Posts by Don

For those interested:

Letter To Menoikeus: A New Translation With Commentary : Don Boozer : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

A new translation of the Letter to Menoikeus (Menoeceus) by Epicurus with commentary.

archive.org

Additionally, we believe αὐτάρκεια is a great good. Not so that we are furnished with the use of a few things; but, if we were to have many things, we would be content with few things. Those in need who are genuinely convinced of this find extravagance more pleasant, and that every natural desire is easily procured, and an empty desire difficult to get. For simple flavors bring equal pleasure to extravagant ways of life when once the pain of body and mind experienced through lack or deficiency is removed. [131] A simple meal of hearty, wholesome bread and spring water delivers the most extreme pleasure whenever food and drink have been brought to bear against hunger and thirst; and, when extravagant experiences do come up every once in a while, they are experienced more intensely by us, and we are better able to fearlessly face the vicissitudes of fortune.

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the τέλος," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and not taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble.

And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.

Personally, one of the biggest epiphanies for me while doing my translation and commentary on the letter was the "bread and water" section in 131. Realizing that that was NOT an ascetic instruction but rather the basic meal of regular ancient Greeks was eye-opening.

Another eye-opener for me was the vocabulary used in the "not taking advantage of slaves (or boys) and women" section.

Feel free to read my commentary at Internet Archive and let me know if you agree with my conclusions. We're all here to grow.

Quote from Cassius

I almost hate to comment on this because my thought is not major and I don't want to interrupt the stream of the posts from Don.

Quote from Cassius

Sorry for the interruption - please carry on Don!

LOL! Methinks you imbue my stream of consciousness with too much significance, but I appreciate the thought.

Quote from Cassius

So the comment "they just are" may be true in that they are not inherently bad or good, but if there is a larger component of choice attached to desires then that would be a significant difference (which reminds me of the comment later in the letter about attaching praise or blame).

Oh, I agree! My only intent was to get away from moral judgements. Desires arise naturally from our physical needs and from just living our life but they also arise from things we've been inculcated to desire by society and culture. They're not *morally* good or bad but they can be useful to our life and existence or detrimental to our well-being if we choose to follow them. If we choose NOT to follow those that are useful for our life, that's not going to go well for us. Likewise, if we choose TO follow unhealthy or harmful desires, that's not going to go well for us either. But we should leave the morality out of it. "Oh, you did THAT! You're a BAD person!"

Quote from Cassius

I remember and agree with what Joshua said in the episode about how often in the end it does not work to suppress desires.

Agreed! Suppression seems to me to be unnatural. You can deny there's a tiger behind the tree, but it's going to eat you nevertheless. Likewise, you can deny you have desires - "I can suppress my desires! Look at how righteous I am!" - , but those desires are going to well up, frustrate you, and they're going to come spilling out one way or the other.

That said, I think one can learn to recognize desires as they arise in the mind and to choose wisely which ones to follow and which ones not to. That's not suppressing our desires. That's gaining the facility to recognize helpful and harmful consequences more readily, more accurately, more wisely. It may look like suppression to someone unaccustomed to this kind of practice, but I think it is a very different thing.

Quote from Joshua

Also, the word "natural" has become hugely problematic--Natural Law, so called, is something like a 4th revelation in Christianity after the person of Jesus and the two testaments. Montaigne made the odd claim that atheism was 'unnatural', and the claims have only gotten worse since.

Agreed. What I like about "natural" in the context of Epicurus's writings and other Epicureans is that - originally - it wasn't tainted with our cultural baggage. But it's hard to extricate it from all that!! That's one thing I was trying to get at in post #31 above. That natural vs empty dichotomy to me is helpful in getting at the idea that "natural" desires arise within us from our being part of Nature: material, mortal beings living our lives. Some "only natural" (or unnecessary) desires come from acculturation (ex., a desire for a particular kind of food that brings pleasurable memories from childhood), but many - to my understanding - empty desires arise from being "told" by society/culture/media that we should - must! - want power, money, numerous material possessions ("Latest iPhone! Gimme! Gimme!"), etc.

Quote from Cassius

I hope everyone will help us remember - however - that our goal should be to eventually emerge from these details with some high-level conclusions about what we think Epicurus was saying. We'll discuss as much of all this as we can on the podcast, but the goal eventually needs to be something in writing that summarizes the major distinctions between "desire" and "pleasure" in Epicurean philosophy.

Perhaps even a comparison chart with Desire and Pleasure as the column headings and as many lines as necessary for the major points about them and how they differ or are the same as to each point.

Agreed! Without a conclusion, we turn into ever-arguing Sophists! Some distinct points for me:

1. I am fully onboard with Godfrey 's insistence on maintaining the distinction between desire and pleasure. That's important.
2. My current contention is that Pleasure and Pain are the two big categories into which we can categorize everything that happens to us (the literal meaning of pathe).
3. As such, desire as a thing (What kind of thing?) is subordinate to or contained in or a component of one of those two buckets.
4. Observation: We can choose to fulfill a desire. We cannot choose to feel pleasure. I think that's an important distinction between these two categories.
5. Observation: In response to Joshua , I believe there is a distinction between "desiring something" and "hoping for something." I can desire a particular outcome, or I can hope for something (or as an alternative translation of elpis "have confidence in something happening"). I think those are two different things and I would contend that the desire is more basic while hope/confidence is more aspirational. Hmm... Maybe I'm just wordplaying here, but this is the direction I'm heading. Hope/Confidence/Elpis seems to always point toward a beneficial or pleasurable outcome, whereas the consequence of desire is not always beneficial to me. I can't think that an "empty hope" or "empty confidence" is a logical thing to say. Granted, I may "hope beyond all hope" or something like that. I am reminded of the recent Sandman episode where Dream and Lucifer are battling each other in a "Sword in the Stone" type Wizard duel and SPOILER Dream declares, "I am Hope." "Lucifer was left flabbergasted and without a suitable counter because the Devil could not conceive of anything that could best Hope." I don't think it would have had the same impact or result if Dream had declared "I am Desire" (especially because Desire is one of Dream's Endless siblings).
   
   1. I realize I'm going off on a side track, but I just found this link on The Sandman fan forum and it specifically links Desire (of the Endless) with the Greek word Epithumia! Sorry. Fan of the comics and the new Netflix show.

That'll do for now. I'll hold off on streaming any more until more can add their thoughts.

I have no reason to think this is Epicurean inspired but I thought it was cute:

Pig Römisch Germanisches Museum Köln

Visit the post for more.

ancientglass.wordpress.com

I found it online and it appears to be in Köln originally but has been moved according to Instagram:

decimusclaudius A Roman glass depiction of a pig. It was found locally and is normally on display in the Roman-Germanic Museum in Cologne, Germany although due to construction works it is currenly on display with a selection of items in the Belgian House which is also in that city very rich of history.

Quote from Joshua

I'm not sure I can get on board with the underlined part above. Lucian opposes fear to hope, which I think is nearer the mark;

Quote

And from this point, as Thucydides might say, the war takes its beginning. These ambitious scoundrels were quite devoid of scruples, and they had now joined forces; it could not escape their penetration that human life is under the absolute dominion of two mighty principles, fear and hope (ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου) and that anyone who can make these serve his ends may be sure of a rapid fortune.

Which drives me on to my next (tentative) conclusion--that fear and hope are both kinds of desire. Desire is everything that happens when you see things as they are, and wish that they were different. When unscrupulous scoundrels prey on hope and fear, they prey on desire.

As i mentioned, I'm intrigued by Joshua 's thesis, and additionally I was taken with the idea of hope and fear (ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου). So, I was really wondering where Epicurus may have used ἐλπίδος (which is the genitive of ἐλπίς) "hope, confidence, expectation"

Fragment 116: I summon you to unceasing joy and not to empty and trifling virtues, which destroy your confidence in the fruits of what you have. ἐγὼ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν ἐλπίδας.

Fragment 445: We must not blame the body for the greatest evils nor attribute our troubles to mere circumstance. Instead we seek their cause within the soul: for by giving up every trifling and fleeting desire*** we give birth to a confidence perfect (ἐλπίδα ὅλοι) in itself. (For *** see below)

Letter to Menoikeus 134: Because, on the one hand, one can generally hope for the intercession of the gods by means of worship… ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς

The Strong's Concordance even has this:

G1680 - elpis - Strong's Greek Lexicon (kjv)

G1680 - ἐλπίς elpís, el-pece'; from a primary ἔλπω élpō (to anticipate, usually with pleasure); expectation (abstractly or concretely) or confidence:—faith,…

www.blueletterbible.org

"from a primary ἔλπω élpō (to anticipate, usually with pleasure); expectation (abstractly or concretely) or confidence:—faith, hope"

So, elpis does have sense of "desire for something pleasurable" but it seems to be more of a "confident hope" or "anticipation with the expectation of coming to fruition" whereas "desire" writ large has no sense that it will be fulfilled for sure, it is more a longing for something pleasurable.

Still thinking...

***The "trifling and fleeting desires" referenced in Fragment 445 also shed an interesting light on this discussion. Interestingly, the word epithymia is NOT used here:

πᾶσαν ματαίαν τῶν ἐφημέρων ὄρεξιν (ἐφημέρων = ephemeron)

"Every trifling 'ephemeral' desire"

ὄρεξῐς "yearning, longing, desire"

Even LSJ defines it as opposed to φυγή which is the *exact* word used by Epicurus in "choice and avoidance/flight"

Epicurus also uses this word in Fragment 202:

He who follows nature and not groundless opinions is completely self-reliant. With regard to what is enough by nature, everything he owns is a source of wealth; whereas with regard to unlimited desires (τὰς ἀορίστους ὀρέξεις), even the greatest wealth is poverty.

It shows up in Demetrius Lacon's PHerc831 (Column 16) as "empty desires" κενῶν [ὀρέ]ξεων

DCLP/Trismegistos 59491 = LDAB 591

So, in addition to epithymia we have to take orexis into account:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ὄρεξις

I also think it's instructive to look at that word "natural" in the "natural" and "empty" desires.

Natural is φυσικός "physikos" "natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native."

The natural desires are the ones that we're born with, the ones that naturally arise because of our being physical, material, mortal beings.

The "empty" desires then - to me - refer to desires that have been inculcated in us by culture, indoctrination, societal expectations, etc. They do not naturally arise within us. They are desires we've been taught that we "should" have -- lust for power, greed for unlimited wealth, etc. -- but that can never be satisfied.

Here's where I'm at on what desires are. Some of this has already been offered by ya'll so I fully admit this is not necessarily original! I'm just consolidating my understanding. So...

The BIG category under which all this falls are the pathe. This literally means "that which happens to someone, that which is experienced." Everything we "feel" falls under this category.

The only ways we experience something is whether it causes us to feel pleasure or whether it causes us to feel pain. That's why - to my understanding - is why Epicurus was so adamant about two feelings especially against the Cyrenaics. If it happens to us, we feel it. Whether that's a subtle pleasurable feeling or an intense pleasurable feeling or a twinge of pain or a terrible pain. That's it. Only two ways of feeling.

That's why the table in the post above puts pathos/pathe at the top under which are pleasure and pain.

That's why I like the idea of desire and phobos/"fear" being the starting points for the two schemas under pleasure and pain. I took phobos to mean "fear" because it's SO associated with English -phobia now. But at its root it means

fear, terror, alarm, fright, panic

the act of fleeing: flight, retreat

which is exactly the same idea for the words Epicurus uses for choice and "avoidance" - literally, choice or "flight/fleeing"

Desire is an attraction to something pleasurable

Flight is a repulsion from something that causes pain

The feeling of desire attracts us to a pleasure leading to a feeling of joy/khara (I **really** want to explore how khara got into that schema!!)

The feeling of wanting to flee repels us from a pain that leads to a feeling of distress

I don't think we "desire" pain, BUT we can *choose* to undergo the pain - fighting the urge to flee - IF we are relatively convinced that going through the pain will lead to a feeling of pleasure. We are choosing to undergo the pain BECAUSE we have a *desire* - an attraction - for the pleasure at the other end. We do not have a desire to undergo the pain. We would rather flee from the pain... BUT we can *choose* otherwise due to our practice of practical wisdom.

We can anticipate the pleasure, and that in itself is pleasurable.

I'm intrigued by Joshua 's concept of desire as a lack of satisfaction or a knowledge of some lack in ourselves that we endeavor to fill. But I'm wondering whether it's focusing on a "lack" or whether we're instead focusing on the pleasure that will accrue from fulfilling that desire. It's not the pain that's the focus but the pleasure at the end that initiates a feeling of desire. I'm still working on that. Pain can be a guide, it IS one of the two feelings after all! But it is also something that we don't seek out for its own sake. If someone says "Hot peppers cause pain." Objectively, yes. Subjectively, some people derive pleasure from spicy food. The hot pepper is not "bad" or "good", painful or pleasurable in itself. It is only our feeling about the hot pepper that causes us to be attracted to it or to flee from it.

Still working through this. Consider this my on-going stream of consciousness on this thread!

One of the issues at play here seems to be the use of the words "good" and "bad" which begins to - albeit unconsciously - give desire and pain and pleasure a moral coloring. I don't think that's useful for our discussions, so I would like to steer us away from any deliberate or accidental moral arguments.

In the original, pain is κακος kakos which is sometimes translated as bad but the original had the following connotations:

As a measure of quality: bad, worthless, useless

As a measure of appearance: ugly, hideous

Of circumstances: injurious, wretched, unhappy

As a measure of character: low, mean, vile, evil

As a "measure of character", yes, maybe we could interpret kakos as "bad" or "evil" but only because a person with that character is going to cause distress, pain, etc.

But applied to pain itself, we have to look at a "measure of quality", so pain is bad like a piece of rotten fruit has gone "bad." It's worthless, useless, etc. Or as a "measure of appearance," pain leads to unhappiness, to a wretched existence, etc.

But pain is not morally "bad."

Desire's are not "bad" or "good." They are "natural" or "κενος 'kenos'/empty (like the void)." Empty is not a moral judgement. To me, it beautifully encapsulates the "groundless" nature of those desires. They can never be filled, never be satisfied, it's like trying to fill the void. It can't be done.

Pleasure is our innate "agathos/good" because it elicits the opposite of pain, moving us to health and peace in our mind and body.

Pain is inherently "kakos/bad" because it elicits the opposite of pleasure, moving us to sickness and distress in our mind and body.

So, I don't think it's helpful to think of desires as "good" or "bad". They just are. I'm going to address my (current) take on what they are in the next post... always reserving the right to revise and extend my remarks.

PS: Extending and revising already here... One of the connotations of agathos "good" and kakos "bad" are useful and useless, respectively. Another way of saying it is beneficial and harmful. Seeing pleasure and pain in that way may be helpful as well.

Quote from Cassius

Pleasure is the only word that Epicurus held to be always "good" -- Did he say that specifically, or is PD08 the closest to that?

Letter to Menoikeus: [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words, what the consequences will be. We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

I would come very close to applying the same phrasing as in the letter and paraphrase the result as: "All Desires are good, because they are desirable, but some desires may lead to more pain than pleasure and thus should not be chosen.

I want to go back through the arguments in the thread and reasons, but this one stuck out to me.

I'd have to say no to that paraphrase. Epicurus explicitly describes some desires as groundless, empty, vain. That doesn't sound like a description of something "good." In fact, it sounds like something to be avoided.

To bring this back to the discussion started on the podcast, it seems to me that desire (epithymia/ voluntas) is a feeling (falling under the pathē) but also an act of will so to speak. From that table above, desire (epithymia) is a feeling of something that results in some pleasure. The opposite of desire is fear (phobos) which appears to be a feeling repelling against something that leads to pain. There are only two categories of feeling because you can only be attracted or repelled by feelings leading to pleasure or pain.

Discuss

Perseus Search Results

Not that many instances of desiderio in Lucretius? Must be using another word for desire.

PS. From this...

https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/9789004233447/B9789004233447-s003.pdf%3FpdfJsInlineViewToken%3D966890815%26inlineView%3Dtrue&ved=2ahUKEwiEo8n5qID6AhUck4kEHQeLA2Q4FBAWegQIBxAB&usg=AOvVaw1kgQQsgiQfZVuUg1iIKfwP

It appears the usual Latin translation of Greek epithymia was voluntas.

Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, vŏluntas

So in Lucretius...

Perseus Search Results

So more than desiderio but not as many as I'd expect. Assuming there are more in Cicero.

More resources of varying academic rigor:

The Passions according to the Stoa

Concupiscence - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Chastity and Lust

Way too Christian but I thought this might be helpful:

§ 4. Ἐπιθυμία / epithumia = DESIRE, LONGING, LUST

[Latin: desiderio]

1. In classical Greek: In Homer and the pre-Socratics ἐπιθυμία / epithumia denotes the direct impulse towards food, sexual satisfaction etc., and also desire in general. In the first instance there is nothing morally objectionable or even suspicious about it. Plato and Aristotle still use the term in a neutral sense; however, they encourage theoretical and practical aloofness from the sensual world. Thus from the Stoics onwards ἐπιθυμία / epithumia acquires a negative connotion in philosophical circles.

So, it looks like the Christians and Stoics started using epithymia/epithumia (u/y both transliterate Greek upsilon υ) negatively for "lust" but it didn't start out that way.

I may take you up on your idea with Latin although I am woefully ignorant of that language. If someone else wants to jump in the linguistic pool, come in!

As a first step, just saw this paper

The Meaning of "Will" (Voluntas) in Augustine

This article (published in Augustinian Studies 37.2) argues that Augustine uses voluntas as a translation for Stoic horme^, i.e. impulse toward action; it uses…

www.academia.edu

But I'll have to try and figure out what got used in Lucretius and Cicero in relation to Epicurean themes.

Wonderful and potentially very fruitful discussion!! Having this many insightful and curious people on the podcast and on the forum is a boon!

I realize I'm heading deep into the weeds with this post, but, as is my habit, I wanted to try to get at what the ancients thought when they used the word we're translating as "desire": epithymia επιθυμία. Where did it show up? What connotations did it have? How was it defined at the time?

I found this paper:

A Semantic Analysis of Desire in 4 Maccabees and its bearing on Romans 7

A Semantic Analysis of Desire in 4 Maccabees and its bearing on Romans 7

www.academia.edu

Granted, it's looking at 4 Maccabees and Romans 7, but I found its diagram on page 4 very interesting (screenshot below)

For those who don't read Greek, I'll transliterate that table and provide some translations:

Pathos (see LSJ definition below)

1. Hēdonē (pleasure) 2. Ponos (pain)

Under pleasure and pain, there's a series that from the paper the author says it's a sequence:

Hēdonē

{epithymia (desire)

|

hēdonē (pleasure)

|

χαρά khara (joy - NOTE: one of the two named "kinetic" pleasures, too!)

So, first comes desire, then pleasure, then joy in this scheme.

On the other side:

Pain

{phobos (fear)

|

ponos (pain)

|

lypē/lupē (pain, grief, distress; see LSJ below)

So, fear then pain then the feeling of distress as opposed to joy in the other column)

The middle word θυμός thymos is tricky. I've placed the LSJ entry below. Basically, those sequences make up the mind or soul.

I'm sharing all this because I found that sequence in the middle interesting and the distinctions made among the components potentially intriguing for the discussion. I haven't read the whole paper yet but the diagram popped out. These texts were written c. 50-150 CE so several hundred years post-Epicurus but still within the classical Epicurean time period albeit from a very different perspective. However, those words were common ways of speaking about pain, pleasure, feelings, desire, etc.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, π , πάγ-χαλκος , πάθος

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πα?́θ-η

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, θυ_μός

Epicurus uses ponos for pain here:

486. Pain does not consist in being deprived of things, but rather in bearing the avoidable distress caused by groundless opinion. οὐκ ἀπορεῖν τούτων πόνος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν μᾶλλον τὸν ἀνόνητον ἐκ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πόνον.

However he also uses other words for pain elsewhere (especially words connoting disturbance, etc) but πόνος is here in 486.

67. I do not think I could conceive of the good** without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν** ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀκροαμάτῶν, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατʼ ὄψιν [those by way of shapes and along with vision] ἡδείας κινήσεις [pleasing motion].

• οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω [thinking/conceiving] τἀγαθὸν
• I do not believe I am about to be thinking/conceiving of the good
• ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς,
• to take away the pleasures of taste/flavor
• ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀφροδισίων,
• and to take away those through sexual desire,
• ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀκροαμάτῶν,
• to take away those through hearing (song and speech)
• ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατʼ ὄψιν [those by way of shapes and along with vision] ἡδείας κινήσεις [pleasing motion].

**"the good" τἀγαθὸν This is the same word used in the Tetrapharmakon as well as the same word used in other texts that talk about "The Good"

Yeah, I'm cutting her some slack. That tranquility angle is the dominant interpretation whether we accept it or not.

Her podcasts are a breezy, fun intro to classical mythology, history, and literature. I highly recommend the podcast for anyone interested in Greek and Latin history who also wants to be entertained.

At least, this is a much better - and friendlier - quick intro to Lucretius and Epicureanism than we usually get!

Quote from Don

on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself.

Several points. Not necessarily original, just on my mind.

There are two primary categories of desires:

A. Empty/fruitless/vain/groundless ones

B. Natural ones

So, whatever desires are not empty are natural

Of the Natural ones, there are:

A. Just natural ones (these are sometimes qualifed as "not necessary" in some parts of the text but not here; here it says they're "only natural")

B. Those natural AND necessary

Of these natural AND necessary ones, there are:

1. Those necessary for eudaimonia

2. Those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body

3. Those necessary for life itself

I have a hard time figuring out what falls into B1. What is "necessary" for my well-being? If I translate it another way, what is "necessary" to make me happy?

However, what if we look at it differently? Is B1 concerned with mental disposition and B2 specifically addressing physical disturbance? Is eudaimonia primarily mental or both mental and physical? But then how to integrate B3 into the mix? I'm convinced it is NOT a hierarchy but rather a classification system.

For B2...

127i. αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

ἀοχλησία "freedom from disturbance"

σώματος genitive singular of σῶμᾰ

σῶμᾰ "the body; one's material body or existence"

“then, those [necessary] for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those [necessary] for life itself.”

There are some translations that interpret αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν to mean only things like clothing and shelter - those things that provide "freedom from disturbance" for the body, that is for one's physical existence. That isn't literally what is written so that is simply one interpretation. Those kinds of things - clothing and shelter - would seem to fall under the final category of those necessary for life. So, this category should catch those between eudaimonia and those necessary for life. This is an interesting category.

I would contend that those "necessary for life itself" are those essentials at the base of Maslow's hierarchy of needs: food, water, shelter, sleep, air, etc. Again, clothing and shelter would seem to fall into this category.

Natalie Haynes Stands Up for the Classics - Series 8 - Lucretius - BBC Sounds

Six-book epic poem on philosophy and physics? Don't mind if I do.

www.bbc.co.uk

I am a BIG fan of Natalie Haynes and now she's finally done an episode of "Natalie Haynes Stands Up for the Classics" on Lucretius.

Other than getting the "size of the sun" shibboleth wrong it's a delightful and positive stand up for Lucretius. Enjoy.

For anyone interested, here is my commentary and translation:

Letter To Menoikeus: A New Translation With Commentary : Don Boozer : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

A new translation of the Letter to Menoikeus (Menoeceus) by Epicurus with commentary.

archive.org

Furthermore, on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain. [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words, what the consequences will be. We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

Looks like there's also Usener Fragment 228

[ U228 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 2, p. 1086F-: Heraclides then, a student of literature, is repaying his debt to Epicurus for such favors of theirs "as rabble of poets" and "Homer’s idiocies" and the verity of abuse that Metrodorus has in so many writings heaped upon the poet.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellenies, V.14, p. 257.52: Homer, while representing the gods as subject to human passions, appears to know the Divine Being, whom Epicurus does not so revere.

Epicurus: Fragments - translation (2)

So, from that it does appear - to me - that Epicurus (and Metrodorus) were most concerned with Homer and the depiction of the gods in poetry.

There's also U227:

Cicero, On End-Goals, Good and Bad, II.4.12: Your school {Epicureanism} argues decisively that there is no need for the aspirant to philosophy to study literature at all.

Cf., Ibid., I.21, 71-72 (Torquatus to Cicero): You are disposed to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement?

And U341:

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, VII.7.13: Zeno, the Stoic, taught that there was a hell, and that the abodes of the virtuous were separated from the wicked, and that the former inhabited quiet and delightful regions, while the latter paid their penalty in dark places and horrible caverns of mud. The prophets made the same thing clear to us. Therefore, Epicurus was in error who thought that this was a figment of the poet’s imagination, and took those punishments of hell to be those which are borne in this life.

And U364:

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 27, 8 p. 782C: As for the gods of whom their poets sing as "Givers of good things," {Homer, Od. viii. 325} these philosophers with mocking reverence say, The gods are neither givers nor partakers of any good things. In what way then do they show evidence of the existence of gods, if they neither see them present and doing something, as those who in admiration of the sun and moon and stars said that they were called gods (θεούς) because of their running (θεειν), nor assign to them any work of creation or arrangement, that they might call them gods from setting (θεῖναι), that is making (for in this respect in truth the Creator and Artificer of the universe alone is God), nor exhibit any administration, or judgment, or favor of theirs towards mankind, that we should owe them fear or honor, and therefore worship them? Or did Epicurus peep out from the world, and pass beyond the compass of the heavens, or go out through some secret gates known only to himself, and behold the gods dwelling in the void, and deem them and their abundant luxury blessed? And did he thence become a devotee of pleasure, and an admirer of their life in the void, and so exhort all who are to be made like unto those gods to participate in this blessing, [etc.]