Posts by Don

For anyone who REALLY wants to get into the weeds...

Greek and Roman Textiles and Dress

Greek and Roman Textiles and Dress

www.academia.edu

Quote from reneliza

my understanding is that, at least in the letter to Menoeceus he didn’t use the term that would be an inversion - or direct opposite of “natural” and that “unnatural” is more of a translation choice because it seemed like they were meant to be opposites in that way - Don’s post seems to affirm this as well, but please correct if I’m wrong)

You are correct. Natural and Empty in Menoikeus. I don't think the Greek word for unnatural is ever used. For example:

PD29 Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ <καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ> καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

Don - Of the cravings, first there are those that are natural and required to live, then there are those that are natural but not required, and, finally, there are those that are neither natural nor required which come to be along with empty beliefs (beliefs devoid of merit).

That's as close as we get, I think.

At the risk of self-horn-tooting, here's my translation and commentary on the desires from my Letter to Menoikeus. Apologies for the length. See the PDF for more:

Translation:

Furthermore, on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life.

Commentary:

127f. Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί,

• Ἀναλογιστέον "consider..."
• τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν "of the desires, yearnings"
  • "Consider then of the desires, on the one hand, are the φυσικαί "natural ones'
    • φυσικαί (physikai)
      • English physical, physics
  • on the other, the κεναί 'empty, fruitless, vain, void ones."
    • κεναί is also again the word used when Epicurus talks about atoms and void.

127g. καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον·

• "And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessities; on the other hand, the natural ones only."
  • ἀναγκαῖαι "necessary, essential; (if a plural noun as here) necessities"

127h. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι,

• "then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, there are those necessary for eudaimonia;

Those necessary for eudaimonia are open to interpretation but must be based on Epicurus's philosophy.

127i. αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

• ἀοχλησία "freedom from disturbance"
• σώματος genitive singular of σῶμᾰ
  • σῶμᾰ "the body; one's material body or existence"
• “then, those [necessary] for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those [necessary] for life itself.”

There are some translations that interpret αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν to mean only things like clothing and shelter - those things that provide "freedom from disturbance" for the body, that is for one's physical existence. That isn't literally what is written so that is simply one interpretation. Those kinds of things - clothing and shelter - would seem to fall under the final category of those necessary for life. So, this category should catch those between eudaimonia and those necessary for life. This is an interesting category.

I would contend that those "necessary for life itself" are those essentials at the base of Maslow's hierarchy of needs: food, water, shelter, sleep, air, etc. Again, clothing and shelter would seem to fall into this category.

PS: the "on the one hand... On the other hand" are meant to literally translate the Greek μεν... δε... It is clunky and awkward in English but I wanted to get across that they were there in the original. They do not have to be, nor should they be, translated this literally in all cases.

You might want to look up Philodemus' On Property Management for an actual ancient Epicurean's perspective on this topic:

Philodemus: On Property Management

Voula Tsouna provides a translation, extensive introduction, and notes on Philodemus&#39; treatise &quot;On Property Management.&quot; A fragmentary version of…

www.academia.edu

Here's an article Hiram wrote:

On Philodemus’ Art of Property Management

An overview and commentary of a scroll written by 1st Century Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara titled &quot;On Property Management&quot;. The main…

www.academia.edu

I realize this may be too "in the weeds" but I wanted to point out that these topics were being discussed in the Garden 2,000 years ago.

I thought that quote from Philodemus was on point about not feeling distressed by what one loses. I take that too mean don't invest recklessly and stay within your means. But he had much more to say, some applicable to modern life, other advice not so much. But it can be instructive to get a different perspective possibly.

Quote from Pacatus

I do not believe I can “hide” in an Epicurean Garden (not that I think that was what Epicurus advocated – even with his recommendation to, insofar as possible, live an obscure life)

We had an interesting, in-depth discussion on "live unknown" a couple years ago:

Post

What "Live Unknown" means to me (Lathe Biosas)

Fragment 551 famously reads λάθε βιώσας and is usually translated as "Live unknown." It could also be translated as "Live hidden," "Live unnoticed," or "Live while escaping notice."

But how do we square this coming from Epicurus who is known two thousand years after he died. Did he live by this maxim? We can't say Epicurus was even unknown during his life. So how are we to understand láthe biōsas as it pertains to him and ourselves?

Epicurus encouraged people to shun the world of politics and the…

Don

March 7, 2020 at 11:12 PM

You might need interested in what was said in that thread.

Quote from Cassius

I can't get rid yet of a nagging concern that evaluating desire on its own separate from pleasure is going to lead to problems of its own,

Um, Epicurus did the same thing in distinguishing desire and pleasure. So ... Just throwin' that out there.

Pleasure is, by definition, good.

Desires can be natural, unnatural, necessary, unnecessary, or empty. Desires are NOT all good by any means.

They're of course connected. We have desires for pleasures. But pleasure is separate from desire.

Eating is pleasurable. However, the desire *to eat* can come in many permutations, some necessary, some unnecessary, even though eating is natural:

• I want to eat because I'm actually hungry.
• I want to eat because I'm worried.
• I have the munchies. I'm bored.
• I want to eat because my friend is eating and I don't want them to eat alone even though I ate recently.
• I want to eat popcorn because that's what I do at the movie theater even though I'm not hungry.
• I want to eat at this one specific restaurant in Chicago but I can't travel there now. (Now, this one could turn into a pleasant memory!)

Quote from Cassius

But I doubt if there is much call in life, short of dealing with obstinate manipulators like Plato, to dwell on terms like "zero-emptiness." Nonstandard terms tend to confuse regular common-sense People.

I assume we're talking about "katastematic" here.

If so, I'll say your statement is true, but...

1. It was not a "nonstandard term" during Epicurus's lifetime or during the founding and early centuries when the philosophy of the Garden was popular and widespread.
2. It doesn't have to be - nor should it be - the first thing that's talked about when introducing the philosophy to people.
3. We need to have a response to the academics who DO use this term extensively. Because, as we know, people will say, "Didn't Epicurus say this katastematic pleasure was the be-all and end-all of his philosophy?" We need to be able to use the word, understand it (even if we may have a different take), and be able to defend our position. I cede nothing to the academics who want to make Epicureanism into "Stoicism-lite" or "Platonic hedonism" or some minimalistic ascetism that can be safely ignored and marginalized! By Zeus! I refuse to allow academics who themselves sometimes can't even agree on a translation let alone an interpretation dictate the terms of this discussion!

I have no problem using "katastematic" pleasure and defending my Interpretation. I'll use academic research papers and academic authors, but I certainly don't have to agree with their conclusions. Add I'll do my best to describe my Interpretation to "common-sense people" and let them come to their conclusion. And I do hope I've been using (for the most part) common-sense language in my posts at least. (btw, Just to be clear, this is NOT a polemic directed against Cassius !! I just get a tad fired up sometimes. )

Quote from Cassius

It's interesting to note that in that summary there is no distinction between kinetic and katastematic

True. There's no distinction, but...

Quote from Cicero

undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain

Quote from Cicero

strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness

To my reading, both of those are solid descriptions of ataraxia and aponia, ie, katastematic pleasure. So, katastematic pleasure is mentioned but the distinction itself between katastematic and kinetic was not important enough to mention.

Quote from Cassius

The answer cannot be "no more than causes any pain" because we sometimes do chose pain as Epicurus said, for greater pleasure, and we seek not that which is longest but the most pleasant

Excellent point!

Well, to play devil's advocate, we DO have to limit all desires in some sense. Eating food and drinking water are both natural and necessary but if we overeat or even drink too much water (hyponatremia), it's going to lead to pain.

And yes, I'm using water as an example to be provocative

This got longer as I continued to review this thread. This is enough for now! These are consolidated ancient and modern sources and some notes from my posts within this thread:

Notes:

Idea (revised): Biological homeostasis = aponia (freedom from pain in the body; everything is working as it should.

Pathe "what is done or happens to a person or thing, opposite: πρᾶξις (praxis)" Praxis is the concrete aspect of pragma (genitive: pragmata).

On perceived errors in Wikipedia: We can all be Wikipedia editors and contribute content, External links, and references to all relevant articles. Nothing stopping us but time and inertia (two powerful forces btw)

Critical source: Diogenes Laertius, Book X.136:

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK X, EPICURUS (341-271 B.C.)

Other Ancient Sources, both Epicurean and otherwise:

Fragment 68 (see post #37)

68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it. (Saint-Andre)

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα (katastēma) καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Vatican Saying 11 (see post #47)

Alternative translation of VS11 by me: "For the majority of people, to be at rest is to be bored stiff; but to be active is to be raving like a rabid dog."

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

ἡσυχάζον (hesykhazon) I. to be still, keep quiet, be at res

My take is that this "being at rest, being still, keeping quiet" IS none other than ataraxia/aponia/katastematic pleasure. Most people - not us Epicurueans he's saying - think this is being bored or numb. We recognize its importance.

However, he's also saying Epicureans can enjoy active pleasures without "raving like a rabid dog".

Principal Doctrine 14 (see post #47)

PD14 . “Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)

Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

hesykhias shows up here - just like VS11 - translated as "inner peace". Again, inner peace = aponia/ataraxia = katastematic pleasure

Vatican Saying 33 (see post #37)

VS33 The body cries out (σαρκὸς φωνὴ) to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. (NOTE: I see these three conditions to be defining *aponia* and thus a katastematic pleasure!) Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness (εὐδαιμονίας eudaimonias).

σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἂν <διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.

Diogenes of Oenoanda (see posts #37 & #39)

DCLP/Trismegistos 865216 = LDAB 865216

Wall Inscription site:

The inscripion

Diogenes of Oenoanda A:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.

Let us first discuss states (καταστημάτων katastematon), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Diogenes of Oenoanda B discusses katastema: "Diogenes (of Oenoanda) justifies the Epicurean use of the term 'pleasure' to refer to the experience of the state of tranquillity that constitutes the moral end by stating that such usage is in line with the term's ordinary meaning." Not sure if I agree with all of that, but the "state of tranquility" is aponia/ataraxia/katastematic pleasure.

See this paper

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43909587

Metrodorus, Fragment 5 (see post #40 and #46):

Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte : Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, d. 277 B.C : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

26

archive.org

"Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'"

This, to me, points to the "source" - "the sound state of the flesh" (to sarkos eustathes *katastema*) - being a more confident source of pleasure than "objects" (kinetic pleasure). It does NOT say the source "in ourselves" is "better (more value)" just that we can be more "sure" of its continuance - I would add - because we have control over it.

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Metrodorus's quote is: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. Right there, again, is κίνησιν (kinēsin) and καταστηματικῆς (katastēmatikēs).

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato’s "Philebus," [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epicurus, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, III.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

Academic Papers:

Epicurean Happiness: A Pig's Life?

Epicurean Happiness: A Pig's Life?

www.academia.edu

"Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures. A Reappraisal", Elenchos xxxvi (2015) fasc. 2: 271-296.

In this paper I shall offer new definitions for what seem to be the most dominant terms in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures – “kinetic” and “katastematic”. While…

www.academia.edu

"ΤΟ ΚΑΤ’ ΕΝΔΕΙΑΝ ΑΛΓΟΥΝ AND EPICUREAN KATASTEMATIC PLEASURES", ORGANON 48 (2016): 5-19

Abstr act. In this article I wish to emphasize the significance of τὸ κατ&#39; ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν, an expression appearing in our sources on Epicurean ethics which…

www.academia.edu

"Epicurus' Varietas and ἡ κινητικὴ ἡδονή", Mnemosyne 71 (2018) 777-798.

According to Epicurus’ view which locates the summit of pleasure in the absence of all pain, once pain has been removed pleasure cannot be increased, but it…

www.academia.edu

Nice summary, Godfrey . I would agree with all of your points.

And I also agree that getting the distinction between desires and pleasure clear in one's mind is crucial. I particularly like your point about desires being potentially limitless while pleasure/pain each have a natural limit (the elimination of the other feeling: No pain = all pleasure simply because if one is filled **with** pleasure, there's no room for pain. It's the *filling up with pleasure* that's important, not the "removing pain.")

On the desire side, one can continue to lust for power no matter how much power you already have. You can desire more money, no matter how much money you already have. There is no natural limit to those kinds of desires. In one sense, that's why they're empty/void, *nothing* can fill them up!

Cassius asked me:

"what would you say are the implications of your position"

Well, I was going to read all the papers, synthesize all the points, convey my agreements and objections, pull in modern and ancient citations and quotes, and...

But that seemed like way too much work and pain!!

So, what I'll do is try to summarize my thinking into some bullet points and see how far we get.

From what I read in the classical and modern sources:

- The katastematic and kinetic pleasure distinction was not uncommon in ancient philosophical debate.

- Epicurus saw his own approach to this debate as a clear line of contrast between his school and, primarily, the Cyrenaics since both schools were getting painted with the same hedonistic brush.

- - The Cyrenaics posited 2 kinds of feelings (pathē) that a human could have (Pleasure (kinesis), Pain) and a 3rd Neutral "state" (katastema) when experiencing neither pleasure nor pain.

- - - Epicurus rejected this "3rd state". He said the "pathē are two: pleasure and pain." When you're feeling one, you're not feeling the other. This appears to have been revolutionary and controversial at the time, to hear any number of ancient authors tell it.

- - - I see this corroborated especially by X.136 in Diogenes Laertius but other places as well.

- That said, once Epicurus defined "pleasure" as including katastema within the pathos of pleasure, the distinction does not appear to have been a big deal. He was concerned with pleasure. All pleasures.

- - Epicurus, per his quote (and surrounding context of X.136) from On Choices and Avoidances, equates ataraxia and aponia with katastematic pleasures (katastematikai hēdonai).

- - - I also find the "calm sea" metaphor of katastematic pleasure in several sources intriguing since there are numerous references to seas, waters, boats, harbors in Epicurean writings from Epicurus to Lucretius and beyond.

- - In light of the ataraxia & aponia = katastematikai hēdonai definition, anytime ataraxia & aponia (or the associated freedom from pain in body or mind, or calm, etc), we can substitute "katastematic pleasure."

- - - BUT, more importantly, it doesn't matter! It's all pleasure, whether ataraxia & aponia, eating food, seeing pleasing forms, etc. It's all pleasure.

- - - HOWEVER, Epicurus DID seem to place some importance , on that freedom from pain and trouble in both body and mind. BUT not to the exclusion of every other pleasure because he couldn't conceive of "good things"/pleasure without what the Cyrenaics conceived of as kinetic pleasure. As Epicurus writes to Menoikeus: "We do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life."

PS: I would like to go back over this thread and compile all the sources I mentioned previously. Honestly, I forgot some, looking back over this long thread. But that'll come later.

Quote from Kalosyni

, it is important to point out that neutral affect is distinct from other nonvalenced states, such as feeling numb

I think *that's* important, too!

Quote from Cassius

I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly

I think the context is clear. I don't think Diogenes is trying to cherry pick either. Look at the full section where this occurs (I'm using Perseus/Hicks for ease of copying )

Quote

136 He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

*Six* titles are referenced there from *three" Epicurean authors: Epicurus, Diogenes of Tarsus, and Metrodorus. There are two quotes, one from Epicurus, one from Metrodorus. All supporting the same thing. I put much more stock in Diogenes Laertius than I do Cicero. It seems to me DL was trying to get down (mostly) factual or at least anecdotal facts as opposed to Cicero who has a an agenda.

PS. I keep getting frowny faces when I use parentheses. Please don't read more into it anybody. I fixed one in this post already.

Quote from Cassius

I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly

Hmm. If that's the concern, we would arguably have to throw out the majority of fragments and even Cicero since he also didn't necessarily cite context but cherry picked what he wanted.

Quote from Cassius

Please correct me if I am wrong, but in addition to being "rare" this is a statement by Diogenes Laertius

Not from my reading. The original specifically says "And Epicurus in On Choices says as follows..." Then gives the quote.

Quote from Cassius

I see no evidence in the core Epicurean texts that the Epicureans got around to mentioning the word "katastematic" except at best in rare instances.

Sure, rare, but:

Quote

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

Sorry, don't have time to read your full post right now. I will!

But Epicurus literally defined katastematic pleasure as ataraxia (freedom from trouble in the mind) and aponia (freedom of pain in the body).

My contention is that anytime those concepts come up in his and other Epicurean writings, they're talking about katastematic pleasure. They don't use the word because it's not necessary. By definition: freedom from trouble in the mind and freedom of pain in the body = katastematic pleasure.

They don't mention the term every time because it really didn't matter to them. It was a tautology: pleasure = pleasure.