Posts by Hiram

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Concerning Cassius ' feedback:

SOE15: Under normal circumstances, we are in control of our mental dispositions.

Objection to SOE15: The "under normal circumstances" probably is so ambiguous that it negates any benefit from this tenet. The Epicurean point in my understanding is that we should work to remain in control of our mental dispositions (like we work to control everything else) so that we maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By mentioning mental dispositions without really stating anything significant about them, the implication is that you are endorsing some kind of Stoic mind control that leads to suppression of emotions. Presumably you would only want to suggest that painful emotions should be kept under control, but even that would likely be a non-Epicurean interpretation, since it is recorded in DIogenes Laertius that Epicurus said that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than others, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom.

I was mainly thinking of Fragment 112 Diogenes, which states that the “sum of happiness is our disposition, of which we are masters". I considered this against PD 20 in one essay, so this is not a Stoic insight at all. The goal of each Tenet is to start a more in depth conversation and commentary on each, not to close the discussion where the Tenet ends (as I mention in the introduction of the Tenets, where I discuss the problem of over-simplification).

When Philodemus addresses habitual fury or arrogance as moral diseases, he also refers to it as diathesis (a bad disposition) which needs to be replaced by a better, friendly, kind, disposition.

So diathesis / dispositions are an important concept in moral development, and they deserve further discussion.

I say "under normal circumstances" because of problems like drug use, addiction, and some mental health issues that I am not fully an expert on, but last night my neighbor texted me because he had a panic attack, and sometimes people (like when they lack sleep) can lose control of their dispositions. There are people who feel, maybe at times, unable to control their disposition. I can also think of diabetes and the emotional / mental problems that diabetes can generate. So it seems to me that, if we do not take care of our health (which is a natural and necessary pleasure), this affects our habitual disposition.

Concerning Cassius ' feedback:

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SOE9: All things operate within the laws of nature, which apply everywhere.

Objection to SOE9: The concept of "laws of nature" is very troublesome today. It is my opinion that this is regularly interpreted to be the equivalent of saying "laws of nature's god" or even "laws of god" in the sense that it implies that there is some being "Nature" which has adopted a set of rules about how everything must work. I think the proper statement is that the universe operates according to the properties of the essential particles, motion, and void, and that everything that we see arises from the interactions of those three things. There really is no such thing as a "law of nature" that applies everywhere; perhaps if you can somehow stipulate that under exactly the same conditions then the elements will respond the same way, but that seems very different from saying that "the laws of nature apply everywhere."

I finally have some time to address more feedback

Concerning "nature's God" or the "laws of god", that's not consistent with Epicurean theology even in the realist interpretation, so not sure that I need to address it.

I was mainly thinking of the "doctrine of innumerable worlds" and its tacit understanding and view (expressed in LHerodotus) that we can infer about what is beyond in the heavens based on what we can see here on Earth.

Also, the study of nature does teach us that there are laws of nature: gravity will always pull bodies, there are laws that govern what molecules are able to combine to form what elements, etc. Our sources say that there are innumerable particles but LIMITED possible combinations of particles--THIS is limited by the laws of nature, which will not allow every imaginable thing to happen, only certain things. Water becomes ice at a certain temperature, and methane becomes ice at a much colder temperature (which is why the moon Titan has methane lakes and we have water oceans and methane gas).

The doctrine of innumerable worlds is based on the opinion that these laws operate always and everywhere, which is why the Epicureans in antiquity were confident in saying that there are other planets similar and different from our own, with beings similar and different from the ones on Earth.

This is the line of empirical logic employed there: the same laws of nature operate everywhere. (with the additional conclusion implying that the planets / moons / stars are not gods who rule our fates but bodies like our own planetary body.)

Quote from Elayne

The way you frame it is as if your desired behaviors apply to all Epicureans, and that's not true.

I guess the question of should each modern Epicurean engage in these "experiments in piety" is a separate question, that can be asked separately by different individuals or groups.

But the point I'm making is a different one: that the ideas attributed to Epicurus in On Piety (that true, material, natural piety has psycho-somatic, observable repercussions) has a solid foundation of empirical evidence. That certain ethical or pious practices do seem to affect the health of mind and body. And modern Epicureans should be happy to accept that vindication with curiosity, and referring it back to the sources. We should be happy to say: "Look! Epicurus was on to something here!"

Also, chanting happens in both Catholic rosaries and Buddhist and Hindu mantras, so this is not a vindication of a particular culture or chant. These studies vindicate a NATURAL process, not the cultures in case.

Quote from Cassius

No doubt you would reply that you think I am promoting a "Cassius Amicus Interpretation of Epicurus." But in dealing with that back and forth, the important distinction is that I recognize that some or all of your preferences are legitimate lifestyle choices if they bring you (and people like you) pleasure. All I am saying is that not everyone agrees with those lifestyle choices and I think it is improper to suggest that Epicurean philosophy leads to a single set for everyone.

I suppose I disagree in that when you have empirical evidence for something (in this case, a study on the benefits of any number of pious practices), you are not discussing culture, but nature. And you are also dismissing canonic (because, empirical) insight.

Quote from Cassius

Which is not to say that the analysis can't be done. Not only can it be done, it MUST be done by the people involved. It's urgent that it be done! It's essential that it be done! If you back away from doing it you're not a man, you're a worm! (Let me not go too far in emphasizing my Nietzschean variation on the Epicurean tune that you have but one life to live and that nihilism for losers and so you must live as vigorously as you can! )

Thank you!

But do you agree that EP offers the tools to help a lawmaker consider the advantages and disadvantages in a particular moment and circumstance to make his choices and avoidances (to pass a law)? And that it gives us the tools to determine whether an existing law is JUST for now, or for a given time?

Because if that's not the case, then we convict Epicurean philosophy of being escapist and impractical. The tools are there, in PD 37-38, and you keep imposing censorship on any attempt to use those tools, and accusing me of idealism when I am applying the CONCRETE, MATERIAL methodology--is this useful or necessary to mutual association, does this produce mutual advantage? Here they are, for the record:

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37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, ***whether or not it be the same for all***; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

38. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were useful for the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful.

Quote from Cassius

So to repeat back the quote that I pasted above, I hear you talking about advantage in a way that sounds correct, but then you take that away with your conclusion that that "justice" is involved, because there was never any agreement with those rabbits in the first place.

If the people in the community AGREE to protect a species, then this is their agreement and it's THEIR posited justice, not because they owe a duty to the rabbits but because they owe an agreement to each other. (I think a similar case is argued byLucretius when he discussed the origin of friendship, and he said that people agreed to not harm those weaker than themselves--what comes to mind is my autistic niece who is non-verbal, but elders in the community have agreed to protect her)

Then, too, did neighbours ‘gin to league as friends,
Eager to wrong no more or suffer wrong,

And urged for children and the womankind

Mercy, of fathers, whilst with cries and gestures

They stammered hints how meet it was that all

Should have compassion on the weak.

So the source for Hermarchus is Porphyry

http://societyofepicurus.com/hermarchus-on-…ent-of-animals/

Quote from Todd

I do think there are things that can be said, from an Epicurean perspective, with respect to various policies, and I approve of your intention to work in that direction. But what I have seen so far of your method completely ignores that fact that pleasure is subjective. If you don't keep that firmly in mind, then IMO you are departing from Epicurean philosophy rather than extending and applying it.

Hi Todd (I don’t think i know you)

I shared the hermarchus example elsewhere and am curious to know what you think about it because the scholarchs, it seems, would have wanted us to apply these Doctrines in real life situations and under diverse conditions rather than be armchair philosophers.

Also Hermarchus may have been deciding for himself whether to eat animals, but it seems like he was speaking of policy makers at different points in history and describing HOW they came up with policy based on concrete advantage and disadvantage at various times.

http://societyofepicurus.com/hermarchus-on-…ent-of-animals/

Here are the passages--notice that Hermarchus doesn't say "oh we CAN NEVER posit a certain policy because that's idealism", no he said "these are the philosophical tools and here's how to use them in the real world with a concrete example", and also notices that he speaks of concrete advantages and disadvantages:

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Since, if we suffered them to increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be left.

Quote from Cassius

But Hiram you take from that starting point that you should endorse particular policy prescriptions that apply to everyone as something that would be endorsed in the name of Epicurus???

I do not follow that analysis at all!

no but I think I addressed this elsewhere minutes ago, this is at the heart of your confusion with what I’ve been saying.

Pd 38-39 make this clear. Policies can be just, for a time and under certain conditions. These conditions involve mutual advantage for concrete people involved. Their ”justness” should be articulated in those terms.

The immediate example that comes to mind is when Hermachus, who was a Scholarch, said that people should consume certain animals if they were too numerous in order to control the population. Here, policy is being called for based on advantage. Less competition for food between our species and theirs if the animals eat what we do, plus more food sources for those who consume those animals.

And so an Epicurean should feel free to call for policy based on advantage, and this has nothing to do with applying always and in every circumstance and for everyone; only for those involved, in the case of Hermarchus, whoever inhabits a land overrun by too many rabbits eating their carrots, for instance.

Of course once the population is under control then this may no longer be just because of the disadvantage of letting them be extinct and never being able to enjoy rabbit again, and the disadvantages of their large numbers not existing anymore..

The source would be whoever translated the source, but also I did a search online for the word attest, which my immediate instinct is that it means “to witness”, and his is what what came up:

verb

1. provide or serve as clear evidence of. "his status is attested by his recent promotion"
   • declare that something exists or is the case. "I can attest to his tremendous energy"
   • be a witness to; certify formally. "the witnesses must attest and sign the will in the testator's presence"

—-

The obvious relation to the canon and to enargeía is that it implies that evidence is being presented to us and we are certifying it.

Quote from Cassius

That is the problem with "Humanism" and I do not see you even acknowledging the issue, much less taking the non-asbsolute position that Epicurus's doctrines would plainly call for.

The problem with humanism is that it means many things to many people. It seems like different organizations agree on different sets of principles for their humanism, which is THEIR hedonic covenant, the rules that THEY have chosen for their organizations. EP says that people will do that, that that is natural morality: an agreement between people. Whatever manifestos people write for their organization is THEIR manifesto, their agreement. The evaluation of the content of these manifestos is a huge task, well beyond the scope of what I can offer, I'm sure I'll agree or disagree with many points, but I'm not gonna lose my mind because a bunch of atheists agree on a set of principles, particularly when they do not claim to be Epicurean and have no reason to state their set of principles in Epicurean terms I'd rather participate in an organization that chooses Tenets I am okay with living with.

Quote from Cassius

For example you are taking the last ten doctrines on "justice" and extrapolating that a certain set of conclusions on social issues should be "the Epicurean position." .

THIS SPECIFIC POINT, THIS is where you're either misconstruing or misreading: No, I do not.

It is clear in PD 37-38 that THAT which is just or moral will change depending on circumstances.

There's a whole section in my review of her book on mutual advantage. There, I do argue that there are METHODS for addressing issues of policy and that Wilson SHOULD HAVE used the method of evaluating what concrete advantages and disadvantages involve the concrete people affected by policies, so that these moral problems can be addressed through an Epicurean lens. She didn't do that. She stated policy offerings without applying any method, or appealing to PDs on how people set rules.

I care about this because I feel that we should be helping to form Epicurean intellectuals capable of arguing the ways in which EP is useful and practical and relevant for modern people. We should not just say: "oh that's idealism" and shut the conversation, as if we all didn't know that we are philosophical materialists. We should say: "what tools does our philosophy offer to help us deal with this problem? To what extent can those tools prove useful" and demonstrate how best to use those tools.

Quote from Elayne

But perhaps I have put words in your mouth. Can you tell me what you mean by perfect person without referring to any ideas you can't show me with perceptual examples? How do you define that?

I was paraphrasing a quote from Philodemus of Gadara's Peri Parrhesia (I think his "On Arrogance" may have said something similar):

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"For how will the sage hate the one who commits pardonable mistakes, remembering that he is not perfect himself and that all men are accustomed to err?" - Philodemus of Gadara

The quote is an appeal to offer criticism to each other with the right spirit. I have it fresh in my mind because I just translated into Spanish DeWitt's "Organization and procedures in Epicurean groups".

Your obsession with labeling everything I say as "idealism" makes it impossible to use words as conventionally understood: a perfect person would be a person with no flaws or failings whatsoever, of any kind.

Now if "perfect" is an idealism, well that is the point! We are not ideal persons. We are real persons.

We **could** argue with the sources--Philodemus, Polystratus, even Epicurus--, but I would prefer if people don't do it until they've made a good will attempt to get what was being said. I'm sure Philodemus understood what was wrong with idealism, and I'm sure he wasn't trying to teach idealism, because he was immersed in a society that was plagued by Platonism and understood the issues.

There's another quote from On Piety where Philodemus talks about how piety helps us to cultivate pleasant "psycho-somatic dispositions". I think this passage is key and should be evaluated next to all the other passages, because it implies that the exercises in piety were meant to have effects on the health of the body AND the mind (psycho - somatic).

So considering how scarce our sources are, rather than dismiss this discourse, it should fall to us to try to reconstruct these ideas, and here is a MATERIALIST theory of piety, one which constitutes a unique contribution that EP makes to ethics, and also one that can be verified against research on the healing effects of chanting and other pious practices. Here is also a chance to show how the Canon is used. We appeal to evidence and check he doctrine against studies available. In my book I cited studies by Marian Diamond which documented and quantified the health benefits of chanting, including lowering blood pressure and heart rate. THIS type of thing vindicates the assertion that piety is meant to have a psycho-somatic effect. And again, this is therefore NOT idealism, it's a way of looking at religious practices from a purely materialist perspective.

Similarly with "imitating their blessedness" and "making oneself harmless", etc. Piety is meant to be an ethical exercise that helps to cultivate a certain kind of disposition (diathesis, a word we find in Philodemus and also in Diogenes of Oenoanda) and character, just like we exercise our body.

Also, what's being said here is not "do not harm, ever". That is NOT the point. What's being said here is "these practices will make you of a certain, harmless disposition". The tacit idea is that this is a disposition that is advantageous or pleasant or desirable, particularly among friends or people who engage in pious acts together. Just like when we associate with certain kinds of people who help us develop a good character, similarly with these practices.

Quote from Elayne

Hiram, here is an example where I think Philodemus shows some idealism. What on earth is "noble" ...

This is another word that was used by the founders (VS 78). The word was used by Polystratus in "On irrational contempt". He was the third Scholarch after Hermarchus died, and would have studied under Epicurus from a very early age, so he is an important source who was in the immediacy of the first Garden.

I believe the word was "kalon", sometimes compared to the opposite word which was translated as "vile". Polystratus argued that qualities such as these ones REALLY existed and were observable / similarly ugly and beautiful, pleasure and pain, etc. His argument was that these were "relational properties of nature".

Quote from Elayne

However, as long as you think in an idealist way and are actively promoting this as a way to view reality, that is going to be unpleasant to me. ..

If you changed your way of thinking such that you adopted a realist philosophy,..

By that definition, which is described by Epicurus but which I developed by my own experience with beloved friends, you and I are not friends. But I will agree to leave that possibility open, depending on how you treat me and those whose pleasure is entangled in mine from here forward.

I still can't wrap my head around your categorization of "idealist" after six years of work in positing what Onfray calls "a counter-history of philosophy from the perspective of the friends of Epicurus and the enemies of Plato". Maybe you have considered my willingness at some point or another to consider other people's views as my agreeing with them? I just don't see what you're even talking about.

Also, for the record, I know that "Epicurus-only fundamentalist" is something that will sound derisive maybe to someone looking from the outside, but I honestly think that Cassius is happy to adopt this label for himself (and maybe others will too) because he is adamant that that is his view: for instance, when he says "Epicurus didn't use this or that word", this is what he means to say. So among us it is clear that your project and agenda is different from mine in this regard, and it's useful to name it so that we can clearly establish that our work differs from each other.

Either way, it's true that we are clearly not friends, and I would also like to leave the door open to friendship in the future, with the understanding that we will be working on separate projects and that our disagreements are sincere and not merely an artifact of ill-will. First: we will disrupt our own pleasure while studying EP, but the founders said that with philosophy unlike other activities the pleasure and the learning come at the same time, so we'd be doing it the wrong way. And second: People who hate EP will use the abuse that they see among the Epicureans to turn around and say: "See how nasty they are? This is how the Epicureans treat each other"--which doesn't serve the teaching mission of the Gardens, and which makes us look as if we're incapable of living the principles of the philosophy.

Re @Cassius' feedback :

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SOE19: Friendship is necessary for securing happiness. It is advantageous to promote Epicurean philosophy in order to widen our circle of Epicurean friends.

Objection to SOE19: As just stated in relation to 18, it is perilous to imply that "friendship" as an abstraction is necessary for happiness. The Epicurean texts are clear that everything is contextual, even friendship, and this statement is not contextual - no individual example of "friendship" or any particular "friend" is stated in the Epicurean texts to be across-the-board necessary. The second sentence in this tenet seems to me to clearly be true, but it is a much more narrow statement than the first sentence.

I changed "friendship is necessary" to "friends are necessary" - in fact I've observed before that using the plural tends to help take concepts from the abstract to the concrete. Tenet 11 establishes the telos clearly, this Tenet has nothing to do with the telos nor does it state that friendship is the telos.

The LMenoeceus says that the natural and necessary goods are those that we need for health, happiness, or life itself. There is research that demonstrates the bodily health effects of isolation, which are compared to obesity and smoking. Then there is also the problems of MENTAL health, which are much worse, and affect the category of "happiness". Therefore, it's clear that friends are a natural and necessary pleasure.

Further, concerning the natural and necessary pleasures and this feedback

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SOE17: To live pleasantly, we must have confident expectation that we will be able to secure the chief goods: those things that are natural and necessary for life, happiness, and health. Therefore, whatever we do to secure safety, friendship, autarchy, provision of food and drink and clothing, and other basic needs, is naturally good.

Objection to SOE18: "Chief goods" is not a term that Epicurus employed and implies that there is an outside ranking of pleasure which does not exist. The natural and necessary observations are helpful for analysis because it helps us consider the result, but WE weigh the result and make our own determinations of how much pleasure and pain is worthwhile - nature does not do that for us and there is no uniform rule established by nature. All of the things you have listed (especially / even autarchy and friendship) are tools that are generally useful in the pursuit of pleasure, but for every single one of these there are going to be times when we forgo or avoid these in our own pursuit of pleasure. Even food and water are to be avoided when fasting is necessary for survival or better health; air to be avoided when holding one's breath to escape danger is necessary; etc. And so it is explicitly wrong to imply that such things are "naturally good" in each and every circumstance. The only thing that Epicurus said is **always** desirable is pleasure itself, which is the result of activities that are themselves always contextual and sometimes to be chosen and sometimes to be avoided.

This, again, says nothing of the telos, nor does it replace it, nor does it state that the telos is replaced or abrogated by this. The doctrine on the telos is articulated clearly in Tenet 11. The natural and necessary pleasures are what Philodemus calls "kyriotatai" or chief goods in the Choices and Avoidances scroll--where he is adamant that not knowing how to separate these from vain desires. Here is his quote:

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Column V. For men suffer the worst evils for the sake of the most alien desires which they take to be most necessary–I mean desires for sovereignty and … reputation and great wealth and suchlike luxuries … they neglect the most necessary appetites as if they were the most alien to nature.

Column IX. Many and great evils concerning many matters occur as a result of the worthless assumptions of mindless men and are avoided as a result of the right concepts.

So here he is making the point that it is important to keep in mind these chief goods and to never neglect them while going in pursuit of vain desires.

Concerning Cassius ' feedback:

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SOE13: The goal of religion is the experience of pure, effortless pleasure.

Objection to SOE13: This statement seems to me to have no foundation in the Epicurean texts whatsoever. Are you saying "should be" rather than "is"? In that case the goal of a "proper" religion would be to promote pleasure and avoid pain, just as the purpose of every tool would ultimately be the same. But unless I am mistaken you are certainly not meaning to imply that this "is" the goal of every current world religion.

The goal to religion (pleasure) is assigned by Epicurus as part of his moral reform.

The source is from Philodemus' scroll On Piety; here are some of the direct quotes:

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But those who believe our oracles about the Gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness, insofar as mortals can, so that, since it was seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will endeavor most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as it is within their power, and second, to make themselves noble …

The just person has noble expectations concerning the Gods, and at the same time exceedingly enjoys pleasures that are unalloyed and effortless.

When describing the truly pious person (according to the Epicureans, as opposed to the vulgarly-pious), Philodemus describes this person as enjoying pleasures that are UNALLOYED and EFFORTLESS.

I interpret unalloyed / pure to mean that, when subjected to hedonic calculus, they produce no disadvantages.

I interpret effortless to mean just what it says. The pleasure here is easy, perhaps tied to singing a religious song or uttering a praise or to contemplation.

Here are other quotes which further clarify what Epicurean piety feels like:

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(To others,) piety appears to include not harming both other people and especially one’s benefactors and homeland. To be sure, they honor something rather kindly and propitious, whereas we all regard our views as the true cause of our tranquility.

… for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the Divine. – Epicurus

So here we see that "making oneself harmless to everyone", making oneself noble, and having views that are "a true cause of our tranquility" are also properties of true piety, according to the Epicurean sources.

Many of the passages in the scroll were notes taken during class (under Zeno of Sidon), and many were quotes from Metrodorus and Epicurus, to whose authority Philodemus appealed frequently.

My purpose in having a "purpose of religion" Tenet is to help us have concrete Epicurean moral guidance to offer to religious students of Epicurus, and also to dig up the few sources that we have regarding this for study.

Here is On Piety:

https://www.amazon.com/Philodemus-Pie…n/dp/0198150083

I suppose I should also address this here:

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SOE12: There are three acceptable interpretations of the Epicurean gods: the realist interpretation, the idealist interpretation, and the atheist interpretation.

Objection to SOE12: What does "acceptable" mean? Acceptable so as to be a member of Society of Epicurus? Acceptable so as to not be considered an enemy of Epicurus? These categories listed here have no generally accepted definitions so would require explanation. I cannot imagine that any interpretation that implies that Epicurus was intentionally being less than honest with his statements on gods would be acceptable to a "Society of Epicurus." And Epicurus' statements were very specific -- he used the term "gods" to refer to naturally-occurring, non-supernatural, non-omnipotent beings which he held do exist somewhere in the universe, but not here on Earth, and having no concerns about us whatsoever, but about which we are able to either perceive or conceive aspects of pleasurable living that can serve as worthwhile things for us to contemplate and emulate. Obviously much has been lost and is unclear but no interpretation that does not accept that Epicurus meant what he said should be acceptable (in my opinion) to a society modeling itself after Epicurus.

Yes, The accusation that Epicurus didn't say what he meant is dangerous. I think he was a realist, and was using the methodology we see in "against empty words" to redefine the word "gods" according to nature.

The idealist and atheist interpretations are by those who came before him. So this is to say: Epicurus himself was a realist. Later Epicureans may agree with his views, or believe that the gods whose bodies are made out of particles:

a. do not exist, but their contemplation has utility (the idealist interpretation)

b. do not exist, and their contemplation is pointless or unnecessary (the atheist interpretation)

Here is Ilkka's easy-to-read essay on this:

http://menoeceus.blogspot.com/2014/08/epicurean-gods.html

In reply to Cassius ' feedback:

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SOE20: Human relations should be based on mutual benefit.

Objection to SOE20: This one pretty well sums up what I see as the major problem with the analysis behind most of the objections above, because it has "humanism" written all over it. Epicurus did not write in terms of "human relations" but in terms of humans pursuing pleasure individually and in groups. The last ten PD10's make absolutely clear that while "justice" is an agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is also absolutely clear that there is no way to enumerate such agreements in absolute terms, and it is also clear that such agreements are to be broken immediately when they become disadvantageous to either party's pursuit of pleasurable living. The clear point of these final PD's is that there IS NO Epicurean "Golden rule" that we must always treat others as we would want to be treated ourselves because each decision is going to be based on the circumstances of the individuals involved: there are no ideal virtues, no supernatural morals, no across-the-board rules for which there is any authority to say that we should always follow them. In this formulation, "mutual benefit" is not only hopelessly vague, but the "mutual" part has absolutely no foundation whatsoever and in fact the clear thrust of many other doctrines is the opposite. PD10 emphasizes that depravity has no absolute definition; that everything must be judged by its result, and the only standard that nature has set is that we find pleasure desirable and pain undesirable. This is the same issue where Catherine Wilson is hopelessly off base when she injects her on social preferences into Epicurean philosophy. In referring to her I give her credit in the recent podcast interview that she admits that she is outside Epicurean orthodoxy in doing so, but the matter isn't just being "outside' orthodoxy -- it turns Epicurean philosophy on its head for ANYONE at ANY TIME to suggest that their own moral or ethical preferences are anything but personal to them.

This is a VERY important issue because this helps us to connect theory with practice, which is one of the purposes of the Tenets.

Mutual benefit is not "hopelessly vague". In fact, it made it to the last ten Principal Doctrines, and we know from Epicurus' sermon "against empty words" that the founders were adamant about avoiding vagueness.

One of my main critiques in my review of Wilson's last book had to do with her lack of connecting policy that she calls for with mutual benefit. If she had discussed the advantages versus disadvantages for the people involved, then she would have been making a complete Epicurean case for her policy solutions. There's a whole secton on mutual advantage in the book review. Here is the most relevant portion:

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If Wilson had appealed to the sources while explaining the concepts of justice / morality, she would have encountered repeated references to “mutual advantage” and this would have added credibility and clarity to her arguments.

If she had relied, again, on the first principles (in this case, the last ten of the Principal Doctrines), her explanation of how Epicurean philosophy provides moral guidance would have been much more cogent and complete. The fact that an area the size of Delaware has been declared unlivable in Louisiana has economic effects, and the building of new dams there and in other coastal regions would result in the spending of billions of dollars that would have to come from the pockets of tax payers. The problems generated by climate change are not abstract. If they are discussed in concrete, measurable, observable terms as they are directly experienced, then the issues of mutual advantage and disadvantage may be addressed. This is how Epicurean morality works, and Wilson wasted an opportunity to encourage her readers to philosophize like Epicureans about these issues.

Also, in my piece for Partially Examined Life on "Applying the Epicurean Theory of Justice to Cannabis Legalization", I use mutual advantage to translate an issue that seems abstract into concrete terms: there's the disadvantage for the state of not being able to tax the revenue from illicit cannabis sales, there's the disadvantage for thousands of youth and their families when they're incarcerated at high rates for victimless crimes related to cannabis use and sale, there's the advantage of the potential small businesses that may emerge if legalized, there's the advantages for the medical use of it, etc.

Now, if someone is an armchair philosopher, this does not apply. But SoFE is meant to promote the teaching mission of the Epicurean gardens, and particularly encourages Epicurean content creators to create vlogs, essays and other content where they figure out ways to demonstrate that EP can be applied and give moral guidance in the modern world. So learning how to argue cases based on concrete instances of mutual advantage is essential for content creators who wish to demonstrate the usefulness and relevance of EP.

For this reason, I wanted a Tenet focusing on mutual advantage.

In reply to Cassius ' feedback:

Quote

SOE5: Our words and their meanings must be clear, and conform to the attestations that nature has presented to our faculties.

Objection to SOE5: Of course we should be as clear as possible in using words. The issue is what is meant by clarity, and how we go about being clear. The issue that I detect in this tenet is that it carries the implication that nature has "testified" ("attested") some particular abstract truth that is the same for everyone. No, nature has not done that. Nature has simply provided us a set of faculties, including the ability to form abstractions (including words) and it is entirely up to us to convey meaning through the use of words or other methods that have been established in the past by agreement to be assignable to certain observations. Nature has not attested to anyone the meaning of "yellow." Nature has simply set up circumstances in a particular time and place that most humans visualize in a similar way under similar conditions, and to these conditions certain people have assigned the word "yellow" while certain others in other languages have assigned other totally different words. The point that Epicurus was making about clarity, and avoiding going on infinitely without reaching any conclusions, is tied totally to the fundamental that observations are contextual and that different people experience things differently. Clarity comes through examples, not by connection with some abstraction made by supernatural gods, ideal forms, etc.

An attestation is not "an abstract truth that is the same for everyone", it's a particular instance of direct perception of something.

This term, together with epíbole (most usually translated as "focusing") and a few others are mentioned.

The source here for attestations is Epicurus' "Against Empty Words" (we also made a video about it)

http://societyofepicurus.com/reasonings-abo…of-empty-words/

Quote from Elayne

You don't know how you would interact with me if I don't follow Philodemus' rules?

Like I said before, I am sorry if I was ever rude or condescending to you. You and I and everyone here are not perfect Epicureans or perfect people. We all have a right to have our flaws. It's also not clear that you accepted an offer of friendship from me, so we do not have to be friends if this is what you've decided. I would not want to participate here if there's going to be a Hiram-bashing and excommunication party every time I intervene. We all have to choose our battles.