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And that leads to "the highest good" having multiple meanings
See, I don't agree with that. The "highest good" or summum bonum or τέλος telos is "that to which all other good things points." You can paraphrase that as need be, but that's the definition as I see it in the texts.
Todd That summary was very helpful to get us back on track and to clearly present your position. Thank you! I am taking pleasure in this discussion, and hope I've engaged in a respectful manner.
Of course, I have thoughts 
...
1) There is no such thing as a good (or a bad) in nature. The concept of a good is a product of human reason. So first we need to define what a good is (or stop talking about them).
I would agree that humans are the ones to assign concepts to natural phenomena. That said, from the human perspective, there are good things and bad things in nature with respect to their effect on humans. And I'm consciously using "good thing" and "bad thing" not the platonic sounding "good" and "bad."
2) How would we define a good, using only the tools nature gave us? Pleasure and pain seem like the obvious tools for the job.
I found the LSJ definition of αγαθός instructive in that it used words like benefit to define the word. A "good thing" provides a benefit of service. That's why other schools can say virtue or reason are "good things." For Epicureans, a good thing is that which leads to pleasure. Likewise, a bad thing produces pain.
3) A good, then, is something that produces pleasure. Producing pleasure is not just a property that goods happen to have. It is the very standard by which we are able to say they are goods at all. It is the ONLY property of a good, as such. Everything that has this property is a good. Nothing that lacks this property is a good.
I *think* I agree with that. I'll admit I'm still parsing that paragraph. There's a lot going on in there.
4) So is pleasure a good? Does it produce pleasure? No, it IS pleasure. Therefore, it is not a good.
That's an interesting question. I still maintain that pleasure is that to which all goods point, or, to be more exact to my thinking, pleasure is the ultimate motivation underpinning all....
Hmmm. That's not right. Hmmm, I'm going to have to cogitate on this a little more.
It remains a fact that Epicurus used the word "good" and "the good." It behooves is to understand why.
Don suggested an idea earlier, that there is a category called Goods that includes pleasure and a sub-category called Instrumental Goods. (A Venn diagram would be handy here.)
Well, I have to share thoughts on that 
Now I'm not so sure on that, but as I said above, those are Epicurus's words (well, not instrumental. I'm going to have to dig a little more on this one).
It seems my action item is to define "good" if I want to stay the course on that topic. Stay tuned.
Sounds good.
I'll cut him some slack if he made a few mistakes, or occasionally said some things that were not consistent.
There's also the ongoing issue that so much of what Epicurus "said" is filtered through unreliable and hostile witnesses, ex., Cicero, Plutarch, et al.
the Plutarch fragment:
“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423
Does that fragment mean "anything that produces pleasure should be considered good" and you should not obsess over other implications of the word 'good'"?
Come with me, this way, down another tunnel in the rabbit warren:
That Plutarch fragment is a little more complex than I first realized. That specific excerpt is a little misleading. Here's the link to Perseus:
Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, section 7
(Emphasis and notations added)
Like unto this is that of Epicurus, where he saith: The very essence of good arises from the escaping of bad, *and* a man's recollecting, considering, and rejoicing within himself that this hath befallen him. For what occasions transcending joy (he saith) is some great impending evil escaped; and in this lies the very nature and essence of good, if a man attain unto it aright, and contain himself when he hath done, and not ramble and prate idly about it.
The archaic language is hard to parse. Bailey provides more context:
That which creates Joy insuperable is the complete
removal of a great evil. And this is the nature of good, one can once grasp it rightly, and then hold by it, and not walk about babbling idly about the good.
Is Plutarch saying that Epicurus said don't talk about "the good" or don't talk about escaping the evil that brought you pleasure? Just experience the pleasure of escaping the evil and move on with your life? That's going to take some parsing in Plutarch's Greek.
Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.
LOL! Well, when you put it like that...!
Epicurean bumper sticker anyone?
Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics.
I see Godfrey 's point. I would add that isolating the philosophy from its historical context isn't possible either. Not that this is necessarily being done in this thread! Just something to keep in mind. Epicurus was reacting to the philosophical and cultural environment in which he found himself. His philosophy is a direct attack/response to Cyrenaic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions of his day. It would be up to Philodemus and later Epicureans to address Stoic ideas.
I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.
I can agree with that.
In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly
Here's my commentary from my translation on that phrase:
129a. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν,
ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον "fundamental/primary good"
Remember πρῶτον from way back in 123b! (Note: This refers to the place in the letter that many translators use "First, ..." I disagree with that ordinal number approach since he never uses a number elsewhere.) Since it's used there and here, I contend that, in neither place, is it meant to convey "first" as an ordinal number but rather "fundamental, primary"
...
129b.ii. καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.
129c. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον,
129. Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing (πᾶν ἀγαθὸν) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain.
Thanks!!
Oh, that is a lot of reconstruction. Some day, I'll try to track down a manuscript image.
Even so, I don't have a problem with ΤΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ. It really does seem to be synonymous with TΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. He are the two definitions side by side:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός
To excerpt some of the definitions:
ΑΓΑΘΟΝ good, serviceable; good, blessing, benefit
ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ useful, good of its kind, serviceable; good for its purpose, effective; as Subst., benefits, kindnesses
it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?
Yes, I think that's my position.
This is a little surprising to me, because you seemed adamant earlier that prudence was the
highest goodmost cardinal, chief, greatest good thing. (Sorry, it was Nate who said it was highest.)But now I understand that you mean "[first?] in a category that also includes pleasure"! How do you reconcile these things?
Are you doing this in an effort to maintain the consistency of everything Epicurus ever said?
Prudence is the "most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing" in the instrumental goods category which includes everything except pleasure within the larger category of goods things.
Pleasure is "the" good thing that stands alone to which all the instrumental good things point.
As far as Epicurus's words, yes. If we can't reconcile the scant texts that we have, we're just picking and choosing cafeteria style. At least that's my goal.
Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.
It's all good.
The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.
Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός
Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").
I've taken that as prudence is the foundation of all our choices and rejections. Pleasure is both the beginning and end, literally and figuratively, of our very existence.
Lucretius implies pleasure is the "supreme good" bonum summum, too:
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, BOOK VI, line 1
So he,
The master, then by his truth-speaking words,
Purged the breasts of men, and set the bounds
Of lust and terror, and exhibited
The supreme good whither we all endeavour,
And showed the path whereby we might arrive
Thereunto by a little cross-cut straight,
And what of ills in all affairs of mortals
Upsprang and flitted deviously about
(Whether by chance or force), since nature thus
Had destined; and from out what gates a man
Should sally to each combat.
...veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis
et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris
exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes,
quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo
qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu,
quidve mali foret in rebus mortalibus passim,
quod fieret naturali varieque volaret
seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset,
et quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret,
...
it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?
Yes, I think that's my position.
The Good, does not belong in the category of goods. It is different category.
From your perspective, what would that category be?
1. goods (as referenced above) are things that produce pleasure. That is our definition of a good in this context.
2. We agree to stop referring to pleasure as a good. The Good, if you really must. Never a good. Please?
1. Within the context of Epicureanism, "goods" are instrumental to producing pleasure. Agreed. In other philosophies, the goods are ends in and out themselves. In Stoicism, virtue is "the highest good." That's what leads me to insisting that pleasure is not only "a good" but "the good" among "goods."
1a. I'm going to have to go back and see the specific words that Epicurus used when talking about prudence and pleasure and their being "goods."
2. See #1.
If it seemed like I was making a distinction there, that was not my intent.
"lower-case goods" == "goods"
I was being too clever for my own good.
Okay, I'll go along with that. Maybe I was being pedantic.
That said, it sounds like we agree that there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category.
Is our hangup then seeing "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good") as being one of these "goods" but being special in that it is the only "good thing" that does not point to any other "good thing"?
I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of lower-case good. Is that correct?
Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.
There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").
I know Eikadistes said earlier in the thread that The Good wasn't a good (and I'm paraphrasing from memory so feel free to correct me!), but I'm not so sure about that.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀγαθο-εργέω , ἀγα^θός
For anyone who's interested, here's a similar thread:
But then he goes on to say that the highest good is prudence. It seems that Epicurus said this, so he's on solid ground there.
Right. The highest *instrumental* good thing.
Nevertheless, I think it is useless and counter-productive to even discuss a "highest good" once you have established that pleasure is not it.
I don't think we've established that.
And providing the most pleasure is the only criteria we have to consider a good "highest", right?
No. We're getting hung up on the word "highest" here. It's not a value like "best." Well, in a way but not primarily. It's the highest at the summit towards which all other good things point. Or, within this discussion, to which all other good things serve as instrumental things.
And even if you could find one "highest good", so what? Are there some important goods that almost everyone will want to have? Sure. And Epicurean ethics should talk about those. But there is no need for a universal ranking to apply to everyone in all circumstances.
It's not a ranking. We're not putting good things into a hierarchy. I'll get to Epicurus's prudence in a moment. I've had this discussion with Cassius before, too. Pleasure is the only good thing that doesn't point to something else. That's what makes it the "highest", telos, goal, summum bonum, etc. The cheese stands alone, to use the Old McDonald had a Farm song. Practical wisdom/prudence can be characterized as the most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing (not The Good) because it is through this virtue that we're able to make them best decisions for what pleasures to choose and from which pleasures to flee. Butt it's still subordinate to and instrumental for achieving pleasure.
And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.
translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.
That's always the issue with texts originally written in a foreign language which we don't read. We (and I'm including myself here!) are at the mercy of translators and scholars, but they bring their own biases and interpretations. That's why I tend to use multiple English words where the texts have one, to try and pull out some nuances. Even if we spoke *modern* Greek, we'd still be at a disadvantage.
To pull this back to "good," that word has it's own semantic baggage in English but it's been decided over the decades that that's a "good" enough "equivalent" to αγαθός. It's important to remember that, but it's what we have to work with.
I don't think I'm going to budge on this.
I respect your conviction.
Pleasure isn't just a good.
What would you call it then? And that's not meant as sarcasm! I'm just wanting to see what word you'd use to describe it.
You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.
I've found it instructive to always go back to the source texts and the words used. When anyone - Aristotle, Epicurus, et al. - talked about "good" or "the good" as it's uniformly translated into English, the words used are αγαθός (agathos) "good" and ταγαθον (tagathon, basically the previous word with the definite article "the" bound to it) "the good."
I looked at the LSJ (THE standard reference for ancient Greek) definition for αγαθός:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός
What I found instructive was the various connotations of that word:
II. of things,
1. good, serviceable
2. of outward circumstances, to good purpose,
3. morally good
4. ἀγαθόν, τό, good, blessing, benefit, of persons or things; as term of endearment for a baby, blessing!, treasure!; confer a benefit on . . , :—in pl., ἀγαθά, τά, goods of fortune, treasures, wealth; “ἀγαθὰ πράττειν” fare well; also, good things, dainties: good qualities; good points, of a horse.
To me, what it's getting at are "What things in life or this world confer benefit? What do we consider to provide a service to us?"
With these connotations, Epicurus seems to me to say wisdom, morality, and justice are goods because they provide the benefit of our living pleasurable lives.
But they aren't the end of goods. Pleasure is that to which all other goods point or end up - all other things that provide benefit to our lives ultimately do so because they provide us with pleasure.
So he uses ταγαθον when he talks about the expansiveness of pleasure here:
Fragment 67. I do not think I could conceive of the good (τἀγαθὸν) without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.
LOL! I like your "clickbait" caveat 
I was with you up until the end but let me try to at least explain why I don't *fully* embrace your post there.
I see your reference to DeWitt 's "summum bonum fallacy" and I've expressed my skepticism for that DeWittean idea before on the forum. As I remember her rests his argument on the fact that Latin doesn't have a definite article and that always seemed weak to me.
I also think that many times (myself included) have equated English "highest good" as "the best good." While "summum" means 'top, summit" I don't interpret that as "best" as in quality. It's the "good" that's reached at the end, it's the good to which will other goods point. Metaphorically, if you're walking up the path past all other goods asking "What is behind this? Why do I do this?" You'll end up finding at the summit the moving toward pleasure (and avoiding pain).
All the ancient philosophies asked the question "What is it to which all goods point?" Epicurus had an answer, and a powerful one.
I've explained my take on this in my commentary to Book 1 of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics:
