Ok so yes there is a list of Metrodorus' works in DL and that's not in it, right? Is It clear that Clement is talking about the same Metrodorus?
As I remember, DL doesn't list all of Epicurus's titles either. There are titles mentioned elsewhere that aren't in his list.
Wow! Y'all have been busy. I'll respond to your various points, but I had to provide some context for my musk ox analogy.
The musk ox (umingmak "the bearded one" in the language of the Inuit) is easily my favorite animal, followed closely by the tardigrade (yes, big nerd here).
In the habitat in which the musk ox lives - the northern Arctic tundra - there are no trees, no bushes, nothing to hide behind. In fact, they typically prefer windswept land in winter where the wind keeps the snow swept away. They'll either stand in the wind or lay down in a gale to reduce their exposure. They appear unfazed by the conditions, and my metaphor was that they know the storm will pass, "the pain will be brief."
It's not a perfect analogy by any means, but, hey, I got to talk about musk oxen 
The description of kinetic and katastematic from The Faith of Epicurus by Benjamin Farrington (1967) is spot on from my perspective:
" 'pleasure' may be eitherr kinetic (i.e., produced by a stimulus from without) or katastematic (i.e., a state of the organism created by itself without external stimulus)."
I posted a screenshot of this page on a prior thread.
I really started down this road in part with the discovery of Metrodorus being quoted in Clement of Alexandria's Stromata II.131, p. 498 which states (in translation )
Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?
The primary source for my contention was simply the title of Metrodorus's book: On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects. The Greek title reads: Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ημας αιτιαν προς ευδαιμονιαν της εκ των πραγματων αγαθον. The idea that the source of our well-being/eudaimonia is greater "in ourselves than that which arises from Objects" tells me that we can't *rely* on objects outside ourselves for pleasure (happiness, eudaimonia, well-being). We can certainly take pleasure in them, but we can't rely on them. The only thing we can have the most confidence in are the pleasures that are within ourselves. That's how I read that title.
The πρᾶγμᾰ in the title (πραγματων is simply the genitive plural) means "deed, act; thing; circumstances (in the plural)."
Alfred Koerte's anthology of the sayings of Metrodorus also referenceσ the following (using Google Translate, I know... but it's the quickest route):
Cicero, De Finibus II, 28, 92 ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis cum corpus bene constitutum sit, et sit exploratum ita futurum. (...for Metrodorus himself, almost another Epicurus, describes himself as happy in these words, when the body is well constituted, and the future is thus explored.)
Cicero Tusc. disp. II, 6, 17 Metrodorus quidem perfecte eum putat beatum, cui corpus bene constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore. (Cicero Tusc. disp. 2, 6, 17 Metrodorus, indeed, considers him perfectly happy, whose body is well formed and examined, and will always be so.)
Cicero Tusc. disp. V, 9, 27 tu vero Metrodore, qui. . . definieris summum bonum firma corporis affectione explorataque eius spe contineri, fortunae aditus interclusisti ? (Cicero Tusc. disp. 5, 9, 27 you, Metrodorus, who . . You have determined that the highest good is contained by the firm affection of the body and its explored hope, have you blocked the access of fortune?)
Cicero de officiis III, 33, 117 nam si non modo utilitas sed vita omnis beata corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas et quidem summa — sic enim censent — cum honestate pugnabit. (Cicero de officii III, 33, 117 For if not only utility, but every happy life is contained in the firm constitution of the body and the hope of its constitution, as it is written by Metrodorus, surely this utility and indeed the highest - for so they think - will fight with honesty.)
Hoc fragmentum paene ad verbum congruit cum Epicuri fragmento 68 Us. (This fragment agrees almost verbatim with Epicurus' fragment 68 Us.).
Using Attalus' site, here is Usener 68 which appears to be quoted from Plutarch and Aulus Gellius:
Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."
This is just a start, but I thought I'd establish where my train of thought left the station first.
PS: Please note that the English translations from Koerte are really bad, now that I go back and read them more closely. They are simply cut and paste Google Translations from the Latin. Consider them at best poor Cliffs Notes. Refer to the Latin and puzzle out your own translations would be my recommendation.
In the spirit of "not being done" and to not further hijack this thread (Sorry, @waterholic !), I have created a new thread for the discussion of whether we can be more confident in katastematic pleasure rather than kinetic pleasure...
This thread grows out of another thread, specifically my "soapboxing" posts that were a response to @A_Gardner and @Cassius where I "took a stand for ataraxia."
For those who don't want too much review, my primary contentions were:
)And that is where we left it. I encourage anyone interested in the full context to go back and read the other thread. I'm starting this one so as not to further hijack the other thread. In this thread, we will inevitably talk about the katastematic/kinetic pleasure "controversy" but my primary goal at the beginning is to establish (IF I can establish) that katastematic pleasure... or pleasure primarily experienced in the mind as a stable state... is the one in which we can be more confident than pleasures resulting from external stimuli or phenomena.
Let the games begin...
Here's the Google translate:
41] When he approaches them, so that he neither abhors the divine deity nor allows past pleasures to flow away and rejoices in their constant remembrance, what is it that he can approach here, that is better?
41] Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere?
Don what source is that?
[41] Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horrea
That's from the Latin you posted on the thread
I think this is it?
[41] Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horrea
Sort of a paraphrase? When approaching the divine power of the gods, there is no need to tremble in fear.
Or There is no need to fear the gods.
Where have I heard that before 
Oh yeah..
ΑΦΟΒΟΝ Ο ΘΕΟΣ
The first line of the Tetrapharmakos.
Be free of awe of the influence of the gods;
This implies there is still influence of the gods but we shouldn't be in awe of it.
I haven't dug into the Latin but that's my off the top of my head comment on that
Work to possess strength of mind,
Great list, like very much the six, except the "strength of mind". I don't understand why, but it "sounds stoic".
I would prefer something like "steadfastness, stability, constancy." Firmitatem is related to "firmament" i.e., the fixed/stable dome of the stars and celestial bodies above the earth in some ancient mythologies.
Quote
And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy (eudaimonia) Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament.
So there is my explicit license from the texts: When I am on the rack I will not "keep calm and carry on" like nothing significant is happening!
I'll see your underlined text and raise your another 
Heading off to work, so don't take silence for anything other than being unable to get to the forum before this evening.
We are not done, my friend
The difference is that some pain is unavoidable: an Epicurean would suffer greatly at a loss of a child or a friend and ataraxia is not a goal in this case. A stoic would have to control the suffering by reminding self that virtue is all tgat matters.
And I agree. Philodemus is very clear that people will - and should - feel the bite of grief at the loss of a loved one or feel the bite of anger when purposefully wronged by someone. We are all human with natural human reactions. But he also wrote that an Epicurean will not let those feelings overwhelm themselves. The "strength of mind" allows one to eventually put it all in context, to understand that the loved one no longer exists and does not feel pain, is not separated from them in some afterlife, and that pleasant memories of them can be recalled and enjoyed. In that case, it is not a Stoic indifference to the loved one's passing. It is a clear-eyed acceptance of reality, both the bite of grief and the eventual - maybe even a long time - acceptance of the world as it is. Same way with anger. We feel that bite if we are wronged, not a stoic indifference. But we don't fire off that email in the heat of anger. We make choices with an eventual calm mind that will lead to a pleasurable outcome.
ataraxia is to be achieved by trying not to put yourself in situations that could cause mental pain for the sake of unnatural and unnecessary desires: e.g. politics, power, exceasive wealth
Ataraxia is achieved by working through and internalizing the antidotes to fear and anxiety: death is nothing to us; the gods present no reason to fear them; some things do happen by chance; we *can* make prudent decisions to lead a pleasurable life, even deciding sometimes to undergo painful experiences if they lead eventually to pleasure; we are not constrained by Fate; etc. Ataraxia is a source of pleasure within ourselves available at all times. It's true that we need to be careful about putting ourselves in situations that cause mental pain, but avoiding things does not create ataraxia. We gain ataraxia/ tranquility by applying Epicurus's antidotes - his philosophical medicine - to our fearful, anxiety-ridden minds. Epicureanism is not a philosophy of avoidance or timidness or refusal to engage with the world. It is a philosophy of personal responsibility and embracing the world as it is, not as we wish it to be or not as some kind of obstacle or show for us to demonstrate our superior virtue.
As long as we're soapboxing...
I feel I should stand up for ataraxia in the face of Cassius's withering attack...
Although it may end up that we're not as far apart as it may at first seem since that seems to end up being the case on many occasions in the past. Even so...
Starting at the beginning, let me address a couple of A_Gardner 's points and then Cassius 's posts.
Quote from A_Gardneran argument against propping up pleasure as the only good in life, is that it can lead to more states of psychological unrest
No question. And Epicurus addresses this exact thing, especially in the letter to Menoikeus, in the lines about "we don't mean endless drinking parties and town festivals..." Epicurus would agree that not all pleasure should be chosen.
Quote from A_Gardnerpleasure is never a guaranteed and we often faces forms of hardship just as much if not more than pleasure, no matter how we may try to mitigate the pain and amplify the pleasure
This is where I start my advocacy for ataraxia or tranquility or calm or whatever pleasurable, stable state of mental equilibrium you want to use to translate the Greek. Epicurus is well aware we'll meet hardship. That's exactly why he advocates strengthening a quiet, calm, anxiety-free mind. That's the only pleasure we can be sure of under all circumstances - including being on the rack (although I have to agree with Emily Austin that he might be overselling here just a tad). Nonetheless, equanimity/tranquility/ataraxia is available at all times, even under duress and trying circumstances. But more on that below.
Quote from A_GardnerCan it be argued here that ataraxia is more difficult to obtain/ maintain when faced under the duress of pain?
Of course, it's difficult. Epicurus writes to "Meditate day and night then on this and similar things by yourself as well as together with those like yourself." It's not a one and done. It takes work! That doesn't mean it's impossible.
Quote from CassiusOf COURSE pleasure is not guaranteed, and OF COURSE we should feel psychological unrest if we run into obstacles to pleasure that we can do something about, which is the case of many or most of them. Should we just crawl into a hole and die and say "Oh me oh my I could have been so happy today but it's raining, and the noise outside is loud, and I have a headache which I could fix with an aspirin but i don't want to take it."
I don't agree at all that "we should feel psychological unrest if we run into obstacles to pleasure that we can do something about." Yes, we can identify obstacles that we can do something about, but we need not feel "psychological unrest." I would much rather meet obstacles clear-eyed with a calm mind and assess the evidence before me that way than to feel "unrest." And the "crawl into a hole and die" is not the opposite of feeling "psychological unrest." That simply defeatism. IF we can cultivate ataraxia, we have a much better chance of making a good choice to remove, move around, or avoid the "obstacle to pleasure" than we would if we get anxious, feel "psychological unrest" or get agitated or fearful. But let's move on...
Quote from CassiusSame answer as to absence of disturbance. If you wake up to find that you have fallen asleep on railroad tracks, or that there's a tornado bearing down on your house, you better hope that you disturbed! You better hope you are not "tranquil" or so "calm" that you can't muster every bit of excitement and energy and determination and even anxiety that you can muster, and get to safety as quickly as you can!
If I wake up "asleep on railroad tracks" or with "a tornado bearing down on (my) house" I may feel a sense of urgency but I hope I'm not "disturbed." To me, that sounds like being overwhelmed and distressed and having a mind overcome by indecision and fear. I hope I wouldn't be like that. I would hope I have cultivated enough capacity for ataraxia that I can assess the situation clear-headed, make good decisions for the safety of myself and my family, and help calm others and get everyone to a safe place to ride out the storm.
You seem to be equating ataraxia/tranquility/calm/etc. with passiveness and being a doormat or being somehow lazy or complacent. I don't get that at all. I see ataraxia as the calm center of the hurricane. Things may be swirling around you, but your mind is calm, collected, able to assess evidence clearly.
You seem to also be equating ataraxia with apatheia which is a Stoic virtue. That's the opposite of feeling emotions (per LSJ - see link). I don't get that all either.
This is one of the reasons I enjoyed Emily Austin's book so much. Her constant refrain of the freedom from anxiety allowing us to better enjoy the necessary and extravagant pleasures struck a chord with me. That is exactly my thoughts on ataraxia in Epicurus' philosophy.
Quote from CassiusThat's the problem with defining tranquility and ataraxia as the goal of life. They AREN'T. Epicurus said it correctly over and over, the goal is PLEASURE, and in the service of pleasure, which any normal human being knows requires work to obtain, you sometime accept and even choose and welcome pain, if it helps you achieve greater pleasure.
Tranquility / ataraxia are not the "goal of life" but Epicurus stresses over and over the importance of freedom from disturbance in the mind and "pain in the body" (I have a problem with this kind of translation of aponia, but we'll leave that for another time.) There's no getting around that in the texts. And, yes, PLEASURE is the goal, and tranquility is pleasure, freedom from anxiety is pleasure, but it is pleasure that is always available to us which is why Epicurus places such importance on it - NOT exclusionary importance as the ONLY pleasure we should pursue but of significant and paramount importance to give us the possibility of the best pleasurable life possible in addition to all the other pleasures we can experience. To my reading, your Torquatus excerpt proves my point:
XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.
That "strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain" is exactly my understanding of what ataraxia *is* - and Torquatus places it "in the first place."
A life spent sleeping in a cave would certainly be tranquil, but it does not take an Epicurus to see that such a life would admit of a heckofa lot of improvement.
Again, "a life spent sleeping in a cave" is a straw man. My metaphor of what is meant by ataraxia / tranquility / calm is the picture of a musk ox, facing into the howling winter wind, legs braces, ice forming on its hair and face, knowing the disturbance will eventually pass ("Pain is short...") and it can then go on and paw the snow for luscious plants to eat. (Note: just a metaphor btw. Not saying musk oxen are Epicureans.)
I continue to "soapbox" that my reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times. Epicurus includes ataraxia and aponia within the katastematic pleasures. Metrodorus stresses that these are the only ones we can be confident of:
"Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'"
Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."
Metrodorus's quote is: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. Right there, again, is κίνησιν (kinēsin) and καταστηματικῆς (katastēmatikēs). The kinetic pleasures arise from our interaction with external stimuli and phenomena. And Metrodorus stresses the importance of both kinds of pleasures, but he also wrote a book entitled "On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects." As Emily Austin writes in her book, if we're stuck in a hospital bed unable to move, the ONLY pleasures we can enjoy are those that arise from within our minds. I would include those pleasant memories within katastematic pleasures along with ataraxia. And we can't enjoy pleasant memories if our minds are disturbed with anxiety, depression, fear, or other painful mental conditions. Ataraxia *is* that calm mind that we have under our control and that is not at the whims of fears and anxiety, running wild in our heads.
Some thoughts...
if you consider "relief from pain" to be a pleasure that is not associated directly with one of the five senses (that itself would be a question) it would still probably be proper to consider that relief from pain to be a "stimulus" involving some kind of change or action that would seem at least analogous to a sensation.
I'm still not sure whether "freedom from pain" is not just a description of the state of adding pleasure (more pleasure added = less pain overall). However, if we have pain and the pain, physical or mental, is relieved, we have a mental awareness of our previous painful state versus our current state of being relieved of pain. We perceive a relief from pain. And mental perception is a sensation - mental images impacting our mind leading to memory. So the work of the mind is a sensation.
The feelings of pleasure and pain are definitely separate from the sense-perceptions. Intimately linked, but separate.
'Here is one hand. And here is another. Hands exist!'
I can't shake the image of a baby laying in a crib being amazed at their hands.
For what it's worth, here are some of the original texts we're working with along with links to the LSJ definitions:
X.31. Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our (1) sensations and (2) preconceptions and our (3) feelings are the standards of truth (κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας - kritēria tēs alētheias)
ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη,
1. τὰς αἰσθήσεις tas aisthēseis (def. article + plural noun)
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, αἴσθ-ησις
2. προλήψεις prolepseis (plural noun)
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πρό-ληψις
3. τὰ πάθη ta pathē (def. article + plural noun)
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πάθος
X.34. They affirm that there are two (δύο) states of feeling, (1) pleasure and (2) pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined
Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἱστάμενα περὶ πᾶν ζῷον
(Literal: And they say feelings are two, pleasure and pain, which arise in all animate beings)
1. ἡδονὴν hēdonēn
2. ἀλγηδόνα algēdona
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀλγ-ηδών
Note: ζῷον = zōon leads to zoo- as in zoology
Happy is also fairly clear in meaning
Unfortunately, "happy" is only "clear" in context and can have any number of meanings.
I'll see your monkey wrench and raise you a complication.
I'd agree with.
To me, the sequence is: We have to have an irrational sensation first, then an involuntary response (literal meaning of pathē: pleasure or pain) to that sensation, then our rational part kicks in with a thought like "I like this".
The problem is that this is not how our brains work per the current research of people like Dr. Feldman Barrett and many others. We wouldn't survive if we waited to react to sensations, e.g., the snake would already have bitten us. Our brains function like prediction engines, constantly assessing incoming data from our bodies and external stimuli and checking it against the "most likely scenario." When we walk through the woods, our brains basically are primed to "beware of long skinny things on ground = danger!". Then if we register a long skinny thing, we jump immediately. It's only after that we realize it was just a twig or discarded rope.
That's woefully inadequate and probably wrong in some spots, but that's my memory off the top of my head on Barrett's and others findings. There's also the registering of brain waves clearly showing our brains "decide" to initiate an action well before we're conscious of it.
There's no way Epicurus would have known ANY of this, but it intrigues me to see the brain's prediction faculty as somewhat akin to "anticipations."
References:
I suppose we can use pleasure as a word that refers to a group of positive sensations the same way we use dog to talk about a particular kind of animal that is a member of a group of domesticated canines... without going down the Pleasure and Dog ideal form route. We just have to remember we're talking language and not philosophy (although, yeah, the line is fuzzy).
What DeWitt is saying is that pleasure ≠ sensation; that no pleasure is a sensation because pleasure presumes judgment ("I like this") and sensation is irrational and incapable of judgment. I realize that after a certain point this all begins to get a little nit-picky.
I'd agree with.
To me, the sequence is: We have to have an irrational sensation first, then an involuntary response (literal meaning of pathē: pleasure or pain) to that sensation, then our rational part kicks in with a thought like "I like this".
