doesn't strike me as Epicurean. It's all contextual. For things that bring pleasure, do they bring more pain in the end or lead to the health of the body and the serenity of the mind, in other words, a pleasurable life. Among "good things" like wisdom, acting justly, etc, is not being "better". It's being the one good thing toward which all other candidates for good things point or lead. According to Epicurus, *that* good thing that is at the "end of the rainbow" let's say, is a pleasure-filled life. All other goods are judged by whether they bring that about. Otherwise, they're spit upon.

Quote from Cassius

Are we not left with the same question as to how to distinguish between which pleasures to choose

I don't think so.

Pleasure - encompassing the health of the body and "serenity" of the mind throughout one's life - is the standard by which to make choices of which desires to pursue or reject.

We choose those activities/things that bring pleasure now if they will not bring greater pain as a result, or we choose pains (my go-to example of exercise) *for now* only if they will bring greater pleasure in the future.

Quote from Cassius

So aren't we left with the clear conclusion that some pleasures are greater (and some are lesser) than others?

No. Some pleasures experienced in the moment will lead to more pain in the end (ex., drinking all night long when you have to be at work the following morning). That doesn't mean the pleasure of intoxication doesn't feel pleasurable in the moment. It's just maybe not a good choice. That doesn't mean the pleasure is greater or lesser. It means it's not choice-worthy judged by the standard.

Quote from Cassius

And if so, the question to "what is the highest pleasure?" is not answered simply by saying "pleasure"? Is it?

Yes, it is. But you're asking the wrong question.

It makes no sense to ask "what is the highest pleasure?" because, by definition according to Epicurus, all pleasures are good. The "highest pleasure" is never used to them best of my knowledge. Pleasure is the highest good thing.

Pleasure is the highest good thing when compared to virtue, wisdom, justice, etc., because all good things are judged by the standard of whether they bring pleasure.

What pleasure to pursue is judged by whether it will bring more pleasure or lead to pain.

Quote from Cassius

How do you interpret the "this" in "And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...?

If we substitute "pleasure" there we get "And because pleasure is the primary and inborn good we do not choose every pleasure...."

Right. This = pleasure (overall).

The Epicurus Wiki does a good job of providing commentary on this section, as well as the Letter as a whole:

http://wiki.epicurism.info/Menoeceus_130-131/

Epicurus defined pleasure (after a fashion) in the section directly previous to those I quoted before:

Quote

health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life. Our every action is done so that we will not be in pain or fear. As soon as we achieve this, the soul is released from every storm, since an animal has no other need and must seek nothing else to complete the goodness of body and soul. Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure.

To provide some inline commentary of my own in ( ) below:

Because pleasure (writ large) is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every (activity that provides the feeling of) pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need (i.e., pleasure) from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains.

So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.

The underlined section again reinforces why pleasure is the standard. We use it to make decisions, measuring our options side by side, looking at advantages and disadvantages between them, in relation to whether they will bring pleasure now or in the future.

Quote from JJElbert

I haven't listened yet, but my gut response is something like John Mulaney here at the 1:40 mark

First, LOL. I like John Mulaney.

Second, I found interesting in the podcast that she disassociated mindfulness from meditating. I also liked the discussion about retrospection (and finding pleasure in it) and prospection (and getting pleasure in the pleasure moment while realizing your plans may not come to fruition).

Quote from JJElbert

Whereas for some people an energetic and wandering mind bears fruits that are pleasing, rather than irritating?

See, I thought her point was to have an energetic mind. To notice novelty, e.g., riding in a car and looking out the window at all the changing vistas and new sites to see.

Or did you get another take?

How to Know That You Know Nothing - How to Build a Happy Life

Staying Present and Breaking the Illusion of Stability

pca.st

I thought this podcast episode had some very Epicurean tips. Discuss

I would like to offer these lines from the Letter to Menoikeus in support of my contention that Epicurus was saying the same thing as "Torquatus" when it comes to the "highest good" (my emphasis added):

Quote

This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of a completely happy life. For we recognize it as the primary and innate good, we honor it in everything we accept or reject, and we achieve it if we judge every good thing by the standard of how that thing affects us. And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα...

πρῶτον

πρῶτος
first
earliest
foremost, most prominent

πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν = first, highest, superior, foremost good thing

Greek Word Study Tool

Ah, that is pretty cool

Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus! ..et Metrodorus!