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If anyone needed proof that our mind is inextricably linked to our physical body (and therefore physical itself), check out both the recent Reframing Your Reality episodes, part 1 and 2, of the Hidden Brain podcast. Fascinating stuff!
From the conclusion of the 2nd paper.
This seems to me not a bad argument for the importance of tranquility (ataraxia) in an Epicurean life. It's NOT a tranquility of living in a cave. It is an unassailable position from which to experience all the "pleasures of daily life in their most vivid form." It is a perspective on life. It is acquired from a right understanding of nature and our place in it. It is a tranquility that makes us self-reliant in the face of adversity. It is the tranquility that allows us to understand death truly is nothing to us.
As I said, I don't agree with all the author's points, but I find his support and reasons for tranquility refreshing in the face of most authors simply asserting a "tranquility is the only goal by itself" thesis. This author gives more of a why.
First, as argued in Section 2, its (the tranquil life's) joys are varied and include the pleasures of daily life in their most vivid form.
Second, Epicureanism is based on the idea that lives that are not tranquil are typically unhappy: due to false religious beliefs, fear of death, and wanting more than they can be confident of securing, most ordinary people are beset with worry.
Third, Epicureans hold that the pleasures of tranquillity are valuable because they are produced by inquiry into nature and the best way to live, by crafting our desires accordingly, and by living so that these desires are unlikely to be thwarted. As such, they are an achievement of reason, and one that, as we have seen, leaves luck only a modest role in shaping our lives. The Epicurean tranquil life is therefore autonomous, in the sense that it involves being guided by our reasoned view of the world and our conception of the good and accomplishing what we set out to achieve.
Finally, as Epicurus claims in the passage just quoted from Key Doctrines 20-1, once we have attained tranquillity, our lives are complete. After all, tranquillity is meant to be attainable even when death is imminent. Death must therefore not thwart any strongly held desires of the serene Epicurean. Once we have attained peace of mind, the very desire to remain serene must therefore be a purely conditional desire. That is, as good Epicureans, once we have attained tranquillity, we will want to spend any further time alive in this condition, but we will not want to stay alive in order to remain in it. If we then make the further assumption that something can be bad for a thoughtful, informed adult only if it frustrates a desire of theirs, then it follows that, once we have attained peace of mind through sagacious means, death will not be bad for us. A long time alive in a tranquil state will be welcome—because better than a life of misery—but it will not improve our lives over living a shorter time continuously in the tranquil state before dying. As the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus put it: “The one who understands, having grasped that he is capable of achieving everything sufficient for the good life, immediately and for the rest of his life walks
about already ready for burial, and enjoys the single day as if it were an eternity” (De Morte XXXVIII.14-19 in Warren 2004, p. 152).
For reference, here's the author's follow-up paper:
Okay, I think the author raised some interesting points. I don't agree with all his conclusions, naturally, but at least he took some opinions that are a bit outside the mainstream ones.
Has this been shared before?
In light of the recent threads on desires, I thought this has some interesting takes. I haven't finished reading the entire paper/chapter but did see statements like this:
Now, with regard to such natural and unnecessary desires, Epicurus’ recommendations seem to have been as follows. So long as these desires are not based on false belief (say, the belief that one simply could not be happy without finery, when in fact one could adapt perfectly well to going about in simple clothes), and so long as one could be sufficiently confident that one would always be able to satisfy them without causing pain or distress, there is no objection to developing them, maintaining them, or seeking to satisfy them.
That to me is at least a step in the right direction.
And I have no qualms about the author's mention of "tranquility." He's not saying that is the only thing, and from all I read Epicurus stressed that we need a calm peaceful mind and a healthy body if we are to lead a pleasurable life.
Now, I need to finish reading...
Well, welcome back, @smoothiekiwi .
See, this is my issue with relying on translations. In Greek, the three traits/virtues are:
φρονίμως wisely, sensibly, prudently
καλῶς II. regul. adv. καλῶς, mostly in moral sense, well, rightly
δικαίως —adv. -ως, rightly, justly
And Kalōs καλώς can be defined as:
Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
admirable idem, page 12.
artistic idem, page 42.
auspicious idem, page 53.
beautiful idem, page 68.
buxom idem, page 107.
capital idem, page 111.
comely idem, page 145.
creditable idem, page 183.
elegant idem, page 265.
estimable idem, page 283.
excellent idem, page 288.
exquisite idem, page 296.
fair idem, page 302.
favourable idem, page 311.
fine idem, page 321.
fortunate idem, page 340.
good idem, page 366.
goodly idem, page 367.
handsome idem, page 383.
happy idem, page 384.
high-principled idem, page 400.
honourable idem, page 405.
hopeful idem, page 405.
lovely idem, page 502.
lucky idem, page 504.
noble idem, page 559.
ornamental idem, page 580.
picturesque idem, page 611.
plausible idem, page 618.
pomantic idem, page 625.
principled idem, page 641.
promising idem, page 653.
propitious idem, page 653.
reputable idem, page 699.
righteous idem, page 715.
skilful idem, page 780.
specious idem, page 799.
spruce idem, page 806.
virtuous idem, page 954.
well-favoured idem, page 974.
So, "morality" is only one Interpretation of that 2nd word.
See I read that differently. I think he's saying not saying that everyone has to avoid those things completely, but that everyone has to evaluate their circumstances and options and preferences and decide exactly how much partying and fine food is going to be what they wish to pursue - for the more they pursue, if their circumstances do not allow it - the more pain they will suffer in cost. I put key emphasis on the "endless" adjective.
LOL. I don't think we read it that differently in the end in light of your explanation there.
He clearly didn't forbid attendance at drinking parties. He wrote a book entitled Symposium after all.
I too think the emphasis is on the "endless". And it doesn't really say that in the Greek. Here are my notes from my commentary:
οὐ συνείροντες (ou syneirontes) "not stringing together"
"not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals…"
Note that he doesn't say you can't attend drinking parties or take part in village festivals! He's saying life shouldn't be an "endless string" of them. That's going to lead to more pain than pleasure in the end.
συνείρω
only in pres. and imperf.
I. to string together, Lat. connectere, Ar., Plat.
II. to string words together, Dem., etc.: then, seemingly intr. (sub. λόγους) to speak on and on, go on without pausing, Xen.
PS. I still think this whole line of argument from him is a direct refutation of the Cyrenaics.
Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the τέλος," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and not taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble.
It seems to me that he's clearly stating that an "endless string" of drinking parties and those others do not fall under his definition when he says "pleasure is the goal/end/telos." He's not being coy or obtuse. When we say this, we don't mean that.
Ha - I will say on my last reading that I detect some bias in listing "too much frugality" without listing the negative "descending" that is attached to profligacy"
Not intentional bias.
VS63 warns of choosing too much frugality.
The letter to Menoikeus clearly says that "an endless string of drinking parties and festivals" is not how Epicurus defines pleasure.
So... One is looking for pain with too much frugality or too much "sex, drugs, and rock and roll."
My take has been to understand Epicurus's point as "If your circumstances, for some reason, made it so that you *had* to live in a cave by yourself on the barest of necessities, you *could* find pleasure in that since you're still alive and Nature can supply your necessary needs. BUT it is NOT necessary to live this way. Living among friends, discussing and practicing philosophy, making all your choices and rejections based on practical wisdom and other sound criteria, living neither with too much frugality nor descending into profligacy... That is a pleasurable life."
For an Epicurean, virtue is one of the tools to experience pleasure.
In Epicurean philosophy, what is virtuous depends on the particular context, whereas in Stoic philosophy, they seem to be rather absolute.
The 4 Stoic virtues are:
- (practical) Wisdom
- Justice
- Temperance
- Courage
For the Stoics these are the only good things, with all others being (preferred or dispreferred) indifferents. The stoics are absolute when it comes to their cardinal (in a non christian sense) values. I think all of these virtues are important for a pleasurable life. I can't be unwise, unjust, without self discipline and a coward and have a happy life.
Are there more or different virtues in Epicureanism than these? If yes, how are they defined?
Thanks for bringing your thread back around to the Stoic/Epicurean question. My first thought when reading the list of virtues was Principal Doctrine 5:
5 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως· ὅτῳ δ᾽ ἕν τούτων μὴ ὑπάρχει οἷον ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.
ἄνευ + gen = without
φρονίμως wisely, sensibly, prudently
καλῶς II. regul. adv. καλῶς, mostly in moral sense, well, rightly
δικαίως —adv. -ως, rightly, justly
ἡδέως pleasantly < ἡδονή
My translation: PD5 It is not possible to live a pleasurable life without the traits of (practical) wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living pleasurably. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.
Consider in light of Fragment 519: The greatest fruit of justice is serenity. δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.
Epicurus clearly thinks the "virtues" are important, but they are important because they are instrumental to achieving a pleasurable life and not as ends or goals for their own sake.
(Wondering if maybe we need to move some of these posts to a new thread, since this was originally a thread for Kungi.)
Agree with Kalosyni on that.
Additionally, I advocate getting away from the natural and "unnatural" descriptors. There are natural desires - those arising from nature - and those that are not natural arising from fruitless, void, groundless, empty beliefs. They are κεναί:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=keno/s That's a much better description of what they are than unnatural. Unnatural implies they are somehow not human. They are unfortunately very human desires, but they're empty of substance and can never be satiated.
This is the exact same word Epicurus uses to name the "void" in "atoms and void." He's saying that there is literally nothing there to back up the desire. The void is the absence of atoms. It is the empty space within which the atoms move.
It would all depend on what is considered necessary for happiness.
Here's my take from my translation of the last part of section 127 of the letter to Menoikeus made into a bulleted list:
"Furthermore, ...
I imagine this may sound like nitpicking
Doesn't sound like nitpicking to me 
If anyone is curious from our last 20th get together, here is the play by Aristophanes entitled Wealth (Πλούτος , Plutus is the Latinized spelling since, evidently, *everything* has to be spelled like the Romans did it 
)
PD15 Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.
ἐκπίπτω
Don translation: Nature's treasure has boundaries and is easy to procure; the riches based on empty beliefs are infinite and always out of reach.
Hicks translation: Nature’s wealth has its bounds and is easy to procure, but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.
Saint-Andre translational: Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion are boundless.
.dangerous for it (the soul) to ignore the commands of nature because of attachment to its usual independence" is intriguing. This provides maybe the simplest description of vain desires: ignoring the commands of nature. And it implies the antidote: pay attention!
"...attachment to its usual independence" is less clear.
And I just realized that that "independence" is our old friend αὐταρκείας autarkeias usually translated as "self-reliance"! I was too fixated on the first part!!
200. Don't think it unnatural (ἀφυσιολόγητον aphysiologēton) that when the body cries out, the soul cries also. The body says don't be hungry, don't be thirsty, don't be cold. It is difficult for the soul to prevent these cries, and dangerous for it to ignore the commands of nature because of attachment to its usual independence.
ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν ἡγοῦ βοώσης τῆς σαρκὸς βοᾶν τὴν ψυχὴν· σαρκὸς δὲ φωνή· μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν· καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ψυχὴν χαλεπὸν μὲν κωλῦσαι, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ παρακοῦσαι τῆς παραγγειλάσης φύσεως αὐτῇ τῆς προσφυοῦς αὑτῇ αὐταρκείας καθʼ ἡμέραν.
Otherwise, the phrasing appears to be:
οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαίας
Neither natural nor necessary
I realize it's possibly pedantic, but the words natural and necessary are simply in a negative phrase: neither X nor Y. It's not the words "unnatural"and "unnecessary" themselves.
Please, if anyone sees otherwise, post your findings!
There's also this thread on self-sufficiency from 2021 that might be of interest:
