Posts by Godfrey

That's a juicy question Marco !

There has been a controversy over the centuries over just that, and the terminology is "katastematic" v "kinetic" pleasure. Katastematic is considered "stable" pleasure and kinetic is considered "active" pleasure. There's a ton of technical debate over whether there are actually two types at all and whether one is a "higher" pleasure or whether pleasure is pleasure, period.

Here's a place on the forum to explore the subject:

Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure

The "go to" paper on the subject is Nikolsky's article in the forum filebase: Nikolsky - Epicurus On Pleasure

As I recall, I got a lot out of reading Wenham's paper which is shorter and maybe a good preparation for reading Nikolsky. I can't find Wenham's paper in the filebase, so I've attached it below.

Having said all that, I see that your question also touches on "duration", which is often combined with "intensity" in describing pleasure. I think this terminology is more practical, where the katastematic/kinetic debate might be considered more philosophical. "Practical" as in choosing between pleasures of varying durations and intensities in a given situation, with the knowledge that a given pleasure is not universally better than any other pleasure.

Quote from Don

***3. The idea of tranquility and peace of mind still appeals to me. I find it easier to appreciate pleasures with a tranquil mind, and, from my readings of the text, Epicurus backs this up. I recognize that tranquility isn't the goal, pleasure is. But tranquility/peace of mind makes appreciating pleasure much easier from my perspective.

I agree with this: well stated!

I would add that an Epicurean understanding of pleasure is tied to an understanding of desires. Desires are not pleasures, and desires are integral to the conditions of one's life.

Epicurus famously breaks desires into natural/necessary, natural/unnecessary, and unnatural thus unnecessary. Whether something is natural, necessary, etc is to some degree determined by the amount of pleasure and/or pain it will cause to a specific individual. And this varies based on specifics such as the person's age, financial situation, health, culture, living situation, friends and so on.

As to your list Kalosyni I have a few comments (my numbers match yours):

1) This is a great example of the relativity of pleasures. A personal example that comes to mind is from a couple of years ago, when I was planning a garage remodel. It was "necessary" in order to carry out structural repairs, but of course there were lots of things that I thought about adding that weren't strictly necessary to solve the basic problem. So I evaluated them in terms of how much pleasure they would bring vs how much pain they would cause in terms of money, time, disruption, etc. I added some things and decided not to add others, and it turned out that the final project has solved the necessary problems but also brings me much joy beyond the utilitarian aspect of having a structurally sound garage. It's not as swanky as it might have been but it brings me lots of pleasure.

So this is how I approached this particular issue on a personal level. Another person might consider it a waste of time and money to do any work on the garage at all: perhaps they don't have the money, maybe they don't expect to live much longer, maybe they're about to move to another state. Yet another person, perhaps homeless, might be happy to live in the garage, repairs or not. And so on....

2) I think this is important, but to me it illustrates to some degree just how natural Epicurus' philosophy is. Because this is something that I think we're all drawn to do, at least on some level. If I have a pain, I try to eliminate it, whether it's chromic disease or acute hunger. You might even say that the faculty of pleasure/pain is to some degree a reflex! To me what is more important is to be as aware as possible of what pains me and what brings me pleasure and why I do the things I do. Examine the sensations and my "preconceptions" about the discomfort and use this information to follow the guide of pleasure and pain.

3) At a minimum, I would add a comma after philosophy: "Study philosophy, which leads to tranquility and peace of mind." Studying philosophy is important but it can bring up difficult truths. Eventually these bring peace of mind, at least in my experience. Maybe I would re-word this item as "enjoy the pleasure of the study of philosophy".

4)

5) I would say "savor the sweetness of life as you follow the Canon".

6) This I think is more of a philosophical argument; personally I don't think about a totality of pleasure or of additional pleasures, just pleasure. I'd probably eliminate this item and end with 5).

Quote from Cassius

As I have said before I really like Rolfe Humphries' version.

Cassius I finally got a copy of this version due to your repeated praises (and also Joshua's if I'm not mistaken). I've just begun reading it, starting with Book 6 (to stay close to the podcast) and so far it really does make for good reading, flowing noticeably better than other versions. Thanks for the recommendation!

  Joshua you bring a nice perspective to the podcast, and your reading voice is quite enjoyable: smooth and extremely clear.

A very insightful post, Kalosyni ! What you are describing is exactly the process of opening to the Feelings as a guide. Half of the guide is "pain": not avoiding or suppressing the unpleasant, but being guided by that as much as by pleasure.

A pleasant and fulfilling recovery to you!

A couple of quite pleasurable activities that I've recently begun are restorative yoga and meditation. Although I've done both activities for years at a time in the past (yoga having been far more active than passive), I'm pursuing them free of dogma and with no "path" and am discovering a new and somewhat guilty and decadent pleasure in them. Which somehow makes them even more pleasurable!

I second your last statement Cassius! And I don't see anything to pick apart in your commentary. What I'm trying to discern is whether there are any Epicurean formulas comparable to the formulas for various types of logic. These would be useful both for discussion with non-Epicureans, and also for practical decision making. Personally I find the Canon very useful, as well as considering pleasures and desires in my decisions; I'm just curious as to whether there is evidence of "formulaic" reasoning in Philodemus.

I'll need to wade back into OMOI, but I won't be getting to it for awhile. I can only take it in small doses before I get lost in the terminology

I think that this much is pretty clear. Is this all that Philodemus is saying in Methods of Inference, or is he putting Epicurean reasoning into more formal terms?

Quote from Cassius

What we are trying to do ultimately is get a firm fix on what it was that Epicurus was rejecting, while still embracing "reason" in PD16!

All this discussion of details is irrelevant and worthless unless we keep that goal in mind.

Exactly.

But even more important is to understand what Epicurus was proposing! It would be great to have a presentation discussing that; I've found it quite a challenge sorting through Methods of Inference. I would find it extremely useful, and would be quite grateful, if someone with more knowledge of the subject than I have could put something together.

Funny thing, Don ... I was listening to this podcast earlier this morning while driving and thought that it might be worth posting. Of course my second thought was "I wonder if Don has posted this?"

To me, this episode is relevant to all of the PDs concerning pleasure and desire. I also think that it's helpful as an Epicurean to understand the differences between pleasures and desires, and getting some grasp of modern neuroscience is relevant in that regard.

I interpret LFB the same way as Don in post #22 and as Cassius in post #23.

This was a book that I took notes on, which I rarely do. Here are some notes and quotes (italicized) regarding "concepts":

“Everything you perceive around you is represented by concepts in your brain.” This is how it reduces the tremendous volume of input to manageable information. The brain predicts sensory signals before they arrive and edits them to make them into useful representations of the world.

“Thus, concepts aren’t fixed definitions in your brain, and they’re not prototypes of the most typical or frequent instances. Instead, your brain has many instances—of cars, of dot patterns, of sadness, or anything else—and it imposes similarities between them, in the moment, according to your goal in a given situation. For example, your usual goal for a vehicle is to use it for transportation, so if an object meets that goal for you, then it’s a vehicle, whether it’s a car, a helicopter, or a sheet of plywood with four wheels nailed on.”

“Concepts are not static but remarkably malleable and context-dependent, because your goals can change to fit the situation.”

When you categorize, you are creating similarities in the world, not finding them.

“When your brain needs a concept, it constructs one on the fly, mixing and matching from a population of instances from your past experience, to best fit your goals in a particular situation.”

“Without a concept for “Fear,” you cannot experience fear.”

“Any healthy human can experience low-arousal, unpleasant affect. But you cannot experience sadness with all of its cultural meaning, appropriate actions, and other functions of emotion unless you have the concept ‘Sadness.’”

Quote from Yonge

...so as to know on the one hand, the opinion which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other...

Quote from Geer

if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation...

Quote from Geer

...and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts...

Quote from Strodach

...or some percept of the mind itself...

My first thought while reading the various translations is that the Yonge quote (as well as most of the others)and the second Geer quote are referring to the same thing (opinions) and therefore the Geer quote is nonsensical.

But to look at the Geer quote, he's comparing "that which awaits confirmation" with "confirmed concepts." I can't comment on the Greek, but comparing Geer quote two with Strodach it looks like Geer is confusing "precept" with "percept."

There's a bit of a skeptical bent to Epicurus' thinking, as I understand it, in that all ideas and perceptions are open to verification: hence the multiple explanations of certain phenomena. But he's obviously not a Skeptic: the verification comes from direct experience. So, to me, Geer's translation is counter to the intent of this PD. Epicurus is saying that "confirmed concepts" are "opinions which go beyond the actual sensations."

My only exposure to the circumplex has been in LFB's book, so I can't say that I fully understand how it's meant to be read. Every time I look it up, I get a different understanding.

With that in mind, the History section of this Wikipedia entry credits it to Timothy Leary and describes it as I originally understood it: the circle being the limit and the intersection of the axes being neutral. However there are entire books written about circumplexes and it could be that there are various interpretations. The quote that I posted earlier in this thread came from an online except of an out of print book on circumplexes and gave me the impression that all relevant data occurs on the circle itself and not inside of it. So the whole circumplex model is, to me, more of a mystery the more that I get in to it, which is compromising it's usefulness. (Insert Timothy Leary joke here.)

Interpersonal circumplex - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I have the Kindle version, it doesn't say much, if anything, about him.

Does anybody have any information on Strodach? I like some of his translations but find his commentary disturbing. All I can find with a Google search is that he was born in 1905.

Apparently there was lively debate in ancient times as to what exactly amber is, and it’s origin:

https://ambers.netlify.app/intro/9/

There seem to have been varying opinions on this point. From footnote 41 in this article:

The Properties of Amber

Quire is a digital publishing framework built on top of the Hugo static site generator. Generate Web, PDF, and print books (with Epub coming soon) from a…

www.getty.edu

"The early Greek philosopher Thales of Miletos is credited by Diogenes Laertius as the first to recognize amber’s magnetism: “Arguing from the magnet and from amber, he attributed a soul or life even to inanimate objects” (Diogenes Laertius 1.24, vol. 1, ed. and trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library 184 [London, 1993]). E. R. Caley and J. C. Richards, Theophrastus on Stones (Columbus, 1956), p. 117, argue that this claim rests on shaky ground; that Thales was the first to mention the property can be inferred only indirectly from Diogenes Laertius’s statement: “Aristotle and Hippias say that, judging by the behaviour of the lodestone and amber, he also attributed souls to lifeless things.” Caley and Richards consider the possibility “that it was Hippias who said that Thales understood the attractive property of amber, but there is no way of confirming such an inference because the works of Hippias are not extant.” Plato (Timaeus 80c) alludes to amber’s magnetism but denies that it is a real power of attraction. Aristotle does not mention amber in the relevant section of On the Soul (De Anima 1.2.405A). Thus, following Caley and Richards, Theophrastus is the earliest extant account. If Thales did describe amber’s static electricity, he may have done so based on his observation of wool production, which used amber implements: distaff, spindle, and whorls. I owe this observation to Schwarzenberg 2002, who calls attention not only to the famous wool of Miletos, but also to the number of extant seventh-century spinning tools. Pliny notes that Syrian women used amber whorls in weaving and that amber picks up the “fringes of garments,” and also comments on amber’s electrostatic property. But, unlike Plato, he thinks its magnetic property is like that of iron. Plutarch (Platonic Questions 7.7) explains that “the hot exhalation released by rubbing amber acts in the same ways as the emanations from the magnet. That is, it displaces air, forming a vacuum in front of the attracted object and driving air to the rear of it”: De Lapidibus, ed. and trans. D. E. Eichholz (Oxford, 1965), p. 200, n.b."

You may have addressed this and I may have missed it, but I was intrigued by the similarity of "meteorology" and "meteor." Apparently Greek ta meteōra means "the celestial phenomena, things in heaven above," plural of meteōron, literally "thing high up."

"Specific sense of 'fireball in the sky, shooting star' is attested from 1590s. Atmospheric phenomena were formerly classified as aerial meteors (wind), aqueous meteors (rain, snow, hail), luminous meteors (aurora, rainbows), and igneous meteors (lightning, shooting stars). All the other senses have fallen away." From:

meteorology | Origin and meaning of meteorology by Online Etymology Dictionary

METEOROLOGY Meaning: "science of the earth's atmosphere, scientific study of weather and climate," especially with a view to… See definitions of meteorology.

www.etymonline.com

meteor | Origin and meaning of meteor by Online Etymology Dictionary

METEOR Meaning: "any atmospheric phenomenon," from Old French meteore (13c.) and directly from Medieval Latin meteorum… See definitions of meteor.

www.etymonline.com

meteorite | Origin and meaning of meteorite by Online Etymology Dictionary

METEORITE Meaning: "rock or metallic mass of extraterrestrial origin that falls to earth after streaking across the sky as… See definitions of meteorite.

www.etymonline.com