Posts by Don

https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2022/01/emotion-isnt-the-enemy-of-reason/621148/

Joshua you're right on point with the themes of the book! The author's addiction that she reveals was reading romance novels. Innocuous, one might assume, but it really took over her life in many ways. The patients she talks about are dealing with sex, drugs, alcohol, food addictions. Addiction can manifest itself in myriad ways it seems.

Quote from JJElbert

I don't know if I'll have time for this one, but I think you are absolutely right about its application.

I'm curious whether Dr. Lembke goes into the other 4 major hormones/neurotransmitters of serotonin (mood, sleep, digestion), endorphins (mitigation of stress and pain), cortisol (increase of stress, and activation of "fight or flight" response) and oxytocin (associated with empathy, relationships and sex). Probably I do need to make time for this!

The other neurotransmitters do come up repeatedly although her main focus is, of course, dopamine. She talks a lot about the reward pathways in the brain and how they get hijacked (my word, not hers) and lead to addictive behaviors.

I just finished listening to Dopamine Nation by Dr. Anna Lembke and would recommend it for anyone trying to understand the mechanism of pleasure in the brain and its role in addictive behavior.

Anna Lembke, MD - Dopamine Nation

Dopamine Nation by Dr. Anna Lembke. In Dopamine Nation, Dr. Anna Lembke, psychiatrist and author, explores the exciting new scientific discoveries that explain…

www.annalembke.com

I had heard a podcast with the author and, at first, thought the focus on addiction was too narrow. But I was wrong. While some of the patients discussed in the book (with their informed consent!) are difficult to hear/read, Lembke does an excellent job in showing the wide range of addictive behaviors.

I saw many echoes and/or applications to Epicurean philosophy in the book. To me, books like this are important because we can "philosophize" all day, but Epicurus advocates for evidence and knowing the science behind the brain and its reward pathways and how and why "not every pleasure is to be chosen" and "we sometimes choose pain for greater pleasures to come" is a reason to know the current science.

I'll be interested if anyone reads it and has any comments.

Here's another article on the Cyrenaics:

Cyrenaics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

It's a solid article. Here are just a couple quick snippets:

Another striking feature of the Cyrenaic theory is its lack of future-concern. The Cyrenaics advocate going after whatever will bring one pleasure now, enjoying the pleasure while one is experiencing it, and not worrying too much about what the future will bring. Although the Cyrenaics say that prudence is valuable for attaining pleasure, they do not seem much concerned with exercising self-control in pursuing pleasure, or with deferring present pleasures (or undergoing present pains) for the sake of experiencing greater pleasure (or avoiding greater pains) in the future.

The Cyrenaics instead aim at enjoying the pleasures that are present, without letting themselves be troubled at what is not present, that is, the past and future. Epicurus thinks that the memory of past pleasures, and the expectation of future pleasures, are themselves most pleasant, and hence he emphasizes the importance of careful planning in arranging what one will experience in the future. The Cyrenaics, however, deny this, saying that pleasures are pleasant only when actually being experienced.

That's been why I've gravitated to the Epicureans and not the Cyrenaics. I'm not "old and infirm" but I take great pleasure in reliving trips taken and other events in the past. I just did a nice review of last year on Jan 1 and took great pleasure in thinking about what my family was able to do this past year all things considered.

Quote from JJElbert

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56–57. The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured, and will die for him; for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

This shows up in the Vatican Sayings on the torture question. To be honest, I barely remember talking about this!

Well, it makes a difference if you said it a week ago (you) or just listened to it on the way to work (me) And I speak from experience!

That is a directly relevant VS, too! Thanks! I'm looking forward into digging into the manuscripts to see how they divide those up in Diogenes Laertius. Yeah, this is what I call fun

Quick pedantic reply to Cassius 's mention of the Tetrapharmakos.

The 4th line is actually:

Quote

And the terrible can be easily endured*

Not "easily avoided." That would change the whole flavor.

*And the terrible can be "endured" because it's either short and fatal or long and we can find some pleasure within it.

Listening to the podcast and found Joshua insight into the rack/ friends sayings about the characteristics of the wise very intriguing. I never considered the "he" in the second mention of torture to refer to the friends but now I'm not sure. I'm going to have to go back to the Greek and the manuscripts. You may need on to something! Thanks for the food for thought:

118 And even ifthe wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when *he* (the sage or the friend??) is on the rack, then he (the sage?) will cry out and lament.

PS: One hesitation is that the word "friends" is plural, and the "he" in the next sentence is singular. But I could see talking of friends in general then a specific friend in the singular. In any case, this has provided some thought-food.

Thanks, Godfrey. I'm glad you find the layout helpful.

Quote from Godfrey

At least according to this, the references that Epicurus makes to diet seem to be much less to do with radical asceticism and more to do with mainstream Greek culture. Another strike against interpreting him as a minimalist

I happened to find this quote about μάζα in The Deipnosophists:

Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, Book XIV., chapter 83

It too talks about the basic nature of the meal as a staple.

PS. I also found this:

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The most common food among the Greeks was the μάζα, a kind of soft cake, which was prepared in different ways, as appears by the various names which were given to it (Pollux, vi. 76). The φυστὴ μάζα, of which Philocleon partakes on returning home from the courts ( Suet. Vesp.610), is said by the Scholiast to have been made of barley and wine. The μάζα continued to the latest times to be the common food of the lower classes. Wheaten or barley bread was the second most usual species of food; it was sometimes made at home, but more usually bought at the market.

From http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Ancient/en/Deipnon.html

Thanks, Cassius. I've taken your advice and uploaded to the Filebase Library and linked to it from here. I appreciate the suggestion!

btw I'll be curious if anyone tries the maza recipe referenced in verse 131 It's on my list of things to do.

Quote from Kalosyni

Cassius and Don and Matt (and anyone else)

I hope we can preserve and continue the discussion of ethics and justice, and continue exploring.

We can resurrect this thread is anyone's interested:

Thread

Toward A Better Understanding of Epicurean Justice And Injustice (With Examples of "Just" and "Unjust")

[ADMIN NOTE: This new thread was started so as to contain the responses to the following post, which is itself a response by Don to a post by Elayne. Please check Elayne's post in the original thread for past context. As per the title I gave the new thread, it would be good to produce some hypothetical examples of "just" and "unjust" so we can begin to see the common themes.]



[…]

Okay, this is helpful for me to flesh out my thinking if y'all will bear with me...

I would say this specific…

Don

March 21, 2021 at 9:34 PM

Quote from Cassius

Because I think we all end up at the same position if we agree that "harm" is very subjective and relative. If we think "harm" can be defined objectively, then we're looking at an absolute standard of justice which I don't think Epicurus would allow.

Broken record that I am, I'm going back to the Greek text of the PDs. There word consistently throughout those PDs to talk about natural justice, the nature of justice, to describe the compact, etc. is βλάπτω.

Principal Doctrines, by Epicurus

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, βλάπτω

If Epicurus or the early Epicureans wanted to use a word less "ambiguous" than βλάπτω to convey another meaning, they would have. Whether we think the English translation of "harm" is ambiguous doesn't matter. We need to grapple with why βλάπτω is the word chosen to convey the "basic grasp of justice" throughout those PDs and its connection to what is δίκαιος "just, right, etc."

Quote from Cassius

I would say that the Pds on justice are closely analogous to, and should be understood to be part of, Epicurus' overall view on virtue (justice generally being considered a virtue). As such, justice is ultimately a tool for the pleasure of ourselves and our friends, in the same way as is wisdom and prudence and the rest. And that's why it is so clear in those PD's that when circumstances change, that which was deemed "just" before is seen to be no longer just.

Hmm 🤔 I'm not entirely convinced, but I'll entertain your post.

As an exercise, I put PD31 to PD38 together as paragraphs and also threw in PD17 (see if y'all can pick it out ) to get away from looking at them as discrete thoughts.

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Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed. Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place. There is neither justice nor injustice with regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed similar to those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.

Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing. One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion. It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.

Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts. When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.

I will say that when you say:

Quote from Cassius

And that's why it is so clear in those PD's that when circumstances change, that which was deemed "just" before is seen to be no longer just.

I think the reason (which is started in the PD) is that something is no longer just is when it's no longer mutually beneficial and no longer adheres to the "basic grasp of justice" which, as I see it, is to neither harm nor be harmed.

Quote from Cassius

I was thinking that was a reference in Seneca, so I could be thinking wrong. Do you have a particular cite for it in Philodemus beyond what you quoted above? I am always more skeptical of Philodemus quotes too due to the uncertainties of the text.

That link in my post has the full PDF of Philodemus's On Frank Speech. It's in Fragment 45.

The SFOTSE is Seneca:

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(Seneca’s Letters, Book I- Letter XXV) But do you yourself, as indeed you are doing, show me that you are stout-hearted; lighten your baggage for the march. None of our possessions is essential. Let us return to the law of nature; for then riches are laid up for us. The things which we actually need are free for all, or else cheap; nature craves only bread and water. No one is poor according to this standard; when a man has limited his desires within these bounds, be can challenge the happiness of Jove himself, as Epicurus says. I must insert in this letter one or two more of his sayings: “Do everything as if Epicurus were watching you.” (Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus) There is no real doubt that it is good for one to have appointed a guardian over oneself, and to have someone whom you may look up to, someone whom you may regard as a witness of your thoughts. It is, indeed, nobler by far to live as you would live under the eyes of some good man, always at your side; but nevertheless I am content if you only act, in whatever you do, as you would act if anyone at all were looking on; because solitude prompts us to all kinds of evil. And when you have progressed so far that you have also respect for yourself, you may send away your attendant; but until then, set as a guard over yourself the authority of some man, whether your choice be the great Cato or Scipio, or Laelius, – or any man in whose presence even abandoned wretches would check their bad impulses. Meantime, you are engaged in making of yourself the sort of person in whose company you would not dare to sin. When this aim has been accomplished and you begin to hold yourself in some esteem, I shall gradually allow you to do what Epicurus, in another passage, suggests: “The time when you should most of all withdraw into yourself is when you are forced to be in a crowd.”

Yeah, it's not an oath in Philodemus's original text. Just a statement of how Philodemus sees how one applies Epicurus's teachings to his life... And how he thinks others in the community should, too.

"the encompassing and most important thing is that we shall obey Epicurus according to whom we have chosen to live,"

I agree this is more of a WWJD reminder than any oath. Epicureans can have their own SFOTSE bracelets anyway

I came across this over on The Humanist in a review of Hiram's book:

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Epicurus is famous for demanding that his followers swear an oath of loyalty: “I will be faithful to Epicurus according to whom it has been my choice to live.”

Tending the Epicurean Garden - TheHumanist.com

Ours is the age of science. We live in a time in which technology has performed such wondrous feats that many have come to believe, if only half consciously,…

thehumanist.com

Then, one of Cassius's sites gave me the citation:

Philodemus, On Frankness, fragment 45.9-11

Letter to Herodotus

Editions: Elemental Edition – Paraphrased in modern English to assist new readers in grasping the concepts before reviewing in greater detail. Reference…

epicureanfriends.com

The text of Fragment 45 runs:

Fr. 45: ...we shall admonish others with great confidence, both now and when those {of us} who have become offshoots of our teachers have become eminent. And the encompassing and most important thing is, we shall obey Epicurus, according to whom we have chosen to live, as even...

https://librosycultura2.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/filodemo-1998-on-frank-criticism-konstan-y-clay-griego-e-ingles.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiDobb0sZH1AhUUjYkEHc7kBSMQFnoECAQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3BQTMX-rvoiFIAdzhRXK5-

Quote from Kalosyni

Since so much of what Epicurus wrote was lost, we can't know if back in Epicurus' time, his community had some sort of precepts that were taken or agreed upon.

That is an interesting question. How did you "convert" to being an Epicurean in ancient times? Was it formal? Or did you just show up at your local Garden and start attending lectures and celebrations? Hmmm... Back to the books!

Discussions of the Epicurean community always bring me back to ask "What was the Epicurean community in Hellenistic times?" "What was The Garden (Ο Κήπος) like?" Here are my thoughts:

• Ο Κήπος was only partially residential. Epicurus and the senior "instructors" probably lived on the grounds or associated house. Many students visited, maybe daily as life allowed, then went back to their regular lives to live the philosophy.
• It was not a commune! Epicurus specifically started property was not held in common. That would imply mistrust, that aid would not be given if needed.
• It was situated on a major thoroughfare between the city walls and the Academy. It was not a remote retreat out in the hills.
• This also appears to be the case for other κήποι in other cities. They were accessible to the citizens of the polis.

Not sure if this is applicable to the current discussion, but it seemed like an appropriate place to drop it in.

Quote from Kalosyni

My question is how to trust other people who are in a shared real life environment? If everyone is pursuing firstly their own individual pleasure, they must also have a believe in the mutual motivation "to cause no harm"...or else there is no trust, and without trust there is no safety.

Good question. As far as trusting people, the old Russian adage "Trust but verify" may be applicable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust%2C_…ify?wprov=sfla1

Do people's actions agree with their words? Let's say it's a matter of observation by our senses (to keep in the spirit of Epicurus).

For me and my understanding, my pleasure depends on warm, cordial and/or friendly relations with those around me. If I extend kindness to someone, there's a hope (or societal expectation?) that I'll receive kindness in turn when needed. I'm not an idiot and know this isn't always the case! But, overall, it's not a ridiculous way to operate.

I also need to point out that, from my reading, personal pleasure and pain don't enter into Epicurus's formulation of justice in the PDs. There's no mention on them in PD31 to PD38. It's all about the basic agreement, contract, covenant, mutual benefit, etc. These agreements should lead to a pleasurable life of safety from fellow members of society, but that's outside the direct scope of those PDs. That realization (just now for me) is food for my thought.