Posts by Don

Quote from Little Rocker

"The one who best contrived against a lack of confidence about external threats made those he was able kin, while those he was unable, he did not make aliens. Those with whom he was not able to do even this, he avoided and banished so far as it was advantageous to do so."

...

The 'with whom' gives away my decision to go with 'persons,' but basically, you would have reason to translate it either way. That said, the opening construction is loosely the same in KD 40, and it does seem pretty clear there he's talking about people.

Your mention of 40 reinforces my conviction that there really aren't "40 principal doctrines." That appears to me to have been imposed much later because the manuscripts do not appear to have been delineated like that. The Kyriai Doxai looks to me as is it was originally a prose work similar to the letters which means there wouldn't have been "hard and fast" demarcations between "doctrines" but rather paragraphs on different topics. Reading them individually as if in isolation has seemed the wrong approach - to me, at least - for awhile now.

PS...

Quote from Little Rocker

a steady diet of burnt toast

LOL! I must like burnt toast because I get a kick out of it. That said, I hear you!

Today's CBS Sunday Morning...

Good call, Todd , in returning to the source. Kicking myself for relying on translations

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φῦλον

You are correct in seeing those as referring to humans of the (homophylos) same tribe etc and (allophylos) other tribes.

This probably circles back to those with whom you can make social agreements and those you can't.

Thanks!

Quote from Todd

I see PD39 as relating to the idea of justice as much as (or more so than) friendship. Based on the awkwardness of the translations, I doubt Epicurus even used the word for friendship there.

Yeah, I'm like a moth to a flame

You are correct. Epicurus did not use any word that specifically refers to "friendship" like philia φιλιά anywhere in that PD. The Saint-Andre translation is one of the more literal ones I've seen:

The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous.

Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο· τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξηρέσατο ὅσα τούτων λυσιτελῆ πράττειν.

For ones like this, I always encourage people to check out Eikadistes 's compilation of translations of the PDs in the File library here at EoicureanFriends.

PS: I wonder, as I read those translations compiled by Eikadistes , if those "external threats" refer in some way to the "external threats" to our inner tranquility. That confidence referred to in PD39 reminds me of Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus talking about the assurance we can have about pleasure arising from internal sources against the less confidence we can have about pleasure from sources outside ourselves. I may be stating the obvious, but it literally just hit me as I was reading through Eikadistes 's doc.

Quote from Little Rocker

But Cassius, surely it's more than simply my 'perspective' that Stoicism sucks! Isn't Stoicism, like, transcendentally bad?!

Yes! It is so refreshing to read that.

There *are* healthier ways of living than others, ways *more aligned* with "the way things are" than others.

Quote from Little Rocker

At least on their surface, KD 36-8 suggests that there's a 'basic grasp' of justice that sets the standard

I agree. That "standard" seems to me to be P31

"Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed."

I've also begun to understand the prolepsis of justice to be connected in some way to the inborn sense of fairness seen in research with babies and toddlers.

Ex:

Do Kids Have a Fundamental Sense of Fairness?

Experiments show that this quality often emerges by the age of 12 months

blogs.scientificamerican.com

Infants as young as 12 months expect resources to be divided equally between two characters in a scene. By preschool, children will protest getting less than peers, even paying to prevent the peer from getting more. As children get older, they are willing to punish those who have been unfair both when they are the victims of unfairness as well as when they witness someone else being treated unfairly.

Developmental differences in infants’ fairness expectations from 6 to 15 months of age

The present research investigated the developmental trajectory of infants’ fairness expectations from 6 to 15 months of age (N = 150). Findings revealed a…

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

A nascent sensitivity to fairness can be traced back to infancy. At 15 months of age, infants look longer at unfair distribution outcomes (i.e., a 3:1 distribution) compared to fair outcomes (i.e., a 2:2 distribution; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). This looking time preference suggests that infants expect resources to be distributed equally among recipients and they are able to identify a violation of this norm of equality.

A new study presents the first evidence that a basic sense of fairness and altruism appears in infancy. Babies as young as 15 months perceived the difference between equal and unequal distribution of food, and their awareness of equal rations was linked to their willingness to share a toy.

Quote from Cassius

It's tricky to describe and yet not sound like a "monster," but it seems to me that Epicurus was saying that the universe simply doesn't care about our moralities.

Thoughts...

One doesn't sound like a "monster" saying the universe doesn't care - about us, our moralities, our culture, our world. That's a simple fact. Fully onboard with that idea.

However...

One starts to sound like that "monster" if it's implied or inferred or understood that Epicureans see "no problem" when people harm or kill others for pleasure. I continue to hold that the philosophy does not do that. I've had this conversation on this forum before, so apologies for anyone who was around for that. But after that basic premise, it gets complicated. After that, it's all contextual. And, I think, I'm able to now get my head around some nuances to that idea. "Torquatus" provides some tough contexts to consider. But this thread has really made me think about the foundational place that context and intention play in sizing up any "ethical" discussion in Epicurean philosophy. It seems to me that one can't really talk about "right" and "wrong" but rather, for example, "just" and "unjust." But there's no judge on high or stone-carved rulebook. A "commandment" like Thou shall not kill is somewhat useless and almost universally ignored. I'm intentionally using that as it's one of the most provocative.

Should you kill to protect your life?

Should you kill to protect your family?

Should you kill to protect your friends?

Should you kill to protect a stranger?

Should you kill to protect your car?

Should you kill to *prevent* harm to your life or your loved ones?

Should you hire someone to kill for you to prevent harm to yourself?

Should you kill animals to eat?

Should you kill rats in your house?

Should you kill bacteria that make you sick?

Should you kill animals in experiments?

Should you kill people like the TV character Dexter does because they've done "bad" things?

I'm hoping the list made you more uneasy as you went down.

To be clear, none of these scenarios matter one way or the other at all to "the universe."

However, we live in a human society with social contracts that provide context for these scenarios. There are just and unjust actions. There are choices and rejections to make. There are wise and unwise choices. *Almost* every one of those scenarios could have multiple contingencies, contexts within which some choices would be prudent and other choices that would not be prudent. Not having a rulebook is hard but it can also be seen as freeing. Because of this, I see Epicurean philosophy as a very grown up, adult way of living. There are exemplars like Epicurus, but ultimately it's up to each individual to make prudent decisions that lead to a healthy body, a tranquil mind, friends that can be relied on, enough community goodwill to be safe, and extravagant pleasures that provide for a pleasurable life.

I'll relinquish the soapbox for now.

Quote from Euboulos

Let them three parts of wine all duly season

With nine of water, who'd preserve their reason;

...

Quote from Fragment from the Greek Playwright Euboulos

"For sensible men...

I find it interesting that "preserve their reason" and "sensible men" translates τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι (tois eu phronousi) which is related to phronesis "practical wisdom." Something like "those who exercise their wisdom well."

Quote from Little Rocker

I mean, at the risk of sounding too extreme, I suspect that Epicurus is even open to the possibility that drinking to excess can be beneficial under some bizarre, even common, circumstances. If, for lack of a better example, a tyrant says he will force the citizens with the healthiest relationship to alcohol to fight in an unjust war, I think Epicurus might recommend falling down drunk in public a few times. Or if the only way a person can motivate themselves to do something courageous is to opt for 'liquid courage,' then Epicurus might say, 'hey, better perhaps you didn't need it, but well, turns out you do. Let me refill your glass.'

Or, ruling out the genuinely bad behavior Euboulos mentions, if it turns out empirically that getting drunk on Friday and ending up at Waffle House with college friends creates long-lasting memories of pleasure, then those memories could justify the hangover. I guess I'm just saying that I'm willing to consider going a lot further into traditional hedonism than a lot of people might find comfortable.

I don't think that's extreme. I would absolutely agree. You're just a little more creative in your scenarios than I've been

Having been raised in a society that likes absolutes in its ethics, that lack of absolutes in Epicurus I find refreshing, difficult to internalize, and intriguing all at the same time.

Thanks, Joshua !! I had forgotten about these lines.

Here's a variant translation from Perseus:

And Eubulus introduces Bacchus as saying—

Let them three parts of wine all duly season

With nine of water, who'd preserve their reason;

The first gives health, the second sweet desires,

The third tranquillity and sleep inspires.

These are the wholesome draughts which wise men please,

Who from the banquet home return in peace.

From a fourth measure insolence proceeds;

Uproar a fifth, a sixth wild licence breeds;

A seventh brings black eyes and livid bruises,

The eighth the constable next introduces;

Black gall and hatred lurk the ninth beneath,

The tenth is madness, arms, and fearful death;

For too much wine pour'd in one little vessel,

Trips up all those who seek with it to wrestle.

Εὔβουλος δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν Διόνυσον λέγοντα ῾II 196 K':'

τρεῖς γὰρ μόνους κρατῆρας ἐγκεραννύω

τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι: τὸν μὲν ὑγιείας ἕνα,

ὃν πρῶτον ἐκπίνουσι: τὸν δὲ δεύτερον

ἔρωτος ἡδονῆς τε: τὸν τρίτον δ᾽ ὕπνου,

ὃν ἐκπιόντες οἱ σοφοὶ κεκλημένοι

οἴκαδε βαδίζουσ᾽. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος οὐκ ἔτι

ἡμέτερός ἐστ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὕβρεος: ὁ δὲ πέμπτος βοῆς:

ἕκτος δὲ κώμων: ἕβδομος δ᾽ ὑπωπίων:

<ὁ δ᾽> ὄγδοος κλητῆρος: ὁ δ᾽ ἔνατος χολῆς:

δέκατος δὲ μανίας, ὥστε καὶ βάλλειν ποιεῖ.

πολὺς γὰρ εἰς ἓν μικρὸν ἀγγεῖον χυθεὶς

ὑποσκελίζει ῥᾷστα τοὺς πεπωκότας.

So, my interpretation has been that pleasure *is* good but it's the *context* within which that pleasure is experienced (and the personal responsibility we take for that context) that makes all the difference.

Ex., Drinking wine with friends is pleasurable.

Drinking wine to excess party after party is going to be... let's say less than optimal for your pleasurable existence.

Quote from Cassius

"flourishing" and "wellbeing" and similar terms

I'm personally fine with Epicureans using terms like that as long as they're in the context of eudaimonia and in the larger context of pleasure/pain, etc.

Quote from Cassius

Anytime we start de-emphasizing the term "pleasure" with other wording we are in dangerous territory.

See that's why I find that Plutarch quote so interesting with him claiming that the Epicureans went "back and forth" using pleasure, aponia, and eustatheia. However, my take on that is that it all referred back to pleasure. Aponia is "absence of pain" (sort of, but that's another thread) because pleasure replaces it. Eustatheia is pleasure because it's that internal, stable tranquility that we can be sure of. Pleasure is the key in the philosophy, so whatever terms one uses, they have to return to a framing of pleasure.

I should echo Cassius 's respect for Dr. Yapijakis' efforts in establishing the Gardens in Greece and the conferences in-person and online and the publishing efforts. I did watch most of the online conference in which Cassius participated (I am remembering correctly that you gave a talk, correct??), and I have an idea what it takes to coordinate events like that. So, that all is impressive in the evangelizing - the spreading the good news - of Epicurean philosophy.

However...

I'm a little uneasy about how some of that paper is phrased, especially (emphasis added):

Quote

Therefore, the Epicureans aimed at eustatheia, the good psychosomatic balance, since they believed that “the consistently good condition of the flesh and the relating hope for its preservation offer the ultimate and surest joy to those who are able to contemplate it.”30 Epicureans were taught to ascend the scale of pleasure by intensifying its continuity and to control its discontinuity. They became more interested in quality than in quantity by taking into account (συμμέτρησις, symmetrisis) useful and useless pleasures.

The "aiming at eustatheia" is interesting. It's most prominent in the Usener 68 fragment from Plutarch:

Quote

[ U68 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

....

Fragment 68: To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it. τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

See also VS33

The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness (eudaimonia).

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Metrodorus also echoes these thoughts, almost exactly in his Fragment 5.

However, Plutarch's text is interesting: they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth. He seems to imply that the Epicureans used "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" almost interchangeably: ἡδονὴν (hēdonēn) ταύτην εἴτ᾽ ἀπονίαν (aponian) ἢ εὐστάθειαν (eustatheian). But this is the first time I've seen the word eustatheia. It's not a bad word to use, but I can surmise some may have an issue with it being "aimed at." It might be interesting to delve into that term more. So, I applaud Dr. Yapijakis for calling my attention to that.

I'm more concerned with the phrasing "ascend the scale of pleasure" and "useful and useless pleasures." I agree with Godfrey that that should be "useful and useless *desires*" at best. The "ascent" doesn't strike me as appropriate either.

In the end, as I said, I can appreciate his work over the years, but I'm not entirely comfortable with some of his emphasis and his framing.

Quote from Little Rocker

I noticed that Conatus is open-access (hooray!), and the studies Yapijakis references in the introduction are contained separately in the issue:

Epicurean Stability (eustatheia): A Philosophical Approach of Stress Management

I realize Dr. Yapijakis is a Associate Professor of Genetics, but his use in this paper of the outdated "triune brain" - even as a metaphor - stopped my reading in its tracks. I have been familiar with this reptile/ mammal/ primate brain "theory" since Carl Sagan's Dragons of Eden. But, first in Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's work then following up with others, I found out that this idea, even as a metaphor, is outdated and simply factually wrong. For example:

A theory abandoned but still compelling

In 1977 readers were enthralled by The Dragons of Eden, a book by the astronomer Carl Sagan that explored the evolution of the human brain. Dragons won the

medicine.yale.edu

Quote

MacLean’s basic premise—his “‘hats on top of hats’ view” that brain systems were added by accretion over the course of evolution—was mistaken.

Rethinking the reptilian brain. - Dr Sarah McKay

The reptilian brain model is not based on evolution or neuroscience. What neuroscience-based stories or concepts should use you instead?

drsarahmckay.com

Quote

Does it matter if we use the ‘reptilian brain’?

TL:DR. YES!

We are not born with hard-wired pre-packaged emotions emerging from a lizard brain. The human brain is not a tripartite-series of separate complexes. We are not at the mercy of our lizard brain when we experience threat. We’ve established that.

It's Time To Correct Neuroscience Myths - Northeastern University College of Science

Lisa Feldman Barrett, a psychology professor at Northeastern who has been awarded a 2019 Guggenheim Fellowship, finds misinformation and myths about the brain…

cos.northeastern.edu

Quote

“Scientists have known since at least the 1970s that the idea of a lizard brain is a fiction of neuroscience,” Barrett says. “The problem here is that is takes 10, 20, sometimes 50 years before discoveries in science make it to the public.”

And so on. I could paste a number of articles, but I think that makes the point. I also vaguely remember making this point about his using the triune brain a year or so again. I didn't like it then, and I don't like it now. Even if "lizard brain" is in quotes, it's factually wrong and metaphorically misleading. It's not necessary to explain Epicurean philosophy. Just leave it out.

Quote from Cassius

Bad news Nate, it looks like they did NOT do their own version. This is from the page introducing them:

Well, ya know what that means, Eikadistes Someone's gotta do it now.

I was curious what footnote 92 referred to, and it's simply the fact that that quoted section is from his other paper. That seems a little circular, but at least it's referenced.

Book 25 (very fragmentary):

DCLP/Trismegistos 59749 = LDAB 853

Also

Synopsis of Epicurus’ “On Nature”, Book 25: On Moral Development | Society of Friends of Epicurus

Sedley, in Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, posits that the swerve doesn't show up in the letter to Herodotus because the letter only covers On Nature books 1-10. He further conjectures that the swerve showed up in book 25 or books in that area, but there's no surviving fragments of book 25 that contain mention of it.

I doubt Lucretius would have included the swerve without justification from a source text. That said, it certainly doesn't seem pivotal or foundation to Epicurus's philosophy. It could be part of a specific argument against Democritus and his physical determinism but may have become overblown with later commentators and critics.

Quote from Little Rocker

I admit to having on occasion approached the question of providence with kid gloves in the past, chiefly because many of the people I care about accept providence. Hell, they even accept petitionary prayer.

I hear you. I would never (probably) share these sentiments with certain family members, but it does feel pleasurable to me to vent them here

Quote from Little Rocker

1) lapse into Epicureanism without knowing it (see, for example, the Irvine passage attached, which is pretty much textbook Epicureanism)

I certainly see where you're going with that. Some modern Stoics I've read sound very Epicurean in their attempt to contort "their" philosophy into something palatable.