Unfortunately this author saddles Epicurus with preaching the absence of pain, and his overall conclusion is that one needs a Platonic or religious world view for true happiness
I figured as much. At least it shows what we continue to be up against. (Insert sad trombone here)
Thanks for that work! Sounds in most cases like the meaning is essentially "Think about the consequences..." Or "imagine for a moment the consequences..." Of s particular course of action?
That's part of it, but I'm getting the impression that it's not just "think about.." and is more "imagine.." Really "see" it, *not* in a "mystical, visualization" way but see it vividly. In other parts of On Anger, (and I think Tsouna writes about this) Philodemus vividly describes the bulging eyes etc. of someone consumed with rage. He makes it, literally, not a pretty sight.
If you're bringing up words, David Sedley's examination of language and definitions in Epicurus's On Nature, Book 28, may be interesting:
Just found this paper at Academia.edu: Was Epicurus a Buddhist?
Haven't read it but the title was intriguing enough to post here. Don't know anything about the author's credentials.
I realized I could get online access to Philodemus's On Anger (Philodemus, On anger / by David Armstrong and Michael McOsker. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2020) through one of the university libraries. What I've done is copy Columns 1-5 and then highlight where the phrase in question shows up. I apologize for the disjointed text. There are lengthy passages of each papyrus leaf that are intact for the most part, allowing long texts, but they are broken up at the top of the rolls. So, here is what I have so far. All text is copied. I haven't included any commentary of my own. There are also mentions of the therapeutic technique in On Frank Criticism but I don't have an English translation for that one, so I may have to puzzle through the Greek on my own. For now, here are the passages mentioning the "setting before the eyes" explicitly in On Anger, keeping in mind the book goes on for 357 pages with only a small introduction. Most of it is Greek on one page, English translation on the other. There are a lot of details in dealing with the patient/student that I haven't included here which could flesh out the technique but simply do not use that phrase:
From Column 1: From this point on, the papyrus unrolled very cleanly, and there are no major problems with stratigraphy or order, except for the fragments of tops pasted in above the columns (frags. A– H), some of which cannot be securely placed.
Column 1
[ circa seventeen lines missing or untranslatable ]
“…[nor do] I [deny?] this. For it is obvious to all that, just as that is an evil, so is this.” [7] By such arguments, indeed, he (sc. Timasagoras) undertook (to prove) that “blaming (anger) is ridiculous,” but idly, as is his custom. [12] Now, if he were rebuking those who only blame (anger) and do little or nothing else about it, like Bion in his On Anger and Chrysippus in the Therapeutikos Logos of his On Emotions , he would be taking a reasonable position. [20] As it is, in supposing that the general idea, (i.e.,) putting the consequent evils before one’s eyes, is ridiculous and raving, he him[self is rav]ing and ri[diculous].…
Column 2
[ circa sixteen lines missing ]
… natural (angers?) … by feeling com[es about (?)] … of his reasonings. [6] [When]ever he (sc. the philosopher censuring anger) inf[ers] what is hidden from him —what is external is obvious, especially to a person who can reason about emotions —he has not m[isled] us, and it is “obvious to all” (66*) that things [are] as he has said. [15] And that element of their disposition, from which they (angry people) become distraught, through which (they are) afflicted by numberless evils, we know begets new evils all over again, in most cases. [21] … philosophical reasoning … [from belief?] (can change this disposition?),
66*. Philodemus sarcastically paraphrases Timasagoras’s words πᾶϲι … φα | νερόν (see 1.5– 6 above), as he will do yet again in 5.22 and in lines 9– 10 of this column (and see n. 70).
Column 3
[ circa seventeen lines missing or untranslatable ]
… [5] for which reason, [by describ]ing some things that are completely unknown (sc. to the patient), some that have been forgotten, others that are being left unappraised— at least with respect to their seriousness, if in no other regard—[11] and others that he never contemplated as a whole, and by putting all this in his sight, he (sc. the therapist) creates a great fright, so that (the patient), now that he has also been reminded that it is up to him, can escape it with ease. [18] For this is what even ordinary philosophers present to him, but the really good ones also sketch out the behaviors by which we might fall prey to angry passions as little as possible. [25] That is, in fact, why, in saying that it is quite “obvious” to everyone … (sc. that Timasagoras is mistaken?) …
Column 4
[ circa nineteen lines missing or untranslatable ]
… [4] although some?] of the doctors (sc. point out?) the seriousness of the disease, the sufferings that happen because of it, and its other difficulties, and sometimes also its dangers, these things escape the sick men’s notice— some generally, others by (failure of) rational appraisal, [12] which is why they become too careless of their escape (sc. from these dangers), as if moderate (evils) were afflicting them, but these (evils), once put before their eyes,*74 render them attentive to their treatment. [19] In fact, in this case (i.e., philosophical therapy), because they do not consider some of these at all and others not clearly, they do not even want to commit themselves to therapy, but once they have learned … according to (?) …
*74. Putting the consequences of evildoing before one’s eyes for rational appraisal ( τιθέναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων ; cf. 1.21– 23 and 3.13– 14), is key to Epicurean therapy; it also appears at Lib. [On Frank Criticism] frag. 26.4– 5; cf. frag. 78Ν.1– 3 ( ἐπιδεικνύναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων ) and col. 17a.4– 14. Here it is defended as a paramedical virtue of the right kind of diatribe. See further Tsouna 2003.
Column 5
[ circa sixteen lines missing or untranslatable ]
… [7] and others call (on them) to pay attention more carefully to this therapy and not to pass over lightly the seriousness and the evils attached to their diseases and to their fits of anger, since the reasons why it is indispensable for doctors to use blame are no less unknown (to Timasagoras?), or at any rate equally as unknown. [17] So the misfortunes that were going to follow from his anger toward Basilides and Thespis were not “obvious” (sc. to him), even though, as he thought, he had s[e]t limits to his bitterness. [25] He is so blind that, though it is much more profitable … (to pay attention to?) reputable [sages] … easi[ly] …
Ah, maybe not relevant then (the light thing). Thanks for the cites!
I'm reading quickly through your posts, but you might be expecting something more than I'm expecting out of all this research. I think the words "technique" or "practice" may imbue this way of counteracting behaviors in a formal teacher/student interaction with more of a "mystical" flavor than either Philodemus or I intended. That's all I'll say for now. Heading out to work. I find this fascinating and an enjoying digging into the texts. More later.
I haven't read your last post yet but:
What is that section in Lucretius with "bring into the light" or something like it? I can't remember the context to determine if it's relevant here or not.
So are there intact sentences which give context to the usage?
Yes. Both On Anger and On Frank Criticism have much of their papyri intact. Here's a better link to Column 1 of On Anger:
I tracked down "set before the eyes" in both Philodemus's On Frank Criticism and in his On Anger. I found the first two mentions but haven't had a chance to read all the columns yet. But Tsouna is absolutely correct in using that phrase. It is a literal translation of τιθῶμεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων:
On Frank Criticism/Peri parressias Column 26.4-5
τιθῶμεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων
On Anger/Peri orges (De ira (Latin)) Column 1.23
τιθέναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων
τιθῶμεν/τιθέναι < τίθημι "place or put"
(with ἐν ὄμμασι (en ómmasi)) I set before one's eyes
522 BCE – 443 BCE, Pindar, Nemean Ode 8.43:
μαστεύει δὲ καὶ τέρψις ἐν ὄμμασι θέσθαι πιστόν
"yet delight also seeks to set a trustworthy pledge before the eyes"
(Full ode: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…3DN.%3Apoem%3D8 )
LSJ entry for τίθημι: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=ti/qhmi
ὀμμάτων = poetic word for "eye" (very popular! See quotations at Wiktionary entry: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BD%84…1#Ancient_Greek )
LSJ entry: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=o)/mma
I think Pindar's use of the phrase is instructive since the whole context seems to point toward a vivid picture in the mind:
Pindar, Nemean, Nemean 8 For Deinias of Aegina Double Foot Race ?459 B. C.
Excellence grows among skillful and just men up to the liquid air,
as a tree shoots up fed by fresh dew.
The uses of friends are of all kinds;
those in times of toil are the highest,
yet delight also seeks to set a trustworthy pledge before the eyes.
Which brings up the idea that Epicureanism may work best for people with a strong and healthy physical constitution
According to DeWitt (and some ancient sources?), Epicurus himself suffered from ill health and (according to DeWitt) had to to taken back and forth from home to the Garden in a 3-wheeled cart/chair.
Unless there is some allowance for the pleasure of release from pain
I think that's supposed to be the intent of the last two lines of the Tetrapharmakos:
On the one hand, the good [pleasure] is easily obtained;
On the other, the terrible (pain) is easily endured.
But the last line has to be understood to include chronic pain in that, even then, some pleasure can be "easily" found if one looks for it and also remembers past pleasures.
Interestingly, the brain was sometimes dealt with in a rather cavalier fashion in antiquity
Yeah, I still like the stories of the ancient Egyptian embalmers taking such care with the heart, placing it in its own canopic jar... Then sticking a hook up the nose and just yanking out the brain, chunk by chunk 
it is extremely damaging to a normal person's hope for happiness for them to come to believe that they are the slaves of any kind of fate whatsoever and that they can have no effect on their futures no matter what they do.
To the best of my understanding, this is part of Daniel Dennett's position with regards to free will.
I've recently become interested in researching the Epicurean practice of "setting before the eyes" which I learned about via Dr. Voula Tsouna's book, The Ethics of Philodemus. According to her, it was a rhetorical technique employed by teachers within the Epicurean school to correct students behaviors, especially when it came to anger. The teacher would "place before the eyes" of the student what they look like when they are angry or what the consequences would be of their anger. I'm just using that as an example. From her writing it appears to have had wider application.
I'm starting this thread to engage in discussion with forum members on this topic, but I also want to provide a placeholder for posting further documentation, both ancient and modern, for this practice/method/technique.
Up front, I need to emphasize that his does *not* appear to be some form of esoteric meditation practice or visualization like Tibetan Buddhist meditation. That being said, as Dr. Tsouna explains it, it does strike me as some form of vivid, imaginative technique to really drive home the error of engaging in certain behaviors during a session of frank speech directed to the student. Frank speech is also used to correct teachers, but usually that's a peer to peer situation and not students correcting teachers (according to Tsouna's book). This vivid picture is "set before the eyes" of the student so they "see" themselves red-faced, scowling, heart racing in anger and then also the consequences of carrying through on that anger without making rational choices and rejections.
That's my current interpretation.
The phrase "setting before the eyes" is evocative to me, and that's why I'm intrigued enough to delve deeper on this topic.
For now, my sources are the book itself and these several papers that are cited or that I found online:
Tsouna, Voula. "Portare davanti agli occhi: Una tecnica retorica nelle opera morali di Filodemo ('Setting-before-the-eyes')", Cronache Ercolanesi, 33, 2003, pp. 243-247 (cited in the book)
Sean McConnell. "Epicurean education and the rhetoric of concern." Acta Classica, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/16006034/Epicu…oric_of_concern
Tsouna, Voula. Philodemus on Emotions. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement No. 94, GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 100 BC – 200 AD: VOLUME I (2007), pp. 213-241 (29 pages) (Available on JSTOR)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43767829
I hope to delve into these sources and share excerpts and/or thoughts on them on this intriguing topic.
I also wonder what evidence could have led Epicurus to claim that the rational soul is situated in the chest.
Because that's where you "feel" many emotions, the metaphorical and literal "tightening of the chest." It's the same cultural idea we have vestiges of with words like "heart broken."
There was a real debate in the ancient world of whether the mind was centered in the brain or the heart.
FYI:
"Prioreschi (1996) concluded that by the end of the 5th century B.C., the question of whether the heart or the brain was the seat of intelligence remained unresolved in Western medicine. This changed with the works of Hippocrates (ca. 460 BC–ca. 370 BC)"
"We now think that the opposing view – cardiocentrism – is obviously wrong. But thinkers as prominent as Aristotle subscribed to this view. Why? One possible explanation is that these philosophers observed that when the heart stops beating, you die, and so they conjectured that the heart must control the mind. Many prominent ancient Greek physicians held this view, and indeed the debate between cardiocentrism and encephalocentrism continued well into the Renaissance."
Thanks for the link, Kalosyni , to the article on Jefferson's beliefs.
I have any number of problems with Thomas Jefferson and remain ambivalent with regards to him. He's never been one of my favorite Founders (I'm more a Franklin fan). I've also never been entirely comfortable with his image being in the header to this forum, but that is entirely Cassius 's call.
I don't believe Jefferson was entirely an Epicurean, but I'm sure he found facets of the philosophy with which he agreed. He was also enamored with Jesus as a philosopher since he created what came to be known as The Jefferson Bible. He also praises Epictetus in a number of places including:
In morality read Epictetus, Xenophontis memorabilia, Plato’s Socratic dialogues, Cicero’s philosophies.
So, I think Jefferson's "I am an Epicurean" should best be understood as only a part of his philosophical outlook, which appears to me to be quite eclectic if syncretic (to use last week's Word of Week 
). As any "gentleman" of the 18th century, he was widely read in ancient Greek and Latin authors. He peppers excerpts from Horace, Cicero, and others throughout his diaries and letters. Later in his life (1803), he wrote:
I should first take a general view of the moral doctrines of the most remarkeable of the antient philosophers, of whose ethics we have sufficient information to make an estimate: say of Pythagoras, Epicurus, Epictetus, Socrates, Cicero, Seneca, Antoninus. I should do justice to the branches of morality they have treated well but point out the importance of those in which they are deficient. (emphasis added)
Granted, his letter to Short was in 1819, so *maybe* his affinity toward Epicurus grew since 1803. BUT, as Kalosyni 's link shows, he was saying things like this in 1823:
"[T]he truth is that the greatest enemies to the doctrines of Jesus are those calling themselves the expositors of them, who have perverted them for the structure of a system of fancy absolutely incomprehensible, and without any foundation in his genuine words."
He as still defending Jesus against his "greatest enemies" and was not fully committed in any way to an Epicurean path.
For reference, here is a link to the National Archives collection of Jefferson's papers where the term epicur* occurs (i.e., Epicure, Epicurean, Epicurus, etc.):
and simply epicurean
https://founders.archives.gov/index.xqy?q=Pr…=1511211111&r=1 (includes Short letter)
and here are Short's letters to Jefferson:
But the main take away here is that Buddhism has as it's goal the removal of suffering.
Well summarized! And, interestingly enough, there are some/many who would unfortunately describe Epicurean philosophy the same way: the removal of pain is the goal.
I think your next statement, Kalosyni , is exactly on point:
Epicureanism has as it's goal the experience of pleasure
I wanted to say too that my understanding is that Buddha didn't seem to question the underlying cultural concept of rebirth. He taught that his path led to the cessation of rebirth. I suppose that could be understood as being reborn every moment. I found your saying this very interesting:
Basically this: that conciousness depends on the body
That sounds nearly identical to what Epicurus would say in the Principal Doctrines. 
So it sounds like what you're saying is that Buddha used the terminology of "rebirth" but recontextualized it to mean moment by moment "rebirth" of my consciousness in this life? Color me intrigued
I also found the raft reference intriguing in light of Epicurus's use of harbors and little boats as metaphors.
Excellent posts, Kalosyni . Thanks!
I think many western people see that the Buddha is a non-theistic path and especially if they are running from western Judeo-Christian traditions, they see the Buddha as an eastern sage offering an alternative path. But the reality is though that a monotheistic “God” is not material to Buddhism, there are plenty of unsubstantiated metaphysical premises that the philosophy is built upon
Yes! Looking back, I believe that was my mindset when I discovered Buddhism. I also found the concept of "rebirth" more palatable than the Christian "you're being tested in this life for the real prize in the afterlife." My go-to thought was "Rebirth just makes more sense" with the seasonal cycles of nature, for example. When compared to the Christian "One strike and you're out", the idea of rebirth was an intriguing alternative. But then I tried to wrap my brain around the convoluted explanations of: there is no atman/soul in Buddhism so nothing "transmigrates" from one life to the next; it's like stamping a ring in clay with the ring being one life and the clay being next and the stamp being the karmic imprints from one to the next and.... etc. Humans are clever little primates and can really come up with some wild ideas!
As Diogoenes of Oinoanda stated it, we accept that the flux exists, but not that it is so fast that we can't come to grips with it!
I find this an interesting parallel to the concept of the Buddhist Two Truths, "conventional" truth and "ultimate" truth.
The Buddhist version goes "Provisional or conventional truth describes our daily experience of a concrete world, and Ultimate truth describes the ultimate reality as sunyata, empty of concrete and inherent characteristics."
From my perspective, the Epicurean version goes something like "Provisional or conventional truth describes our daily experience of a concrete world, and Ultimate truth describes the ultimate reality as consisting of only atoms and void." There are only *really* atoms and void but that doesn't negate or make it any less important that we are alive, we make decisions, our decisions have consequences, and we can live a pleasurable life. But, in the *ultimate* analysis, we are simply momentary aggregates of atoms moving in the void.
This is a fascinating thread. Thanks for initiating a "fresh" one, Cassius !
I'll admit I'm a little intimidated by the depth of knowledge displayed by Eikadistes. His grasp of early Indian philosophies is far deeper than I even realized was available! Thanks for sharing that! I find it fascinating that there was such a wide divergent spectrum of beliefs and philosophies.
I also appreciate Kalosyni 's post. One of the things that had attracted me to Buddhism in the first place was its lists and outlines and the sense that all that gave of "We have this all figured out. Here's the charts and diagrams and outlines to prove it!" Maybe that's what attracted me initially to Epicurus, too? The Principal Doctrines, the Three Legs of the Canon, the 3-part Physics/Canon/Ethics have that flavor of "Here's the basics" when first encountered. Yes, I realize there's SO much more to wrap one's head around but being able to say "Here's an outline" is somehow gratifying and inviting and sparks curiosity to dig deeper.
Kalosyni gave the Four Noble Truths in her post. From another source, these are:
(1) dukkha exists (i.e., There is dukkha)
(2) dukkha arises from causes
(3) we can end dukkha
(4) by following the Buddha’s path to awakening (The 8-fold Path).
(See https://tricycle.org/magazine/dukkha-meaning/ )
My penchant for going back to the original texts was strong even back when exploring Buddhism, so I found many translations of dukkha somewhat misleading and pale reflections of the connotations of the original. That Tricycle article I linked to had an interesting point:
This central term [dukkha] is best understood alongside the related word sukha. The prefix su- generally means “good, easy, and conducive to well-being,” and the prefix du- correspondingly means “bad, difficult, and inclining toward illness or harm.” On the most basic level, then, sukha means pleasant while dukkha means unpleasant. The noble truth of suffering, however, does not simply refer to bodily pain; its meaning is far more subtle and rich.
One can also feel mental pleasure and pain. Here, the twin prefixes are employed again. A “good mind” (su-manas) is contrasted with a “bad mind” (du-manas) to yield the Pali words most often used to describe happiness (somanassa) and sorrow (domanassa), also known as mental pleasure and mental pain.
The traditional way of translating the First Noble Truth is: Life is suffering. But that's not exactly the meaning of that "Truth" (yes, I'm going to start putting it in quotes). Kalosyni 's link does a great job of displaying the original texts (Thanks!) and it seems to me that even Epicurus would agree that the things that Sariputta lists can be described as "terrible things" (as the 4th line of the Tetrapharmakos calls "pain").
I also find it interesting in the Tricycle article's discussion of the prefixes su- "good" and du- "bad" which, it seems to me have parallels in Epicurus's focus on pleasure and pain. So, it also seems to me that, ultimately, Buddhism and Epicureanism are both concerned with "pain" and "pleasure" and maximizing "pleasure" in one's life...
***BUT! *** (before anyone's head explodes! 
)
It seems to me they both started from different locations on *how* pain exists and what "pleasure/good things" means. From the start, Epicurus posited 2 feelings - pleasure and pain - which Epicureans use as the "yardstick" by which to measure which actions would be most advantageous to move us to a more pleasurable life.
Buddha, on the other hand, said that our very existence - the very components of our physical and mental makeup, "the five clinging-aggregates" - are themselves dukkha/pain/unsatisfactory. The only release from this dukkha is found in dousing the fires of our desires, our clinging, that which connects us round after round on the wheel of rebirth. I think Buddha said that nirvana/moksha could be experienced while alive (or was this expanded on in later sutras and traditions like the bodhisattva foregoing his/her own "release" until all sentient beings are freed) but the ultimate "prize" is NOT being reborn, not having to go through all the dukkha all over again and again and again.
Epicurus had something to say about that attitude:
So, everything we experience, we experience in this life. There is no rebirth. There is no karma determining our future existence although understood more broadly, we DO experience the consequences of our actions and decisions - which is one understanding of "karma" - and that does determine our life in the future in this life. Which, to me, is a reason for defining terms. I could see a Buddhist saying that Buddhism is designed to allow a person to lead "the most pleasurable life" or better "the most blissful life." But right there, how do you define "pleasure" or "bliss" and even "life."
There is a modern strain of Western Buddhism - secular Buddhism (that even has its own podcast!) but to me (and one of the things that finally led me away from Buddhism as a path) that attempts - from my perspective - to do something similar to some modern Stoics and try to separate a "modern version" of the philosophy from its underpinnings and its historical context. Which is why I think Cassius 's focus, for example, on the underlying Epicurean physics on this forum is important. We have to look at the totality of the philosophy and where it grew from if we're to understand the rest of it. A cafeteria-style Buddhism or Stoicism is just a watered down version of the original. And if you want watered-down philosophy, I suppose that's one way to go.
2 - While it looks more appropriate to use "dialectic" rather than "logic," that really doesn't answer the question because as cited above the term is generally now being referred to as "dialectical logic" to reference a particular form or type of logic
That's one of my arguments for always going back (a) to the original text (What word is used before translation?) and (b) What is the context and connotations of the word during the time period of the writing? While Diogenes Laertius is writing hundreds of years after Epicurus, it was Metrodorus and Epicurus who were writing "against the dialecticians." It seems to be that during their time, dialectic seems to refer to what we call the "Socratic method." I get the impression Epicurus did not agree with this round and round "What do you mean by _____?" He strikes me as "say what you mean." Even Torquatus prefers the lecture/presentation approach over continual back and forth dialogue/dialectic with Cicero.
See also
Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ; related to dialogue; German: Dialektik), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned argumentation. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may thus be contrasted with both the eristic, which refers to argument that aims to successfully dispute another's argument (rather than searching for truth), and the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other.
If using this as a jumping of point, it seems that Epicurus may be more of didactic than dialectic.
