Posts by Don

Quote from EricR

the winter of grim Stoicism...

Yeah, I'm a sucker for some fine wordsmithing. That's a good line.

Quote from Cassius

unruly children "You little Hedon!"

LOL! I always thought that was "little Heathens"

Agreed. The term is definitely not ancient. It appears to have started with Bentham:

Felicific calculus - Wikipedia

The Epicureans seemed to have consistently used "choices and rejections" as the key phrase: αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν (hairesin (kai "and") phugēn).

Here's my translation of 130, maybe a little more literal than Bailey:

Quote from Epicurus in Letter to Menoikeus

[130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words, what the consequences will be. We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

Hedonic calculus also seems to be popular with positive psychology researchers, as well as hedonic treadmill. I think we can potentially learn a lot from this field of research as long as we don't get hung up on terms and approach with a critical eye.

Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός,

ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος

καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον,

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον

The 4 lines of the Tetrapharmakos are statements of fact, not commands or commandments. I can't help that some translate them that way. Ἄφοβον is an accusative noun not an imperative verb. If the creator of the Tetrapharmakos epitome wanted to command people to "Don't fear the gods!" or say "I will not fear the gods", they could have used the imperative of φοβέομαι, δείδω, or ὀκνέω, but they didn't

Literally, the first line reads something more like:

The god causes no fear.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἄφοβος

Same for line 2:

Death is free from risk. (i.e., there is no afterlife)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀνυπ-εξαιρέτως , ἀνύποπτος

The Tetrapharmakos is nothing more than an epitome or summary of the first four Principal Doctrines. They are no more a full presentation of the whole philosophy than are the Letters to Herodotus or Menoikeus or the Principal Doctrines themselves. Just as those summaries are meant to keep the key points of the philosophy ready in one's mind, so the Tetrapharmakos keeps the first four Doctrines ready for application in one's mind. There's a reason Epicurus placed those first four Doctrines first, and, as far as I know, we can't say definitively that Epicurus himself didn't write the Tetrapharmakos. We know it from the writings of Philodemus, but there's nothing stating who actually composed it as far as I know. People seem to have asked Epicurus on multiple occasions for summaries of his philosophy. I see no reason to think the Tetrapharmakos might not be another one.

Saying a reason to ignore or downplay or dismiss the Tetrapharmakos is that some may misconstrue or misinterpret it is the the wrong way to handle it. This is an epitome gleaned from an authentic ancient Epicurean text (multiple texts!) that exemplifies the kernels of the philosophy. Philodemus goes to great pains to expand those four maxims, using the first four Doctrines, and expanding beyond those summaries in [On Choices and Avoidances]. Philodemus himself urged people to return to the books and that the summaries weren't sufficient in themselves. They are reminders and outlines, and always point back to the texts.

An understanding that, to paraphrase...

The gods provide no reason to fear them... because they're not motivated by anger or gratitude.

Death is to be approached with no suspicion... because we don't exist after we die.

The Good is easily obtained... because of the reasons laid out in various texts.

The Terrible is easily endured... because ditto.

These are fundamental to the whole philosophy. It's not dumbed down. It's to make it crystal clear that the philosophy as a whole is eminently able to be grasped by everyone. It's not open to a select few but is appropriate to everyone. That's one reason Diogenes had his wall carved in Oenoanda. You get benefit in your life *starting* at the beginning with the summaries but you can also go as deep as you want to or are able to with the volumes of texts. We are at a disadvantage because all we have had for a long time are summaries.

I will continue to defend the Tetrapharmakos, especially because I don't know who wrote it and I don't see any reason to think it may not have been Epicurus or one of the other early scholarchs of the Garden. Plus any kernel from authentically Epicurean sources not filtered through a Cicero or Plutarch is a precious gem.

Yes, we're definitely clear that's what he's referring to. Go further along, too. He mentions the first four of the Principal Doctrines at the beginning in that order. That's the Tetrapharmakos. As I understand, he mentions it/them in other works. Which means I have to keep working on the other ones of his works in Les Epicuriens.

PS: I'm also going through Tsouna's The Ethics of Philodemus and checking her translations of excerpts from [On Choices and Avoidances], comparing against PHerc.1251, and sizing up my translations from French to English, and I'm finding the French (if my English ones are right) seems to be more literal in matching up to the papyrus while Tsouna's is more paraphrased or colloquial English. This is turning into a fascinating exercise, *and* shedding light on authentic, ancient Epicurean texts not generally available to us... at least not to me

Oh, plus it strengthens, from my perspective, the importance of Philodemus's works.

Quote from Cassius

Do you see anything in it that stands out as remarkable and that needs more scrutiny?

I was pleased, as I said, to see the advocacy of the Tetrapharmakos primarily.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

some sort of "Other Philosophies and their faults" course

Some comparative look might not be a bad idea. I'm trying to think of a more "diplomatic" word for "faults" . Maybe "shortcomings" or "differences"... Or just cut to the chase with "Why other philosophies are wrong"

Okay, so here's my first draft of the translation from the French. I ended up typing large swaths into Google Translate after trying to take a photo and do it "automatically." That worked for part but needed, let's say, tweaking. I'm including the link to the papyrus again as well.

Note! It's not easy to read and there are a lot of "missing" words and lines. But there's enough there to get some inspiration. I especially liked the haven of philosophy and the ending bit as well.

Enjoy!

Philodemus

DCLP/Trismegistos 62463 = LDAB 3639 (papyri.info)

[ON CHOICES AND REJECTIONS]

1. [1] [missing 6 lines] pleasure, [it is right to] reply to those who, among the supporters of contrary doctrines on the questions just mentioned, claim that [even] without philosophy [it is possible] to carry out actions correctly. In fact, as we know, access is easy precisely to the polemical writings in which we see them speaking ill of us. And, if we quote some of them [missing 1 line] briefly [missing about 20 lines].

[2] [missing 3 lines] and in proportion [missing 2 words]. And they postulate that in reality nothing is first, because they are convinced that the [missing 1 word] of the soul relates to the [missing 1 word] and that we [proceed] to our choices and our rejections by such [comparative estimation], considering both at the same time. In fact, we cannot even have good hope that the joys [are born in us] in a similar way (all at once, lest] they engender for themselves disagreeable embarrassments [caused by certain] very great [affections] [missing 2 words] of what has been prepared by nature] with a view to reasoning [missing 2 words] without trouble [missing 20 lines approximately].

[3] [missing I line] and some even [claimed] that it is impossible for us to know anything, adding that we should not do everything from [choices] immediately, in the absence of a necessary point of support [for this]. Others, by explaining that the affections of the soul are ends (τέ̣[λ]η τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς), precisely without their further need for judgment, which is based on other [criteria], have given everyone full license to say that they derive joy from whatever they want, and from doing what tends towards that goal. Finally, the others have maintained the thesis that the words sorrow and joy -- which we certainly use, for our part -- are totally empty, given the indeterminacy that manifests itself [missing 20 lines]

2. [4] [Epicurus teaches us that good is easy for us to procure] and that evil is [not] only limited by precisely because it is useless to have defined the good (τἀγαθόν), if it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to attain, nor to have fixed limits to evil, if it is difficult to bear because of its long duration. This knowledge has the effect of prohibiting both the pursuit of any [good] which is not by nature capable of eliminating pain - such are, most of the time, the [goods] which have motivated a search eager in humans -, and let none be discarded which does not prevent having pleasure -- that is how one must [conceive] most of [those which are acquired] gradually. And, in reverse, for [missing approximately 20 lines]

[5] [missing 3 lines] After that, it is also necessary to take into account the differences that present the desires (ἐπιθυμ̣[ιῶ]ν̣) relating to the pleasures and to what produces them, since precisely the lack of discernment on this subject gives rise to serious errors concerning the choices and the rejections. It is indeed because they regard as what is most necessary the goods which are most external to them, I mean a sovereign power, a dazzling fame, an exceptional wealth and sources of pleasure of this sort and other similar ones that they are in charge of the most painful evils; and that, conversely, [they remain deaf to their most necessary appetites] (ἀναγκαιοτάτων), because they take them for what is most exterior to them [missing about 20 lines].

[6] [Indeed, for Epicurus], [desires are partly necessary, [and partly unnecessary]. Among the first, [those which are] necessary, [there are those which are necessary for] life, those which are necessary for the maintenance of the body in good health and those which are necessary for a happy life (τὸ μ̣[α]καρίως [ζῆ]ν), to take [at least] the cases in their diversity, is not [all at once.]

[There are also] various [cravings]. Some, it seems, provoke in [the soul] terrible hurricanes, and others do not. Some remain unsatisfied because of certain lackings, others result from specific feelings for those who experience joy. There are also some which result from habits, and others which are precisely independent of them. If some find their starting point in us, others [appear] as a result of a kind of injury, inflicted by external objects or even by things that deprivation makes you want to possess, just to think about them. Still others [missing 20 lines approximately]

3. [7] [missing 2 lines] of the gods [missing 2 lines] not only [missing 1 word] fear and trouble [inspired by the gods themselves], but also [missing 1 word] of [appetites], even if they have that too. One must, moreover [to carry out righteous actions], follow good directions, because beings who know supreme bliss eternally are far from [the burden] of these matters.

However, in truth, that opinions of this kind are the causes of thousands of errors, it is easy to observe. And in fact, they indulge themselves to the point of taking advice from no one in the world, in their conviction that nothing depends on man, but that all things are arbitrated by divinity. Subsequently, they experience all of a sudden the misfortunes that a lack of prior advice quite naturally inflicts on them [missing 20 lines approximately] [8] [missing 2 lines] [For it is not] profitable to [missing 2 lines], while others use [missing 1 word]. It should also be emphasized that [not only] they head for irremediable misfortunes, but that sometimes they even precipitate their own city into evils. And even if, in truth, they [are [not] defeated by the logic of facts or even if chance makes the omens agree with what must happen, the idea that they risk committing an act going against the will of the gods leads them in the opposite direction: they procrastinate and postpone their actions until later. And their troubles, effectively insurmountable, make them [neglect] [missing approximately 20 lines] [9] [missing 2 lines] errors [missing 1 word]; in many people misfortunes [many] and sizeable, of course, occur when they follow the harmful assumptions of men [incapable of thoughts/reflection], and are avoided when they follow their [desires]. Besides, each one puts forward different considerations, holding them for what is most important: this is precisely what is sketched out in these discussions.

Moreover, they believe, men will owe what happens to them, through the agency of the gods and other powers, evils [unceasing] after their death, much greater than the goods which they will have had during the time of their life. And it is for this reason that [missing 20 lines approximately] [10] [missing 6 lines] [by] them to the gods. This is why, [in truth], the wretched lament [precisely when they are victims] of evils very similar to those caused by ingratitude towards both individuals and country, and also, for that matter, towards the evils caused by the superstition of the fact that god is supposed to be responsible for both death and life -- even if the other evils, of course, are very great indeed. And the pain that grips them at the idea of dying makes them irascible, never happy or in a good mood [missing 20 ca] 4. [11] [missing 2 lines] and for this reason, it is clear, apart from these misfortunes, they are very [miserable].

[And] we say what we have just said about the four maxims (τῶ[ν] τεττάρω[ν]), because the important contribution made to effective choices and rejections by understanding and remembering the most important points of doctrine, it is considered that it amounts not as some have wanted to understand in their rusticity - to relate some of the choices and rejections to the absence of trouble on these questions, but to operate these latter in a correct way, on the condition of measuring them by nature's ends, and number of [missing about 20 lines].

[12] [missing 1 line] [the multitude] [knows] clearly ..., although they do not have the [fundamental ideas (ἀξιοῦμεν ὑπο[λή][ψ]εις)] that we are talking about. And what leads him instead to upright behavior are the laws, which brandish threats over his head: death, punishments of divine origin, as well as punishments considered very difficult to endure and deprivation of certain things which are said to be difficult to obtain. This is partly explained by what was discussed at the beginning and, partly, because it is against fools, people whom truthful precepts cannot persuade, that these threats are brandished; because these only have the effect of holding them back for a short time; and because obviously the suppositions [missing about 20 lines].

[13] [missing 1 line] they [remain in mind] the means of getting out of it, [because they have welcomed these [four maxims] as contributing by themselves to the practice. Moreover, these also establish the principles of philosophy - which alone allows for righteous actions - and also, it is clear, the ends attached to our nature, which are of course carriers of the clearest evidence and by the yardstick of which we measure what is to be chosen and rejected. As for ethical reasoning on the choices and rejections, they too must in any case be drawn from the study of nature so that they are complete: if to say that "nothing is accomplished independently of a cause" is nothing (that) "there is no change" [missing about 20 lines] [14] [It is not possible to lead a pleasant life] that is not prudent, beautiful, and just, and still courageous, self-disciplined (French: maitresse de soi - Original papyrus: ἐγ]κρατῶς > LSJ: master of oneself, self-controlled; self-disciplined), magnanimous, open to friendship, full of humanity and generally [accompanying] others more consequential in terms of choices and rejections when certain people, believing the opposite, are for this reason overwhelmed by their vices in each of their acts.

However, in truth, one must not denounce as a sycophant (συκοφαντητέον; LSJ: common informer, voluntary denouncer (there being no Public Prosecutor)) the transmission of the elements [of the doctrine], saying that it is only a question of the intertwining of some of them with others and of all the ways they have of linking themselves together. In fact, desires sometimes [missing 20 lines approximately] [15] [missing 3 lines] and it is in view of [missing 2 words] that we encourage [missing 2 words], and then in the actions [missing 1 line]. It should [surely] be kept in mind also that if careful study beforehand -- about the things which, in detail, are able to produce the goods which are external to us, such as a luxurious lifestyle, beauty, wealth generally speaking, [marriage] and the like -- of the relationships they have with us no doubt also contributes to aiming straight (“a viser juste”), their contribution is weak, compared to that of the most important [maxims] that we have recalled (οἷον πολυτελείας καὶ μο[ρ]φ[ῆς] καὶ πλούτου κοινῶς καὶ [γά]μου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων - Note that “marriage” [γά]μου is reconstructed). It is moreover for this reason that in the Principal Doctrines (Κυρίαις Δόξαις) precisely these have been placed in this order, and at the beginning, even if one can say that [missing approximately 20 lines].

[16] [Lac 1 line] [The unwise assert] rashly: “It is not possible for anyone to know in advance -- the precise moment, at least, no one knows -- what day [death] will come, any more when one is old than in the case of a premature disappearance. Also, instead of it being like when someone clearly recognizes the imminence of his death, we don't constantly think that we will die (we have time to spare!); and, because it is difficult to set an end to life, we incline sometimes to quickly stretch it out so that it is as long as possible, sometimes not to be unable to leave it, precisely out of reverence towards the gods.

Under these conditions, it is against what is suitable that some [missing 20 lines approximately] 5. [17] [missing 1 line] They are not ready, for insignificant gain, [both] to say goodbye to the only things that can give pleasures, and to bear sorrows in vain -- indeed, they also turn away entirely from philosophy, each saying: "Am I now going to start giving myself endless pain only to then get thrown like a disc halfway through?" -- even to share anything because, they believe, it is up to the immortals to do so, or to those who wait to be thanked. And they show themselves ungrateful in their turn towards everyone, each time exclaiming with a sneer: "Not the slightest gift for those who died!" And indifferent to all [missing approximately 20 lines] [18] [missing 3 lines] they exclaim: "Isn't it true that in life I behave well and [act godly], and respect the laws of men? When I reach the end, I will be immortal." And what concerns everything that would improve their existence they disregard, like those condemned to death. And naturally they also disregard anything related to their health, adding: "Yes, whatever torments I have to endure, I will give myself three hours of good time! ('ἐγὼ πόσα δὲ ὑπομενῶ' προστιθέντες, 'ε[ἰ τ]ρυ̣φήσω τρεῖς ὥρας;')"; and here they are again fainting at the thought of illnesses! And as they imagine in advance eternal evils after death, they are prey to limitless troubles. Also, evil [deeds], for precisely these reasons, they [commit many] [missing approximately 20 lines] [19] [missing 4 lines] And as they imagine in advance eternal evils after death, they are prey to limitless troubles. Also, evil [deeds], for precisely these reasons, they [commit many] [missing approximately 20 lines] [19] [missing 4 lines] [some are struck by misfortune, whereas they believed?] to protect themselves from it thanks to their piety, as legends have passed down about a few.

But, as they have this way of seeing things and as, in its suddenness, this unexpected blow knocks them out [in truth], they change their language. They begin, moreover, by depriving themselves of all enjoyment in order, assuredly, to always have enough of what is necessary to subsist, and live in postponement, as if it were possible for them to have their share of goods later; and, thereafter, they pass their existence in total incoherence and impose [numerous] penalties on themselves [lac, 20 lines approximately] [20] [missing 1 line] they have made and will do new things in order to repel the terrible events more quickly which could always everywhere swoop down on them until they die.

And the fear of one day running out of necessities makes them very reluctant to share and they refuse to return benefits. Moreover, when they lose their fortune, they endure the tortures of Tartarus, and enter into angers and hatreds which have nothing human about them; and they become arrogant as much by summons as by orders and threats. Moreover, unable to come to terms with their relatives, and to feel sympathy for them, just as they cannot [missing about 20 lines].

6. [21] [missing 1 line] For his part, [the wise epicurean] does not [need to accumulate [a lot] of money, and “treats the present well”, seeing nothing incongruous in this.

Furthermore, while having come to know well among the [public activities] those which bear fruit, he cultivates them with relative carelessness (“une relative insouciance”), unless it is for friends; and, because he is -- more than anything -- spare his time, whenever necessary, he counts only on himself; and, since his tender childhood, he never neglects the havens of philosophy (φιλοσ[ο]φία[ς] [ὅ]ρ̣μους). moreover, fully reassured by the idea that everything [will be sufficient] for the duration of his life, however long it may be, he goes so far as to share, after having reserved just enough to live on, everything that he has left. [And] [lake. about 20 lines] [22] [missing 2 lines] of men, when he was in charge.

Moreover, as it is without paying attention to it that he [sees his end coming], he is active because of the [doctrine] which goes hand in hand with the notion he has of the preservation of goods (i.e., property, “des biens”). And, Because he does not seek to put an end to his existence when it lasts a long time, he always throws himself into new activities, which attract friends to him, and he is interested in the way in which it will be possible to manage his personal affairs.

Moreover, he cares about what he has known before, because he tells himself that it may concern him in the future; and he is full of attentions for the greatest possible number of human beings, at the same time he is grateful for those who have shown him friendship, precisely because he hopes that he will be able to share certain things with them, and also to receive from them some good treatment in return, although [missing about 20 lines] [23] [missing 1 line] [because of] the long [duration] of its [existence]. And, in seeking out anything that offers some improvement in his health, he spares no effort to restore it because he expects to live again. He provides especially, yes, for his health; and, fully reassured on the subject of problems of health and death, he energetically takes the measures which can keep them at bay.

I found this fragment of Menander that illustrates the point I was trying to make in #7 above:

Quote from Menander

The lightest of all ills is bothering

You—poverty! And what is that? One friend

Who helps can medicate it easily.

Source: https://archive.org/details/menand…ge/137/mode/2up

I just realized that Menander and Epicurus were contemporaries in Athens, although Menander was (according to Wikipedia) a student of Theophrastus so they would not have hung out together but could very well have known each other:

Menander: c. 342/41 – c. 290 BCE

Epicurus: 341–270 BCE

I mentioned this elsewhere on the forum, but I'll post here as well. To me, the role of friendship has evolved since Hellenistic times. I think that people were just as committed to their friends then as they are now. However, there was much more of a reliance on one's friends - one's philoi φίλοι - for one's well-being back then. There was no "social safety net" or institutions for elder care or hospitals. Without friends, you were up the proverbial creek. Friends are still today a necessary component of a pleasurable life but I'm not sure they full the same life or death niche they did 2,000 years ago. I think that's one of the reasons why Epicurus and Torquatus et al. placed such a high importance on friendship in the texts.

I haven't read the article (and in light of Kalosyni 's review may skip it).

This does bring up the thought for me that marriage was a completely different institution in ancient Greece than today. And I do NOT advocate any kind of return to that btw.

It also brings up the topic of friendship. Friends were absolutely necessary in ancient world too. There was no "social safety net." Unless you were independently wealthy (which it appears Epicurus and others were) you were out of luck if you got sick or just got old. You relied on your friends to help you.

Now, we hope to have marriages between friends for companionship, mutual support, etc.

We also have professionals in elder care, hospitals, hospices, etc. That doesn't mean we don't need a social support system!

So, the need for friends fills a slightly different niche than it did 2,000 years ago.

I'm not sure where you went with that whole "Peace and safety" discussion, and I'm curious to hear what the verdict was on pleasure or instrumental good. But on the idea of its being an Epicurean slogan, I don't see any evidence that this was a catchphrase of the Epicureans in Thessaloniki or elsewhere. This idea comes only from DeWitt a far as I can tell with no more evidence than the words Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια "Peace and safety" in I Thessalonians 5:3. I don't doubt that Epicureans valued peace and safety over war and insecurity, just like everyone else! But I don't see any reason to think this was a regular saying among the Epicurean community. I'd be happy to be proven wrong. You can even see some of my early posts on this forum included it because of DeWitt's comments. But, after looking at the source (I Thessalonians 5:3), I stopped using it. I've seen some papers that point out that it doesn't even have to be read as a slogan or phrase. It's simply "while they are saying 'peace' and 'safety'..." and a number of commentators make a strong case that the actual people that Paul is referring to are the Romans and their imposed peace and security of the Pax Romana. While the Romans are saying peace and safety, the Lord is going to come back and smite them all... So be ready... Or some religious fantasy fever dream like that.

See also:

1 Thessalonians 5 :: King James Version (KJV)

1 Thessalonians 5 - But of the times and the seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you.

www.blueletterbible.org

"Peace, Security, and Labor Pains in 1 Thessalonians 5.3," Leaven 23.1 (2015): 37-42.

In this brief essay, I present the case for reading "peace" (eirene) and "security" (asphaleia) as two separate but complementary qualities…

www.academia.edu

Quote from Cassius

it wasn't easy to assess the reliability of the fragments

That's one of the nice things Les Epicuriens. They do give (lacuna of 10 lines) and (1 word missing) and such. Then you can compare the papyrus transcription and the drawings of the leaves. The papyrus is surprisingly intact over wide sections.

I'm still working on the translation from the French but felt I could give an update and some additional resources:

First, here is the link to the actual papyrus of [On Choices and Avoidances]:

DCLP/Trismegistos 62463 = LDAB 3639

I've been able to use this because the French translation in Les Epicuriens gives the column numbers, and they line up perfectly.

All that being said, there is a translation of this work which appears to be in English:

[Philodemus]: [On Choices and Avoidances]. Giovanni Indelli, Voula Tsouna-McKirahan. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, Collezione di testi ercolanesi diretta da Marcello Gigante, 15.) Pp. 248. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995. ISBN: 88-7088-343-4.

There is a limited search available at Google books: https://books.google.com/books?id=Go1fAAAAMAAJ

Tsouna also cites [On Choices and Avoidances] extensively in her The Ethics of Philodemus.

Hiram Crespo does appear to have access to the Indelli/Tsouna translation or Les Epicuriens or both and has much for facility with French and/or Italian than I do. He wrote several commentaries/reviews of the work at his website. I haven't had a chance to read all of his commentary yet but here are the links:

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part I) | Society of Friends of Epicurus

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part II) | Society of Friends of Epicurus

Reasonings About Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (Part III) | Society of Friends of Epicurus

Even so, I'm going to continue my translation exercise, especially since I'm getting to compare the papyrus with the French with the snippets online and in Hiram's commentary even though I realize this is a roundabout way of getting at the text! "Why don't you just get a copy of the Indelli/Tsouna book, duh?" I'll probably do that at some point through interlibrary loan, but there are not a lot of libraries that have it even. Part of my motivation is for the same reason I did my translation and commentary of the Letter to Menoikeus, to make the project more personal and to stretch my linguistic legs. But this is definitely a roundabout way of getting at the text - no question!

Greek papyrus > intermediate translations and copying > French > Google Translate > refining translation into English > compare to Greek papyrus > refine again...repeat.

So, don't expect anything soon... let's say soon-ish.

"We're all made of quantum fields..."

I've said it elsewhere on the forum and I'll restate it here slightly differently (and maybe more emphatically). This is rapidly becoming my position:

Epicurus's τἀγαθὸν (tagathon) = "The Good" , i.e., the greatest/highest/ultimate good thing = Pleasure = "that at which everything else aims"

The good things are not ranked. Pleasure is The Good; all other good things are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure stands alone. Virtue, wisdom, etc. are subservient to pleasure. Pleasure is the "foundational" good thing (the αρχή) ; it is our inborn, natural good thing; it is the goal at which we aim (our τέλος). Epicurus says φρονησις phronesis/practical wisdom is the "greatest good" (but didn't call it τἀγαθὸν) which I'm taking as the greatest instrumental good to achieve pleasure and a pleasurable life. Everything we do is - or should be - for the sake of pleasure, that is, for leading a pleasurable life.

I'm in the process of "Google translating" Philodemus's [On Choices and Rejections] in Les Epicuriens and was excited to find an explanation and endorsement of the Tetrapharmakos! It was unexpected. And, to note, this is not the papyrus from which the 4-fold formula is usually cited. That is PHerc 1005. This is PHerc 1251. I'm working on making the translation more flowing and will share as I'm able. Since this has the Tetrapharmakos, it too has the word ταγαθον.

Quote from Cassius

go back to Epicurus' own letters, Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus, in that order.

Sounds interesting. And definitely in that order! Maybe I'll rejoin in 2024 when you get to Menoikeus

Quote from Cassius

I agree with most of what is written above, but one additional point I would include is that the Latin authorities were much closer to the Greek language and to the Epicurean texts than we will ever be (as to both).

I can respect where you're coming from, but it's still a secondary filter with their own cultural assumptions coloring the interpretation.

Quote from Cassius

So when we know that someone like Lucretius is trying to be faithful, I think their interpretations are entitled to great deference, even to the extent of considering them to have much more expertise than our own efforts to grasp the Greek.

One issue with Lucretius is that we know virtually nothing about the person. Where did study? Did he just have access to Epicurus's On Nature and some letters and teach himself (granted, as we do!) or did he learn his Epicurean philosophy from an authoritative teacher of the school itself? I've seen some papers that argue he was unaware of some contemporary Epicurean thought.

As far as deference, my preference would be - wherever possible - to compare two Greek sources to see how they're using terms and concepts either in comparison or contrast. But again, I respect where you're coming from, but the Latin authors - especially Cicero - are still one step removed from the original sources. There's some evidence that Cicero used Philodemus for the Torquatus material. In which case, I'm going back to Philodemus and see where he can illuminate Cicero, not the other way around.

PS... I should say that it's not that I don't think the Latin sources are important! By Zeus, we have so few sources to begin with! But I am saying that, for me, defence will always be given to Greek sources. De Rerum Natura is priceless, *but* I want to squeeze everything I can out of every scrap of Lucretius's *sources* especially Epicurus's On Nature. That's why I'm trying to translate the texts in Les Epicuriens that I haven't been able to find anywhere else. Granted, it's like reading a description of the reflection of the Moon in the pond through sunglasses (fancy designer French sunglasses) but it's all I got