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Joshua brought up the κλεψύδρα (klepsydra): a water-clock, like our sand-glasses, used to time speeches in the lawcourts
This has a great parallel to English words:
kleps- related to kleptomania
-(h)ydra - related to hydro "water"
Therefore, κλεψύδρα "water-stealer"
Fascinating thread! Thanks for doing all the legwork 
I'm going to point back to my post on the title of Metrodorus 's as well as the quote from that book:
I think there is a definite distinction between pleasures. I don't think it's necessarily a hierarchy, but it seems there are pleasures of a state and pleasures from activities or objects outside ourselves.
I wanted to address the title of Metrodorus's book that is cited by Clement of Alexandria.
The title in Greek is:
Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ἡμας αἰτιαν προς εὐδαιμονιαν της ἐκ των πραγματων
The "New Advent" English translation is:
On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects
I don't entirely agree with the translation choices made there, but they'll do well enough.
What I want to do is look at several key words that impact our current discussion on katastematic pleasure.
μειζονα = greater, larger (comparative degree of μεγας megas)
αἰτιαν = (accusative singular) cause (translated above as "source" evidently)
- - την παρ' ἡμας αἰτιαν = thε cause for us"
προς εὐδαιμονιαν = for eudaimonian (translated above (inadequately, IMHO) as "happiness"; personally I prefer "well-being" to connote or play on the eu + daimon origin of the word.)
πραγματων = (pragmaton, genitive plural of pragma). This is the important one.
Pragma has a number of definitions and connotations:
- deed, act, fact
- occurrence, matter, affair
- thing, concrete reality
- thing, creature
- thing of consequence or importance
- (in the plural) circumstances, affairs
- (in the plural, in bad sense) trouble, annoyance
- - της ἐκ των πραγματων "that which is from deeds/things/circumstances/etc."
Now, from Metrodorus's book, we get his quote asking "What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?"
This is consistent with the title from what I can see. That title is saying that we can be more confident of "the hope of [the] continuance" of pleasure which arises within us than that which arises from deeds/things/circumstances/etc. This seems to me to be consistent with the emphasis on autarkeia (self-reliance) elsewhere in the texts and that we don't have to rely on outside circumstances for our pleasure. Of course, we can vary our pleasures with our deeds and circumstances! But the pleasure that arises from within ourselves - katastematic pleasure, namely aponia and ataraxia - is always near at hand. We have complete control over that whereas our circumstances are not always under our control due to chance and outside factors.
Additionally, one of the definitions of pragma in LSJ is "deed, act, the concrete of πρᾶξις..."
Along those same lines, Πάθη (pathe) is something that happens to you, something that is experienced. LSJ: "what is done or happens to a person or thing, opp. πρᾶξις (praxis)"
The pathe are pleasure and pain. In this definition, the pathe are opposed to praxis. We always have the pathe to rely on. I'm still mulling over the significance of this point, but I think there's a significance there, too.
I don't remember if there is an article or discussion you may have posted some time ago on "homeostasis"? Or if you can post a link to an earlier discussion?
I've mentioned it several places. Here's a search:
You'll see me mention Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and Dr. Anna Lembke in those search results.
Just so there's no confusion, homeostasis is not some idiosyncratic state that might appeal to introverts over extroverts. It is the well-functioning of one's body and mind when everything is in balance.
Here's the biological definition:
As Khan says, homeostasis is "The tendency to maintain a stable, relatively constant internal environment."
Here's a PubMed paper:
"The health and vitality of the organism can be said to be the end result of homeostatic regulation. An understanding of normal physiology is not possible without an appreciation of this concept. Conversely, it follows that disruption of homeostatic mechanisms is what leads to disease, and effective therapy must be directed toward re-establishing these homeostatic conditions."
Homeostasis is not "mindfulness" or some "mystical" state, it is the foundational "health and vitality of the organism."
My take is becoming that this idea of biological homeostasis as the "health and vitality of the organism" is what Epicurus was referring to - generally - as katastematic pleasure. It is the underlying, foundational starting point of physical (aponia) and mental (ataraxia) health. If our body and mind are working properly and we are listening to our "feedback loops" of pleasure/pain, we can better *vary* our pleasure once we've achieved a homeostatic/katastematic foundation.
At first glance I thought the proportion was larger than that but apparently not. It is what it is but did you think larger too?
There's a huge difference between the diameter of the Sun (109 times) and the *volume* of the Sun (a million Earths). Either of which are hard to comprehend.
Just came across this paper on Academia. I wouldn't spend too much time on it, and I only skimmed it. The author's main point seems to me the opposite of Epicurus. The author seems to be saying there IS a "neutral" feeling between or in opposition to pleasure and "unpleasure."
I'll say one thing for the paper: It certainly is a lot of words gathered together in one place.
I don't think that methodological naturalism asserts that there is nothing supernatural--that to my understanding would be 'philosophical naturalism'. Methodological naturalism is not so much a doctrine or belief, as it is an attitude or approach to inquiry.
You are absolutely correct, Joshua . Thanks! Very good points to remember.
But to state my own position plainly, I think that Epicurus was a philosophical naturalist, who further employed methodological naturalism in his study of nature.
I would concur as well. I think that is an excellent way to phrase it. And so I would agree with Cassius above as well in saying Epicurus did positively assert that there was nothing supernatural. As Cassius mentioned in the most recent podcast (Nicely done on the 12 Fundamentals btw), the Epicureans could be lauded for their ALWAYS looking for a material/physical explanation even when confronted by Alexander the Oracle-monger and his magic snake. So, the Epicureans would assert, as you said Joshua that there is nothing supernatural (I would add: Because I assume they believed the universe was infinite and there was nothing "outside" of the universe.) therefore, they were "philosophical naturalists" in their perspective. As such, they would (in our terminology here) be "methodological naturalists" in their day to day dealings with the world.
By contrast, Dr. Francis Collins who is a renowned geneticist and was the the head of the Human Genome Project is not at all a naturalist, being a Christian, but in his scientific work he sought natural explanations for the phenomena of nature.
You are on fire, my friend! Excellent point there as well. That is a good illustration of the different permutations possible in the naturalist and scientist categories.
I think I mentioned that term on the first episode of the letter to Pythocles, during the discussion as to whether the ancients were really doing "science". I'd have to listen back to be sure.
But I certainly think it's applicable to what Epicurus was doing in the 4th century.
Sorry if I missed that! 
It seems to me, too, to possibly be applicable to Epicurus's outlook.
I guess that's the question.
Was Epicurus asserting that there was nothing supernatural?
Or, was he asserting that nothing supernatural would have any impact on our universe so it would be irrelevant to our lives and our happiness?
Functionally, those two could work similarly or identically, but they are two different things.
Interesting. I had not heard the term "methodological naturalism."
Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread!
I sent you a conversation regarding the homeostasis topic so we don't derail
And thanks! I'm enjoying the research
Okay, here's Metrodorus, Fragment 5:
I just found this, and it also references Cicero so this may be a known fragment already.
(PS. I see it also references Epicurus Fragment 68 which has some similar wording. So, Metrodorus's contribution isn't earthshaking but does appear to be reinforcing.)
Nonetheless, there's our old friend κατάστημα right there (using the alternative c for sigma: κατάcτημα).
Using https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02102.htm as a source for a translation of Metrodorus: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'"
The Greek for Metrodorus's quoted material is:
αγαθον, φησι ((he) says), ψυχης τι αλλο η το σαρκος ευσταθες καταστημα και το περι ταυτης πιστον ελπισμα.
Notes:
αγαθον ψυχης = "the good of the soul/psyche" Note also, is this "The Good" we've talked about elsewhere or just more like "for the benefit/good of the soul"?
το σαρκος ευσταθες καταστημα = "the sound state (katastema) of the flesh"
This is from
Display Morecolumn 3
σι(*)ν, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐκείνας, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐ-κείνας, vac. 1 ὦ Ζήνων καὶ Κλε-
ά̣νθ̣η̣, vac. 1 καὶ σὺ Χρύσιππε, vac. 1, καὶ (*)
ὅσοι τὴν αὐ̣τὴν ὑμεῖν ἄ-
5[γ]ο[υ]σιν, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐκείνας ἀπο(*)-
φ̣α̣ι̣νόμεθα τὰς ἡδονὰς
ὑπάρχειν τ[έ]λος τὰς τῶν
π̣ολ̣λ̣ῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτας ἃσ
ἀρ̣τίω̣ς̣ εἰρήκαμεν, vac. 2 τέ̣-
10[λο]ς̣ ̣μ̣όνας. vac. 1 εἰ γὰρ ἀρέσ(*)-
κε̣ι̣ ̣γ̣'̣ὑ̣μεῖν τὸ τῆς φύσεως(*)
ἀγ̣α̣θ̣ὸ̣ν̣ κατά̣σ̣τ̣ημά τι καὶ(*)
[οἰκ]ε̣ῖ̣ο̣ν̣ τοῦτ̣'εἶναι τέ(*)-
λος κατὰ τὸν ἡμεῖν σύν -
Or this one:column 4
φωνον λόγον, vac. 1 τὸ δὲ τ̣[ῆς ἡ-]δονῆς ὄνομα μεισε[ῖτε,]
τί οὐ πάλαι ἡμεῖν ἐλέ̣[ξα-]
τε; -τὸ μὲν δόγμα ὑμῶ̣[ν ἀ-]
5ληθές, ἄνδρες, τῷ δὲ [τῆς]
ἡδονῆς ὀνόματι φα[ύλως]
κέχρησθε, ἵνα πρὸς [τοῦ-]
το ὑμεῖν εἴπαμεν· vac. 1 [και-]
νὸν μὲν οὐδαμῶς ν̣[ῦν]
10τάττομεν τόνδε τὸν [λό-]
γον κατὰ τοῦ προειρη[μέ-]
νου καταστήματος, [ἀλ-]
λ'ἄνωθεν ὡμειλη[μέ-]
νον πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν [ ̣ ̣]
Ah! Now I see why there was no translation on the inscription website! These columns are from NF192 ("new fragment 192") first described in 2011 and then expanded on in this 2014 paper in JSTOR:
Diogenes of Oinoanda on the Meaning of 'Pleasure' (NF 192)
Author(s): Barnaby Taylor
Source: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik , 2014, Bd. 191 (2014), pp. 84-89
Published by: Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43909587
Here are two selections:
"Diogenes begins thet hird column by drawing a distinction between two types of pleasure, the 'pleasures of the many' (III.6-8) and the 'aforementioned pleasures' (III.8-9). In a forcefully-expressed sentence3 addressed to Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and all their followers (III. 1-10), Diogenes states that only the 'aforementioned pleasures' constitute the moral end (ὑπάρχειν τ[έ]λος). As the editors suggest, Diogenes' 'pleasures of the many' must be equivalent to the 'pleasures of the profligate' listed by Epicurus at Men. 131-2: drinking, party-
ing, fish-eating, feasting, sexual enjoyment of boys and women.5 The 'aforementioned pleasures' are to be identified with the two forms of static pleasure adduced by Epicurus in the very same passage: freedom from bodily pain (aponia) and freedom from mental disturbance (ataraxia). The identification of static
pleasure with the moral end is standard Epicurean ethical theory: while all pleasures are good per se , any pleasure which is likely to be followed by pain, and thus threatens the stability of the state of painless tranquillity, ought to be avoided.6 As such, not all pleasures are to be included in the moral end."
" The final sentence of Diogenes NF 192 constitutes important new evidence in this regard. There, as we have seen, Diogenes justifies the Epicurean use of the term 'pleasure' to refer to the experience of the state of tranquillity that constitutes the moral end by stating that such usage is in line with the term's ordinary meaning. Crucially, however, he does not do so simply by appealing to contemporary ομιλία (as does Epicurus at Hdt. 67), but makes an explicitly historical claim, stating that the Epicurean use of the term 'pleasure', far from being a recent development, is in fact in line with what has been that term's ordinary meaning for all Greeks from the beginning. NF 192 thus provides uniquely valuable evidence concerning the Epicurean attitude to the value of ordinary language. Diogenes' defense of the Epicurean use of the term 'pleasure' to refer to tranquillity combines the issues of colloquialism and language history, connecting what he claims to be the contemporary colloquial usage of 'pleasure' with what he claims to have been the ordinary meaning of the same term from the beginning."
There's not a full complete translation of 3 & 4 in the paper, but there's enough I think for me to puzzle a literal one out later.
Have we brought up Fragment 68 yet?
68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it. (Saint-Andre)
τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα (katastēma) καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κατάστημα
εὐσταθὲς = "well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)"
σαρκὸς (sarkos, genitive) = "of the material which covers the bones of a creature; of the flesh; of the body (as opposed to the mind/soul/spirit"
κατάστημα = "bodily or mental condition" So, Saint-Andre's "health" is a translation decision. The phrase at its most basic is "the stable condition of the body" which to me, again, implies homeostasis, a stable, well-balanced, body in good c working condition.
Saint-Andre notes VS33 as a complement:
33. The body cries out (σαρκὸς φωνὴ) to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness (εὐδαιμονίας eudaimonias).
σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἂν <διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.
LSJ also gives some references to Diogenes of Oenoanda, so I dug those up for our discussion here:
DCLP/Trismegistos 865216 = LDAB 865216
And so the .......... [are] ....... If .................. [prudence.]
Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.
Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.
[- ca.7 -] εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα].
ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η
πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς
γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κα-
τασ̣τήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πράξεσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν
καταστημάτων πρῶ-
τον εἴπωμεν, ἐκεῖνο
τηροῦντες, τὸ δὴ ὅτι τῶν
10ὀχλούντων τὴν ψυχὴν
παθῶν ὑπεξαιρεθέν-
των τὰ ἥδοντα αὐτὴν
ἀντιπαρέρχεται. vac. 1
τὰ οὖν ὀχλοῦντα τίνα
Can't find a translation of this one:
column 3
σι(*)ν, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐκείνας, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐ-
κείνας, vac. 1 ὦ Ζήνων καὶ Κλε-
ά̣νθ̣η̣, vac. 1 καὶ σὺ Χρύσιππε, vac. 1, καὶ (*)
ὅσοι τὴν αὐ̣τὴν ὑμεῖν ἄ-
5[γ]ο[υ]σιν, vac. 1 οὐκ ἐκείνας ἀπο(*)-
φ̣α̣ι̣νόμεθα τὰς ἡδονὰς
ὑπάρχειν τ[έ]λος τὰς τῶν
π̣ολ̣λ̣ῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτας ἃσ
ἀρ̣τίω̣ς̣ εἰρήκαμεν, vac. 2 τέ̣-
10[λο]ς̣ ̣μ̣όνας. vac. 1 εἰ γὰρ ἀρέσ(*)-
κε̣ι̣ ̣γ̣'̣ὑ̣μεῖν τὸ τῆς φύσεως(*)
ἀγ̣α̣θ̣ὸ̣ν̣ κατά̣σ̣τ̣ημά τι καὶ(*)
[οἰκ]ε̣ῖ̣ο̣ν̣ τοῦτ̣'εἶναι τέ(*)-
λος κατὰ τὸν ἡμεῖν σύν -
Or this one:
column 4
φωνον λόγον, vac. 1 τὸ δὲ τ̣[ῆς ἡ-]
δονῆς ὄνομα μεισε[ῖτε,]
τί οὐ πάλαι ἡμεῖν ἐλέ̣[ξα-]
τε; -τὸ μὲν δόγμα ὑμῶ̣[ν ἀ-]
5ληθές, ἄνδρες, τῷ δὲ [τῆς]
ἡδονῆς ὀνόματι φα[ύλως]
κέχρησθε, ἵνα πρὸς [τοῦ-]
το ὑμεῖν εἴπαμεν· vac. 1 [και-]
νὸν μὲν οὐδαμῶς ν̣[ῦν]
10τάττομεν τόνδε τὸν [λό-]
γον κατὰ τοῦ προειρη[μέ-]
νου καταστήματος, [ἀλ-]
λ'ἄνωθεν ὡμειλη[μέ-]
νον πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν [ ̣ ̣]
Working on those last two, butt putting here for future reference. LSJ also cites Metrodorus, Fragment 5. Looking for that, too.
It seems to me that, just from observation, there are at least two types of pleasures that exist as states of being, as Epicurus points out, such as:
- being in a calm, tranquil state of mind (ataraxia)
- and feeling the the positive feeling of a body without pain in good working order (aponia)
We can work toward those states, and part of it is dispelling fears and anxiety and also taking care of our physical bodies. But once they are there, we don't "work at" feeling that pleasure. It just is (until our minds start to wander or we get distracted by that itch in our elbow...)
Then, on the other hand, there are pleasures that we derive from volitional actions in the moment, such as
- talking with friends
- remembering past pleasures
- taking a drink after a long hike
- eating your favorite food
So, right now, that's where I'm heading on "katastematic pleasures" and "pleasures of action". Whether there's any academic papers that back that up, I don't know.
This is a great example of the much documented issue of lack of documentation
Well put! Exactly.
Remember, too, that when you say...
Can any significance be derived from the fact that he wrote that peace of mind and freedom from pain imply a state of rest, whereas joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity?
That's not exactly what Epicurus said. That's an extrapolation and Interpretation of:
"ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."
That whole "which imply a state of rest" is contained in καταστηματικαί. The only thing that we can be sure is that that first sentence reads:
"For ataraxia and aponia are 'katastēmatikai' pleasures..."
What did Epicurus mean by katastēmatikai pleasures?? That's the rub. LSJ says
καταστηματικός , ή, όν,
A.pertaining to a state or condition
as well as, in relation to musical instruments, "calming"
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Κκ , κατάσσυ^τος , καταστηματικός
That's a LOT of commentary and Interpretation that gets thrown about from "scholars" and "experts " and a LOT of it gets filtered through a Platonic lens before it ever settles on Epicurus.
If this is a direct quote from Epicurus from his On Choices (and Rejections), then there's no doubt Epicurus had words to say about different kinds of pleasure. He says it right there:
ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία are this type of pleasures (ἡδοναί hēdonai); χαρὰ and ἡ εὐφροσύνη are ....
βλέπονται "seen" possibly "experienced? exist?"
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, βλέπω
κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ (kata kinēsin "through/by way of motion" energeiai "activity, etc.")
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…ntry=e)ne/rgeia Note that LSJ has it defined as "the opposite of ἕξις" which is "a state or habit of mind" which seems exactly to me what the katastematic Pleasures point to: a state of being. So that dichotomy is reinforced using ἐνεργείᾳ...
More by the same author:
I found a paper that I just started reading, then did a search here and found it only mentioned by Cassius in 2019. For ease of access:
Here is Cassius 's 2019 response:
And here is the direct link to the paper:
I'm not sure I have the same reaction as Cassius , but hey it's early in the morning. I'll report back later, maybe after rereading Nikolsky, too.
quite a sarcastic and misleading description of that.
And "sarcastic and misleading" is exactly what I'd expect from our "dear friend" Cicero
