Posts by Don

The word Epicurus uses is εναργής.

It has two primary definitions:

1. visible, palpable, in bodily shape, properly of gods appearing in their own forms (in Homer); so of a dream or vision; ex., ἐναργὴς ταῦρος "in visible form a bull, a very bull"
2. manifest to the mind's eye, distinct

He can't mean the first since he's fairly adamant that the gods don't interact with humans. But the second definition coincides with his contention (and the idea of the prolepseis) that the gods are apprehended by the mind only. That also sets up a nice contrast with the first definition's use by Homer in describing the Olympian gods appearing "in visible form." Homer's gods were εναργής in one sense of the word; Epicurus's in the other sense.

The inscripion

Quote

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point. Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist. Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....

Quote from ayraj

My goal is to learn more from the primary writings, to read posts from others, and to learn to be an Epicurean. Because I've left a faith tradition, I'm also interested in any rituals or "best practices" anyone has for making Epicureanism a part of everyday life - kind of like how Christians pray, Buddhists meditate, or there are holidays to commemorate important holy days, etc., or even something simple like a home altar to reflect at. Not sure how much is in the purview of the Classical Epicurean perspective, but I truly am interested in being a student of Epicurus, Epicureanism, and in becoming a "devout" so-to-speak Epicurean.

Greetings, ayraj ! Thank you for sharing your background. I, too, find it an interesting exercise to look for "any rituals or "best practices" anyone has for making Epicureanism a part of everyday life." I need to go back and re-read (it's been awhile) The Ethics of Philodemus by Dr. Voula Tsouna, but there are some interesting practices that she talks about including "setting-before-the-eyes" to counteract or address one's anger (or other negative or harmful emotions). To me, the practice sounds like a vivid visualization in one's mind to really "see" the results of that emotion before one engages in it. That's a Cliffs Notes version.

The closest I've come to any daily or regular practice is to recite the Tetrapharmakos in ancient Greek to myself to try to keep the "basics" in mind. And made myself a keychain with SFOTSE (Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus) which is (from Seneca's letters XXV.5) and means "Do all things as if Epicurus were watching." Sort of an Epicurean "WWJD: What would Jesus do."

As far as a home "altar," there is every precedent for having a bust of Epicurus. The are numerous files online for printing a small 3-D bust. I keep meaning to do this. Or maybe just a picture.

So, welcome to this little corner of the Epicurean internet! I look forward to reading any discoveries you make and questions you might have.

Well said!

Thanks, Eikadistes . That's a fascinating article.

How would you line up that with prolepseis or concepts? Epicurus certainly wouldn't have had instruments or observations at the 100ms scale, but I do think he got some things intuitively correct. Just curious about your take on the article.

I also think this intersects with Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's research. The idea of the brain needing to predict our actions is intriguing, makes sense when explained, and provides interesting parallels to Epicurus's philosophy.

Quote from Cassius

I hope I don't sound tedious on this point

Hey, as they say, "the Devil's in the details." All good points.

I agree there's a big difference between innate faculties and innate concepts. We are not born with innate concepts of house, human, horse, justice or οίκος, άνθρωπος, 'ιππος, δίκαιος and then map reality to those innate concepts. Research doesn't support that. Epicurus doesn't seem to me to support that.

I will say language acquisition in children is miraculous to behold! I can see how some may have come up with a theory that we "re-discover" language because it is so magical to behold. It may be interesting to note that research has discovered that babies naturally produce every phoneme that human language uses and those that are not phonemically significant for their parents first language will be weeded out. We gradually learn to see that animal as a horse and not a 'ιππος or Pferd depending if our parents are English or American or Greek or German.

We also don't have some kind of innate Platonic Horse Form against which we compare our sensory input. It's simply the baby's constant reinforcement of "That's a horsie." Points. "Orsy!" "No, that's a cat." "Orsy!" "No, that is a dog." "Horsy!" "Right, that's a horsy! Oh, pretty horsy." I find it hard to think that Epicurus endorsed an innate horse-template to "measure" our sensory input against. But, you're right, I think I've read that sort of thing as some saying that's what prolepseis are.

I need to go back and read Laertius description of the Canon and Sedley's paper on On Nature Book 28 on language.

As for the "fourth leg," my jury is still out that there's any 4th leg at all. I'm still not entirely convinced that Laertius's "Epicureans" weren't qualifying the prolepseis or expanding the explanation of prolepseis. I also need to dig back into DeWitt's paper.

The translation is:

"Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth ; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations44 to be also standards."

Note 44 in Perseus read: Such mental pictures are caused by atoms too fine to affect sense : cf.§ 64infra; Lucr. ii. 740 sqq., iv. 722 sqq. ; Cic. N.D. i. 54. On the whole subject consult Usener's Epicurea, Fr. 242-265, and, more especially, Sext. Emp. Adv. math. vii. 203-216.

Usener Fragments 242-265 are available on Attalus's site: http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus2.html#us2

Especially pertinent here seems to be 255-259.

This isn't a simple topic by any means, but it is an important one. I'm enjoying the digging in!

Quote from Cassius

"Would or did Epicurus himself wish to use the literary device of casting the mind or soul out into space? It seems to me that modern writers now universally seem to agree that he did so, which DeWitt points out would be contrary to one of the most fundamental physical premises of the philosophy -- that the mind/soul is absolutely connected and tied to the body and cannot be separated from it.

Oh, I have no problem with the "literary device," and there's no need to postulate some kind of "out of body" experience. For me, this simply means imagination or thought-experiments or thinking deeply about the cosmos, atoms, void, etc. out there. That's just what astrophysicists and theoretical physicists do now. Even Einstein was famous for his thought experiments. If you're saying there are commentators that put forward some kind of soul travel outside the body... Yeah, that makes no sense.

Eikadistes I think you're into something. Here's my take from a little while back on PD24:

Post

PD24 - Commentary and Translation of PD 24

Principal Doctrine 24 (PD 24) is one of the more convoluted doctrines with multiple phrases and conjunctions. I would like to provide some commentary and break the doctrine down into manageable words and phrases for everyone to get a more coherent understanding of what Epicurus was communicating. You may also want to take a look at this doctrine’s page on the Epicurus Wiki:

First the original text:

[…]

Now, let’s break it down before we put it all back together. I’ll provide a (mostly) literal…

Don

September 2, 2020 at 11:56 PM

DeWitt wrote a whole paper on this specific topic.Epicurus On Impressions of the Mind.pdf

Ex.

Post

RE: Anticipations - Justice & Divine Nature

[…]

I completely understand where you're coming from. However, the "blank slate" idea, while a popular and long-standing theory, has been well debunked. There is a lot of fascinating research on babies and toddlers.

[…]

Excellent observation! This sense - anticipation - of "justice" or "fairness" has been observed in monkeys as well. I think I've posted elsewhere on there forum on this, but the one that comes to mind is the experiment where two monkeys are given a task and rewarded with a…

Don

August 16, 2021 at 7:40 AM

I go back to babies, monkeys, chimps, etc al exhibiting displays of "fairness" (or however one describes it) as being manifestations of an innate sense or prolepseis of "justice." I don't think they can be acculturation in relation to babies. The utility of "fairness" might be learned, but the sense of fairness is innate.

We crossposted, Cassius . I do think you're on the right track on the pre-rational, sensory, pre-conceptual nature of the prolepseis. Not sure how I square that with divinity and justice being our two examples, but I agree that's the track to follow.

But there is an underlying "no harm to me, no harm to you" reciprocity at work, especially in the chimp and monkey examples. If you look at the definitions of δίκαιος, there's a maintaining a certain balance in society aspect. One chimp sees a group member being "harmed" by being denied food etc. Another member shares, maintaining balance in society. The sharing member also sets up the precedent for reciprocity from the other member in the troop.

The idea of the "just" war is defensible(?) possibly in that one community didn't have any agreements with the other. Or if they did, one side sees the other as doing something against the contract and they are inflicting punishment on the offending party.

That's a take off the top of my head.

Is the prolepsis (notion, anticipation, preconception, etc) of justice simply the concept that one neither harms nor inflicts harm? That that is where the definition of what is starts?

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, δίκαιος

From http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…057:entry=di/kh

Quote from Kalosyni

a small cup of light wine

Thanks for that!

I find it interesting that that phrase above is the word οινιδιον oinidion which is just a diminutive of "wine" οίνος oinos. Plus it appears to only show up in a couple places with some inscriptions and that one mention in DL book X being most of them.

PS. Diminutives: "Ancient Greek suffixes that are derived from a base word to convey endearment, small size or small intensity." (Wiktionary)

So, with so few attested usages of οινιδιον, it's hard to say what is actually being conveyed. I've seen some articles that say diminutives were sometimes just alternative forms of the word, οινιδιον just could have meant "wine." I've also seen some translators use "inferior wine" but I see no reason why Epicureans would choose inferior wine. Some possibilities from the Wiktionary definition to me could be:

• endearment: precious or favorite wine. They had a particularly favorite vintage or supplier.
• small size: They drank small cups, but that doesn't seem noteworthy. It also doesn't address the beverage. You'd think there would be a mention of the cup but it's not; it's the beverage (juxtaposed with water)
• small intensity: This one makes the most sense to me. The wine typically drunk in the Garden was less potent, maybe not fermented as long, maybe with more water added (as was common) especially since water is also mentioned next. So maybe the passage is getting at the idea that some added a "little wine" to their water and others just stuck with the plain spring water or rain water.

The mixing of wine and water goes back way into the history of Ancient Greece, mentioned even in the Odyssey (1.110):

[110] some were mixing wine and water for them in bowls, others again were washing the tables with porous sponges and setting them forth, while still others were portioning out meats in abundance.

What Telemachus greets Athena with soon after that excerpt strikes me as almost a version of the greeting posted at the entrance to the Garden:

“Hail, stranger; in our house thou shalt find entertainment and then, when thou hast tasted food, thou shalt tell of what thou hast need.”

Homer, Odyssey, Book 1, line 80

It might be good to refresh a look at the word for "justice" δίκαιος

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, δίκαιος

Thought these might be helpful for the discussion:

Fr. 548. Happiness and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature.

τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον [eudaimonia and blessedness] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.

χρημάτων πλῆθος = a huge amount of money or wealth

χρημάτων = things one needs or uses; property, esp. money

πραγμάτων ὄγκος = lit. heap of things

ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν = having authority

ἀλυπία = "freedom from pain"

πραότης παθῶν = "peace of mind" lit. mild, gentle feelings/reactions http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=pra=os

43. It is not right to love money unjustly, and shameful to love it justly; for it is unbecoming to be overly stingy, beyond what is right. φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδικα μὲν ἀσεβές, δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν· ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.

This is interesting with the μὲν...δὲ... which can be typically translated as "on the one hand... On the other hand..." plus γὰρ then "since, because" giving the reason for what came before.

φιλαργυρεῖν is literally does mean "to love money" philargyrein philo- love argyros "silver, money"

There are various permutations of just/unjust:

ἄδικα

δίκαια

δικαίου

ἀσεβές is the opposite word used in the title of Philodemus's "On Piety" and means ungodly, unholy, profane, sacrilegious, opp. εὐσεβής (used in the title.

αἰσχρόν is an antonym of καλός kalos "noble, upright, beautiful, etc..." http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=ai)sxro/s

ἀπρεπὲς is "unseemly, unbecoming, indecent, indecorous; of persons, disreputable." With the α- "un-" prefix, think of those definitions without it to get antonyms. πρέπει is something like "fitting"

ῥυπαρῶς is an adverb. Filthily, dirty-ly, sordidly, but it sets up clever word play by Epicurus because it can also refer to coins made of base metals or alloys instead of pure silver so with a nod to meaning counterfeit maybe or not pure precious metals http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…entry=r(uparo/s

φείδεσθαι to be thrifty, to use sparingly. I get the idea of being frugal or spending money wisely.

καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.

"beyond what is right" could just as easily be "beyond what is just (δικαίου)"

The latest episode of Lucretius Today (or use it "Torquatus" Today now ) talked about this, from my perspective, with the discussion of the "love of money" for its own sake. If the acquisition of money is just to acquire more money (ie, you're not making money to work toward some achievable goal), there's no limit to that desire. You can never be satisfied with how much money you have.

But humans' desires can be insatiable especially for power and money.

The Next Big Idea - DOPAMINE NATION: Why the Modern World Puts Us All at Risk for Addiction

In “Dopamine Nation: Finding Balance in the Age of Indulgence,” Dr. Anna Lembke says today’s superabundance of pleasurable stimuli makes us all vulnerable to…

podcasts.google.com

Podcast episode from The Next Big Idea directly pertinent to discussions on this forum.

I'm more and more coming to the idea that homeostasis or "the hedonic set-point" *is* ataraxia and aponia, and that was one of Epicurus's innovations to see that homeostasis is a kind of pleasure and not just some neutral state between pleasure and pain.

Listen and share your thoughts.