Posts by Don

Quote from Godfrey

logic games won't be of much use.

I'm legitimately sorry for being dense, but I'm just not seeing the "logic game" in all this. Steering toward pleasurable experiences should undergird all our choices and rejections. That's Epicurus's answer, as I see it, to the question of "what is that to which everything else points?". We should aim at that goal/telos. That's the definition of the "Greatest Good" - simply that thing that you base your "conduct of life" on. I don't see it as a logic problem or some kind of gotcha question. It seems eminently practical to me, and I think Epicurus's answer makes the most sense of any other possible answer.

Quote from Cassius

But we still arrive at the same point once we identify "Pleasure is the Greatest Good:" because the daily question that has to be answered moment by moment is "What next?"

You use that to wisely inform every choice and rejection in the conduct of your life. Pleasure is your North Star, the lighthouse by which to steer your little boat.

Quote from Cassius

I read Epicurus as saying that the exercise really accomplishes very little other than answering the philosophic question that the others insist on asking. Once you have identified "pleasure" as the answer to the logic game, you're still at the very beginning of your analysis of how to act in a particular situation.

That's exactly the opposite conclusion I'm reaching. I think Epicurus felt the answer one gives to that question "What is the Chief Good?" accomplishes everything. If you're aiming at something other than pleasure, your "conduct of life" is going to be off kilter. To me, it's not a "logic game," it's as practical as it gets for Epicurus in this "problem" that "all philosophers" are expected to answer. Aristotle's and "Torquatus's" definition of the Chief Good is simply "that to which all else points." Basically, why do we do what we as humans do. The telos for Epicurus is related to the chief good, but Aristotle took the idea of the telos to its absurd conclusion: e.g., the telos of the eye is to see. If I remember, Lucretius puts that idea to rest. However, the supreme good/ultimate end has concrete practical application:

Quote from Aristotle

"If therefore among the ends (τελος/telos) at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. [2] Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life?"

One of my reasons for maintaining Epicurus would say there is a supreme good is his distaste for infinite division or regression. Part of Aristotle's definition here is: if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. It seems to me Epicurus would say, "Okay, so you ask what is it that is the ultimate end of our actions what our conduct of life should steer by? It is pleasure. We choose everything because of pleasure, sometimes pleasure in the moment, sometimes pleasure in the future, but always pleasure. Not virtue. Not wisdom. Not the καλός. I spit on all those unless they bring pleasure." *That* "fact" - that pleasure is the one thing to which all else aims - then underpins all of Epicurus's "conduct of life."

PS: Of course, there are many things which produce pleasure, just as there are many virtuous actions, just as there are many ways to become wise, just as there are many beautiful things (one meaning of καλός. That doesn't negate the fact that we should steer toward pleasure as the chief aim.

I want to read the papers posted by both Kalosyni and Cassius but haven't had a chance yet. I also don't have direct responses to Cassius 's questions in post #43 yet, but I'd like to address the summum bonum issue directly in De Finibus.

Above in post #19, I said summum bonum was the Latin translation of Greek τελος [telos]. I'm going to amend that to saying summum bonum was the Latin literal translation of Greek ταγαθον [tagathon]. Artistotle defines ταγαθον as that "at which all things aim." From Nichomachean Ethics, Book 1:

"Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim." (Note: The translator's capitalization, not mine)

Aristotle goes on to explain what he means by ταγαθον throughout Book 1:

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%20page%3D1094a Here is an illustrative excerpts:

"If therefore among the ends (τελος/telos) at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. [2] Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life?"

That "futile and vain" is significant, because the Greek words there are kenos and mataios (κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν). We are *very* familiar with Epicurus using kenon to describe actions or desires as "empty." Epicurus also uses mataios throughout his extant writings:

VS62. If parents have cause to be angry with their children, of course it is *foolish* (μάταιον) to resist, and thus not try to beg for forgiveness. But if they do not have cause and are angry without reason, it is ridiculous to make an appeal to one who is irrationally opposed to hearing such an appeal, and thus not try to convince him by other means in a spirit of good will.

VS65. It is foolish (μάταιόν) to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves.

Fragment 445. [We must not blame the body for the greatest evils] nor attribute our troubles to mere circumstance. Instead we seek their cause within the soul: for by giving up every foolish (ματαίαν) and fleeting desire we give birth to a confidence perfect in itself.

Menoikeus 125b. "So, the one who says death is to be feared is foolish (μάταιος)/at fault…"

Menoikeus 127c. “If, on the other hand (he says so) joking, (he speaks) foolishly (μάταιος) [about] things that [do not] allow (for jokes)”

This use of kenon and mataion in both Aristotle and Epicurus leads me to consider that he might just agree with Aristotle in that our actions would be "foolish and vain" if they are not directed to one chief aim/telos/tagathon.

Cicero's Torquatus is one of the latter-day Epicureans that believes "elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discusion" are needed to disprove "why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil", as some philosophers maintained. "Torquatus" states that "The fact is, I think that you [Cicero] are like our friend Triarius, and dislike Epicurus because he has neglected the graces of style that you find in your Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. For I can scarcely bring myself to believe that you think his opinions untrue."

So, "Torquatus" is trying to beat Cicero's "Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus" by meeting on their philosophical playing field. He's going to show why Epicurus's pleasure meets the criteria for Aristotle's ταγαθον or, to give it its Latin translation, summum bonum. "Torquatus" is going to show why pleasure is the "Chief Good" and "That at which all things aim."

Below are the occurrences of "summum bonum" (or a form of the phrase) in Book 1 of De Finibus. These are the instances spoken by "Torquatus" in his exposition of Epicurus's philosophy.

Section 29 - Torquatus: "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the end to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the **Chief Good**, pain the *Chief Evil*."

Section 30 - Torquatus: "...every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the **Chief Good**, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil,"

Section 42 - Torquatus: "Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the **Chief Good** is to live agreeably.

"Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name..."

Section 55 - Torquatus: "(1) The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain." [NOTE: A variation on summum bonum: finibus bonorum et malorum]

Section 57 - Torquatus: Notice then how the theory embraces every possible enhancement of life, every aid to the attainment of that **Chief Good** which is our object.

quod propositum est, **summum bonum** consequamur?

Section 70 - Torquatus: "All these considerations go to prove not only that the theory of friendship is not embarrassed by the identification of the **Chief Good** with pleasure, but also that without this no foundation for friendship whatsoever can be found."

I want to specifically look at Section 29's quote. Torquatus says specifically that "all philosophers are agreed [the final and ultimate Good] must be of such a nature as to be the end to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else." This is almost a word-for-word translation of Aristotle's definition of ταγαθον in Nicomachean Ethics. Torquatus's "all philosophers" shows that he's addressing a widespread philosophical idea and attempting to provide an Epicurean answer to "What is the 'final and ultimate Good' [extremum et ultimum bonorum]?"

Also, in section 42, Torquatus specifically uses the Greek telos and defines the Greek word as "the highest, ultimate or final Good [summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum — quod Graeci τέλος nominant] which isn't a bad attempt at a definition, see the LSJ: "full realization, highest point, ideal; the final cause; the chief good" https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…ntry%3Dte%2Flos

So, referring to pleasure as the Chief Good (yes, I'm capitalizing because the translator did) is addressing a specific philosophical question that "all philosophers" appeared to have asked before, during, and after Epicurus's time. Epicurus's school needed an answer to this, maybe especially for a segment of the school that felt "elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discusion" were necessary at the period of time Cicero and Philodemus and possibly Zeno of Sidon were writing - and maybe even Epicurus himself in answer to a widespread Greek question articulated even before Epicurus's time by Aristotle. As of my writing this, I don't have a problem with seeing Epicurus maintaining that pleasure is the Chief Good at which all other things point.

Quote from Godfrey

Quote from Don

It seems to me that the "actual linguistic meaning" of"good", at its most basic, is simply "that which provides pleasure." "Evil" is"that which causes pain."

I'm pretty sure we can all agree on this.

Okay, good! Now, we're getting somewhere. So, as a generic adjective or noun in common speech, we all(?) can agree on this this meaning of good and evil.

Oh, and I have to applaud the use of "goodies" in #39! That was good

Quote from Godfrey

To me it becomes questionable when it's stated as "the Good", and that seems to be just a philosophical argument which leads down a rabbit hole and is of limited or no practical use. All of the examples in post #37 are "lower case" goods and make sense both practically and philosophically as far as I can tell.

One of the issues then is talking about pleasure as the capital G Good and not just a lower-case g good. The caveat for that is that I don't think there was any way to capitalize Greek in the time period in which were talking, or Latin in the sense we're capitalizing words for "philosophical" purposes. So, maybe I should quit that. Capitalizing is just a convenient modern shorthand for emphasis. So, no more Good, just good. That still leaves the point of contention of characterizing pleasure as the "greatest good."

I am glad Godfrey cited "practical wisdom is the greatest good." Do we have problems with that statement? We could also translate it as "practical wisdom is the greatest good thing." You certainly can't have two greatest things. 132e. Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.

"and so the foundation (ἀρχὴ) of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις."

Of course, elsewhere Epicurus says:

ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

"We say pleasure is the foundation (ἀρχὴν) and telos of the blessed life."

So, are there two foundations? Or is practical wisdom just the foundation of our choices and rejections, and pleasure is the foundation of the blessed life?

I'm still limiting is to one work of Epicurus's so as not to be overwhelmed. Within the letter, Epicurus defines pleasure as:

* pleasure is the foundation (ἀρχὴν) and telos of the blessed life.

* pleasure is the telos (the end, the fulfillment, the goal)

* pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good

Greek: "Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον"

σύμφυτον (symphyton) carries the idea of inborn or "born with"

πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν (prōton agathon), on the other hand, comes very close to the idea of "greatest/highest good" in that prōton is the superlative of proteros and means "first, primary, most superior, foremost-est" http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…os1&i=1#lexicon

and

G4412 - prōton - Strong's Greek Lexicon (kjv)

G4412 - πρῶτον prōton, pro'-ton; neuter of as adverb (with or without ); firstly (in time, place, order, or importance):—before, at the beginning, chiefly…

www.blueletterbible.org

Translating this literally as "this(pleasure) is both the primary and inborn good (thing)" pulls out that emphasis on pleasure being set apart - primary, superior - as a good thing. *Or* is he saying pleasure is our *first* good thing as in "we are born having this good thing, ie. pleasure"? The Kai... Kai... "both x and y" may be used here to convey that meaning. Hmmm. Just thought of that possibility.

PS: πρῶτον is the exact word that Epicurus uses to introduce the first topic in the letter about the gods. I see that also as "primarily, first in rank or importance, something foundational." Some translators just use "First,.." as number one, number two, in that context, but Epicurus doesn't use any other numbers as if it's an outline. My feeling is that he's using the sense "this is important so I'm telling you this up front!"

Thoughts?

I don't understand the hesitancy to accept the word "good." In the the letter to Menoikeus alone, Epicurus uses "good" (αγαθός (agathos) or a form of it) 16 times, including:

133. He has diligently considered the end (τέλος) fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things (των αγαθών περας) can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight.

134: he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil.

In fact, the letter ends with the phrase: ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς: (live) "in/among eternal goods."

This quote from On Nature, Book 28, seems applicable: "For I do not doubt that you [, Metrodorus,] could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we, alter names with regard to the objects of perception."

It seems to me that the "actual linguistic meaning" of"good", at its most basic, is simply "that which provides pleasure." "Evil" is"that which causes pain."

Scott : I'd concur with Cassius 's answer to your question to me (How's that for a convoluted response!)

I'd also add that some people's political situation (authoritarian) may preclude them from fully engaging in the pursuit of pleasure as their natural telos. They still have that innate birthright. They may just be unable to fully realize it.

Sounds good, Scott .

That being said, I literally woke up this morning with the following addendum to my "every human" points. One of the characteristics of the wise one is "However, in the end, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality will permit someone to become a sage." (DL X.117) Evidently, not every human being is constitutionally or in a situation that will give them the ability/opportunity to "become wise." So, ideally, every human should be encouraged and able to follow the path that Epicurus laid out since it's based on our nature. However, not everyone is going to be able to. I think that's a problem with the individual's constitution and not inherent in the Garden path itself. Okay, so that's my caveat/addendum to "there is one telos for everyone." There remains one telos for all humans, but not every human will be able or willing to see that or follow it to it's end.

Quote from Scott

Quote from Don

This is exactly why I also contend that, yes, there is one telos, one good, The Good, for everyone.

I'm all with you, Don, until you capitalize "The Good". In my brain, that starts turning it into something kind of "transcendent". An ideal.

The goal? Yes! The "guide"? Yes! The "good"? Yes! The "Good"? ...ouch

LOL! Don't get hung up on the capitalization. There's really no other way in English to graphically emphasize "the cheese stands alone" aspect of pleasure. It's not transcendent woo-woo. It simply means there isn't anything other than pleasure that stands alone. Aristotle or the Stoics be damned with their wisdom and virtue - or - to taunt the bull - Wisdom or Virtue. Name anything else - any other motivation - and ultimately it's going to come down to "you're aiming at pleasure."

Quote from Scott

The "good/greatest good" is just an abstract idea, not a living reality!

I have to disagree. The Good (ταγαθον) is nothing more than "that to which all things aim." It couldn't be more concrete. Why do people do what they do? To seek pleasure. They can lie to themselves and say they're being virtuous or being responsible or being selfless or being [fill in the blank].... but they're all aiming at pleasure. The feelings are two. Either you're feeling pain or you're feeling pleasure. Pleasure *is* The Good, the Goal, the Guide. All other motives are instrumental in seeking pleasure whether people admit it to themselves or not. They can tie themselves into linguistic and psychological pretzels to convince themselves that they aren't aiming at pleasure - because most/all/many cultures have convinced people that pleasure is bad! Epicurus was one of the only - or maybe the only - person to stand up and tell people that they were fooling themselves... and just to embrace the pursuit of pleasure honestly, rationally, and wisely.

I was initially going to respond point by point to the comments posted in this thread. That, however, was going to take more work than I was willing to put in, but ya'll may recognize where I'm responding to specific points made elsewhere. We may end up breaking this out into a separate thread at some point as it seems we've strayed far from discussing Aristotle's golden mean. That being said, since I promised I'd have more to say, here is my further contribution to this thread.

As I understand it, the major points of contention under discussion include:

- What is actually meant by summum bonum vs telos.

- Can we ask the question "Is there really one "greatest good?"?

- Is there one "greatest good" for everyone?

Feel free to respond if anyone sees there are more. Here are my responses to those three for now:

As I've said, my understanding is that "summum bonum" is simply the Romans' attempt at translating the Greek word τελος [telos] into Latin. I see this as a reasonable attempt. The telos is the goal, end-point, fulfillment, the end, the highest point, etc. The summum bonum is the highest, greatest, supreme "good." I reject DeWitt's contention that Epicurus said "'the greatest good' was not pleasure but life itself." Of course we can only experience pleasure while alive by definition - by Epicurus's definition even: there is no sensation in death. That being said, living is simply a prerequisite for the practice of philosophy itself.

But let's leave summum bonum for the side for a moment since Epicurus didn't speak or write in Latin. The wording he used was "we say pleasure is the telos" (Letter to Menoikeus) and referred to pleasure as "the good" in one fragment that was in Epicurus's work "On the Telos":

"I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, and withdraw the pleasures of love, and withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused to sight by beautiful form."

In this fragment, he specifically refers to pleasure as ταγαθον [tagathon] "the good", the same word used in the 3rd line of the Tetrapharmakos: "And the good is easily obtained" again equating "the good" with "pleasure."

This *exact* word - ταγαθον [tagathon] - was also used by Aristotle: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3a1999.01.0053

τἀγαθόν οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται "the Good is That at which all things aim." (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1094a)

Epicurus is not shying away from a fight by using Aristotle's own word to define what The Good - ταγαθον - is. Epicurus is meeting Aristotle on the philosophical field of battle and throwing down the gauntlet of pleasure. "You want to know what The Good is? That at which all things aim? It's pleasure."

It seems to me that Epicurus clearly equates pleasure with "the good" and with the telos - the goal/fulfillment/purpose/end - of a human life. And "the good" ταγαθον is "The Good", the good at which all other good things aim as in other goods are only instrumental to ταγαθον The Good which is pleasure according to Epicurus.

That's why I contend that there is such a thing as a telos or "the good" (ταγαθον). Because Epicurus taught that. There is something that can be called "the good" and it is the telos of a human life. Pleasure is both the goal and the guide *in that* pleasure is the north star by which we guide our own small boat. Pleasure isn't a guide *in* the boat, it's the "guiding light" the beacon to which we steer. If we get off course, we steer back towards the "guide".

This is exactly why I also contend that, yes, there is one telos, one good, The Good, for everyone. We are all humans. Humans - as natural animals - are human before they are Christian or Buddhist or Muslim or Humanist or any other creed or religion. However, the more I think about it, we are also - in many respects and by some definition - Epicureans in that humans, in our natural state, will steer themselves toward pleasure and recede from pain. Just because someone wants to see "God" as their guide, the reason they want to please God is because this brings them pleasure. They could just cut out the middle-man (or middle-deity, as the case may be) and seek pleasure for itself. So, while there are multiple ways to experience pleasure - pleasant forms, pleasant tastes, the joys of sexual passion, pleasant sounds, etc. - it is pleasure writ large which is the telos - The Good - of every human life whether they admit that to themselves or not.

At work today, but I'll have plenty to say later... That sounds way more ominous than it should btw.

You posted another reply as I was typing this, but I think this address posts #33 and #35 above...

As I said previously, saying "pleasure is the 'highest good' (summum bonum)" doesn't mean the "best among equally good things"; it means the highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme good thing - the one good thing that stands alone; the good thing to which all other good things points. It is the sum of all good things; the summit of all good things.

I sincerely don't understand the hesitancy in this thread. Or the problem that is trying to be solved when it comes to calling pleasure either the "highest good" or the telos or even the guide. I would say pleasure is called the guide because it's the beacon at the summit to which we are trying to get at. It's the North Star by which we steer all our choices and avoidances. It's the goal and the guide.

All the schools of philosophy in ancient Greece were arguing what was the purpose of a human life, what was it all leading up to, what was it for. I don't think Epicurus was any different in that respect. His revolution was in naming pleasure as that to which life pointed. But not Cyrenaic "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" momentary pleasures strung together - not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals - but something deeper and more long-lasting including being able to describe it as the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind. I think that was his revolution: to define pleasure wide enough for everyone to partake of it as the telos/guide/greatest good/The Good/T'agathon/etc.

I know I don't have to quote chapter and verse to many here, but, for the record, here are some pertinent excerpts (at least from my perspective):

PD25 Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴ τε φυγὴν εἴ τε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλό τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of nature, [pleasure] but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

Letter to Menoikeus: "The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, (i.e., the health of both our physical and our mental existence), since this is the goal (τέλος)of a blessed life.

Letter to Menoikeus: "we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος) of the blessed life."

Letter to Menoikeus: "one who has rationally determined (ἐπιλελογισμένου) the τέλος of one's natural state." [which is pleasure]

Quote from Cassius

The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone.

I have to disagree with that characterization. There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

Here are my thoughts on Norman DeWitt’s “Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy” (1950).

Overall, I’m unimpressed with DeWitt’s aim of using a linguistic quirk between Greek and Latin to make a larger philosophical point. Numerous languages get by with no definite article and can convey as complex and nuanced as any language with a definite article: “Linguists believe the common ancestor of the Indo-European languages, Proto-Indo-European, did not have articles. Most of the languages in this family do not have definite or indefinite articles: there is no article in Latin or Sanskrit, nor in some modern Indo-European languages, such as the families of Slavic languages (except for Bulgarian and Macedonian, which are rather distinctive among the Slavic languages in their grammar, and some Northern Russian dialects[7]), Baltic languages and many Indo-Aryan languages. Although Classical Greek had a definite article (which has survived into Modern Greek and which bears strong functional resemblance to the German definite article, which it is related to), the earlier Homeric Greek used this article largely as a pronoun or demonstrative, whereas the earliest known form of Greek known as Mycenaean Greek did not have any articles. Articles developed independently in several language families.” (Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_(…istic_variation )

From all I can see, Latin simply translated Greek τελος into Latin summum bonum as the closest alternative. To compare the two definitions:

Greek: telos: excerpt: “3. Philos., full realization, highest point. ideal” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=te/los

Latin: summum bonum (summus): excerpt: “H.—Of rank or degree, highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…60:entry=summus

I’m curious about his second paragraph where he says that “Epicurus is on record as assuming that "only Greeks are capable of succeeding in philosophy,"” He cites Usener 226 which comes from Clement of Alexandria’s Miscellanies, I.15. Here’s the full context of that source:

And Plato does not deny that he procured all that is most excellent in philosophy from the barbarians; and he admits that he came into Egypt. Whence, writing in the Phædo that the philosopher can receive aid from all sides, he said: "Great indeed is Greece, O Cebes, in which everywhere there are good men, and many are the races of the barbarians."[128] Thus Plato thinks that some of the barbarians, too, are philosophers. But Epicurus, on the other hand, supposes that only Greeks can philosophise. (1.15.67.1 οὕτως οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ βαρβάρων φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑπολαμ1.15.67.2 βάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.) https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nice…llanies:_Book_1

I wonder if this is also connected to the characteristics of the wise one in Diogenes Laertius (DL) X.117 when he talks about other nations: https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…lity?authuser=0 DL does not mention Greek or Greeks specifically in that text.

Whether Cicero’s statement that “the Latin language is not only not lacking in copiousness but is actually richer than Greek" is more absurd than DeWitt’s contention that the lack of an article makes Latin somehow deficient is problematic from a scholar like DeWitt. As I said, I don’t find his basic thesis here convincing or compelling.

DeWitt states that "In Greek the practice is to say "the greatest good" and not "the highest good," and to Epicurus "the greatest good" was not pleasure but life itself. In other words, to him the summum bonum was not the telos." This seems to me to be splitting the tiniest of hairs: greatest vs highest. Look at the Greek and Latin definitions above. Both words seem to show up in the definitions of each.

DeWitt also claims that "Epicurus, holding body and soul to be alike corporeal, placed the two on a parity, and one of his definitions of happiness is "a healthy mind in a healthy body."" I had problems with this in his book, Epicurus and His Philosophy, but I can accept that Epicurus held a similar view. But here in this paper, when DeWitt is putting so much stock in the differences between Latin and Greek, he made me laugh out loud when I read the Footnote 8 (emphasis added):

Footnote says 8 ***Not citable in Greek,*** but demonstrable: cf. Horace Carm.i. 31. 17-19; Juvenal x. 356 mens sana in corpore sano (Epicurean context); Petron. 61 bonam mentem bonamque valetudinem.

And he goes on to cite Latin references for Epicurus’s supposedly Greek idea. That just seems sloppy to me.

DeWitt tries to use DL X.126 to substantiate Epicurus's "reason for placing a higher value upon old age as against youth." I don't see that in 126. Instead, 126 seems to express Epicurus's insistence that one is never too old or too young to practice philosophy.

[126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.

For those unfamiliar with Maecenas (as I was!), here’s his WP entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaius_Maecenas?wprov=sfla1

DeWitt then discusses Vatican Saying 42 which is interesting on a number of levels. First of all, there is not agreement on what the Vatican Saying even says or, if it is correct in its transcription from some earlier texts. Here is the actual line from the early 14th century manuscript containing the Vatican Sayings: Vat.gr.1950.pt.2 https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0257

As written it appears to read: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως

However, some editors/scholars add to the end: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>. (e.g., Saint-Andre: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html , http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_42/ , and others)

Bailey suggests the reading should be ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ απολαύσεως

DeWitt's translation is "The same span of time embraces both beginning and end of the greatest good." I have problems with his use of the word “embraces”. I do not see that within the Greek. The Greek, as it stands, without the added on “evil” is literally something like:

“At the same time, there is both the creation (γενέσεως) of the greatest good and the release/departure (ἀπολύσεως)" That last word is why some scholars advocate for adding on "of the greatest evil" so we would get "release/departure of the greatest evil." But evil isn't in the manuscript.

Bailey's translation is "The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment." I have problems with Bailey’s use of “blessing.”

Bailey cites απολαύσεως "having enjoyment of a thing" instead of ἀπολύσεως "release, deliverance from a thing" which the latter is suggested by Usener and evidently accepted by DeWitt since he cites Bailey in his paper. Neither Bailey nor DeWitt make use of the added <τοῦ κακοῦ> “the [greatest] evil” so it’s obviously not needed to make a decent translation. DeWitt’s putting so much stock into this saying to bolster his argument is problematic in that there is so much debate and discrepancy among scholars on VS42. It should be clearly stated that many of the Vatican Sayings, including this one, are without context.

ἀπολύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…Da%29po%2Flusis

απολαύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…a%29po%2Flausis

I can see rationalizations for either translation, DeWitt’s or Bailey’s.

So, in the end, I can’t see any reason for DeWitt to maintain that Epicurus had any “highest good” or telos other than pleasure.

I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?), but here's my take. I've ranted in similar themes before.

To my understanding, summum bonum is the Romans' way of translations Greek τέλος into Latin. They're both trying to get at the same thing. Pleasure is the "highest good", the goal, etc. because it is that to which everything else points. It's at the end of the road (τέλος/goal) to which all roads lead. It's the "highest good" because it's at the top of the mountain, Pleasure Point, and the Virtue Trail, the Wisdom Trail, the Name Your Path Trail, all end up trying to get you to pleasure. You are virtuous because it, in the final analysis, brings you pleasure whatever you'll admit it or not. Summum bonum doesn't seem to me to be a value judgment (as in "Pleasure is the best among equals"), it's a difference in kind from other things judged "good." It's the good thing to which all other "good things" point. All other "good things" are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure itself is not instrumental (other than being a necessary component of well-being/ευδαιμονία/happiness).

Quote from Cassius

Oh I am not sure that this will survive the editing phase but I should also mentioned that at first I thought Joshua was saying something not entirely positive about a technique of Don's, but after I got myself oriented it was entirely positive, so I don't want Don to have a heart attack when he hears the reference

Well, I'll look forward to hearing that Now, you have to leave it in!

Quote from Cassius

I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions.

From my perspective, the big difference between "pleasure" and, say, "virtue" as the goal is that pleasure is first and primarily a biological reality, then the concept is built in that. Virtue as a concept is built in a foundation of sand at the seashore. There's nothing there. It's a concept on a concept. Pleasure and pain, in contrast, in some form are present in all forms of life down to amoebas and tardigrades. Even plants exhibit some aspect of this. Humans move from this biological imperative of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain for survival to extrapolate mental pleasure and pain, to build concepts on top of this imperative, but there is always that sound foundation upon which those concepts point back to.

Quote from Cassius

But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it

I would be careful about using phrases like "it too is a concept" in this context. It's maybe better to think of words as labels. All languages label reality in different ways, sometimes dividing it up finer or coarser. I'll have to go back again and read Book XXVIII.

Quote from Cassius

It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us

Yep. That's the job of the Cyrenaics.

Quote from Cassius

Especially since in the end the Platonists don't replace the doubt with answers, but with apocryphal methods of syllogistic logic to which they lay claim to be the experts and which is beyond the understanding of all except their initiates.

Initiating questioning is usually good, but I do not sense that the Platonists and Pyrrhonistz et al were acting in good faith

I find this interesting. Plato's initial philosophy goes directly back to Socrates. I have major problems with Sōkratēs (let's give him his true name). The gadfly was a terrible husband, neglectful (at best!) father, and general pain in the ... neck. His questioning has been presented as a way of "getting at the truth" but was it really that? He seems to argue for argument's sake, twisting people in knots... And leaving them there. He took no position, and turned those around who did! It certainly sounds like he had some charisma. He was clever. But it seems like the whole "all Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato/Socrates" is very sad and the ultimate missed opportunity

As for Pyrrho, here's his bio from Diogenes Laertius:

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK IX, Chapter 11. PYRRHO (c. 360-270 b.c.)

In fact, check out verse 70 (emphasis added):

Quote

Besides these, Pyrrho's pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their principles, if we may call them such-- [70] Zetetics or seekers because they were ever seeking truth, Sceptics or inquirers because they were always looking for a solution and never finding one, Ephectics or doubters because of the state of mind which followed their inquiry, I mean, suspense of judgement, and finally Aporetics or those in perplexity, for not only they but even the dogmatic philosophers themselves in their turn were often perplexed.

I'm becoming more convinced of the significance of the juxtaposition of δογματιεῖν (dogmatiein) and ἀπορήσειν (aporēsein) after looking at those references. If Diogenes Laertius was copying from some Epicurean text for those characteristics, it seems there was a definite contrast being made between those who δογματιεῖν and those who ἀπορήσειν.