Posts by Don

At work today, but I'll have plenty to say later... That sounds way more ominous than it should btw.

You posted another reply as I was typing this, but I think this address posts #33 and #35 above...

As I said previously, saying "pleasure is the 'highest good' (summum bonum)" doesn't mean the "best among equally good things"; it means the highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme good thing - the one good thing that stands alone; the good thing to which all other good things points. It is the sum of all good things; the summit of all good things.

I sincerely don't understand the hesitancy in this thread. Or the problem that is trying to be solved when it comes to calling pleasure either the "highest good" or the telos or even the guide. I would say pleasure is called the guide because it's the beacon at the summit to which we are trying to get at. It's the North Star by which we steer all our choices and avoidances. It's the goal and the guide.

All the schools of philosophy in ancient Greece were arguing what was the purpose of a human life, what was it all leading up to, what was it for. I don't think Epicurus was any different in that respect. His revolution was in naming pleasure as that to which life pointed. But not Cyrenaic "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" momentary pleasures strung together - not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals - but something deeper and more long-lasting including being able to describe it as the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind. I think that was his revolution: to define pleasure wide enough for everyone to partake of it as the telos/guide/greatest good/The Good/T'agathon/etc.

I know I don't have to quote chapter and verse to many here, but, for the record, here are some pertinent excerpts (at least from my perspective):

PD25 Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴ τε φυγὴν εἴ τε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλό τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of nature, [pleasure] but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

Letter to Menoikeus: "The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, (i.e., the health of both our physical and our mental existence), since this is the goal (τέλος)of a blessed life.

Letter to Menoikeus: "we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος) of the blessed life."

Letter to Menoikeus: "one who has rationally determined (ἐπιλελογισμένου) the τέλος of one's natural state." [which is pleasure]

Quote from Cassius

The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone.

I have to disagree with that characterization. There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

Here are my thoughts on Norman DeWitt’s “Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy” (1950).

Overall, I’m unimpressed with DeWitt’s aim of using a linguistic quirk between Greek and Latin to make a larger philosophical point. Numerous languages get by with no definite article and can convey as complex and nuanced as any language with a definite article: “Linguists believe the common ancestor of the Indo-European languages, Proto-Indo-European, did not have articles. Most of the languages in this family do not have definite or indefinite articles: there is no article in Latin or Sanskrit, nor in some modern Indo-European languages, such as the families of Slavic languages (except for Bulgarian and Macedonian, which are rather distinctive among the Slavic languages in their grammar, and some Northern Russian dialects[7]), Baltic languages and many Indo-Aryan languages. Although Classical Greek had a definite article (which has survived into Modern Greek and which bears strong functional resemblance to the German definite article, which it is related to), the earlier Homeric Greek used this article largely as a pronoun or demonstrative, whereas the earliest known form of Greek known as Mycenaean Greek did not have any articles. Articles developed independently in several language families.” (Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_(…istic_variation )

From all I can see, Latin simply translated Greek τελος into Latin summum bonum as the closest alternative. To compare the two definitions:

Greek: telos: excerpt: “3. Philos., full realization, highest point. ideal” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=te/los

Latin: summum bonum (summus): excerpt: “H.—Of rank or degree, highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…60:entry=summus

I’m curious about his second paragraph where he says that “Epicurus is on record as assuming that "only Greeks are capable of succeeding in philosophy,"” He cites Usener 226 which comes from Clement of Alexandria’s Miscellanies, I.15. Here’s the full context of that source:

And Plato does not deny that he procured all that is most excellent in philosophy from the barbarians; and he admits that he came into Egypt. Whence, writing in the Phædo that the philosopher can receive aid from all sides, he said: "Great indeed is Greece, O Cebes, in which everywhere there are good men, and many are the races of the barbarians."[128] Thus Plato thinks that some of the barbarians, too, are philosophers. But Epicurus, on the other hand, supposes that only Greeks can philosophise. (1.15.67.1 οὕτως οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ βαρβάρων φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑπολαμ1.15.67.2 βάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.) https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nice…llanies:_Book_1

I wonder if this is also connected to the characteristics of the wise one in Diogenes Laertius (DL) X.117 when he talks about other nations: https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…lity?authuser=0 DL does not mention Greek or Greeks specifically in that text.

Whether Cicero’s statement that “the Latin language is not only not lacking in copiousness but is actually richer than Greek" is more absurd than DeWitt’s contention that the lack of an article makes Latin somehow deficient is problematic from a scholar like DeWitt. As I said, I don’t find his basic thesis here convincing or compelling.

DeWitt states that "In Greek the practice is to say "the greatest good" and not "the highest good," and to Epicurus "the greatest good" was not pleasure but life itself. In other words, to him the summum bonum was not the telos." This seems to me to be splitting the tiniest of hairs: greatest vs highest. Look at the Greek and Latin definitions above. Both words seem to show up in the definitions of each.

DeWitt also claims that "Epicurus, holding body and soul to be alike corporeal, placed the two on a parity, and one of his definitions of happiness is "a healthy mind in a healthy body."" I had problems with this in his book, Epicurus and His Philosophy, but I can accept that Epicurus held a similar view. But here in this paper, when DeWitt is putting so much stock in the differences between Latin and Greek, he made me laugh out loud when I read the Footnote 8 (emphasis added):

Footnote says 8 ***Not citable in Greek,*** but demonstrable: cf. Horace Carm.i. 31. 17-19; Juvenal x. 356 mens sana in corpore sano (Epicurean context); Petron. 61 bonam mentem bonamque valetudinem.

And he goes on to cite Latin references for Epicurus’s supposedly Greek idea. That just seems sloppy to me.

DeWitt tries to use DL X.126 to substantiate Epicurus's "reason for placing a higher value upon old age as against youth." I don't see that in 126. Instead, 126 seems to express Epicurus's insistence that one is never too old or too young to practice philosophy.

[126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.

For those unfamiliar with Maecenas (as I was!), here’s his WP entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaius_Maecenas?wprov=sfla1

DeWitt then discusses Vatican Saying 42 which is interesting on a number of levels. First of all, there is not agreement on what the Vatican Saying even says or, if it is correct in its transcription from some earlier texts. Here is the actual line from the early 14th century manuscript containing the Vatican Sayings: Vat.gr.1950.pt.2 https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0257

As written it appears to read: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως

However, some editors/scholars add to the end: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>. (e.g., Saint-Andre: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html , http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_42/ , and others)

Bailey suggests the reading should be ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ απολαύσεως

DeWitt's translation is "The same span of time embraces both beginning and end of the greatest good." I have problems with his use of the word “embraces”. I do not see that within the Greek. The Greek, as it stands, without the added on “evil” is literally something like:

“At the same time, there is both the creation (γενέσεως) of the greatest good and the release/departure (ἀπολύσεως)" That last word is why some scholars advocate for adding on "of the greatest evil" so we would get "release/departure of the greatest evil." But evil isn't in the manuscript.

Bailey's translation is "The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment." I have problems with Bailey’s use of “blessing.”

Bailey cites απολαύσεως "having enjoyment of a thing" instead of ἀπολύσεως "release, deliverance from a thing" which the latter is suggested by Usener and evidently accepted by DeWitt since he cites Bailey in his paper. Neither Bailey nor DeWitt make use of the added <τοῦ κακοῦ> “the [greatest] evil” so it’s obviously not needed to make a decent translation. DeWitt’s putting so much stock into this saying to bolster his argument is problematic in that there is so much debate and discrepancy among scholars on VS42. It should be clearly stated that many of the Vatican Sayings, including this one, are without context.

ἀπολύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…Da%29po%2Flusis

απολαύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…a%29po%2Flausis

I can see rationalizations for either translation, DeWitt’s or Bailey’s.

So, in the end, I can’t see any reason for DeWitt to maintain that Epicurus had any “highest good” or telos other than pleasure.

I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?), but here's my take. I've ranted in similar themes before.

To my understanding, summum bonum is the Romans' way of translations Greek τέλος into Latin. They're both trying to get at the same thing. Pleasure is the "highest good", the goal, etc. because it is that to which everything else points. It's at the end of the road (τέλος/goal) to which all roads lead. It's the "highest good" because it's at the top of the mountain, Pleasure Point, and the Virtue Trail, the Wisdom Trail, the Name Your Path Trail, all end up trying to get you to pleasure. You are virtuous because it, in the final analysis, brings you pleasure whatever you'll admit it or not. Summum bonum doesn't seem to me to be a value judgment (as in "Pleasure is the best among equals"), it's a difference in kind from other things judged "good." It's the good thing to which all other "good things" point. All other "good things" are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure itself is not instrumental (other than being a necessary component of well-being/ευδαιμονία/happiness).

Quote from Cassius

Oh I am not sure that this will survive the editing phase but I should also mentioned that at first I thought Joshua was saying something not entirely positive about a technique of Don's, but after I got myself oriented it was entirely positive, so I don't want Don to have a heart attack when he hears the reference

Well, I'll look forward to hearing that Now, you have to leave it in!

Quote from Cassius

I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions.

From my perspective, the big difference between "pleasure" and, say, "virtue" as the goal is that pleasure is first and primarily a biological reality, then the concept is built in that. Virtue as a concept is built in a foundation of sand at the seashore. There's nothing there. It's a concept on a concept. Pleasure and pain, in contrast, in some form are present in all forms of life down to amoebas and tardigrades. Even plants exhibit some aspect of this. Humans move from this biological imperative of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain for survival to extrapolate mental pleasure and pain, to build concepts on top of this imperative, but there is always that sound foundation upon which those concepts point back to.

Quote from Cassius

But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it

I would be careful about using phrases like "it too is a concept" in this context. It's maybe better to think of words as labels. All languages label reality in different ways, sometimes dividing it up finer or coarser. I'll have to go back again and read Book XXVIII.

Quote from Cassius

It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us

Yep. That's the job of the Cyrenaics.

Quote from Cassius

Especially since in the end the Platonists don't replace the doubt with answers, but with apocryphal methods of syllogistic logic to which they lay claim to be the experts and which is beyond the understanding of all except their initiates.

Initiating questioning is usually good, but I do not sense that the Platonists and Pyrrhonistz et al were acting in good faith

I find this interesting. Plato's initial philosophy goes directly back to Socrates. I have major problems with Sōkratēs (let's give him his true name). The gadfly was a terrible husband, neglectful (at best!) father, and general pain in the ... neck. His questioning has been presented as a way of "getting at the truth" but was it really that? He seems to argue for argument's sake, twisting people in knots... And leaving them there. He took no position, and turned those around who did! It certainly sounds like he had some charisma. He was clever. But it seems like the whole "all Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato/Socrates" is very sad and the ultimate missed opportunity

As for Pyrrho, here's his bio from Diogenes Laertius:

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK IX, Chapter 11. PYRRHO (c. 360-270 b.c.)

In fact, check out verse 70 (emphasis added):

Quote

Besides these, Pyrrho's pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their principles, if we may call them such-- [70] Zetetics or seekers because they were ever seeking truth, Sceptics or inquirers because they were always looking for a solution and never finding one, Ephectics or doubters because of the state of mind which followed their inquiry, I mean, suspense of judgement, and finally Aporetics or those in perplexity, for not only they but even the dogmatic philosophers themselves in their turn were often perplexed.

I'm becoming more convinced of the significance of the juxtaposition of δογματιεῖν (dogmatiein) and ἀπορήσειν (aporēsein) after looking at those references. If Diogenes Laertius was copying from some Epicurean text for those characteristics, it seems there was a definite contrast being made between those who δογματιεῖν and those who ἀπορήσειν.

Quote from Cassius

we're acting in good faith.

Were or weren't?

Also

L. Castagnoli, 'Aporia and inquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism’, for V. Politis, G. Karamanolis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 205-227.

L. Castagnoli, 'Aporia and inquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism’, for V. Politis, G. Karamanolis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge…

www.academia.edu

Compare aporia (from ἀπορήσειν ) and its connection to Plato:

Aporia - Wikipedia

The Socratic aporia in ancient skepticism

The study of the figure of Socrates is necessary not only for understanding the work of Plato and the platonists of every time, where it is a fundamental…

www.academia.edu

Y'all brought up the "the sage will be dogmatic" which I found interesting when doing my translation:

I find it very interesting that that "δογματιεῖν (dogmatiein)" is juxtaposed with "ἀπορήσειν (aprēsein)" which seems to dovetail exactly with what you all are discussing.

Literally, the "dogmatizer" will make a decision; the "aporēsizer" (to coin a term) will remain puzzled and not come to any decision. I would like to see ἀπορήσειν was applied to Skeptic philosophy.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

It’s evident that we should be cautious when trusting our senses- sometimes they can lie.

I would rephrase that as "It’s evident that we should be cautious when interpreting our senses - we can sometimes lie to ourselves (often unknowingly).

Quote from Nate

Temperance, Liberality, Proper Pride, Good Temper, Truthfulness, Ready Wit, Friendliness, and Righteous Indignation are always virtues for Aristotle, even if adherence to those virtues leads to evil consequences

Ah! So, the Virtues themselves are the Mean per Aristotle! Thanks for that!

The myth of the eight-hour sleep

Sleeping in one eight-hour chunk is a very recent phenomenon, and lying awake at night could be good for you, according to scientists and historians.

www.bbc.com

Segmented Sleep in Preindustrial Societies

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biphasic_and_polyphasic_sleep#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DBiphasic_sleep_%28or_diphasic%2C_bifurcated%2Cof_sleep_within_24_hours.?wprov=sfla1

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/sleepl…-may-be-natural

Quote from Cassius

For me the subject of empathy always comes down to: The "empath" episode of Stat trek the original series

For those not up on their Star Trek original episodes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Empath?wprov=sfla1

Is empathy what we're talking about, too?

I was looking at Sedley's paper for something else and came across this:

Quote

According to Diogenes Laertius (X 31), the Canon gave the three criteria as being sensations, προλεψεις, and feelings. Cicero's translation of this phrase shows that there is no significance; except perhaps a grammatical one, in Diogenes' omission of the article before προλεψεις. I mention this because Furley and Rist have deduced from it that προλεψεις were lumped together with sensations as constituting a single category. Its inclusion of προλεψεις as truth-criteria dates the Canon at any rate later than the Letter to Herodotus, according to the principle established above. It may well also be significant that the metaphor of κανων, meaning a truth-criterion, does not occur in the fragments of On Nature Books I-XV, or in the Letter to Herodotus, but is found frequently in the writings which we have already established to belong after 300 B.C.71

This should help dispel the mystification created by Diogenes Laertius' observation that the Epicureans add φανταστικαι επιβολαι της διάνοιας as truth-criteria, which has appeared to many to conflict with Epicurus' own acceptance of these 'image-making mental acts of concentration ' as virtual truth-criteria in the Letter to Herodotus 79 and in KD XXIV. If we assign an early date not only to the Letter to Herodotus but also to KD XXIV, the most satisfactory solution will be that when he came to develop the notion of προλεψεις in the following years he subsumed under it certain truth-criteria to which he had previously granted an independent validity. We have already observed that the 'fundamental meaning of a word ' became an element in the broader concept of προλεψεις ; and the same goes also for the φανταστικαι επιβολαι της διάνοιας , without which we could not visualise things at will, and consequently could have no generalised conceptions at all. Thus when he came to write the Canon he had downgraded φανταστικαι επιβολαι της διάνοιας in favour of προλεψεις. And if later Epicureans chose to upgrade them once more to the status of criteria, they had good authority in their master's early works for so doing. (p.16)

Sedley's paper is available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/4310042

Quote from Kalosyni

one's own pleasure must be set aside for these goals. For example, pursuing the perfection of a virtuoso violinist, a prima ballerina, or an olympic champion

The question of "Does this bring me pleasure?" can only be answered by those violinists, ballerinas, and champions. In many if not most cases, I would think they'd have to answer "yes."