Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

Ok who is going to explain the "tantra" reference??

LOL. Maybe when you're older.

Seriously though, the Buddhist tantra is popular in Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhist is about using *everything* as a vehicle to enlightenment: sex, anger, other things many see as "negative" or "evil." Its focus in the West has become fixated on "tantric sex", but I'll let you Google it Wikipedia that.

On second thought, let's take Kalosyni 's advice and stick with

Quote from Don

any time you can be fully present and aware is going to increase your ability to tune into your experience of pleasure.

Personally, I'm more inclined to believe that any perceived similarities between Buddhism and Epicureanism are due to convergent evolution rather than direct contact. What works, works, regardless of the geography or time period.

Quote from Cassius

Wow Cleveland you inspired quite a history lesson from JJ there!

Yes, Joshua , that was excellent!!!

Quote from JJElbert

I've been reflecting on it, I have come to the conclusion that I can certainly see it as another useful tool in the Epicurean toolkit; to "occupy serene heights, well fortified by the teachings of the wise", as Lucretius has put it.

I certainly agree with that paragraph!

I'd be wary about bringing tantra into it, but any time you can be fully present and aware is going to increase your ability to tune into your experience of pleasure.

... or maybe pleasure is an apple and katastematic and kinesis can be thought of like red and sweet.

Still working on an apt metaphor.

I'll have to go back and carefully read Nikolsky. I was going to wing it but that's not fair to Nikolsky nor to this discussion.

I will share an analogy/metaphor that just struck me. As of right now (reserving the right to extend & revise etc), I think "pleasure" may be able to be thought of like "taste"; katastematic and kinetic may be able to be thought of as analogous here to salty, sweet, sour, bitter, or umami. Salty isn't better or higher than sour, just different. They're all tastes. This is only a metaphor to show how one thing can be categorized into smaller things without making value judgments. I'm not equating pleasure with the sense of taste, just trying to build a metaphor.

Quote from Cassius

But show me an instance of an authoritative EPICUREAN doing that distinguishing.

[136] He differs from the Cyrenaics136 with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity." (Diogenes Laertius X.136)

Cassius : First, your passion is apparent, appreciated, and completely understandable.

I'd like to address your last few posts above in a tangential way and then state why I "liked the way the author lays it out overall" in that article I posted. I don't necessarily expect you to agree with me, but it might at least give you (and any curious readers) a better idea where my head is at.

For me:

- There are obviously different kinds of activities that bring pleasure discerned simply by observation.

- Categorizing two broad categories as katastematic and kinetic doesn't bother me, especially since Diogenes Laertius quotes both Metrodorus and Epicurus himself in Lives, X:136, that pleasure can be experienced, let's say, katastematically and kinetically:

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." (κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς (kinesin and [tes] katastematikes)) The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity." (ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία (ataraxia and aponia) καταστηματικαί (katastematikai) εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη (khara and euphrosune) κατὰ κίνησιν (kinesin) ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.")

- Metrodorus and Epicurus are drawing a distinction between the philosophy of the Garden and the philosophy of Cyrenaics who appear to only recognize kinetic pleasures as the goal or the highest good. Epicurus (and Metrodorus) are quoted as saying, "No, pleasures encompass those gained from both kinds of pleasures."

- Ataraxia and aponia are specifically designated by Epicurus in On Choices as καταστηματικαί (katastematikai). This appears to mean in a stable state. It is related to the word meaning ‘bring to anchor,’ bringing one to his destination.

- Khara (joy/delight) and euphrosune (mirth/merriment/good cheer/cheered with glad thoughts) are defined by Epicurus as kinetic pleasure. Why? I don't know other than to say maybe your soul atoms are bouncing around more (they're kinetic) in response to the

pleasure; whereas they are stable (at anchor) while experiencing a katastematic pleasure.

- No value judgements that one is better than another.

Where I liked the article was:

Quote

To claim that pleasure is good, then, does not mean imagining that all pleasures are equally good

I interpreted this to mean "good [for you]" as PD10. I realize I'm reading into the article's text, but that's the way I interpreted it.

I'll admit I have some misgivings about their characterization of kinetic pleasures. Going back to Epicurus, he states joy and merriment are kinetic pleasures, not pleasures from sight, touch, hearing, etc. You can get feelings of joy and merriment from any number of activities. Excitement might be a candidate from my perspective of pleasure derived through kinesis. I like their katastematic lines better:

Quote

Katastematic pleasures are ‘pleasures at rest’ or in stasis, which implies an absence of disturbance or discomfort. They denote a state of being, involving equilibrium, calm, stability and completeness.

That's the definition I'm coming around to to try and describe them.

I liked their repudiation of Mill. I also liked this:

Quote

For Epicureanism things are not quite that simple (Rist, 1972: 108–109, 115). Even if the kinetic are lower (though this is a proposition we will interrogate in Chapter 2), this does not mean we should disdain them (as Mill seems to disdain pushpin) for three reasons.

Firstly, as materialists Epicureans were receptive to the delights which we experience when the senses are stimulated.

This goes back to the idea that we can only experience pleasure when our senses interact with the external world at least in the kinetic pleasures. Katastematic pleasure can be experienced through internal sensations (interoception to channel Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and others).

Quote

Finally, the above arguments suggest that kinetic pleasures may be valuable for their own sake. Seeking variations in pleasure is important if a life is to go well. ... If we can derive simple, untroubling enjoyment from kinetic activities then they may add to life’s richness.

The kinetic and katastematic are therefore intermingled to a degree that does not appear true of Mill’s lower/higher distinction. What matters is not just what we do but the reasons why we do what we do (Jones, 1989: 51).

So, kinetic and katastematic are NOT higher/lower, better/worse for Epicurus like they were Mill. They are simply ways of talking about the various ways pleasure is experienced.

Let's take the pleasure derived from intoxication. Epicurus wrote his Symposium (paraphrasing) "Don't act the fool when you're drunk", so I'm going to assume he didn't prohibit drinking. If one goes out drinking with friends to strengthen the bonds of friendship with no responsibilities the next day, I see no reason that's not a valid Epicurean choice. If you go out alone drinking when you have a big social or work commitment the next day, that would not be choice-worthy and would lead to more pain. The pleasure is the same (probably kinetic if we're keeping to the thread) but the *desires* to experience that pleasure are not equally choice-worthy.

So, that's where my head is at right now in regards to kinetic and katastematic.

Thanks for all that legwork, Cassius

Epicurus: in outline and in history

<p>This chapter has two aims. First, it provides an overview of the basics of Epicureanism. It therefore reviews the Epicurean adaptation of atomism,…

www.elgaronline.com

Came across this book chapter online and liked the way the author lays it out overall:

Quote

To claim that pleasure is good, then, does not mean imagining that all pleasures are equally good (Jones, 1989: 49–50). Epicureans therefore distinguished between two categories (Mitsis, 1988: 45–51; Preuss, 1994: Ch. 6).

Kinetic pleasures are non-necessary ‘pleasures in motion’ which depend upon change and process. Sensual pleasures of sight, touch, hearing and so forth seem to fall under this heading. A kinetic pleasure also seems to depend upon pain. If I enjoy reading a novel the enjoyment comes from anxious anticipation about how things will turn out. Will my favourite character die? Will the hero defeat the villain?

Katastematic pleasures are ‘pleasures at rest’ or in stasis, which implies an absence of disturbance or discomfort. They denote a state of being, involving equilibrium, calm, stability and completeness. Since they can be varied but cannot be quantitatively improved upon (as with the white loaf of bread) these are the highest pleasures and are sometimes known as ‘static pleasures’ (see Epic IV.130–32).

Though we should be wary of drawing an exact parallel, the kinetic/katastematic distinction is presumably what J.S. Mill had in mind when he praised Epicureanism and devised his own distinction between higher and lower pleasures as a way of evolving Utilitarianism beyond Bentham, for whom all pleasures were equally good (Arangno, 2013: 201, 203–204; Wilson, 2009: 280).¹²

But there is an important difference. Mill was more willing to identify the higher with one set of activities and the lower with another set. For Mill, poetry simply was superior to pushpin, as anyone who had experienced and been educated in the former could tell you.

For Epicureanism things are not quite that simple (Rist, 1972: 108–109, 115). Even if the kinetic are lower (though this is a proposition we will interrogate in Chapter 2), this does not mean we should disdain them (as Mill seems to disdain pushpin) for three reasons.

Firstly, as materialists Epicureans were receptive to the delights which we experience when the senses are stimulated. A good game of pushpin enjoyed with friends is presumably better than reading bad poetry in solitude.

Secondly, therefore, even if kinetic pleasures do invite pain and disturbances, these may be worth experiencing. The short-term anxiety caused by reading my novel may be worthwhile if the result leaves me in a higher, long-term state of katastematic pleasure than I would have experienced otherwise.

Finally, the above arguments suggest that kinetic pleasures may be valuable for their own sake. Seeking variations in pleasure is important if a life is to go well. Epicurus’ distinction between adding pleasure and varying pleasure may not hold if and when variation itself constitutes a form of addition. If we can derive simple, untroubling enjoyment from kinetic activities then they may add to life’s richness. (This is an argument we pursue in the next chapter under Puzzle 3.)

The kinetic and katastematic are therefore intermingled to a degree that does not appear true of Mill’s lower/higher distinction. What matters is not just what we do but the reasons why we do what we do (Jones, 1989: 51).

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Here's the pushpin referred to:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push-pin_…%29?wprov=sfla1

In my study, I'm coming to the conclusion that katastematic pleasure refers to deriving pleasure from a stable (albeit temporary) state or condition while kinetic pleasure has to do with deriving pleasure from an action. To me, this makes sense if ataraxia is a katastematic pleasure. Tranquility is a stable state of being. Eating, drinking etc are kinetic pleasure.

This is all in flux, but I'm exploring this as an avenue of research in authoritative sources.

PS: My understanding is that the Cyrenaics only recognized "kinetic" pleasures. Epicurus recognized all sources of pleasure.

Quote from Kalosyni

I admit that the "pleasure at rest" sense of satisfaction doesn't happen for me very often. But I wonder if Epicurus might have taught this in the Garden. And if it was lost, though it's not something that easily translates into words.

I'm very skeptical if Epicurus taught a form of sitting (Eastern) meditation in the Garden. But his use of the word μελετᾶν/μελέτη "study, practice, meditate on, practice, exercise" suggests to me some form of sustained focused attention on and memorization of the Principal Doctrines and other epitomes and summaries. That being said, mindfulness, in my opinion, could easily be incorporated into an Epicurean practice (as that podcast I recently posted suggests to me). Anything that makes us more aware of our feelings and makes us better able to make informed decisions on what to choose and what to reject seems applicable to me.

Quote from Kalosyni

Perhaps my viewpoint comes from past dabbling in Zen meditation (and modified by a Theravadin approach of sitting for the feeling of bodily enjoyment).

You'll find several of us here with some Buddhism in our backgrounds.

Quote from Cassius

There is no true rest in human life (or in the universe for that matter) because all atoms are constantly in motion. "Rest" is a fiction of the Platonic imagination because his realm of forms (which does not exist) is the only place where "things" allegedly remain immovable and the same. There is no "horseness" - only horses, and there are in my view no real pleasures that can be considered unmoving or at rest, only some which last longer than others.

I have to take some issue with your conflating "rest" with Platonic ideals. I may be reading too much into your post, but here's my response anyway.

If there were "no true rest in human life" that would be an abominable situation. We have to find some "rest" in the storm, otherwise we're at the mercy of the storm, tossed wave to wave. Epicurus defines (in some places) a pleasurable life as "health of the body and tranquility of the mind." That's the kind of "rest" I would say he advocated. You can't lead a pleasurable life if your body is unhealthy and your mind is troubled by fears and agitated by anxiety or anger (for example). In fact, pleasure can be more fully experienced in that state of health and "peace of mind." There's no hint of a Platonic ideal, just practicality. That tranquility (ataraxia in the phrase "tranquility of the mind") isn't the goal, but it is a pleasurable experience; plus I find it interesting that it's origin it's in a metaphor of calm seas.

Quote from Kalosyni

So this highlights both the pleasure of rest and the pleasure of action...

....so both "the cake AND the frosting".

I like that characterization. Epicurus serves up the whole slice.

Legal Positivism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I found it interesting that Bentham is mentioned in the history section.

I certainly haven't read this entire PhD dissertation, but I was intrigued by the title in light of this thread

I also hadn't heard of the author before: Jan Maximilian Robitzsch

Epicurean Justice and Law

Abstract

This dissertation concerns a cluster of related issues surrounding the Epicurean conception of justice. First, I show that the Epicureans defend a sophisticated kind of social contract theory and maintain a kind of legal positivism, views that are widely held today and so are of continuing interest for contemporary readers. In doing so, I argue that thinking about justice and law forms an integral part of Epicurean philosophy (pace the standard view). Second, I take up some neglected issues regarding justice and so provide detailed accounts of the metaphysics of moral properties in Epicureanism as well as of Epicurean moral epistemology.

Quote from Godfrey

Reading Matt's post #101 brings to mind PD14 and how that might relate to this discussion. I'm not sure how that might be, just putting it out there

One reason I'm posting here is to bump this back up the list of active threads. I don't think we're anywhere near exhausting this issue. I also wanted to refer back to my own interpretation/translation of PD14 to reply to Godfrey 's post above. Here's the link to the thread and my translation (click the phrase).

If you look at Nathan's translation compilation, you'll see DeWitt uses "dynastic protection" but I think that is just incorrect (Sorry, Norman). The Greek is δυνάμει but dynastic seems to be more related to δυνάστης with a sigma after the alpha (noted). I have great respect for DeWitt's scholarship, but I'm not convinced of his "dynastic protection" here. It seems to be more related to an individual's power to repel aggression/harm. Which, I agree with Godfrey, related to the idea of "neither harm nor be harmed" in some way... and that is related to the idea of what it means to be "just" in Epicurean philosophy. We really have to wrestle with PD31 through maybe the end and PD40. There a LOT to sift through there!!