Start At 25:16
Bart Ehrman mentions the forged letters of "Epicurus" that tried to slander him.
Dr. Ehrman mentions earlier in the podcast that the biblical book of Ecclesiastes relied on Epicurean philosophy! I think DeWitt claims the same thing. I may have to dig into that a little more now.
Full disclaimer: I'm a big fan of Bart Ehrman's from way back.
the presenter standing in a car park in Athens
Around the 8 min mark
I welcome feedback on the article and what's said in the video. I hope they spark some discussion.
I just took a look at the link Kalosyni provided. That definitely is a more in depth article. Right off the bat I saw:
Epicurus founded his school in 306BC in Athens, just five years before Zeno would branch out from his studies with the Cynics and Megarians to establish the Stoic school in 301BC.
And I'm more than happy to pick nits with the Stoics, so *technically" Epicurus bought the property for the Garden in Athens in 306. He had been teaching for several years prior to that in Mytilene and Lampsacus before that. The 306 and 301 dates make it appear that Epicurus and Zeno started teaching within 5 years of each other whereas Epicurus had a longer head start.
There are plenty of other nits (and larger bugs) to pick with that article but not a good start.
Just so I don't seem too critical of Cassius 's rebuttal to the Daily Stoic commentary:
** They believed in thermodynamic entropy (it’s easier to destroy arrangements of atoms than for the arrangements to be made, thus the universe is ageing towards a state of complete disorganization). <<<< I don't believe this is correct from the texts. Yes decay takes place in parts of the universe, but in other parts the atoms are coming together, and this offsets the decay, so in total the different parts of the universe remain constantly cycling, not decaying overall.
I fully agree with your response to that. Just because there is decay in one part of the universe don't necessitate decay in all parts of the universe.
** It’s a certain medieval christian bias that led to the interpretation of Epicureanism as the pursuit of sensual pleasure. <<<< No, this is not true, because Epicurus DID advocate the pursuit of sensual pleasure. The inaccuracy is that he advocated the pursuit of ALL KINDS of pleasure, including mental / emotional, and not ONLY sensual.
Fully agree again. This was Epicurus's big innovation, separating his philosophy from the Cyrenaics.
** What is important is the Greek term Eudaimonia, which is often translated as happiness, but has little to do today with what we call happiness (the bubbly, pleasurable sensation that accompanies agreeable outcomes and events). Perhaps a better translation would be “Flourishing of life.” <<<
See above. Plus, I continue to advocate for a translation of "well-being" for eudaimonia. "Flourishing" doesn't strike me as conveying the right tone... it's hard to explain, but I'm sticking with "well-being."
** Accordingly, the Epicureans advocated moderation in things, and a balanced, “agreeable” life that pursued the “higher pleasures” of fraternity, self improvement, and freedom from the fear of death, which they thought would result in the freedom of all fear. <<<< False in several respects. Again, "moderation" is Aristotle - there is no advocacy of "moderation" in Epicurus. In fact it is the opposite, pleasure is the goal, and it should be pursued with all the vigor possible, but that means prudently so that in fact the pleasure is maximized, not run amuk and creating needless pain. Also, there are no "higher" pleasures ranked by Epicurus. Friendship is one of the greatest tools for achieving pleasure, but it is given no "ranking" as superior kind of pleasure - nor is any other type of pleasure-- pleasure is pleasure.
I would concur that moderation is Aristotle. His doctrine of the mean did not impress me. On the other hand, I would contend that Epicurus advocates for a simple life, one in which one lives within their means, while at the same time taking pleasure in "extravagances" when they become available. And yes, there are not "higher" and "lower" pleasures; but I would contend that there are pleasures in which we can be more confident and less confident.
Epicurus focused on PLEASURE as the guide of life. Eudaimonia and flourishing are terms associated with Aristotle and other Greeks, not the Epicurean perspective.
I agree with Little Rocker that Epicurus had every intention of engaging in the debates that were roiling through ancient Greek culture and philosophical debate for some time. Epicurus was more than happy to meet on the "field of (philosophical) battle" so to speak and to attempt to set the philosophical aright (as he saw it). I see parallels with his arguments for pleasure being the telos. Plato's Philebus tries to argue against pleasure; Epicurus tried to show how the argument in that work was fallacious. The Cyrenaics had one view of pleasure; Epicurus engaged with them to show how they were wrong.
Same with eudaimonia. Epicurus included eudaimonia as one of the results of living a pleasurable life. Eudaimonia was part of Epicurus's vocabulary and he had no issue including it in his philosophy. I found 6 instances of his use of the word eudaimonia itself plus one use in the commentary of Diogenes Laertius discussing Epicurus's philosophy in a cursory search of his texts:
PD33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for **happiness.**
σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ **εὐδαιμονίας** μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]
Fr. 548. **Happiness** and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature.
τὸ **εὔδαιμον** καὶ μακάριον [happiness and blessedness] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.
Letter to Menoikeus
[122] Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς **εὐδαιμονίαν** ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτ’ εἶναι. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δ᾽ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν **εὐδαιμονίαν,** εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δέ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
[122] Neither must one who is young delay in loving and pursuing wisdom; nor should one who is old grow weary of loving and pursuing wisdom; because it is neither out of season nor untimely for the health of the psykhē. And one who says either the season to love and practice wisdom is not yet arrived or the season has passed by is like someone who is saying either the proper time has not arrived or is no more for **eudaimonia.** Therefore, both the young and old must love and pursue wisdom. On the one hand, the old can be young by means of gratitude for the pleasures which have happened; on the other hand, the young can be as if they are old in years by means of the fearlessness of facing what is intended to be done or what is to come. You must study and meditate upon that which produces **eudaimonia.** For if indeed that is present, we have everything; if that is not present, we do anything to have it.
[127] ... Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς **εὐδαιμονίαν** εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for **eudaimonia;** then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself.
Letter to Pythocles
[116] οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ζῷον, κἂν <εἰ> μικρὸν χαριέστερον εἴη, ἡ τοιαύτη μωρία ἐμπέσοι, μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῆ **εὐδαιμονίαν** κεκτημένον [aquire, possess, own].
"Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα, Πυθόκλεις, μνημόνευσον:
[116] For such folly as this would not possess the most ordinary being if ever so little enlightened, much less one who enjoys perfect **eudaimonia.**
"All this, Pythocles, you should keep in mind ;
Laërtius commentary not Epicurus: DL X [121]
Τὴν **εὐδαιμονίαν** διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.
Μετιτέον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολήν.
"Ἐπίκουρος Μενοικεῖ χαίρειν.
[121] Two sorts of **happiness** can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.
We must now proceed to his letter.
"Epicurus to Menoeceus, greeting.
Reference to Chrysippus vs Epicurus in writing, and to the statue in the Ceramicus - plus the meaning of Chrysippus' name!
That etymology is for the pun on his name: Crypsippus 
That's not bad!
(That cryp.. in the pun is the same as the "crypto..." in cryptography etc)
Don has agreed that if he is able to attend that he will give us a presentation on his new "Location of the Garden" article so that is additional incentive to attend!
FYI
LOL No pressure! Happy 20th everyone!
Uploaded a new version correcting the amount on p. 10 from 105 mina to 1.05 mina.
New version ready for download in Files.
btw I applaud Cassius 's optimism in calling this the definitive thread
Definitive because this time we will pursue this as long as it takes!
Miner's helmet, check! Down the rabbit hole we go! 🐇
btw I applaud Cassius 's optimism in calling this the definitive thread
I'm again thinking of virtue: do Stoics consider that you can reach a state where you are virtuous, and therefore don't long for it any more?
I think that is a definite yes - when you get to the summit you are at the top and there is nothing greater.
I remember Emily Austin said that the Stoics didn't think anyone could really attain perfect virtue. The analogy was that you can drown just as easily in an inch of water as in the ocean: it's an all or nothing... And no one can be all virtuous all the time.
I think that's why the Christians allowed the Stoic strain to seep into their doctrines... We're all sinners. Even a little sin is still sin. Etc...
Does anybody know a Stoic to ask about this? Personally, the argument seems to me to be so absurd as to be meaningless but that's probably not the case for somebody serious about Stoicism.
Is it, in the end, just a reductio ad absurdum?
Running Chryssipus' line thru Google translate:
"Does your hand, so affected, as it is now affected, long for it?"
That final desiderat can mean desire or long for. Lack has different semantic baggage in English.
It seems to me that he's saying if pleasure is the highest good, how could your hand (or whatever body part) desire pleasure (since it's the highest good to which we're supposed to strive) if it was in a state in which it didn't desire anything. How could it be in a state where it didn't desire the highest good? Epicurus would say it's exactly that state of no pain that is pleasure itself, as opposed to the Cyrenaics who would claim that is a neutral state, neither pleasure nor pain.
IF (and I am not taking that as established) we were to conclude that the issue Chrysippus is alluding to is that the guide or the greatest good must be continuously present (for some combination of practical or philosophical reasons that we still need to clarify) ,...
I don't think it's the continuously present part he was arguing against. It seems to have been the presence of a neutral state being called pleasure.
The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus.
This is because the Cyrenaics didn't accept that homeostasis, balance, ataraxia was pleasure. If "the hand" was in a balanced, homeostatic state, the Cyrenaics didn't accept that as pleasure. They called that a neutral state. Epicurus didn't accept that premise. Everything for him was either pleasure or pain.
I've posted a new article in the Files section discussing the location and size of Epicurus's properties - the Garden and house - in ancient Athens. Feel free to provide comments including suggestions for improvement.
Enjoy 
This also gets to the question of whether, in a purely material universe, there is a supreme good. Organisms have a highest level goal, but that's quite different from an idealized supreme good.
The "highest level goal" (τέλος telos) = "the supreme good" (summum bonum).
They're the same thing. One is simply the translation of the other.
The supreme/highest good is simply that to which all our actions point, the goal to which we strive, the answer to "why do you do what you do?"
For Epicurus, pleasure is that. Keep piling on enough answers for those why's and you end at pleasure at the top, the highest good thing in the widest sense.
For the Stoics, it's somehow "to be virtuous."
I'm going to break down this dialogue (C for Chryssipus; S for Stooge):
C: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all?
S: Certainly of nothing.
C: But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack.
S: I agree.
C: Pleasure then is not the supreme good.
For good measure, here's the Latin:
—'Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'
—Nihil sane.
—'At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'
—Ita credo.
— “Non est igitur voluptas bonum.”
That's it. That's the whole "story." Here's my response:
Your hand doesn't "feel" anything. You may sense something with your hand, on your hand, in your hand, and so on; but your hand, in its present condition, is merely a part of your sensory apparatus. If you feel that your hand doesn't lack anything, it's in homeostasis. It is in balance. That balance is pleasurable by definition because it is not painful. You are already feeling pleasure in your hand. Chryssipus is simply not accepting Epicurus's premise that there is only pleasure and pain, and then forging ahead to make a point regardless of Epicurus's position.
That one characteristic of the supreme good is that it is always present and - if absent - that the presence would be felt immediately?
The supreme good is not always present. It is that to which all other actions aim for. We are always striving to achieve the supreme good. Chryssipus is saying that if the hand didn't "want" anything, if it didn't "want" pleasure, then pleasure can't be the supreme good because we should always strive to gain the supreme good. Epicurus would say that the feeling of freedom from pain IS pleasurable, is pleasure, and so "the hand" IS already experiencing the supreme good which is pleasure.
