REMINDER: SUNDAY WEEKLY ZOOM - February 1, 2026 -12:30 PM EDT - Ancient text study and discussion: De Rerum Natura, Currently we are at Line 136 - Level 03 members and above (and Level 02 by Admin. approval) - read more info on it here.
If it seemed like I was making a distinction there, that was not my intent.
"lower-case goods" == "goods"
I was being too clever for my own good.
Okay, I'll go along with that. Maybe I was being pedantic.
That said, it sounds like we agree that there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category.
Is our hangup then seeing "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good") as being one of these "goods" but being special in that it is the only "good thing" that does not point to any other "good thing"?
I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of lower-case good. Is that correct?
Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.
There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").
I know Eikadistes said earlier in the thread that The Good wasn't a good (and I'm paraphrasing from memory so feel free to correct me!), but I'm not so sure about that.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀγαθο-εργέω , ἀγα^θός
For anyone who's interested, here's a similar thread:
But then he goes on to say that the highest good is prudence. It seems that Epicurus said this, so he's on solid ground there.
Right. The highest *instrumental* good thing.
Nevertheless, I think it is useless and counter-productive to even discuss a "highest good" once you have established that pleasure is not it.
I don't think we've established that.
And providing the most pleasure is the only criteria we have to consider a good "highest", right?
No. We're getting hung up on the word "highest" here. It's not a value like "best." Well, in a way but not primarily. It's the highest at the summit towards which all other good things point. Or, within this discussion, to which all other good things serve as instrumental things.
And even if you could find one "highest good", so what? Are there some important goods that almost everyone will want to have? Sure. And Epicurean ethics should talk about those. But there is no need for a universal ranking to apply to everyone in all circumstances.
It's not a ranking. We're not putting good things into a hierarchy. I'll get to Epicurus's prudence in a moment. I've had this discussion with Cassius before, too. Pleasure is the only good thing that doesn't point to something else. That's what makes it the "highest", telos, goal, summum bonum, etc. The cheese stands alone, to use the Old McDonald had a Farm song. Practical wisdom/prudence can be characterized as the most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing (not The Good) because it is through this virtue that we're able to make them best decisions for what pleasures to choose and from which pleasures to flee. Butt it's still subordinate to and instrumental for achieving pleasure.
And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.
translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.
That's always the issue with texts originally written in a foreign language which we don't read. We (and I'm including myself here!) are at the mercy of translators and scholars, but they bring their own biases and interpretations. That's why I tend to use multiple English words where the texts have one, to try and pull out some nuances. Even if we spoke *modern* Greek, we'd still be at a disadvantage.
To pull this back to "good," that word has it's own semantic baggage in English but it's been decided over the decades that that's a "good" enough "equivalent" to αγαθός. It's important to remember that, but it's what we have to work with.
I don't think I'm going to budge on this.
I respect your conviction.
Pleasure isn't just a good.
What would you call it then? And that's not meant as sarcasm! I'm just wanting to see what word you'd use to describe it.
You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.
I've found it instructive to always go back to the source texts and the words used. When anyone - Aristotle, Epicurus, et al. - talked about "good" or "the good" as it's uniformly translated into English, the words used are αγαθός (agathos) "good" and ταγαθον (tagathon, basically the previous word with the definite article "the" bound to it) "the good."
I looked at the LSJ (THE standard reference for ancient Greek) definition for αγαθός:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός
What I found instructive was the various connotations of that word:
II. of things,
1. good, serviceable
2. of outward circumstances, to good purpose,
3. morally good
4. ἀγαθόν, τό, good, blessing, benefit, of persons or things; as term of endearment for a baby, blessing!, treasure!; confer a benefit on . . , :—in pl., ἀγαθά, τά, goods of fortune, treasures, wealth; “ἀγαθὰ πράττειν” fare well; also, good things, dainties: good qualities; good points, of a horse.
To me, what it's getting at are "What things in life or this world confer benefit? What do we consider to provide a service to us?"
With these connotations, Epicurus seems to me to say wisdom, morality, and justice are goods because they provide the benefit of our living pleasurable lives.
But they aren't the end of goods. Pleasure is that to which all other goods point or end up - all other things that provide benefit to our lives ultimately do so because they provide us with pleasure.
So he uses ταγαθον when he talks about the expansiveness of pleasure here:
Fragment 67. I do not think I could conceive of the good (τἀγαθὸν) without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.
LOL! I like your "clickbait" caveat 
I was with you up until the end but let me try to at least explain why I don't *fully* embrace your post there.
I see your reference to DeWitt 's "summum bonum fallacy" and I've expressed my skepticism for that DeWittean idea before on the forum. As I remember her rests his argument on the fact that Latin doesn't have a definite article and that always seemed weak to me.
I also think that many times (myself included) have equated English "highest good" as "the best good." While "summum" means 'top, summit" I don't interpret that as "best" as in quality. It's the "good" that's reached at the end, it's the good to which will other goods point. Metaphorically, if you're walking up the path past all other goods asking "What is behind this? Why do I do this?" You'll end up finding at the summit the moving toward pleasure (and avoiding pain).
All the ancient philosophies asked the question "What is it to which all goods point?" Epicurus had an answer, and a powerful one.
I've explained my take on this in my commentary to Book 1 of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics:
I found this Vatican Saying interesting, translated by Saint-Andre:
60. Everyone departs from life just as they were when newly born.
πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.
[NOTE] This saying is a bit cryptic. Some translations render it almost as meaning that the soul is born again at death, but clearly that would be at odds with the rest of what Epicurus says (e.g., Principal Doctrine #2). I take it to mean that human beings do not change throughout life in their essential needs: a person who is dying, just like a newborn baby, needs only to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold .
"Older people are more complicated. They seek pleasure in more advanced ways, and they often appear to seek pain in the short-term. But they hope that will bring them even greater pleasure later."
I think that is a great formulation. It avoids the "infants are just better" problems.
I could see that formulation, but I'd push back on "infants are better."
They're not better. They're a data point. Animals are another data point. These demonstrate through observation that this is a natural inclination to seek pleasure and avoid pain.
Adults not seeking pleasure but are another data point demonstrating what happens when we don't skillfully seem pleasure.
Pain and pleasure don't tell us what to act upon but themselves. They are a guide. We use our reasoning ability to weigh outcomes and seek that which will lead to a maximally pleasurable life.
I guess the fundamental problem I have is the idea that living things start good, and then get worse.
Oh, I don't necessarily think good/bad is the way to go. We as humans are observed (especially as children) to instinctively gravitate towards what gives us pleasure (in the widest sense) and to recoil from that which gives us pain. It's not good or bad. That's just what happens. As adults, we should learn - per Epicurus - how to do that skillfully to provide ourselves with a maximally pleasurable life. Some adults find other motivations and stop listening to their pain/pleasure guide.
Maybe this will be clarifying: In your opinion, is the cradle argument an example of "reasoning"?
I would call it observation, seeing things the way they are.
It also is important to remember that Epicurus's problem was with indoctrination within the Platonic educational system: paideia παιδεία is the word he consistently uses.
Right, but if that it is the only issue, then you could look to the "uneducated" for ethical guidance.
Well... Sometimes that might not be such a bad idea.
Cassius brings up good points in #43.
It also is important to remember that Epicurus's problem was with indoctrination within the Platonic educational system: paideia παιδεία is the word he consistently uses.
And why do they want to do that? What is their motivation?
Fear and lack of true friendship.
Exactly! They are in pain. How do humans relieve pain? By moving toward what gives them pleasure.
Some people do make choices out of how they want to appear to others, so as to gain respect
And why do they want to do that? What is their motivation?
ground it into something purely Epicurean
Hmmm... So that's the issue then. To be "purely Epicurean" hints at there being some "essence" of Epicurus's philosophy whereas Epicurus tried to use nature (and human nature) as it is found to serve as the foundation. There are definitely technical, specific terms used in Epicureanism like prolepsis, but "pleasure" is meant to cast a wide net and to be grounded in the natural feeling of pleasure vs pain. Epicurus's whole thing was to expand the definition in contrast to the Cyrenaics and Platonists.
To narrowly define pleasure or to constrain it would be a step in the wrong direction I believe.
Though in some respects, maybe they have a point, not in their rhetoric attached to such lifestyles, but acting in according to their desires in their own non-Epicurean way.
Well, Epicurus said it's better to follow the religious beliefs of the hoi polloi than be subject to determinism.
Perhaps it's less "happiness and contentment through my free will and contemplation" and more "pleasure is the active and passive sensation I experience from my study of nature and rejection of the supernatural on top of making choices and avoidances according to my desires."
Ok, I think I can see where you're going.
I'd add that Epicurus only allowed for two primary categories of feelings: pleasure and pain. All our sensations are supposed to fall into one of those (with obvious gradations and variations).
Plus from my perspective, Epicurus's philosophy is based on making skillful choices as to what to act upon and what to reject as to live a pleasurable life.
Oh you were still pursuing pleasure or acting on your desires; you just didn't know it."
I would also say that they *know* it, they just can't admit it to themselves because "pleasure" is seen as a "four letter word."
I find it to be extremely reductive and almost gimmicky to reduce a lot of other ways of life and decisions on the grounds of "Oh you were still pursuing pleasure
Ah! But not all pleasure should be chosen. Do those pleasures I have listed lead to a life of secure pleasure or can they lead to anxiety about the future or how one is perceived by others?
