Posts by Cassius

Yes to me the consideration of mathematical symbolism helps make the issues involved in debating nominalism and reductionism clear.

Two things plus two things equals four things, because we define it that way. But what is a "thing"? In the end the usefulness of such symbolic equations becomes a matter of identifying what "thing" means. You can reduce everything over and over into a series of definitions as you try to assign meaning to your symbols, but in the end you have to remember that definition games can be circular and be a fool's errand, and the only way to prevent that is to tie things ultimately to observations of the facts observed by senses, anticipations, and feelings.

Surely there are practical "rules" or "conventions" about how to define things, based on experience, that will generally work to make the process more accurate. But in the end the definition game had better tie back to observations from the senses (or anticipations or feelings) or else the entire game collapses into circular abstractions.

It appears to me that Epicurus was waving major red flags about definition games, and he would have done the same with implying that all knowledge is a matter of definitions in the mind that are infinitely malleable. I would see the same issue with "rules of construction" such as we apply in the law, or as we deal with in deciding what is good logic vs what is a logical fallacy. Ultimately justice is not a matter of robotically following rules, nor is identifying truth a matter of definitions.

You have to eventually come to conclusions in order to survive, and it's fair to work as hard as you can to describe the best process of reasoning so that you can reproduce that process over and over.

But the cardinal and overriding rule seems likely to be that in the end rules cannot be considered to override the facts of the sensations ,anticipations, and feelings in ultimately analyzing any situation.

And the temptation to try to develop "rules" to be considered universal and infallible seems to be at least as great a hazard as the temptation to deny the usefulness of any and all rules. Epicurus certainly had his own rules of thought, such as PD23 and PD24, but they were always couched in terms of the ultimate rule being that the sensations, anticipations, and feelings are the ultimate abiter. In any situation of conflict between pure rules vs pure evidence (from the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, not including "rules of symbolic logic,") the ultimate arbiter of what we should acknowledge to be true is not the result of rules, but the result of facts established by the sensations, anticipations, and feelings.

In this episode let's talk about:

• - The three main schools of thought on the gods:
  • - Stoics (Lucilius Balbus) (split the honorable from the profitable and go with the honorable)
  • - Epicureans (Velleius) (go with the profitable)
  • - Academics (Gaius Cotta) (they're not sure) Cicero is also in this category
  • - Peripatetics would have been represented by Marcus Piso, but he is not present. (combine the honorable with the profitable)
  • - The scene then of the dispute will be home of Gaius Aurelius Cotta, who was talking with Senator Gaius Velleius, the Epicurean. Quintus Lucillius Balbus was also there, taking the Stoic side. Cicero says that if Marcus Piso were present, no school would lack an advocate. It appears that Piso would have represented the Peripatetics, because Cotta says that Antiochus held that the Peripatetics did not differ from the Stoics in substance but only in words. Cotta says this is actually a significant difference, but says more on that later.
• - The role of confidence in Epicurean philosophy - "After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus’s intervals of worlds."
• - Velleius says do not attend to:
  • - idle and imaginary tales;
  • - nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato’s Timæus;
  • - nor to the old prophetic dame, the Πρόνοια of the Stoics, which the Latins call
    • Providence;
  • - nor to that round, that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers!
• - First the attack on Plato's gods:
  • - What was his evidence? "For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modeled and built by God?
  • - Plato cannot explain how god created the universe: "What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? From whence arose those five forms, of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look
    • more like things to be desired than to be discovered. (wishful thinking)
  • - How can Plato's god have created an eternal world? "But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy <ins> who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning?</ins> For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end?
• - Attack on the Stoic god:
  • - If your Providence, Lucilius Balbus, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God?
• - Attack on Both Stoics and Academics:
  • - It makes no sense that the god woke up one day and created the world after doing something else for an eternity beforehand:
    • - But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was.
  • - Why were the gods idle for so long?
    • - desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and
      • decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.

  • - Who benefited from the creation? If for the wise, that's a small number. For fools? why?

    • - Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when they are come.

    
    

Welcome

to Episode 227 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

We are now discussing the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," and this week we introduce the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning in Section 8

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here. The text which we include in these posts is the Yonge version, the full version of which is here at Epicureanfriends. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

Today's Text

VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M. Piso was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would want an advocate. If Antiochus’s book, replies Cotta, which he lately sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus.

"I?" says he. I wonder that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind, and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began with.

With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me), who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods; concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus. Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of nothing. What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiased mind, and not bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I like or dislike it.

VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus’s intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato’s Timæus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the Πρόνοια of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive philosophers, but of dreamers!

For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modeled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? From whence arose those five forms, of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered.

But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God?

IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.

Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when they are come.

As a reminder, here is the issue as Wikipedia states it:

In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels.^[1][2] There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals – things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects – objects that do not exist in space and time.^[3]

William of Ockham

Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals exist only post res, that is, subsequent to particular things.^[4] However, some versions of nominalism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g., numbers), while others are concrete entities – entities that do exist in space and time (e.g., pillars, snakes, and bananas).

Nominalism is primarily a position on the problem of universals. It is opposed to realist philosophies, such as Platonic realism, which assert that universals do exist over and above particulars, and to the hylomorphic substance theory of Aristotle, which asserts that universals are immanently real within them. However, the name "nominalism" emerged from debates in medieval philosophy with Roscellinus.

Further:

The problem of universals

Nominalism arose in reaction to the problem of universals, specifically accounting for the fact that some things are of the same type. For example, Fluffy and Kitzler are both cats, or, the fact that certain properties are repeatable, such as: the grass, the shirt, and Kermit the Frog are green. One wants to know by virtue of what are Fluffy and Kitzler both cats, and what makes the grass, the shirt, and Kermit green.

The Platonist answer is that all the green things are green in virtue of the existence of a universal: a single abstract thing that, in this case, is a part of all the green things. With respect to the color of the grass, the shirt and Kermit, one of their parts is identical. In this respect, the three parts are literally one. Greenness is repeatable because there is one thing that manifests itself wherever there are green things.

Nominalism denies the existence of universals. The motivation for this flows from several concerns, the first one being where they might exist. Plato famously held, on one interpretation, that there is a realm of abstract forms or universals apart from the physical world (see theory of the forms). Particular physical objects merely exemplify or instantiate the universal. But this raises the question: Where is this universal realm? One possibility is that it is outside space and time. A view sympathetic with this possibility holds that, precisely because some form is immanent in several physical objects, it must also transcend each of those physical objects; in this way, the forms are "transcendent" only insofar as they are "immanent" in many physical objects. In other words, immanence implies transcendence; they are not opposed to one another. (Nor, in this view, would there be a separate "world" or "realm" of forms that is distinct from the physical world, thus shirking much of the worry about where to locate a "universal realm".) However, naturalists assert that nothing is outside of space and time. Some Neoplatonists, such as the pagan philosopher Plotinus and the Christian philosopher Augustine, imply (anticipating conceptualism) that universals are contained within the mind of God. To complicate things, what is the nature of the instantiation or exemplification relation?

Also: I note that the wikipedia article spends considerable time with William of Occam. In this last podcast, which I edited down to make it fit a normal length, I edited out a brief discussion that we had of Occam's razor. That's a related topic to nominalism, it seems from the wikipedia article, and I'd like us to explore that as part of our current series on Cicero's "on the nature of the gods." But I think before we go too far in evaluating it we need to spend time with how it relates to William of Occam's views on nominalism, as there are things here that seem to be a cause for concern in regard to nominalism, and those issues probably relate to too broad an intrepretation of "Occam's razor" too. That's something Joshua was mentioning as well, that Occam's razor shouldn't be interpreted as meaning that "the simplest explanation is always correct." That would end up being a "rule" that I think goes further than Epicurus would go.

Comparing Occam to PD24: "PD24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong."

It appears to me that we have Epicurus laying down a better rule, that all theories which comply with facts about which we are confident must be considered to be possible, and that we don't settle on one until we have the facts to eliminate other possibilities. Injecting a rule of "preferring the simplest" or even "preferring the one which makes the least assumptions" concerns me as sounding like a rule which is not included within the more basic PD24. I wonder if Occam's viewpoint (or the way it is interpreted) is asserting a rule that Epicurus would say is not justifiable if we are to ground our opinions exclusively on the evidence of the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, rather than looking for logical rules that are allegedly superior to and more important than the actual evidence.

This topic won't be easy or quick to resolve but it's something we can discuss here for a while before staking out positions.

This is the Sedley commetary I am wanting to relate to reductionism, commenting that Epicurus rejects "reductionist atomism," in favor of the common sense perspective: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

To me, cats are given the name "cats" by the mind, and the "name" is totally arbitrary, but it is not the mind that makes a cat a four-legged furry creature that chases mice. It's the combinations of atoms and void playing into the genetics that makes a "cat" what we think of as a "cat," and that's different from saying that every cat is a totally unique specimen. There are "commonalities" and those commonalities are not just in our minds.

Now maybe "nominalism" as a term was never meant to imply that the mind creates reality in full, but that would be the trend of thought to which "radical nominalism" might lead, just as radical reductionism leads toward the view of saying that "nothing really exists except atoms and void" which would not be a correct statement of Epicurus' view (even though it might be a correct statement of Democritus' view).

But in the end I think that it ought to be made clear that even if you consider Epicurus a "sort of nominalist" that he would have rejected too radical an interpretation of that view.



I am not satisfied with where we left this discussion two years ago.

Twentier and Don in particular contributed some really good reference material, with Twentier pointing out that Dewitt said that Epicurus ended up at a "sort of nominalism." And of course Godfrey and Pacatus' comments were very useful too.

But that's as close as we got to any kind of summary and I think there are significant issues that relate to Sedley's comments we discussed thereafter about Epicurus' rejection of radical reductionism that need to be incorporated.

We have some new people since two years ago and I would welcome new comments.

The article Don cited remains very much on point, and we need a clear summary?

Is Epicurus daily considered to be a nominalist, and if so or if not, with what kind of explanation?

I still tend to the view that Epicurus would reject "radical nominalism" just as Sedley describes him as rejecting radical reductionism. That would explain Dewitts "sort of" qualifier. But what is the nature of that qualification?

Followup discussion to the post at the Facebook Group. This first YT post was in response to my post over there which was a slightly modified version of what I posted in post 1 above. There is also other conversation there but this is probably the most relevant to repost.

YT: Cassius That was pretty much my take on it as well. I also thought it was somewhat off the mark to describe Jonathan Haidt as conservative, but that was just a minor issue. Might be worth trying to get him as a guest on Lucretius Today to flesh out these questions about tradition vs naturalism, Epicurus, Jefferson and Madison.

JB: YT I don’t think there would be anything gained by having this person as a guest on Lucretius Today. Perhaps I might want to know if he believed that there was a god who was watching his every move. Epicurus had the right answer to this!

Cassius Amicus: Yes the possibility of inviting him to our Epicurus podcast is definitely something to consider, but at present my thoughts are more like John's. I definitely found the professor - and the interviewer - to be likeable and intelligent and easy to listen to, but I suspect that the "Madison" orientation would invite more confrontation on religion than it would illumination as to Hume or Bentham or the rest. They might well be uncomfortable appearing on an explicitly "Epicurean" podcast with there being no way to bridge those deeper issues.

But I did find it remarkable to listen to them talk to each other and both seem to appreciate that there is more to Epicurus than meets the eye, and even when he disagreed with Epicurus the professor gave Epicurus credit for being the real "architect" of this position in the ancient world, and deserving of far more credit for his influence than he is given.

The professor's remarks to the effect that Epicurean theory of pleasure is too "light" (my word) to sustain a full moral theory is a common problem with lots of commentators, because they focus on the stimulative pleasures and then stumble over the "absence of pain" statements as essentially unintelligible, so they move on.

One day we're going to be able to make the case better that "absence of pain" is not a dark phrase but simply means all experiences of life, including all normal and healthy physical and mental existence, which are not explicitly painful. This formulation is clearly visible in Cicero's presentation of Epicurean ethics where Torquatus is explaining it, even giving examples such as the proper reply to Chrysippus' "hand" argument, but that kind of detail has simply not penetrated the orthodox distaste for "pleasure" as a term.

I'd like to think that there is a younger generation that is immune to that older orthodoxy, and immune to the gloss-over that's been given to Epicurus, and that unpolluted attitude is what I hear in the voices of both the interviewer and the professor. They seem mystified that Epicurus has been given so little credit for his influence, and if they stick with the study long enough (and if they aren't so firmly in the grip of religion) then there's good reason for hope that new attitudes will eventually prevail.

I see that Elli has posted this thread on the Facebook page and the content is definitely worth reposting here. Elli and I have talked about this book for many years, and it is a shame that (as far as I know) it has still not been translated into English. The only collection of Liantinis' essays of which I am aware in English is "Gemma" available on Amazon. Everything below this point is Elli's post:

-An excerpt from the book entitled : “Polychronio-Stoa and Rome” by Dimitris Liantinis that was a professor of Greek Philosophy in University of Athens.

<<Epicurus was not heard in his era as other philosophers were heard, nor after his era did the people hear him. However, he conquered many countries as much as those that were conquered by Αristotle and Alexander, and then only through hearing we heard a few of his words. In all history, no one wrote Epicurus' philosophy as a whole, with the only exception that stands out being the exceptional Lucretius.

Half of the people who heard the name of Epicurus, being as naive as carpenters on the sea, took him for a loser. The other half, as wicked as executioners with their axes, correctly detected his vigorous message of rebellion. They saw and were terrified of the harvest that might come from it. And they took their measures: The "uneducated," they called him - the "shepherd of pigs and oxen."

They quickly grabbed their axes and the other paraphernalia of gravediggers and covered the noble body of Epicurus's knowledge in mayflowers, and in the echoes of silence. The tangible moment for mankind was lost in front of their eyes.

Thus, mankind had been deprived of the great opportunity to enter a universe of frankness, responsibility, honesty, and beauty.

The Seljuks of the priesthood, the school, and the pen accused Epicurus with numerous suppositions:

That he supposedly over-simplified life, because he called it joy, lightness, and well being for he denounced the evils, the sufferings, and the sadness of life.

That he supposedly humiliated the decency of mankind, because he proclaimed:

"Let us eat and drink and enjoy our life, because tomorrow we will die."

That he supposedly despised the wise and the teachers, for he praised innovative knowledge of the self, and the freshness of the deep calling of the present. That he supposedly mocked the divine and the sacred.

Behind the eyelids of a man’s sleep, and as long as he lives, there are dreams, desires, beauties, truths, and delusions moving slowly, but when the man dies, it is spiders, scorpions, and lizards that creep out of man's skull.

If Epicurus's voice had not been blocked by man's fears, ignorance, and misanthropy, history would have taken another path. But the line and the course of the world is engraved with our shame: a shivering heart, a sheep's and hyena's mind, and the prominent belly that maddens by its rumblings.

The courtyard, the luminaire and the porch of our house concealed the façade, the studio and the roof. We were once of a noble generation. We the gypsies.

If Epicurus had passed from here- alas! only the Medes are passing – what would have remained in the world would be a simple kind of anti-religion. The unified consciousness, that is, the knowledge of nature, the clarity, the strength, the courage, and the positiveness. All that Epicurus described then as bravery, and Nietzsche, in the more recent past, described as "gay science" and "human, all too human."

With Epicurus, mankind had the opportunity to protect its future from an Atlantic of worthless things: miseries, lies, errors, frauds, sacred sessions, lives of saints, caps of priest and pope, crimes, and futile waste of the intellect.

And the opportunity was lost.>>

We will definitely get to that at some point. As with this first episode, I think we found that there is going to be a lot to talk about in terms of Epicurus' relationship to religion that will take us some time to go through before we get to that.

Cicero has lots of general observations that are worth discussing, as we went through at length in this episode, and if I recall correctly Velleius goes through a lot of criticism of other schools before he gets to those final passages discussing Epicurus' own views.

So we will definitely call you when we get to that and in the meantime you're always welcome as well. There are plenty of issues, like Carneades (closer to Cicero than to the Stoics) criticizing the Stoic position on the gods determining every feather on every bird. I didn't have time to pursue that in episode one but it would be good to get a fix on to what extent the Cicero-team extended their insistence on "probability" rather than confidence to the gods themselves.

If I can do It I will try to re-read the whole book over the next couple of weeks while we are still going over Velleius, but that's an example of where it would be good to aim the big guns at the many names and details that Cicero is discussing which aren't very familiar.

So the Stoics were "more catholic than the Pope" in comparison to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, at least in terms of divine guidance of the affairs of men and the universe?

If so, I feel sure that our modern Stoics would squirm at that (to the extent they even realize it).

Well I have an easy remedy for that -- you can start a "Hedonism" forum and create an icon of people holding hands with the Cyreniacs!

But that will limit you to the physical pleasures of the moment!

A word of introduction on this one: Not a moment is devoted to the discussion of "idealist" vs "realist" perspectives. This is a very general introductory discussion, tracking how CIcero himself introduces the subject.

As with all episodes, and especially this new series as to "the nature of the gods" - comments are welcome.

Profkesarsarwara -- The new podcast is up (see the link at the top of the past) and we start treating the evidence of the senses argument around the 38 minute mark.

Today the Lucretius Today Podcast starts a new series focusing on Epicurean views of the nature of the gods: "Episode 226 - Cicero's On The Nature of The Gods - Epicurean Section - Part 01 - Introduction"

Thank you for asking Twentier and you now have that trophy. It's still a little bit of a work in progress, and I have more thinking to do about how to implement it, which I'll probably make another post about before too long.

Also - I had forgotten that Joshua had brought up this very issue - of Descartes - in our recording of the Lucretius Today podcast two days ago. It isn't quite ready for release but when it is I will come back here and point out how Joshua addresses this around the 40 minute mark.

Below is a link that was posted on the Facebook group by one of the participants there. I have now listened to the podcast, which is an interview by Annika Nordquist with a professor by the name of Aaron Zubia, and in general I am very pleased with it. Of course there are some issues that deserve criticism, but here's my general take, which is very positive:

Despite the title, the podcast does not get into modern partisan politics, and the "origins of liberalism" is a reference much more to "modern classical liberalism" than to the partisan kind. The podcast is a very literate discussion focusing on Hume, but really talking almost as much about Epicurus as anything else. The interviewer and the interviewee both sound very academic, and they treat Epicurus fairly to the extent their religious presumptions allow them. The limitation on my endorsement is that it is clear that both interviewer and interviewee are traditional Christians, and so they have to tone down their praise of Epicurus even when they evidently agree with him. Except for some minor comments about people like Jordan Peterson at the end of the podcast, where it becomes clear that they will never endorse Hume or Epicurus, likely because of their religious presuppositions, both parties on the podcast are obviously impressed by Epicurus. I think that in general this would be a better introduction to Epicurus' work than most any generalist podcast I have heard in a long time. It covers issues like "virtue," the criticism of Socrates, criticism of Stoicism, the basis of empiricism, the "apikoros" issue involving Jewish thought, and lots of issues that don't often get discussed in generalist podcasts.

I was a little disappointed in the professor's defense of Epicurus' view of the senses, as the interviewer asked one of the frequent questions about how Hume, or Epicurus, could put trust in the senses when there's illusions and stuff. The professor didn't go into how error is in the mind and not in the sensations, but if I recall the answer he gave was decent enough, and I don't recall that then or ever did the professor criticize Epicurus or make him sound naive or obsolete.

In fact the main take-away I got from the episode, who is devoting a lot if his emphasis to Hume, is clearly persuaded by many of the opinions of Epicurus (and Hume), and that he would agree with most all of them but for that stubborn refusal to let go of Jerusalem and Judeo-Christianity, which became clear at the end of the episode. However all in all I think this podcast episode is well worth the time to listen.

You might want to give it until about the seven or eight minute mark for the conversation to turn to Epicurus, and in retrospect I am shocked that they managed to have the entire discussion without once - to my recollection - mentioning Thomas Jefferson! And his name cried out for mention when they started discussing "head" vs "heart" and they did not mention Jefferson's "Head and Heart" letter where Jefferson clearly sides with Epicurus, nor did they mention any of Jefferson's letters supporting Epicurus. Both interviewer and interviewee appear to be "Madisonians" so they aren't predisposed to depart from their "Madisonian" traditionalism, but you can hear in their voices that they are surprised how much good they are finding in Epicurus!

I myself have done very little reading in Hume, and this podcast makes me want to find that time to correct that oversight.

Some others might have better responses on this, but my first thought is that some point you are going to run into your question being a matter of biology rather than philosophy. Philosophically, the issue divides between the mind (whatever that is) and the eyes (for example, whatever that is) and the formation of opinions. Philosophy isn't going to be able to tell you the exact mechanism of these things, but when you are asking mental questions about whether to trust "the senses" or "something else" or "nothing at all" then you into philosophical choices. Reductionism to worrying about what particular atoms are doing at a particular moment is impossible and self-defeating and not required in order to come up with a logical framework of analysis. I think Epicurus was mostly concerned with answering those from a philosophical perspective who asserted that "the senses can't be trusted" but on the other hand "reason" or "logic" or "the gods" can be trusted. Epicurus is pointing out that those alternatives do not really exist, in that the gods don't answer these questions for you, and "logic" and "reason" do not have direct connections with reality to answer them either. Only the senses (and anticipations and feelings) are considered to be direct connections with reality whose input must be dealt with as "real."

Also as to this

Quote from profkesarsarwara

I hadn't considered the mind and the senses as being separate, and error in the former being caused by lack of information from the latter

It would probably be better to say that the mind and the senses are separate, and that errors in the mind are caused by misinterpretation by the mind of the information provided by the senses. The senses report "truly" exactly what they perceive, without any added opinion. Exactly what to make of what they receive, however, is the job of the mind, and the mind very easily jumps to conclusions that are not warranted by specific perceptions of the senses. The only way to judge the 'truth" of an opinion generated from one set of observations is to test it by the opinions generated by many other observations over time and from various perspectives. Only when the assembled opinions start to resolve into a consistent conclusion are we confident that the opinion is correct. So sometimes "lack of information" would be the right term, but probably a better way of looking at it is that the observations over time are not consistent, so we need to suspect that something is going on to cause us to want to "wait" to form a strong opinion until the observations begin to resolve consistently with observations about which we are confident.

Profkesarsarwara - Great to hear from you and that you are studying philosophy so closely! Your father would be proud!

The short answer to your question is that there is a flaw in the premises that the senses are ever deceived. The senses do not form opinions, they simply report information exactly as they perceive it. Opinions are formed in the mind, and it is there that error takes place if we conclude something that is not sufficiently supported by clear and repeated observations of the senses. Erroneous opinions cannot be corrected if the information from new sensations is not accepted with the same confidence as those of prior perceptions, so if is false to deride the senses as unreliable. It is the proper use of the senses that is in question, and so all opinions have to be tested against repeated observations of the senses and nothing accepted as true unless and until the observations begin to line up consistently with one another.

A longer presentation of this can be found in Book 4 of Lucretius where this precise issue of illusions is discussed. (I will come back and post a line reference)

I also highly recommend the entirety of Chapter 8 of DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy," especially that part from the start of the chapter up to page 142.

Check your messages here and I will respond further, but this should get you or anyone else started on the path that makes tne most sense to me in interpreting Epicurus on this issue.

Lot's of good comments above but to comment on only two:

Quote from Don

Do I think Epicurus would change his mind about some of his ideas given a chance to learn modern explanations? Sure.

I think it is important (for me at least) to be clear that the areas where he would change his mind involve relatively insignificant speculations on operations of nature which he knew were open to revision. On the "more philosophical" matters of ethics and epistemology I don't think he would have any reason to revise much at all.

Quote from Godfrey

Was Epicurus perhaps making his school friendlier, less intimidating?

That's a very good point that I haven't seen anyone suggest before, and which had not occurred to me. What appears to us to be "cult-like" behavior might be viewed as a significant "lessening" or "freeing" of attitudes - almost certainly so in comparison with the Pythagoreans. We don't really know what the everyday attitudes were within the schools of the time period, and even today we have examples of professional teachers who are very intimidating and allow no dissent within their classrooms. Joshua's cite to Plotinus is something i've never heard either and helps a lot in thinking about these issues.