Posts by Godfrey

This is a fascinating and important topic, and a lot to digest! There's a reason that it was apparent saved for advanced study in Epicurus' day. I'll weigh in here but I've got limited time so hopefully I can make a coherent contribution.

Discussion of the gods is inseparable from discussion of prolepsis. So to start, I think an excellent definition of prolepsis is "the faculty of pattern recognition." This compares to the faculty of the senses or of the feelings. An individual prolepsis is true in the same way that an individual sensation is true: it's what is perceived, but it doesn't necessarily correctly represent the external physical condition (think of the square/round tower example).

Next, there is the particular prolepsis, in this case that of the gods (in the same way as there are particular sensations, for example). Finally, as I understand it, a particular prolepsis is not fixed but can change over time. Think of the infant's inkling of justice v that of an adult. A recognition of a pattern evolves as more information relevant to the particular pattern becomes available.

So for me, the core, and potentially unsolvable, problem is to determine what is the most primitive version of the "god prolepsis." It's certainly not a white haired, bearded man in a toga or a shape shifting animal as in some cultures. These are additional pieces of information added to one's innate prolepsis, by the individual's culture, from birth. The question is "what pre-dates this?"

Don I thought you might enjoy that catnip . Thanks for looking into it!

Still a little shaky but I'm well enough to be bored!

This book was written in French by Festugiere in 1946 and translated to English by C.W. Chilton in 1955. It’s fairly short at around 100 pages, including pages of footnotes (many in Greek and many non-English sources) at the ends of the chapters. It’s a pretty easy read, not too academic, with but a little untranslated Greek, but there is enough information in it that one could dig into the subject quite deeply if so inclined. It can be read for free online at the internet archive.

Here are some brief notes I took while reading it. They’re not so much descriptive of the book as a whole as they are of things that caught my interest while reading it: I was looking to find out more about Epicurus’ use of religion and perhaps prolepseis. The notes are quotes or paraphrases from the book, followed by page numbers. Any of my additional thoughts are added after the page numbers. Overall I’d say the book is worth reading as a good overview, although it leans heavily toward the ascetic and toward the absence of pain school.

1. In the preface is a discussion of absence of pain….

2. The tetrapharmakos, freedom from pain, etc is only the means to ataraxia. Ataraxia does not comprise all happiness, it is the indispensable condition. Otherwise EP would be Buddhism, which it is not. There is a positive aspect to joy which depends on the self sufficiency of the individual: spiritual joy. This is found in the study of nature and of philosophy. Ευθυμία, χαρά, ευφροσύνη. To meditate unceasingly, day and night, on the things which bring happiness, alone or with a friend, is the essential obligation of a sage. (pages 32-33)

3. From Google translate: Ευθυμία = frolic, (from Wiktionary: cheerfulness, good mood, contentment, tranquility); χαρά = joy; ευφροσύνη = cheerfulness

4. Wisdom means a life of the spirit and the exercise of wisdom is the practice of that life. (page 36)

5. Friendship contributes more than anything to happiness. Epicureanism was a spirit much more than a doctrine. (page 42)

6. In a sentence the author uses the phrase “concepts born of sensation” (followed by προληψεις [prolepseis] and a citation that I don’t understand) (page 58)

7. Prayer is proper to wisdom, not because the gods would be annoyed if we did not pray, but because we see how much the nature of the gods is superior to us in power and excellence. (page 60)

8. We adapt everything that happens to us to the manner of living which befits divine felicity. (page 61)

9. The divine needs no mark of honor, but it is natural for us to honor it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering... the traditional sacrifices. ...since the gods are indescribably happy, to draw close to them in prayer and to offer sacrifices and traditional festivities is to take part in their happiness. (page 61)

10. The goal of this religious activity is the contemplation of beauty, a very Greek notion. (page 62) I have in the past attended church services for the purpose of listening to an exceptional choir, this was quite pleasurable. This also brings to mind my enjoyment of some of the finer examples of church architecture. I think we have a thread with some discussion of this from when Notre Dame burned down in Paris.

11. The Sage addresses prayers to the gods, he admires their nature and condition, he strives to come near to it, to touch and live with it, and he calls wise men and gods friends of each other. (page 63)

12. The most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things. (page 64)

13. The Platonic gods of necessity leave room only for fear and despair: it would be better to banish belief in gods altogether. (page 75) This seems to touch on our contemporary problem. The idea of “god” has become Plato’s idea of god over the centuries. To me, this is why it seems so difficult to understand Epicurus’ gods and why the only proper interpretation today is to imagine gods as an ideal to strive for. I’m not even sure if this conception of the gods relates to what to me is a prolepsis of awe and wonder.

14. In a world emptied of the divine seek the means of living happily by the sole means of limiting one's desires. (page 88)

15. DeWitt article in bibliography: The Gods of Epicurus and the Canon, Trans. Roy. Soc. Of Canada, Ottawa, XXXVI, 1942, pp. 33ff. (I’m not able to find this but it might be a good read.

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And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions.

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Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession— then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

These are the cites of "essence" from the Phaedo passage above.

This is my take on the main points. I'm putting words in Epicurus' mouth by using my own understanding.

1A. Plato: there is knowledge before birth of equality, beauty, goodness, justice, holiness; dialectic “essences.” This is not possible without an immortal soul.

1B. Epicurus: there is no immortal soul, therefore by Plato's logic there can be no "essences."

2A. Plato: knowledge obtained before birth is forgotten at birth but still exists in the memory of the soul, therefore “learning” is properly called “recollection.”

2B. Epicurus: the soul does not exist before birth, but we have an inborn faculty to recognize concepts (for example justice, truth). This is the faculty of prolepsis.

3A. Plato: when we perceive something through the senses, we obtain a notion of some other thing which is associated with it. This notion is in the memory of our immortal soul and thus is "recollection."

3B. Epicurus: through repeated exposure to something through the senses we are able to construct a concept of that thing using the faculty of prolepsis. This conceptualizing occurs after the birth of the perceiver.

I just finished this episode and you covered quite a bit of what I've noticed regarding "Fido" v prolepses: we seem to have "cross posted," as it were.

Excellent episode, lots of informative discussion! Discussing Plato is very useful to better understand Epicurus, although it's pretty discouraging to consider that Plato is taught so extensively and Epicurus hardly at all.

As an aside, I'm finding reading Plato to be much easier now that I'm grounded in Epicurus. When I was much younger, with no exposure to philosophy, it was kind of infuriating but challenging. Now it reads as comedy, although for comedic reading Lucian writes better dialogs.

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The first thought that comes to my mind is "Is it possible that serving as response to the Recollection theory is primarily or exclusively what the prolepsis theory was all about?

That definitely is the pertinent question!

I think you're right that there's a distinction between concepts of real world things and universal abstractions. There are a lot of details to review: when I get a chance I'd like to do a point by point comparison between this Phaedo passage and what the pertinent Epicurean sources have to say. Time to make some lists...

Prolepses are one of the theories of Epicurus that have very little remaining in his extant writings. Recently I gave Plato’s Phaedo a quick read, and one thing that struck me was this passage. The context of this argument is in direct contrast to Epicurus’ universe of atoms and void, and similarly to his theory that the “soul” begins and ends at birth. Which would lead one to the conclusion that Epicurus was probably looking closely at this from time to time as he formulated his counter argument. This particular portion appears to relate to the prolepses, and it is part of a “proof” that we have an eternal soul:

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?— for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts— for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

So much is clear— that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:— either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.

Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.

Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born— that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?

No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession— then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Edited from Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books) (p. 767-770). Titan Read Classics. Kindle Edition.

Does this passage add any clarity to how we can understand the prolepses? If we examine the opposite of everything Plato describes here, can we replicate a part of Epicurus’ process of conceiving the prolepses?

I see in here a potential source for Diogenes Laertius’ “cow explanation” of prolepses as things learned from repeated exposure, which would seem to reduce its credibility. Also the eidola would relate to this, and DeWitt’s idea of a prolepsis as an embryonic notion or sketch of an idea. Then of course there’s the fact that we have modern neuroscience to consider once we reach some sort of understanding of Epicurus’ conception. I haven’t had a chance to digest the full implications yet!

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...nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful.

Seriously?

Great; thanks for the list Cassius!

This discussion got me interested in Lucian; I read A True Story last night as I've been meaning to do so for quite a while. I think I'll give Hermotimus a read today: much more enjoyable than Phaedo!

Continuing on the tangent, the article that I linked to at the beginning of the thread The Polytheism of the Epicureans is a good and fairly brief presentation of the realist viewpoint. I've tended to follow the idealist take, but this got me thinking...

In the dialog there's a "thumbnail" button to place it in the message like this.

Great discussion!

@Susan Hill I add images from my phone or tablet using the paper clip icon (next to the emoji icon) below where I'm entering text and above the "reply" and "preview" buttons. It opens a dialog for attaching files; there is a maximum file size which you need to be aware of.

Timely news:

https://www.latimes.com/science/story/…and-andrea-ghez

Regarding infinity, he begins talking about it around 1 hour 13 minutes in the video.

All I can say is... I'm going to take a nap now.

Thanks Susan! Of course I'm not as smart as Penrose but to me, infinitely small is different from infinite in extent. One Epicurean argument is against infinite divisibility of atoms, but I'm not even sure if this is addressing that argument. Another Epicurean argument is that the universe is infinite in extent, but it doesn't seem like he's addressing that argument. He mentions infinities of different sizes, but again I think that applies to number but not extent (?).

I started watching that video but got interrupted; I'll have to get back to it at some point and try to catch his argument if I can.

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The infinity of a universe can be observed from without. It is only infinite from within that universe. You can have infinities of different sizes.

Huh? By the standard definition this makes no sense: what's he talking about?