Compare my Arisocles/Eusebius quote in #123 (also available here at the end of chapter 18 for in situ context:
with Cicero in De Finibus:
For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself5 — anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations — that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses — this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 17 "I certainly do not," said he; "I maintain that all who are without pain are enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest form of pleasure." "Then you think that a man who, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for p99 another, feels the same pleasure as the thirsty man who drinks it?"
So, they're all feeding off each other, pointing back to earlier sources:
Cicero 106–43 BC
Aristocles of Messene 1st-century CE
Eusebius 260 – 339 CE
To reply to your post, Cassius :
something that people assert to be as important as this - to take the place of pleasure itself in the discussion of Epicurus - very much needs to be sharpened down to a fine point so that it can be placed in proper perspective
Katastematic pleasure isn't taking the place of pleasure per se. They're redefining pleasure in an almost Ciceronian way and substitute their definition for pleasure writ large. Many of the "mainstream" commentators are ONLY focusing on that third state - the calm, the absence - that Epicurus included within his definition of pleasure when he rejected there was a neutral state with no motion of the soul atoms. He said, in strong opposition to the Cyrenaic position (and others), that there is no neutral state. That state - the freedom from pain and trouble in the body and mind - is included in Epicurus's definition of pleasure. There is only pleasure OR pain, full stop. That *feeling* of calm, of the stable well-functioning state of body and mind, IS pleasurable. But Epicurus included ALL pleasures within the definition of Pleasure, whether "kinetic" when the soul-atoms were in motion in the moment, whether one was remembering or anticipating a past or future pleasure, or whether one was experiencing the absence of pain and trouble in body and mind. I'm going to posit (for now) that those last two categories of pleasure fall under "katastematic" pleasure. Furthermore, wherever Epicurus is writing about calm, freedom from pain or trouble in body or mind, remembering or anticipating pleasure, etc. that he's writing about katastematic pleasure whether the word gets used or not. For him, I believe, there was a distinction without a difference. It was all pleasure and so all of it fell under the descriptor of "good." The problems arise with some desires for specific pleasures that led to pain, or pleasures at certain times that were unwise or not prudent. We make better decisions when we're calm and working well in body and mind and that, I think, is why Epicurus laid an importance of emphasis on that aspect, but ALL pleasures were within the realm of consideration in context and choices.
