Posts by Eikadistes

We're heeding caution this time around.

I may drop off the grid sometimes Wednesday or Thursday.

Quote from Cassius

Would "readily" work?

I sense unease with the adverb "easily" ... and I share that unease.

As a haiku, I tried to chew on "boldly" as a meaningful tweak:

Fear not God nor death;
The good is easy to get,
The bad, boldly met.

That's not a correct translation, but it rings to me because the Epicurean capacity to endure pain goes part and parcel with fearlessness (of boldness, or courage). It is definitely not easy to mechanically lessen the physical intensity of the sensation of severe, unmanageable pain, but it is relatively easy (by comparison) to embolden an internal spirit of confidence through reflection.

I just wanted to throw in this rhyme for the sake of preference (its origin is unknown to me).

But, if we're gonna end with "easily endured" ...

... it's begging to be rhymed with "easily procured".

There is currently a DNS issue with CloudFlare (from what I can tell) that is preventing users from accessing their website http://www.shapeways.com. It may just be temporary.

Those look great!

I was moved by a similar spirit and painted this plastic, 3-D print coin/pendant:

Quote from Kalosyni

Thank you!  Don for explaining the ancient Greek words used, very helpful.

Reason I was asking was that I thought that perhaps "terrible" was refering to "unnatural and unnecessary" - and that came out of my idea that "the pains from the unnatural and unnecessary are easy to avoid" - but looks like I was way off on that.

And as you are saying, the correct translation is: "the terrible is easily endured".

One thing I'll note is that EYEKKAPTEPHTON is used in opposition to TAΓAΘON (which, as Don has demonstrated in the past, can appropriately be expressed as "The Good", which is Pleasure), so in this case, "the terrible" or "bad", I think, is referring to the general feeling of Pain.

It is never too early, nor late late to preserve the health of one's soul.

Quote from Matteng

In positive psychology, a distinction is made between hedonistic, happiness(Pleasure) and Eudaimonia. Do I understand it correctly that Eumonia happiness is also hedonistic happiness at its core?

Most of the Hellenistic philosophers can be described as "Eudaimonic" in their ethics. Overwhelmingly, they agreed that "happiness" (being the general translation with which we are largely comfortable) was the goal in life. Their definitions of "happiness", however, (and how to obtain it) differed drastically, so the word was employed in differing, technical ways.

We might prefer to call Socrates "pre-Hellenistic", but, as per Plato's dialogues, he (and Plato) discuss eudaimonia often. For them, it was a function of temperance (in particular, I would argue, self-restraint, or self-denial). Socratic happiness strikes me as tending toward asceticism. From this, Plato argues that a eudaimonic person has an organized soul, in accordance with the Form of the Good, so this sort of happiness is highly abstract (and I question if it can actually be felt).

Aristotle saw eudaimonia as "excellence", exemplified by a Man of Action, an engaged, public figure (typically male; he wasn't convinced that females were intellectually capable of pursuing philosophical excellence). The excellent Aristotelian can be evaluated as a function of their moral adherence to the Golden Mean, and the utility they provide to their polis. For Aristotle, a person could not enjoy excellence without engaging in a reputable, profitable occupation. Simply clearing one's mind of anxiety, and enjoying simple pleasures of life was not enough.

Epicurus, of course, thought this was all malarky. Eudaimonia for the Epicureans was "pleasure", pure, unadulterated, unapologetic pleasure, fearlessness of the mind, and painlessness of the flesh. The happy Epicurean was not limited by political duties or occupational obligations. Of course, nature compels a happy person to be practical, have integrity, and treat others with decency, so he was not alien to civic engagement. However, having a prosperous career was not seen as being necessary to happiness, and politics was seen as being (usually) anti-thetical.

Pyrrho (the Skeptic) said this was all nonsense. Eudaimonia for him was a kind of epistemological "tranquility" and was only attainable by suspending all alleged judgments, having concluded that no dogma can be justified. He doesn't trust sensation, pleasure, or, for that matter, the possibility of reliable knowledge through logical inference. His type of eudaimonia strikes me as being unpleasant, or, perhaps, cold, unfeeling, and unrewarding. That bring me to the Stoics.

For the Stoics, eudaimonia is "virtue", cold, calculated virtue (I don't think they'd like the "cold" description, so forgive my clear, Epicurean bias). The happy life of the Stoics may not be a pleasurable life, but is definitely a life in which one's behavior is governed by the conclusions of logical propositions, and never by the pleasurable or painful consequences of actions.

Of all of these philosophers, few equated "happiness" with "physical pleasure". Largely, happiness was associated with prosperity or self-denial, and usually not "feeling happy".

"We found a network of brain regions that, when damaged, are linked to higher religious fundamentalism. This functional network was lateralized to the right hemisphere and overlaps with the locations of brain lesions associated with specific neuropsychiatric and behavioral conditions. Our findings shed light on neuroanatomy that may influence the emergence of religious fundamentalism, offering implications for understanding the relationship between brain networks and fundamentalist behavior." <https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2322399121>

Here is a summary of the otherwise locked study: https://www.psypost.org/new-study-link…Ub6_uTkIvaMO67Q

Quote from Cassius

don't necessarily want to derail this thread with another discussion with fine points on "the gods," but is it your view at this point that you do not think Epicurus held the gods to have any physical existence whatsoever ("....though, those deities are simply inspiring mental objects") or am I misreading your intent there?

I shouldn't say "simply" because our discussions have revealed that the topic of Epicurean theology is anything but simple. Perhaps "primarily", "most immediately", or "at least" would be better. At least, I consider the "divine nature" to be a mental construct that provides humans with ethical utility. Therein, one's "god" is, and the collection of human "gods" are, at least, personal expressions of the common notion of divinity that almost all human beings seem to share.

Do these conceptions of divinity correspond with non-terrestrial, quasi-animals that dwell in the void between world systems, whose non-compound bodies respirate with quasi-blood? Perhaps. But even if a human being could triangulate the position of a god in space, by definition, the god would be too well hidden or protected or discrete to allow itself to be discovered, or examined like a specimen. So, those gods, as "extraordinary extra-terrestrials", are somewhat theoretical.

Indeed, Epicureans spent a lot of time contemplating the various ways in which the universe could contain a being that is both "alive" yet "immortal". The Kathegemones dedicated treatises to the topic, so I hesitate to dismiss it solely on the argument that: (1) compounds cannot be immortal, (2) all living beings are compounds, (3) "the gods" are living beings, (4) "the gods" cannot be immortal. Ancient Epicureans seemed to have had a lot more to say about this than just that.

I'm not sure exactly how to deal with that. I wish we had more extant texts.

But the icons in ancient peoples' dreams that some have called "gods", are, at least, immediate, concrete, reproducible, inspiring, and we can discuss them in meaningful ways with sensuous vocabulary. The thought of a divine being stimulates a positive mental response the same way that a massage stimulates positive sensations in one's nerves. We observe this sort of internal stimulation in people across the world, and we have been making this observation since before written history. If we want to meaningfully discuss "the gods", we can, at least, start there.

Right off the bat, I appreciate that you describe your outline as a philosophical exercise. As far as our sense of Epicurean spirituality goes, writing an outline is a key practice.

Epicurus would agree with your theological rejection of supernatural deities; however, he positively affirms that natural deities do exist (though, those deities are simply inspiring mental objects). Now, if our definition of theism identifies the divine as being responsible for creation, for maintaining natural forces, and for interfering with the development of human history, then Epicurus could reasonably be called an "atheist". However, Epicurus wrote against the atheism of his time, and positively recommends to his pupils that they consider the divine nature to be blessed and imperishable (though the spiritual objects of the masses are incoherent).

I absolutely identify with your position on theology. But I think that the way Epicurus discussed religion was less in terms of abstract metaphysics, and more in terms of cultural anthropology. In which case, "god-belief" is just a natural, human practice, like wolves howling at the moon. Certainly, the moon will never respond to howling: but that's not why wolves howl.

Your discussion of one's own death is very much so Epicurean in approach. Epicurus describes death as ANAIΣΘHTEI from from ἀν- (ἀn-, “without”) + αισθητός (aisthetós, “perceptibility”, “sensibility”) meaning “devoid of sensation”, “unconsciousness”, “no sense-experience”, “absence of sensation”, “lacks awareness”, “no feeling”, “no perception”. Contextualizing death as the absence of sensation is exactly how Epicurus saw it. I think the only discrepancy here is that Epicurus did not associate the decision-making faculty of the mind with the prefrontal cortex in a human skull.

I can see why you would both propose both physical determinism and moral nihilism: if one supposes that freedom, choice, and responsibility are illusions, then one would have to admit that we lack any kind of moral agency. Democritus would sympathize with you here, but not Epicurus. Epicurus rejects determinism, not only because it violates his principle of particles' unpredictable swerving, but also in an ethical sense, because the belief in determinism can be measurably paralyzing and unhealthy. Even if most of our thoughts and actions are just dominoes in a line of falling particles, the belief in determinism just surrenders whatever small bit of control we do have over our imaginations, even if its only memorizing data, or intentionally daydreaming.

As far as the moral nihilism goes, we treat this proposition with suspicion because, overwhelmingly, pleasure can be equated with physical health. Most things that are physically healthy are inherently pleasurable, whereas physically destructive behaviors tend to be painful. Since Epicurus identifies pleasure with The Good and pain with that which is terrible, and since the feelings of pleasure and pain come from Nature, we reason that good and evil are grounded in nature. Nature compels us to pursue pleasure (to be healthy), and we suffer when we reject these natural compulsions. There may not be an absolute Ten Commandments to which all human beings are held, but there are natural, behavioral tendencies that reinforce an organism's ability to thrive.

Overall, your perspective on fear of death aligns with Epicurean philosophy insofar as recognizing it as being an irrational source of anxiety. He might question your proposition that death is harmful; surely, dying is harmful, but once the process of dying has finished, and death is the case, there is neither pleasure nor pain, good nor evil, because those things require consciousness. Still, the general, thanatological position that fear of death is unhealthy and irrational is on point.

I appreciate your list of ways in which to pursue a better life. Epicurus proposed a number of conclusions at which you have arrived. I think the biggest thing I see as being (in my humble opinion) a contradiction, is the tension between "responsibility impossibilism", "moral nihilism" and your thoughtful list of helpful habits. I maintain, from an Epicurean position, that the fact that we are concerned with ethics in the first place, that we hold ourselves responsible for choice and avoidance, and that we pursue education are evidence that we have at least a little bit of control, and that the choices that we make are subject to our own moral evaluation.

Quote from Cassius

The point is that the other philosophers, typified by Plato with his cave, allege that the senses "lie" to you and that they are therefore unreliable sources of information about how to live.

I'm terribly near-sighted, and I like to use the example of eyesight.

Without glasses, everything is dangerously blurry: precisely as it should appear to someone with an elongated eyeball. If I saw the world "as it really is" (i.e. "not blurry"), then my senses would be lying to me, leading me to believe that my eyeball is round. But it doesn't, because it isn't.

Evaluating sensory data is like asking a toddler a question about your physical appearance: the toddler doesn't know how to manage that delicate, social interaction; they will probably blurt out the first, unfiltered impression they have, without any thought as to the implications.

There is also a strong contrast here, not only against Plato, but also, against Democritus. Both philosophers would have seen near-sightedness as evidence that the senses are unreliable, and that the objects of perception are just illusions that come from a more fundamental reality.

Quote from Titus

(https://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/w…es/foreword.htm)

The catbull link to the dissertation seems to be broken, so I've formatted and uploaded excerpts from the Second Edition of the Marx-Engels Reader, translated by Robert C. Tucker: https://twentiers.com/marx/

Quote from AcuDoc213

I follow a Secular Buddhist philosophy (for the most part) and undertand that there are a great many ideas/concepts that both philosophies agree upon. I wonder if anyone else follows or comes from a Secular Buddhist background, too.

I really enjoy the ideas of Epicurus with his ideas of physics (atomic structure), the gods (non-theism), and his ideas on death match mine nearly perfectly.

Welcome, AcuDoc213 ! You may enjoy perusing a thread we've grown that compares Epicurean Philosophy with various forms of Buddhism: 2022 Epicurus vs Buddhism Compare and Contrast Thread

I compiled a list of instances where Epicureans cite a deity or the divine nature.

Sometimes, the invocations are simply non-religious expressions (like saying "God bless you" when someone sneezes) or idioms (as is the case when an insurance agent declares irreparable storm damage to be "an Act of God"; when someone sees something terrible on the news and asks "for the love of God...") or expletives (like yelling "Jesus Christ!" or "Good Lord!" to express shock). Sometimes, they are pious (as is the case when Philodemos invokes "the Savior" in On Death). Sometimes, they are intentional, poetic personifications of natural forces (such as we mythologize "Mother Nature").

Most of the time, the object of piety is simply identified in the genderless plural, as "the gods" or "deities".

EPICURUS:

Usually, Epicurus employs the words "god", "a god" or "the god", and "the gods" as synonyms for a "the divine nature" (and her expressions) that is perfectly untroubled, blameless, and worthy of human veneration. This also extends to making comparisons between human pleasure, and the pleasure enjoyed by gods, both of which are divine.

I note that he published a scroll called “On the Gods”, in the plural (according to Diogenes Laërtius).

Epicurus mentions “god” or “the gods” in Epistles to Menoikeus and fragments. He uses the singulars “god” and “the god” (or “a god”), as well as the plural “gods”. He never mentions a specific deity, only the general notion of “deity”.

We find both “God” and “the gods” throughout his extant fragments.

He mentions “Zeus”, by name in Vatican Saying 33.

In Menoikeus, and throughout Pythokles, Epicurus refers to deity as “the divine nature”, not as a person.

METRODOROS:

Metrodoros, Polyainos, and Hermarkhos are all attested by Philodemos as having written theological works.

In On Change and On Gods (as captured by Philodemus in On Piety), Metrodoros juggles some of the arguments about "the gods" in the plural. He notes that "that which has no share of the void endures, but that every compound is destructible".

POLYAINOS:

In Against Ariston and another unnamed work, Polyainos writes that "of bodies some are | compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed". Philodemos explains that Polyainos "considers the gods to be neither simple entities nor compounds, since those are completely eternal, while these are destructible. So in no way can gods have bodies, since they are | indestructible. But not necessarily for those thinking that only […] if they inquire accurately, he says, he thinks that it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it, and that it is possible even for many eternal and immortal gods | to exist..."

HERMARKHOS:

In On the Way of Life of the Gods (P.herc 152-7), Philodemos describes Hermarchus as having supposed "the gods" to respirate. Here is at least one example of Hermarchus interfacing with the objects of piety. According to Hermarchus, as Philodemos documents: "we would not consider them more fortunate and indestructible if they did not, but rather similar to mute human beings. For since in fact all of us who are not maimed make use of language, to say that the gods either are maimed or do not resemble us in this respect (there being no other way either they or we could give shape to utterances) is extremely foolish, especially since conversation with those like themselves is a source of indescribable pleasure to the good".

COLOTES:

Plutarch accuses Colotes and Epicureans of refecting Zeus as the “Author of the Race”, Demeter as “Giver of Laws”, and Poseidon as “Guardian of Growth”, perhaps implying that Colotes (among Epicureans), would have defended the existences of Zeus, Demeter and Poseidon, but not as interveners in human affairs, nor as givers of life.

DEMETRIOS OF LAKONIA:

Demetrios writes a treatise called "On the Shape of [a/the] God". He seems to have been a strong advocate for the position that the gods are extra-ordinary extra-terrestrials from the void beyond our kosmos. His expressions of divinity largely deal with "god" in either the masculine or neuter singular, the way we tend to receive it most frequently.

Thanks to Bryan for this list: [Demetrius Lacon - Main Biography]

• "4. Because of this, [the mind] possesses a direct reception of similar things, and when these are examined closely, they are not difficult to restore, and by such restorations, we leave god in a human form - because clearly we connect [the form of a human] to a god.
• 15. Since we do not find reason in any other form apart from a human form, it is evident that we should leave a god in an anthropomorphic form so that, even with reason, he may have substance (so that he has a real existence along with the rational faculty). Therefore, we say that [a god] is anthropomorphic...
• 16. He [Bion] does not grasp our point even when he leads to it. For they say that if god is anthropomorphic because it has reasoning and shared vitality, we associate with god many other common properties of forms, such as hands, fingers...
• 17. ...[god] has a similar soul [to man]. Therefore, it is not necessary that if any animals have such a form that a god also has that form. But it will have the faculty of reasoning and, in addition to these common properties, it will also have many other properties in the highest degree...
• 18. 'If indeed,' he [Bion] says, “it has a human form, it is clear that it will have eyes, so it will also suffer from ophthalmia, and it will be affected similarly by the remaining senses." But this itself is similar to nonsense.
• 20. We say that 'god is not the universe nor tireless sun or the full moon” but it is not possible to say this to a Stoic or a Peripatetic! For how does that which is spherical have its own form? Otherwise, those saying that [god is spherical] do not see that because it is proper for the nature of things…
• 25. But we say that the form of a god is not like what other philosophers attribute. Certainly, they would have seen that [a god] has shapes that are not spherical nor has judgments or angry dispositions or pettiness, but forms that stand apart in the sublime and dispositions rejecting everything lower – all directed towards its own bliss (μακαριότητα) and imperishability (ἀφθαρσίαν)."

PHILODEMOS:

Philodemos' usages include a full range of linguistic idioms, personifications, as well as expressions of piety.

Philodemos mentions numerous mythic figures, deities, and divine qualities through his Epigrams, including “Aphrodite’s secrets”, “the heavy wrath of the Muses”, “The Fates themselves”, “the girdle of Aphrodite”, “golden Cypris”, “Callistion”, “Perseus”, “Andromeda”, “Poseidon”, “Melicertes”, “Ino”, “Leucothea”, the “Nereids”, “Poseidon”, “Zephyr”, “Rhea … the mother of the gods”, “the Phaeacians”, “born in the Ram or the Twins, or in both the Fishes”, “goat-horned Pan”, “Heracles”, and “wing-footed Hermes”. He is no stranger to Greek mythology, and comfortably employs mythic imagery.

In On Anger he twice declares “by Zeus”. He once invokes the name of “Apollo” while describing the mistaken gods of the masses, having assigned to Apollo human flaws and failures. Apollo is nowhere else mentioned (to my knowledge).

In On Death, he writes “Let us drink in honor of Zeus the Savior”, and three other times writes “by Zeus!” He also mentions “the gods”. This is consistent in On Frank Criticism as well, mentioning “by Zeus” and the “gods”.

He mentions “Zeus” by name a few times in On Piety, as well as “god”, “a god”, “the god”, and “the gods” hundreds of times. Most of the time, he refers to “the gods”. He occasionally refers to “the divine” and “divinity” as “the divine nature”. In this work, Philodemos records Epicurus as having participated in “Attic Dionysia”, a festival in the name of Dionysius. He also mentions those who “sacriifce to Athena and Ares” in an allegorical sense.

He only mentions “the gods” once in On Property Management and On Rhetoric.

He invokes “god” and “the gods” several times in On Signs.

LUCRETIUS:

Lucretius provides us with a colorful array of examples. Most of the time through De Rervm Natvra, he refers to the many "gods" in the genderless plural. However, beyond that, we have dozens of examples of piety and personification, most notably, the proem to Venus (i.e. Aphrodite) that opens the very first book of the poem.

• “Venus”, “Mother of the Aeneadae”, “O, lady”, “the goddess” (1.1-40, 225; 2.173, 434; 3.777; 4.1052-1274)

• “Earth”, “great mother of gods”, “the goddess” (1.250; 2.598, 621, 655, 1090, 1093)

• “Favonius” (1.10)

• “Mavors” (i.e. “Ares”, 1.29-40)

• “the gods” (1.68, 155, 1014; 2.167, 175, 352, 434, 598, 640, 646; 3.18, 48, 319, 981; 4.590, 1007, 1239; 5.51, 60-90, 124, 146, 156, 181, 306, 1156, 1161-1236, 643-95, 379, 387, 419, 756, 760)

• “Epicurus”, "godlike" (1.731, 734; 3.14; 5.7-52; 6.5)
• “Earth”, “great mother of gods”, “the goddess” (1.250; 2.598, 621, 655, 1090, 1093)
• “Neptune”, “the sea”(2.471, 655; 6.1076)
• “Ceres”, “corn” (2.655; 4.1168, 5.13, 741)
• “Bacchus”, “that liquor” (2.655)
• “Nature”, “her own mistress” (2.1090)
• “Tantalus” (3.981)
• “Iacchus” (4.1168)
• “Silenus” (4.1168)
• “Spring” (5.737)
• “Zephyr” (5.737)
• “Flora” (5.740)
• “Volturnus” (5.744)
• “Jupiter” (6.387, 400) elsewhere called “Jove” (2.633)

I'm sure there are others in that poem that I have missed.

DIOGENES OF OINOANDA:

Numerous menitons of “the god” and “god” in the singular. (Fragments 20, 21, 24)

He also mentions individual deities, including “Zeus”, “Demeter”, and “in the name of the Twelve”.

• “For indeed, while honouring supreme Zeus and Demeter as deities, [we regard human beings] not as [their] slaves, [but as their friends.]” (Diogenes of Oinoanda, fr. 17; translated by M. F. Smith)

• “[T]he crisis comes and passes away in the shortest time; while if it is relieved, it ushers the creature to health.What then, in the name of the twelve gods, is terrible about that?” (Ibid., fr. 47)

• “[What advantage then], Dositheus, [attached to] this [desire for your son, in the name of] Dionysus?” (Ibid., fr. 128)

• “What [benefit], father Zeus, [did he derive] from these [richness]?” (Ibid., fr. 153)

Quote from Matteng

Would someone who follows Epicurus' teachings commit injustices if they were never seen?

For sure, Epicurus warns against violating a mutual agreement. Though, when faced with unethical laws, living in violation of the law is inevitable, and we would expect sage to respond to such a situation with consideration: "Will the wise man do things that the laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find." (Usener fragment 18).

I am thinking, for example, of abolitionists assisting runaway slaves.

Quote from Matteng

It is often said that injustice towards others is more likely to arise from non-necessary needs, which the Epicurean sage does not have.
But what about natural/necessary needs? But this also includes ataraxia. This is also important to the Stoics. Needs for the body or "life" are less important to Stoics than to Epicureans.

Epicurus sees friendship as a natural and necessary need; a violation of friendship will prevent a social need from being satisfied, so injustice towards others is incompatible with the pleasant life.

Quote from Godfrey

It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.

The Epistle to Herodotus 55-59 discusses the range of sizes of an atom:

"However, one must not believe that every kind of magnitude exists in atoms, lest we find ourselves contradicted by phenomena. But we must admit that there are atoms of different magnitude, because, as that is the case, it is then more easy to explain the impressions and sensations; ⁵⁶at all events, I repeat, it is not necessary for the purpose of explaining the differences of the qualities, to attribute to atoms every kind of magnitude.

We must not suppose either, that an atom can become visible to us; for, first of all, one does not see that that is the case, and besides, one cannot even conceive, how an atom is to become visible; besides, we must not believe, that in a finite body there are particles of every sort, infinite in number; consequently, one must not only reject the doctrine of infinite divisibility in parcels smaller and smaller, lest we should be reducing everything to nothing, and find ourselves forced to admit, that in a mass composed of a crowd of elements, existence can reduce itself to non-existence. But one cannot even suppose that a finite can be susceptible of transformation ad infinitum, or even of transformation into smaller objects that itself; ⁵⁷for when once one has said that there are in an object particles of every kind, infinite in number, there is absolutely no means whatever of imagining that this object can have only a finite magnitude; in fact, it is evident that these particles, infinite in number, have some kind of dimension or other, and whatever this dimension may be in other respects, the objects which are composed of it will have an infinite magnitude; in presenting forms which are determined, and limits which are perceived by the senses, one conceives, easily, without it being necessary to study this last question directly, that this would be the consequence of the contrary supposition, and that consequently, one must come to look at every object as infinite.

58 One must also admit that the most minute particle perceptible to the sense, is neither absolutely like the objects which are susceptible of transformation, nor absolutely different from them. It has some characteristic in common with the object which admit of transformation, but it also differs from them, inasmuch as it does not allow any distinct parts to be discerned in it. When then, in virtue of these common characteristics, and of this resemblance, we wish to form an idea of the smallest particle perceptible by the senses, in taking the objects which change, for our terms of comparison, it is necessary that we should seize on some characteristic common to these different objects. In this way, we examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves, more as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we consider, the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent. This analogy applies to the atom, as far as we consider it as having the smallest dimensions possible. ⁵⁹Evidently by its minuteness, it differs from all sensible objects, but still this analogy is applicable to it; in a word, we establish by this comparison, that the atom really has some extent, but we exclude all considerable dimensions, for the sake of only investing it with the smallest proportions.

We must also admit, in taking for our guide the reasoning which discloses to us things which are invisible to the senses, that the most minute magnitudes, those which are not compound magnitudes, and which from the limit of sensible extent, are the first measure of the other magnitudes which are only called greater or less in their relation to the others. For these relations which they maintain with these particles, which are not subject to transformation, suffice to give them this characteristic of first measure. But they cannot, like atoms, combine themselves, and form compound bodies in virtue of any motion belonging to themselves." (trans. Yonge)

Quote from Cassius

Twentier since you seem to have read into this, any comment on Joseph Campbell and his work? (I've heard of him but know virtually nothing.)

I love Joseph Campbell; his approach to mythology helped provide me with personal orientation when it came to spiritual propositions and religious idea. He shares a tremendous in common with Jung, both of whom admire non-traditional spiritual influences, both of whom I would contextualize within the Freudian tradition of psychoanalysis. In general, the approach of each of these thinkers is grounded in the proposition that there is a common, psychological territory through which all humans travel, and that Freud and Jung, among others, could map that territory.

There is something of a double-edged sword here that keeps nagging me from the back of my mind, and I think that is, that, on one hand, the general notion of the "collective unconscious", if we are to mean that common, psychological territory we share (for example, the fear of death), then that is totally coherent with Epicurean Philosophy, and, in my mind, presents us with more accessible ways to interface with ideas like prolepseis. On the other hand, I think that Epicurus would be very critical of the ways that Freud, Jung, and Campbell relied on metaphor. That group of thinkers attempted to provide us with dream analysis, which Epicurus, I think, would have cautioned against (if not necessarily rejected). They also laid the foundations for the idea of personality typologies, which are by no means objective, or even always useful. Joseph Cambell's heroic archetypes are often so general and numerous that they (with respect, because I love Joseph Cambell) seem to me not to have value as predictive tools, scientifically or medically.

A lot of these ideas are ground-breaking and brilliant in that, in the post-Darwin era, they contextualized human psychology within evolutionary theory. They were bold enough to explore taboo, and provided rational explanations for religious experiences, for criminal behavior, for alternative sexuality, and were willing to admit common value with Dharmic traditions.

But the specific features they designate on their psychological maps to define the territory of the human mind are sometimes moreso grounded in by cultural metaphors than neurology and psycho-biology. They can still be meaningful, but without relying on frank vocabulary, some of these ideas, as I see it, get robbed of their usefulness, again, as objective, psychological tools. Clearly psychoanalysis has value ... but so does the placebo affect ( in a significant way). That does not mean that the objects of one's belief are real, only that belief, itself, is powerful.

I find the greatest correspondence between these thinkers and Epicurus to be in their attempt to ground the religious experience within the context of being an animal, and in generally evaluating the similarities of human beliefs and behavior across cultures. Archetypes might be a useful way to understand prolepseis, but there are differences, and Jungian archetypes would not necessarily align with Epicurean archetypes. They also had soft spots for Plato and tantric, Indian practices, so that demonstrates a difference in terms of inspirations, as well.

I've often supposed that Jungian archetypes could be meaningful points of reference against prolepseis (in particular). In Epicurean Philosophy: An introduction from the “Garden of Athens", Christos Yapijakis agrees, and connects prolepseis with “images from the subconscious”. Elsewhere, he connects supposes that "the non-rational part of soul [...] was later named 'subconscious' by Sigmund Freud" (92). I caution comparison with Jung, if for no other reason than for his fondness for Plato, but also for his celebration of metaphor (versus Epicurus' frankness). Still, I think it would be very reasonable to suggest that "god" is the "archetype" of a blessedness and imperishability, and that the universal, human spiritual experience is grounded in universal, evolutionary precursors.

Quote from Cassius

Are we sure that that is part of the theory?

Nope, this is definitely just my own deduction.