Posts by Don

"We're all made of quantum fields..."

I've said it elsewhere on the forum and I'll restate it here slightly differently (and maybe more emphatically). This is rapidly becoming my position:

Epicurus's τἀγαθὸν (tagathon) = "The Good" , i.e., the greatest/highest/ultimate good thing = Pleasure = "that at which everything else aims"

The good things are not ranked. Pleasure is The Good; all other good things are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure stands alone. Virtue, wisdom, etc. are subservient to pleasure. Pleasure is the "foundational" good thing (the αρχή) ; it is our inborn, natural good thing; it is the goal at which we aim (our τέλος). Epicurus says φρονησις phronesis/practical wisdom is the "greatest good" (but didn't call it τἀγαθὸν) which I'm taking as the greatest instrumental good to achieve pleasure and a pleasurable life. Everything we do is - or should be - for the sake of pleasure, that is, for leading a pleasurable life.

I'm in the process of "Google translating" Philodemus's [On Choices and Rejections] in Les Epicuriens and was excited to find an explanation and endorsement of the Tetrapharmakos! It was unexpected. And, to note, this is not the papyrus from which the 4-fold formula is usually cited. That is PHerc 1005. This is PHerc 1251. I'm working on making the translation more flowing and will share as I'm able. Since this has the Tetrapharmakos, it too has the word ταγαθον.

Quote from Cassius

go back to Epicurus' own letters, Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus, in that order.

Sounds interesting. And definitely in that order! Maybe I'll rejoin in 2024 when you get to Menoikeus

Quote from Cassius

I agree with most of what is written above, but one additional point I would include is that the Latin authorities were much closer to the Greek language and to the Epicurean texts than we will ever be (as to both).

I can respect where you're coming from, but it's still a secondary filter with their own cultural assumptions coloring the interpretation.

Quote from Cassius

So when we know that someone like Lucretius is trying to be faithful, I think their interpretations are entitled to great deference, even to the extent of considering them to have much more expertise than our own efforts to grasp the Greek.

One issue with Lucretius is that we know virtually nothing about the person. Where did study? Did he just have access to Epicurus's On Nature and some letters and teach himself (granted, as we do!) or did he learn his Epicurean philosophy from an authoritative teacher of the school itself? I've seen some papers that argue he was unaware of some contemporary Epicurean thought.

As far as deference, my preference would be - wherever possible - to compare two Greek sources to see how they're using terms and concepts either in comparison or contrast. But again, I respect where you're coming from, but the Latin authors - especially Cicero - are still one step removed from the original sources. There's some evidence that Cicero used Philodemus for the Torquatus material. In which case, I'm going back to Philodemus and see where he can illuminate Cicero, not the other way around.

PS... I should say that it's not that I don't think the Latin sources are important! By Zeus, we have so few sources to begin with! But I am saying that, for me, defence will always be given to Greek sources. De Rerum Natura is priceless, *but* I want to squeeze everything I can out of every scrap of Lucretius's *sources* especially Epicurus's On Nature. That's why I'm trying to translate the texts in Les Epicuriens that I haven't been able to find anywhere else. Granted, it's like reading a description of the reflection of the Moon in the pond through sunglasses (fancy designer French sunglasses) but it's all I got

Quote from Nate

(https://philarchive.org/archive/PACTCO-8v1).

That's the exact article I uncovered, too

I find the brief exposition of Democritus's philosophy in that paper to be an interesting precursor to, or to dimly presage, Epicurus's own.

It strikes me that one reason we're getting tied up in knots about this is our trying to reconcile ancient Greek and Latin sources. For me, any Latin source will always - always! - be secondary to an ancient Greek source, even Cicero or even (*gasp*) Lucretius. Lucretius was using Epicurus as a source but had to translate what he found there. Any ancient Greek source can quote verbatim from Epicurean sources without the need for translation into a different language and idiom. The Greek sources are going to be debating using shared cultural memes, maybe vehemently disagreeing but most likely coming from a common background. A Latin source is, for me, always going to be - to use a Zen metaphor - looking at the finger pointing to the Moon and not looking at the Moon directly. Latin is like, to put it a different way, looking at the Moon's reflection in the pond and not looking at the Moon itself. English is even worse, especially if it's a translation of a Latin source! That's like reading a description of the reflection of the Moon in the pond! Getting hung up on summum bonum is, in some respects, pointless. Epicurus didn't use that phrase, Philodemus didn't use that phrase (who knows, he may have used it in conversation with his Roman friends but he certainly didn't need to use it in his texts), Diogenes Laertius didn't need to use that phrase, etc. For me, to understand what Epicurus and the Epicurean school taught, we always need to return to the Greek.

This is why I'm becoming more intrigued with the word τἀγαθὸν which appears in Epicurus and Philodemus as well texts from before Plato, in Aristotle, in Plutarch... And that's just what I found this morning poking around online. I think that's what the Romans were trying to "point at" with their summum bonum, but I'm finding I don't care as much now. I'm becoming curious about the significance of τἀγαθὸν itself within that Greek cultural milieu and why it was so widespread. Epicurus couldn't conceive of τἀγαθὸν "without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms." τἀγαθὸν is not simply ἀγαθὸς "good" with "the" definite article slapped on the front. It is an ancient Greek cultural meme, endlessly debated for hundreds of years from before Plato (428 BCE) through Aristotle through Plutarch (119 CE) and beyond to even 15th-century Christian theologians (see https://epistole.wordpress.com/2009/03/26/the…humanist-ethos/ ). I'll have more to say at some point. For now, that's where my head is at.

Thanks for the positive shout-out regarding my "scatter shot" translation proclivities I really do think it's necessary sometimes to get at the nuances of the original languages.

Quote from Kalosyni

sometimes wisdom is a primary tool for making choices and other times pleasure works best as the primary tool for making choices... and sometimes both wisdom and pleasure at the same time

From my perspective, wisdom (practical wisdom/phronesis) is always subservient to pleasure. We use wisdom to pursue pleasure, to make choices on immediate pleasure or postponing pleasure. Pleasure is always the goal. Wisdom is a means to get there.

Thanks for that, Eikadistes . That's some good food for thought.

Along similar lines, I'm thinking that pleasure is the good that stands alone, it is the guide/telos/ταγαθον. Other "good things" are *instrumental* goods in helping us get to that goal of pleasure, in greater and lesser degrees ( Cassius 's toenail clipping vs sex). I'm still working on these thoughts, but that's where I'm heading.

Quote from Cassius

Is *that* what Epicurus was talking about?

Yes.

Quote from Nate

Where do we fit the following phrase from Ep. Men. into this discussion?

"...TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON ΦPONHΣIΣ..."

Epicurus then compares ΦPONHΣIΣ against the "other virtues", therein linking the concepts of AΓAΘON with APETAI.

Good question. How do you parse his calling "practical wisdom" as the "greatest good" in light of this thread so far?

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Is there a goal other than pleasure that you would suggest?

Not ME! But there are a lots of other philosophers who would beg to differ, and they insist on arguing on "logic" grounds for other goals.

Ah! But Epicurus based his answer on nature (babes and animals), not devious logic. So, my first inclination is to say "Who cares what the other philosophers argue?" I think that's what he meant about needlessly prattling on about the Good. His argument was "look to nature." That'll tell you what the Chief Good is.

Wow That's a lot to work through. For now...

Quote from Cassius

We *don't* think that in regard to the movement of the atoms through the void, so why should at some other point there be a single goal?

Atoms don't have free will. Humans do. Therefore, humans can decide to what goal they wish to direct themselves. Is there a goal other than pleasure that you would suggest?

I want to ask more questions about your post, but I'll leave it at that to get/keep the ball rolling.

Quote from Godfrey

logic games won't be of much use.

I'm legitimately sorry for being dense, but I'm just not seeing the "logic game" in all this. Steering toward pleasurable experiences should undergird all our choices and rejections. That's Epicurus's answer, as I see it, to the question of "what is that to which everything else points?". We should aim at that goal/telos. That's the definition of the "Greatest Good" - simply that thing that you base your "conduct of life" on. I don't see it as a logic problem or some kind of gotcha question. It seems eminently practical to me, and I think Epicurus's answer makes the most sense of any other possible answer.

Quote from Cassius

But we still arrive at the same point once we identify "Pleasure is the Greatest Good:" because the daily question that has to be answered moment by moment is "What next?"

You use that to wisely inform every choice and rejection in the conduct of your life. Pleasure is your North Star, the lighthouse by which to steer your little boat.

Quote from Cassius

I read Epicurus as saying that the exercise really accomplishes very little other than answering the philosophic question that the others insist on asking. Once you have identified "pleasure" as the answer to the logic game, you're still at the very beginning of your analysis of how to act in a particular situation.

That's exactly the opposite conclusion I'm reaching. I think Epicurus felt the answer one gives to that question "What is the Chief Good?" accomplishes everything. If you're aiming at something other than pleasure, your "conduct of life" is going to be off kilter. To me, it's not a "logic game," it's as practical as it gets for Epicurus in this "problem" that "all philosophers" are expected to answer. Aristotle's and "Torquatus's" definition of the Chief Good is simply "that to which all else points." Basically, why do we do what we as humans do. The telos for Epicurus is related to the chief good, but Aristotle took the idea of the telos to its absurd conclusion: e.g., the telos of the eye is to see. If I remember, Lucretius puts that idea to rest. However, the supreme good/ultimate end has concrete practical application:

Quote from Aristotle

"If therefore among the ends (τελος/telos) at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. [2] Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life?"

One of my reasons for maintaining Epicurus would say there is a supreme good is his distaste for infinite division or regression. Part of Aristotle's definition here is: if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. It seems to me Epicurus would say, "Okay, so you ask what is it that is the ultimate end of our actions what our conduct of life should steer by? It is pleasure. We choose everything because of pleasure, sometimes pleasure in the moment, sometimes pleasure in the future, but always pleasure. Not virtue. Not wisdom. Not the καλός. I spit on all those unless they bring pleasure." *That* "fact" - that pleasure is the one thing to which all else aims - then underpins all of Epicurus's "conduct of life."

PS: Of course, there are many things which produce pleasure, just as there are many virtuous actions, just as there are many ways to become wise, just as there are many beautiful things (one meaning of καλός. That doesn't negate the fact that we should steer toward pleasure as the chief aim.

I want to read the papers posted by both Kalosyni and Cassius but haven't had a chance yet. I also don't have direct responses to Cassius 's questions in post #43 yet, but I'd like to address the summum bonum issue directly in De Finibus.

Above in post #19, I said summum bonum was the Latin translation of Greek τελος [telos]. I'm going to amend that to saying summum bonum was the Latin literal translation of Greek ταγαθον [tagathon]. Artistotle defines ταγαθον as that "at which all things aim." From Nichomachean Ethics, Book 1:

"Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim." (Note: The translator's capitalization, not mine)

Aristotle goes on to explain what he means by ταγαθον throughout Book 1:

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%20page%3D1094a Here is an illustrative excerpts:

"If therefore among the ends (τελος/telos) at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. [2] Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life?"

That "futile and vain" is significant, because the Greek words there are kenos and mataios (κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν). We are *very* familiar with Epicurus using kenon to describe actions or desires as "empty." Epicurus also uses mataios throughout his extant writings:

VS62. If parents have cause to be angry with their children, of course it is *foolish* (μάταιον) to resist, and thus not try to beg for forgiveness. But if they do not have cause and are angry without reason, it is ridiculous to make an appeal to one who is irrationally opposed to hearing such an appeal, and thus not try to convince him by other means in a spirit of good will.

VS65. It is foolish (μάταιόν) to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves.

Fragment 445. [We must not blame the body for the greatest evils] nor attribute our troubles to mere circumstance. Instead we seek their cause within the soul: for by giving up every foolish (ματαίαν) and fleeting desire we give birth to a confidence perfect in itself.

Menoikeus 125b. "So, the one who says death is to be feared is foolish (μάταιος)/at fault…"

Menoikeus 127c. “If, on the other hand (he says so) joking, (he speaks) foolishly (μάταιος) [about] things that [do not] allow (for jokes)”

This use of kenon and mataion in both Aristotle and Epicurus leads me to consider that he might just agree with Aristotle in that our actions would be "foolish and vain" if they are not directed to one chief aim/telos/tagathon.

Cicero's Torquatus is one of the latter-day Epicureans that believes "elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discusion" are needed to disprove "why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil", as some philosophers maintained. "Torquatus" states that "The fact is, I think that you [Cicero] are like our friend Triarius, and dislike Epicurus because he has neglected the graces of style that you find in your Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. For I can scarcely bring myself to believe that you think his opinions untrue."

So, "Torquatus" is trying to beat Cicero's "Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus" by meeting on their philosophical playing field. He's going to show why Epicurus's pleasure meets the criteria for Aristotle's ταγαθον or, to give it its Latin translation, summum bonum. "Torquatus" is going to show why pleasure is the "Chief Good" and "That at which all things aim."

Below are the occurrences of "summum bonum" (or a form of the phrase) in Book 1 of De Finibus. These are the instances spoken by "Torquatus" in his exposition of Epicurus's philosophy.

Section 29 - Torquatus: "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the end to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the **Chief Good**, pain the *Chief Evil*."

Section 30 - Torquatus: "...every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the **Chief Good**, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil,"

Section 42 - Torquatus: "Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the **Chief Good** is to live agreeably.

"Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name..."

Section 55 - Torquatus: "(1) The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain." [NOTE: A variation on summum bonum: finibus bonorum et malorum]

Section 57 - Torquatus: Notice then how the theory embraces every possible enhancement of life, every aid to the attainment of that **Chief Good** which is our object.

quod propositum est, **summum bonum** consequamur?

Section 70 - Torquatus: "All these considerations go to prove not only that the theory of friendship is not embarrassed by the identification of the **Chief Good** with pleasure, but also that without this no foundation for friendship whatsoever can be found."

I want to specifically look at Section 29's quote. Torquatus says specifically that "all philosophers are agreed [the final and ultimate Good] must be of such a nature as to be the end to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else." This is almost a word-for-word translation of Aristotle's definition of ταγαθον in Nicomachean Ethics. Torquatus's "all philosophers" shows that he's addressing a widespread philosophical idea and attempting to provide an Epicurean answer to "What is the 'final and ultimate Good' [extremum et ultimum bonorum]?"

Also, in section 42, Torquatus specifically uses the Greek telos and defines the Greek word as "the highest, ultimate or final Good [summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum — quod Graeci τέλος nominant] which isn't a bad attempt at a definition, see the LSJ: "full realization, highest point, ideal; the final cause; the chief good" https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…ntry%3Dte%2Flos

So, referring to pleasure as the Chief Good (yes, I'm capitalizing because the translator did) is addressing a specific philosophical question that "all philosophers" appeared to have asked before, during, and after Epicurus's time. Epicurus's school needed an answer to this, maybe especially for a segment of the school that felt "elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discusion" were necessary at the period of time Cicero and Philodemus and possibly Zeno of Sidon were writing - and maybe even Epicurus himself in answer to a widespread Greek question articulated even before Epicurus's time by Aristotle. As of my writing this, I don't have a problem with seeing Epicurus maintaining that pleasure is the Chief Good at which all other things point.

Quote from Godfrey

Quote from Don

It seems to me that the "actual linguistic meaning" of"good", at its most basic, is simply "that which provides pleasure." "Evil" is"that which causes pain."

I'm pretty sure we can all agree on this.

Okay, good! Now, we're getting somewhere. So, as a generic adjective or noun in common speech, we all(?) can agree on this this meaning of good and evil.

Oh, and I have to applaud the use of "goodies" in #39! That was good

Quote from Godfrey

To me it becomes questionable when it's stated as "the Good", and that seems to be just a philosophical argument which leads down a rabbit hole and is of limited or no practical use. All of the examples in post #37 are "lower case" goods and make sense both practically and philosophically as far as I can tell.

One of the issues then is talking about pleasure as the capital G Good and not just a lower-case g good. The caveat for that is that I don't think there was any way to capitalize Greek in the time period in which were talking, or Latin in the sense we're capitalizing words for "philosophical" purposes. So, maybe I should quit that. Capitalizing is just a convenient modern shorthand for emphasis. So, no more Good, just good. That still leaves the point of contention of characterizing pleasure as the "greatest good."

I am glad Godfrey cited "practical wisdom is the greatest good." Do we have problems with that statement? We could also translate it as "practical wisdom is the greatest good thing." You certainly can't have two greatest things. 132e. Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.

"and so the foundation (ἀρχὴ) of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις."

Of course, elsewhere Epicurus says:

ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

"We say pleasure is the foundation (ἀρχὴν) and telos of the blessed life."

So, are there two foundations? Or is practical wisdom just the foundation of our choices and rejections, and pleasure is the foundation of the blessed life?

I'm still limiting is to one work of Epicurus's so as not to be overwhelmed. Within the letter, Epicurus defines pleasure as:

* pleasure is the foundation (ἀρχὴν) and telos of the blessed life.

* pleasure is the telos (the end, the fulfillment, the goal)

* pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good

Greek: "Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον"

σύμφυτον (symphyton) carries the idea of inborn or "born with"

πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν (prōton agathon), on the other hand, comes very close to the idea of "greatest/highest good" in that prōton is the superlative of proteros and means "first, primary, most superior, foremost-est" http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…os1&i=1#lexicon

and

G4412 - prōton - Strong's Greek Lexicon (kjv)

G4412 - πρῶτον prōton, pro'-ton; neuter of as adverb (with or without ); firstly (in time, place, order, or importance):—before, at the beginning, chiefly…

www.blueletterbible.org

Translating this literally as "this(pleasure) is both the primary and inborn good (thing)" pulls out that emphasis on pleasure being set apart - primary, superior - as a good thing. *Or* is he saying pleasure is our *first* good thing as in "we are born having this good thing, ie. pleasure"? The Kai... Kai... "both x and y" may be used here to convey that meaning. Hmmm. Just thought of that possibility.

PS: πρῶτον is the exact word that Epicurus uses to introduce the first topic in the letter about the gods. I see that also as "primarily, first in rank or importance, something foundational." Some translators just use "First,.." as number one, number two, in that context, but Epicurus doesn't use any other numbers as if it's an outline. My feeling is that he's using the sense "this is important so I'm telling you this up front!"

Thoughts?

I don't understand the hesitancy to accept the word "good." In the the letter to Menoikeus alone, Epicurus uses "good" (αγαθός (agathos) or a form of it) 16 times, including:

133. He has diligently considered the end (τέλος) fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things (των αγαθών περας) can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight.

134: he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil.

In fact, the letter ends with the phrase: ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς: (live) "in/among eternal goods."

This quote from On Nature, Book 28, seems applicable: "For I do not doubt that you [, Metrodorus,] could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we, alter names with regard to the objects of perception."

It seems to me that the "actual linguistic meaning" of"good", at its most basic, is simply "that which provides pleasure." "Evil" is"that which causes pain."