Posts by Cassius

Quote from TauPhi

Now, if I could convince you to drop 'theology' in favour of something like 'cerebration of nature' j

Yes for those who were not there, "the definition question" was the issue that several of us discussed on Zoom last night. Tau Phi and several others are firmly in what I will call the - "What the heck was Epicurus doing messing with the definitions of words?!?#!&^????" camp.

That's where Cicero was too, so they are in very respectable company!

However challenging and changing the definitions we give to words seems to be a central element of the whole Epicurean project. That means there will need to be smoother and more persuasive ways to convince people that that is a valid approach. I think Bryan and Joshua at the very least have some good ideas on that, because the list of words that Epicurus was using in unique ways seems to be very long. Even if we start only with the list Cicero himself gives, the list goes all the way from pleasure to prolepsis, and that just gets us started with the "p's," without even mentioning the "g-words!"

Right now I am still inclined to go with DeWitt's reasoning:

Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

So to interpolate that last sentence to our current context:

The fact that the name of "gods" has not been customarily applied to beings who live only in pleasure and without any pain, and who can continue to live for an unlimited lifespan, does not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to them; nor that reason justifies the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Another link that I will file away to consider as to how exposure to repetitive images over time would impact us:

Afterimage - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

1. Here on Earth, we observe for ourselves many different types of people and animals.
2. We observe that some live longer lives, some live shorter lives.
3. We observe that some live more pleasant lives, some live less pleasant lives.
4. We also observe that nature never makes only a single thing of a kind.
5. Because of our understanding of the atoms, we confidently expect that the universe is boundless, and that it has always existed and will continue to exist for a boundless period of time. We therefore expect that there are boundless numbers of other "people" in the universe, many of whom are a part of species which have been around a lot longer than we have.
6. Given the above, why would we *not* expect that some of those species have extended their length of life, and their experience of pleasure, so that both their lives and there pleasures are unending, uninterrupted by death or pain? And why would we *not* expect that we benefit from thinking about how they might have achieved that goal, so that we ourselves can make our pleasures and our lives last longer and without interruption to the extent we are able? Stated positively, it seems to me that Epicurus is saying that we *should* reach those conclusions.

Does there really have to be anything more to Epicurean theology than that? Is not *everything* beyond that which causes so much controversy (expectations of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence), false opinions that people under the influence of non-Epicurean perspectives are adding in, *none* of which false opinions are appropriate when Epicurean physics and canonics are consistently applied?

From this perspective, and taking into account how far we observe medical science has come in less than 2000 years, I would say that Epicurean theology is *more* persuasive than it was in 50BC or 250BC!

Maybe somebody can convince me that the above chain reasoning is not a fair summary of Epicurean theology, but to the extent it *is* a fair summary, I am personally 100% convinced of its validity!

Edit: I would say that "prolepsis" comes in mostly to allow stages 1, 2, and 3 to occcur - but 1,2, and 3 are not examples of prolepsis themselves. Without a faculty of prolepsis, we would "look" but we would never "see" things that lead us to form concepts such as Earth, "we," "people," "animals," or any of the rest of the concepts being used to construct this chain reasoning. I would say a faculty of prolepsis is necessary to organize and construct every step of the chain reasoning, but that none of the individual links in the chain are themselves "a prolepsis."

Also very probably related, Lucretius Book 2, Bailey:

[522] And since I have taught this much, I will hasten to link on a truth which holds to it and wins belief from it, that the first-beginnings of things, which are formed with a shape like to one another, are in number infinite. For since the difference of forms is limited, it must needs be that those which are alike are unlimited, or else that the sum of matter is created limited, which I have proved not to be, showing in my verses that the tiny bodies of matter from everlasting always keep up the sum of things, as the team of blows is harnessed on unbroken on every side.

[532] For in that you see that certain animals are more rare, and perceive that nature is less fruitful in them, yet in another quarter and spot, in some distant lands, there may be many in that kind, and so the tale is made up; even as in the race of four-footed beasts we see that elephants with their snaky hands come first of all, by whose many thousands India is embattled with a bulwark of ivory, so that no way can be found into its inner parts: so great is the multitude of those beasts, whereof we see but a very few samples.

[541] But still, let me grant this too, let there be, if you will, some one thing unique, alone in the body of its birth, to which there is not a fellow in the whole wide world; yet unless there is an unlimited stock of matter, from which it might be conceived and brought to birth, it will not be able to be created, nor, after that, to grow on and be nourished.

And here from book three is where Lucretius mentions the possibility that our atoms might in the future come together again as they are now placed:

[843] And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.

I think DeWitt is correct about this too, where he says that from infinity "Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods." This view would strongly influence how we interpret what Velleius says about prolepsis being the basis. Under this view prolepsis alone would not write in our minds "gods exist and are blessed and imperishable" but rather prolepsis provides the spark to get us started thinking about the subject, at which point our reasoning takes over and through isonomia and related argument leads us to more specific conceptual conclusions.

Quote

"It was from this principle [infinity] that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode."

Lucretius Book 2: 1077 - Bailey:

[1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

As usual I think DeWitt is going in a very productive direction but I don't know that he explains it as persuasively as he could.

When he says ..... : "The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. " .... I doubt it's best to use the words "perfect" and "imperfect" because of the connotations of magic those words carry.

In the very next sentence DeWitt quotes what I think is the better alternative: "Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." ⁷² Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods."

So I wouldn't say we're talking about "perfect" vs "imperfect,' but rather more in the line of a spectrum from poor, good, better, best -- in that whenever you line up a spectrum, you're going to have *something* at the top of the spectrum. Simply being at the top of the spectrum does not mean that you are of a different type than what came before -- if you weren't of the same type you wouldn't be on the same spectrum in the first place. So simply being at the top of the "living beings experiencing pleasure" spectrum doesn't mean necessarily anything more than that all your time is pleasurable and that you don't ever have to die. Translating Cicero as saying "surpassing" does not require any kind of "magical" connotation.

That kind of interpretation would seem to me to be consistent with the way Lactantius and Cicero are understanding what Epicurus had said, and it would be consistent with Epicurean physics and not introduce any kind of "magical" analysis of deriving the existence of a 'supernatural' being from the existence of the "natural." That's an obvious non-starter under epicurean physics and should not even be entertained as a possibility of what he was saying.

Quote from Dewitt's "Epicurus And His Philosophy"

ISONOMY AND THE GODS

In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. He enunciated his Twelve Elementary Principles and adhered to them closely. Two of these, the fifth and sixth, asserted the infinity of the universe in respect of matter and space. To this idea of infinity he ascribed fundamental importance. He exhorted the young Pythocles to study it as one of those master principles which would render easy the recognition of causation in details.⁶⁸ Cicero must have been recalling some similar exhortation when he wrote: "But of the very greatest importance is the significance of infinity and in the highest degree deserving of intense and diligent contemplation." ⁶⁹ He was quoting Epicurus.

It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia, a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it aequabilis tributio, "equitable apportionment." ⁷⁰ The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.

The term isonomia itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word prolepsis. To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to eunomia, government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.

Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.

That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed."⁷¹ The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." ⁷² Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.

It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." ⁷³ One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled On Evidences, "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." ⁷⁴ Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." ⁷⁵ This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.

The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.

At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.⁷⁶ The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.⁷⁷

In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." ⁷⁸ This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.

It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite."⁷⁹ This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called intermundia, where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

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Last week's episode will be released later today, and listeners will find that we did not move too far ahead in the text, as we discussed more general topics. This week we will definitely reach the section discussion "isonomia," and as we discussed on the Wednesday Zoom last night that topic is going to take some preparation to make sense of it. I'll post here some of DeWitt's commentary, and if others have suggestions for where it is discussed by other commentators please post that here too.

We will also want to include in this discussion what Lucretius has to say about related topics, such as "nature never makes only a single thing of a kind," and we'll need to find that reference.

Welcome to Episode 237 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius. We will continue with Section 18 and begin moving into 19.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus ἰσονομία; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.

XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?

Hence first arose your Εἱμαρμένη, as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? Then follows your μαντικὴ, in Latin called divinatio, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.

Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.

Great topic Cleveland Oakie. It's very interesting to look into the meaning of the Latin "posse commitatus." We in the USA don't generally seem to associate the term with anything other than our law which prohibits the use of military troops from getting involved in civil matters, but your example implies there is a lot more going on than that!

I see this also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posse_comitatus

Quote

The posse comitatus (from the Latin for "power of the county"), frequently shortened to posse, is in common law a group of people mobilized by the conservator of peace – typically a reeve, sheriff, chief, or another special/regional designee like an officer of the peace potentially accompanied by or with the direction of a justice or ajudged parajudicial process given the imminence of actual damage – to suppress lawlessness, defend the people, or otherwise protect the place, property, and public welfare.

...

Derived from Latin, posse comitātūs ("force of the county/region") is sometimes shortened to simply posse from the mid-17th century onward to describe the force itself more than the legal principle.^[3] While the original meaning refers to a group of citizens assembled by the authorities to deal with an emergency (such as suppressing a riot or pursuing felons and outlawry), the term is also used for any force or band, especially with hostile intent, often also figuratively or humorously.^[4] In 19th-century usage, posse comitatus also acquired the generalized or figurative meaning.^[5] In classical Latin, posse is a contraction of potesse, an irregular Latin verb meaning "to be able".^[6][7][8] The unusual genitive in "-ūs" is a feature of the fourth declension. In its earliest days, the posse comitatus was subordinate to the king, country, and local authority.^[9]

Sound to me like translating it as "county" is probably covering over a deeper meaning that goes in the direction of what Cleveland is finding.

Quote from Godfrey

It seems to have some potential overlap with pattern recognition, although some (such as Wundt) think of it as a conscious process. I'm not sure if it's helpful or not to examine the word further, but it does seem to at least have some of the same issues as prolepsis in terms of pinning down a definition.

Very good information, Godrey, so this is going to cry out for our Greek scholars to examine that word and help us figure out how it was used elsewhere, and potentially how it was translated into Latin.

Maybe this thread "Give Us An Example of A God!" should come after examination of "Give Us An Example of A Prolepsis!"

And I think the straightest path to that is going to be to analogize to the eye and the other faculties. In the case of the eye, according to this article the eye receives and processes into a form the brain can handle - in a single word - "light":

Visual system - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

(Note: By quoting WIkipedia I am not suggesting that anything was required from modern science that wouldn't basically have occurred to Epicurus. It's an obvious question to ask what part of thinking takes place in the eye and what part takes place in the brain/soul/mind whatever. Also,I am following up on the prior comment that the eye probably doesn't even distinguish borders between separate "things." Picking out one "thing" from another presumably takes place in the brain too.)

Presumably the ears receive and process "sound" into a form the brain can handle. (And it is the mind that can pick music out of background noise.)

So what does the prolepsis faculty receive and process into a form the brain can handle?

I would bet Epicurus would say that it does *not* receive and process "gods" or "justice" or "oxen" or any concrete "thing" or "concept." I suspect he would say that those words ("gods" Justice" and "oxen") are concepts that the mind has formed because the faculty of prolepsis has done some kind of work *beforehand* to allow the brain to think about these concepts. Had the prolepsis faculty not done it's work beforehand, the brain would never have been able to come up with "gods" or "justice" or "oxen" in the first place. Seeing an infinite number of copies of the Mona Lisa would never tell us to pick out the individual things that go into the Mona Lisa out from the background of the painting, unless some faculty of organization of relationships led us to first pick out "things" like hair and eyes and noses and mouths and trees in the first place. Even a gods could not create a world without something which would have allowed them to think of worlds in the first place. (Note that I am writing that carefully because maybe a "god" could take existing matter and refashion it into a "world," but no god could ever make something from nothing or make the universe as a whole.)

It's going to be something more fundamental - like repetitive or repeated "relationships" or "arrangements" - or something else that describes why we should recognize that one body has a special relationship to another body. And the receipt of "images" over time, in which bodies repeatedly appear to us in repetitive relationships to each other, would be a prime candidate to consider as what it is that prolepses "receives and processes."

No doubt someone else can do a lot better than that, but I think that's the direction, and so long as we continue to discuss "concepts" as what prolepsis is receiving and handing over, I don't think we make progress toward giving due credit to either the faculty of prolepsis or the theory of images.

Diogenes Laertius - it seems like I have read commentators explain this word "apperception" in 32 below as a reference to the "repeatability" of the phenomena. Could it be that the "repeatability" of something makes the most difference in justifying us to consider something to be "real" or "true":

[32] Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

[51] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.

In addition I think we still have a lot more to clarify about what "a prolepsis" is. When we say "a prolepsis of ______" something , that something is coming out in our description as a conception, and I don't think that is right.

Prolepsis should lead to formation of concepts but not be concepts themselves, just like eyes never tell us what a thing is, but only give us raw data about color and brightness and sharpness and the like. Possibly even the eyes don't tell us "boundaries" either, of where one "thing" stops and another starts. Maybe "thing" is itself an opinion of the mind after our mind assembles the data from the senses.

On the nature of "things" might itself have multiple meanings.

Quote from Twentier

Let's use the example of "demons" (as a class).

Well, "demons as a class" already sounds like a conceptual construct to me. Blessedness (pleasure) and Imperishability (life) seem to me things that are much more on a level of "sensation." "Gods" would be the conceptual embodiment of those characteristics (blessedness and life/imperishability) in perfected form. "Demons" i guess could be considered conceptual construction like "gods," but I don't think once you start talking about "demons" you are still talking about something that can be a true opinion generated by a prolepsis, just like the existence of centaurs would not be a true opinion, even though they can be generated by "images."

Quote from Twentier

I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure" and I assign to that prolepsis the word "demon", as a class of perfectly-pleasureless beings?

So I think I would first have to unpack that sentence in the same way. "Prolepsis" seems to me to be focusing on "arrangements" but to assign to a particular arrangement a label "a living person who permanently lacks pleasure" probably goes into "false opinion."

Once again I think these are great questions, and I am sure that my answers can be improved. I think these questions do have good answers, I am just not at all sure mine so far are the best that can be given.

Quote from Twentier

How do I know that "the gods" in "dreams" are more real than centaurs and cyclops?

That's a good approach and I bet it has several ways of responding. Both gods and centaurs are "real" from the perspective of affecting us, but gods are "more real" than centaurs if "real" is thought of as meaning that the thing has likely an ongoing physical existence capable of generating its own images on a regular basis. Here are two starting points that will need revision:

- Our observations of the physical universe tells us that "gods" are likely and possible, but that centaurs are not. In the case of gods we are talking about a wide class that could have very many forms, so long as those forms are consistent with blessedness and imperishability. In the case of "centaurs" that's an assertion of a very specific physical formation that conflicts with our long experience with both humans and horses.

- "Gods" as a class are very frequently the topic of our interest (receipt of images), but "centaurs" are very infrequently so. Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real." Anything with an independent existence will regularly generate images of their own. Centaurs are combinations of images of men and horses which happen much less frequently.

I would be interested in Bryan 's thoughts on this. But the issue turns on the overriding question of the meaning of "real" and how we consider anything to be real.

Quote from Twentier

Similarly, Epicurus advises against romantic exploits, but stops short of explicitly prohibiting them, so long as they do not cause turmoil.

I think the last phrase there should be "does not cause more pain than pleasure" which would be the general way the analysis applies to all topics. Because although I know that not everyone interprets PD10 this way, I think it is reasonably interpreted to mean that no activity can ever be "blanketly" ruled out because there is no fate and thus no absolute certainty as to result. It seems to me its always a problem to state any rule of conduct in terms of an absolute rule, as that would override the physics and the fact that nature gives us only pleasure and pain as guides.

Quote from Twentier

I wonder, like sex and politics if Epicurus would allow for a non-theistic rejection of the traditional gods if one is so inclined by their natural disposition?

Therefore (after my first comment) I would say that he would "allow" the possibility of such a position, if indeed in a particular case it does lead to a successful result, but he'd "warn against it" as going against general human experience.

Quote from Bryan

Yes, but of course just a little bit remains.

This is excellent work Bryan! I presume this is yours? Can we set up a "Demetrius Lacon" Thread or subforum to include this and the links to papyri from which you are working?

I am thinking a subforum in this section:

Ancient Epicurean Texts (300 BC to 300 AD)

Quote from Twentier

(3) Hermarkhos, Demetrios, Philodemos, and Lucretius making indications that the gods breathe and converse is not a preconception, but inductive reasoning that happens to be coherent with the preconception, and (4) the actual gods don't really exist except as concepts in our minds.

I think Point 3 is correct and applies to Epicurus as well. Preconceptions are never the same as inductive reasoning, and I would say "statements of fact" are always better termed "conceptions," as "statements of fact" are never the same as preconceptions. "Opinions" is another good word, as Epicurus apparently said (Diogenes Laertius?) that opinions can be true or false, but unfortunately today the word "opinion" is firmly understood to imply that the opinion is "not true," so in most cases clarity will require some other word.

As to point 4 I would say the problem is the meaning of the term "the actual gods." If someone insists that the term "actual gods" must include Yahweh, Allah, Zeus, Thor, or whoever, then yes I would say the statement "actual gods do not exist except as concepts in our mind" is true, because *those gods* do not exist as independently real beings with bodies and locations and so forth.

However the term "actual gods" by no means requires accepting that Yahweh and the rest are included within that term. Therefore I would submit the statement "the actual gods don't really exist except as concepts in our minds" as that statement would be made in common discussion and understood by 99% of people today would be seen in Epicurean terminology as false.

I would say (as I think you did later in the post) that if Epicurus were here today he would say something like the following, which is what I understand the texts to mean when read fairly. Epicurus would say "divinity" or "god" is a term that humans apply to living beings that meet a certain criteria of total blessedness and total deathlessness, and that this term is applicable to and appropriate to describe beings which our physics and understanding of nature tell us do actually exist in the universe.

The problem always comes when someone makes specific assertions about some personality like Yahweh or Zeus or any of the rest actually existing. It's also a problem to make general assertions about the class of gods that goes beyond deathlessness and blessedness, as none of those assertions have ever proven to be reliable and reproducible and worthy of belief.

Thus it appears that the Epicureans speculated about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" to acknowledge that we can reasonably believe that the class of "gods" have certain qualities that allow them to exist in the universe, but that we do not have the ability to specify the details of those qualities given our lack of information from our vantage point here on Earth.

Quote from Twentier

This brings up another point: various Epicureans have presented the argument that a Creator cannot be a god because a Creator must have been bored, or lonely, or in need of other beings prior to creation; such a state is inconsistent with blessedness.

Which is why I would expect Epicurus to have emphasized life in the universe along a "spectrum" in which there will be lots of beings lots more advanced than us which *do* create their own "worlds" (but not from nothing), with the status of "god" being reserved for those that have in fact reached the point of wanting nothing that they do not already have.

Quote from Twentier

How can a blessed quasi-animal always have existed?

I tend to think that their answer there would have been that gods "as a kind" have always existed as a part of natural processes leading to that result, but that gods as individuals have not existed forever, given that the only things that have existed without creation are matter and void. This leads down the road DeWitt mentions that the gods have to act to maintain their deathlessness. I suppose it's not inconceivable that individual gods might conclude after eons that variety really does not add to complete pleasure, and decide voluntarily to go out of existence. I wouldn't be surprised if the ancient Epicureans asked themselves that question, at the very least as part of the discussion about beings like us, who will surely die, and questioning how much in fact we necessarily lose by being mortal rather than deathless. Variety is in fact nice to us who haven't learned the lesson, but if we were to in fact experience for ourselves (through technology in the future) how it does not in fact make pleasure "more complete," then I am thinking that it would be conceivable to decide, once we were really sure that we had experienced "complete" pleasure, that nothing more is needed, and to get tired of the "more."