Posts by Cassius

Another comment after reading Hume's Dialogue: Truer words were never spoken than this passage from DeWitt's Book, under the section "True Opinions: False Opinions" - "In the succession of philosophers the place of Epicurus is immediately after Plato and Pyrrho the skeptic. Platonism and skepticism were among his chief abominations."

Hume seems to see the same thing, and he structures his entire Dialogue as a debate between skepticism and dogmatism. He let's "mysticism" have a voice initially, but then has the advocate of mysticism walk out before the end as if no reasonable person, whether dogmatist or skeptic, will accept the mystic's arbitrariness.

Epicurus' whole argument about the gods - and everything else for that matter - is framed in terms of how you refute the claims of skepticism that nothing is knowable. Epicurus' conclusions about happiness, pleasure, death, life - the whole ball of wax - are framed in terms of "how" we are confident that his conclusions are true. And the "how" derives from taking the position that we test "truth" according to what we get from the canonical faculties. The feelings of pleasure and pain are as "true" to us as the data we gather from the five senses, and the rest of the picture is that the data from images/prolepsis must be viewed that way as well.

Truth isn't measured by X number of scientists or philosophers or priests telling us that it is so, and we don't wait for "gods" to tell us what is true either. Seems to me that the best way to look at it is that Epicurus held opinion about anything to be "true" if that opinion is consistently confirmed, and without contradiction, by the data from the three canonical sources.

Quote from Eikadistes

I wanted to mention that I've recently com across a few scholars who suggested that this trilemma actually comes from a Skeptic (perhaps Carneades the Academic), and not Epicurus (Larrimore, Mark Joseph. The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Blackwell, 2001). Based on De Ira Dei David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779). While it comports with Epicurean theology, it does not correspond with any extant writings of Epicurus nor another Epicurean. I also note that Lactantius documented this material approximately 600 years after Epicurus was teaching in Athens. <https://twentiers.com/anger-of-god>

Excellent post Nate. Now that I am fresh from reading Hume's Dialogue in which it appears, I tend to agree that it was a skeptic who framed the argument this way. As presented, it is focused on "the problem of evil" and tightly interwoven with the position that it is illogical to take the Stoic position that "god" is benevolent. The real root of it seems to be as part of the larger argument that there is so much pain and suffering in the world that a "good" god is impossible. While that argument helps against "design," and definitely has aspects that rings of the Epicurean argument that the world has so many defects that it can't have been designed by a benevolent god, it rings to me of having a much more "skeptical" flavor than Epicurus would have used.

As we know Epicurus focuses on stating the positive things that we *should* believe about gods - that they are living beings blessed and imperishable. While the two perspectives can be made to fit together, to me the Hume/Lanctatius version rings with a real emphasis on suffering that does not strike me as the way Epicurus would have presented anything.

When Epicurus presents suffering it's usually (always?) in the context of how suffering can be avoided. After all pain is generally manageable if long and short if intense. Seems to me Epicurus' focuses on the remedy to pain and suffering and it would be uncharacteristic of him to use an argument that takes as its premise an emphatic endorsement that suffering inevitably dominates the human condition.

I made a long set of notes on my reading of Humes "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" and they are now here:

Thread

David Hume and his "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion"

Not sure yet how to approach the Hume material from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, or how much time we will have for it in the podcast beyond the Riddle, but I may collect a few notable quotations as I go through it. It's notable that none of the major players are advocating an Epicurean position:

• Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and

…

Cassius

October 30, 2024 at 7:54 AM

Let's use this thread to discuss David Hume. If we develop enough detail we can create a subforum, but let's start here.

This morning (10/30/24) around 9:00 AM EST, our hosting provider had a brief outage, and EpicureanFriends was unavailable for approximately an hour. As a reminder, if you ever find EpicureanFriends inaccessible, look for updates at our emergency backup wiki, which should be accessible at CassiusAmicus.com, or our main Twitter/X feed which is at https://x.com/CassiusAmicus.

Not sure yet how to approach the Hume material from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, or how much time we will have for it in the podcast beyond the Riddle, but I may collect a few notable quotations as I go through it. It's notable that none of the major players are advocating an Epicurean position:

• Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion.
• I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm (I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers.
• [Note - This next is very similar to what Thomas Jefferson says to Adams in a letter we discuss regularly] Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement.
• [Note - The Skeptical argument:] A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole? Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former? ... When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance...
• [Note - A Response to the Skeptical Argument:] Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather than by serious argument and philosophy.
• The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties.
• [Note: More Skepticism:] All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason.
• [Spoken by Cleanthes, but somewhat close to the Epicurean position?] I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition.
• [Accuses the Peripatetics of Subterfuge:] It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena.
• [Admitting limitation of idealism:] An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.

Need Translation of the following Latin from the Start of Part 5:

Quote

All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even following the old system of the world, could exclaim,

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes
Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?

If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN:

"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?"

If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention.

Probably the Lucretius quote is from some part of this (Bailey):

[1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

[1090] And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods. For by the holy hearts of the gods, which in their tranquil peace pass placid years, and a life of calm, who can avail to rule the whole sum of the boundless, who to hold in his guiding hand the mighty reins of the deep, who to turn round all firmaments at once, and warm all fruitful lands with heavenly fires, or to be at all times present in all places, so as to make darkness with clouds, and shake the calm tracts of heaven with thunder, and then shoot thunderbolts, and often make havoc of his own temples, or moving away into deserts rage furiously there, plying the bolt, which often passes by the guilty and does to death the innocent and undeserving?

[1105] And since the time of the world’s birth, and the first birthday of sea and earth, and the rising of the sun, many bodies have been added from without, and seeds added all around, which the great universe in its tossing has brought together; that from them sea and lands might be able to increase, and from them too the mansion of the sky might gain new room and lift its high vault far away from the lands, and the air might rise up. For from all places all bodies are separated by blows each to its own kind, and they pass on to their own tribes; moisture goes to moisture, with earthy substance earth grows, fires forge fires, and sky sky, until nature, parent of all, with perfecting hand has brought all things on to the last end of growing; as it comes to pass, when there is now no whit more which is sent within the veins of life, than what flows out and passes away. Here the growth of all things must stop, here nature by her powers curbs increase.

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The latin from On The Nature of the Gods doesn't have a line cite:

If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN: "Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?"

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[Note: We don't know that Epicurus himself said this, or if he did, that he did not include caveats such as those expressed by Velleius.] And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

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[OK Part 8 is devoted to an altered (non-infinite) version of Epicurean physics, followed by a proclamation of victory for the Sceptic:] "All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?"

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[ Defect of a priori / mathematical reasoning] Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis! But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

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[OK so the "Riddle" is buried as a sidelight to Part 10, which is devoted mostly to the miserable pain-focus of Demea, who presumably represents the "mystical" viewpoint but with which the Skeptic Philo largely agrees. What a miserable combination!!!] EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

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[To double down on my last comment, Epicurus "riddle" is buried within the Skeptics argument against the existence of any gods, with the argument basically being that the universe is so screwed up, and humanity is so unhappy, that the universe cannot possibly have any gods, given that the divine nature can't contain such unhappiness. While Epicurus certainly used this argument as a reason to deny that the universe was created or supervised by supernatural gods, I do not think that Epicurus would have embraced such a thoroughly negative view of human affairs and what is possible to humans. Yes, lots of humans are unhappiness, but this is not a necessary condition, and through Epicurean philosophy it IS possible to live happily. Our failure to live happly is not the fault of the Epicurean gods, but in ouselves. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are underlings."] And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? ... Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.

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[ The whole conclusion seems to be a very good argument against the Stoic/Mystic view of a supernatural god creating or intervening in he universe, but it never mentions and doesn't touch Epicurus' views of "gods" at all. Interesting that he seems to side with Cassius and Cicero against Caesar:] Some small touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind.

--

[This accusation thrown at the skeptic is well stated: ] Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself?

And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and melancholy of mankind. But at present... Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism.

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[Here's a very interesting statement in the conclusion. i doubt Epicurus would agree with this characterization of the two positions. I suspect Epicurus (as a dogmatist) would take the position that the problems of how to take positions on difficult issues are not insolvable (thus he developed his canon of truth), and that he would agree with the quote above that skeptics are not philosophers, they are liars.... (as cited by Lucretius in Book 4 that the man who claims that nothing is knowable is standing on his head and not worth engaging in discussion) ]: No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable.  No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity.

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[I think Epicurus would certainly *not* agree with this:] My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal? [ Much better to have a correct view of divinity rather than a corrupt view or atheism.]

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[ Most of the ending of Part 12 is an attack on supernatural religion with which Epicurus would largely agree. I see the final paragraph seems to endorse the dogmatic/stoic position, but it's not clear to me from this text whether this is meant to be Hume's own opinion or what.] CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's; but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth.

Thank you Matteng! This looks to me to be a major new set of articles that I don't think anyone here has referenced before. I would ask that those who have the time to help us explore what's here and post in the thread about what they are finding. I will also edit the title of the thread to make clear that its a 2 - Volume work - and the PDF download from Academia is free. Thank you again!

Here's the blurb from Cornell:

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena).

Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, the book includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi.

Contributors: Julie Giovacchini (CNRS, Paris), Francesca Masi (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia), Dino De Sanctis (Università degli Studi della Tuscia), Chiara Rover (Universität Hamburg/MCAS), Enrico Piergiacomi (Universität Zürich), David Leith (University of Exeter), Vincenzo Damiani (Universität Ulm), David Konstan (New York University), Voula Tsouna (UC Santa Barbara), Jürgen Hammerstaedt (Universität zu Köln), Craig Martin (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia), Frederik Bakker (Radboud Universiteit)

Thank you! Looks like it's very new. Is there a Volume 1 or other Volumes?

Lucretius Today Episode 252 is now available: "Why Reverence the Epicurean Gods"

Side note during editing: The topic that is referenced in the current title of the episode (Why reverence the Epicurean gods?) doesn't really kick in until about the 30 minute mark, but at that point we begin to bring up an analogy that I think is useful:

One way of looking at the opening hymn to Venus, and Her role in bringing peace / pleasure to Mars at the beginning of the poem, is that Lucretius is laying the ground work to shift the paradigm from the familiar (Venus as the goddess leading the way to the best life) to the new paradigm. in which the real "god" to whom we owe respect and appreciation for leading us in the best life is Epicurus, who in god-like / savior-like / father-like way does the same thing, but with true philosophy, rather than by means of the supernatural.

Viewed in this way, when Lucretius says "Call upon Neptune/Ceres if you like...," just so long as you don't let your mind get fouled with superstition, he's saying that the real "god" to call on is Epicurus, who -- once we allow him to show us the true nature of the universe -- takes on the role of Venus in leading us properly in the pursuit of a pleasurable life.

And in the same way, piety / reverence toward the gods in Epicurean philosophy takes on a very similar positive flavor to piety / reverence toward Epicurus himself in Epicurean philosophy. That seems to me to be the best way of interpreting Epicurean participation in "religious ceremonies, in that that participation would be very analogous to participation in the Twentieth or other memorialization of the Epicurean founders and public festivals with friends.

Mentioned in this episode:

Epicurus' refutation of determinism

Epicurus' refutation of determinism

www.academia.edu

Yes it is - I don't know who Alex O'Conner is .... familiar with him?

Over at the Facebook group a reader posted to this video as part of a longer post which referenced several videos. The topic of the post was broadly speaking about issues with reductionism, with which I am sympathetic and frequently cite the David Sedley paper "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism."

Now that i have had a chance to watch this video, I see that the topic of this one isn't really reductionism, but broadly about Dawkins' views of memes as a "mind virus" vs. Peterson's amalgamation of Jungian archetypes and all sorts of other things. As Dawkins says, Peterson is "drunk" on symbolism." [I hope the word is "drunk" - might be another word of similar meaning.]

So while this video is only tangentially related to reductionism, I do think it's very interesting for revealing how Peterson is happy to admit that he is not convinced of the truth of core Bible stories, but doesn't think that their truth is relevant to their importance. To me this just oozes of a Platonic "noble myth" approach where one doesn't care a bit whether a story that is being told is "true" so long as it is effective in producing a desirable social result.

I have tremendous respect for Richard Dawkins but I have to question whether Dawkins responded with the kind of intensity that was appropriate. Peterson is long-winded and tends to filibuster whenever he gets a chance to speak, with the result that this video is mostly Peterson telling Dawkins what Peterson thinks with an occasional break to give Dawkins a short reply.

For those who might want to watch I think this video is useful for:

1. Revealing a straightforward and bold-faced proponent of "I don't care if something is true as long as it leads to a result that i desire." (Peterson)

2. Giving an example of how someone who's broadly aligned with Epicurean views (Dawkins) can respond to such a position. I'm beginning to see Dawkins more as someone almost to be sorry for than as an example for Epicurean argument. His age is not his fault, and he seems to be under a lot of censorship pressure in England to tiptoe around religious issues he'd have been much more clear about in the past. And I detect that Dawkins' humanism inclines him to look for agreement with Peterson where he can agree on political issues, rather than to fight with Peterson on the fundamental errors of his approach.

But all in all it's a worthwhile video -- if you can stomach listening to Peterson's preachy style of talking.

Welcome to Episode 253 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we will take a brief detour from Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," to take a look at what is known today as "The Riddle of Epicurus."

David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779).

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, states: "You see, therefore, that we have greater need of wisdom on account of evils; and unless these things had been proposed to us, we should not be a rational animal. But if this account is true, which the Stoics were in no manner able to see, that argument also of Epicurus is done away. God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does He not remove them?2 I know that many of the philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument, and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes no interest in anything, which Epicurus especially aims at; but having examined the matter, we easily do away with this formidable argument. For God is able to do whatever He wishes, and there is no weakness or envy in God. He is able, therefore, to take away evils; but He does not wish to do so, and yet He is not on that account envious. For on this account He does not take them away, because He at the same time gives wisdom, as I have shown; and there is more of goodness and pleasure in wisdom than of annoyance in evils. For wisdom causes us even to know God, and by that knowledge to attain to immortality, which is the chief good. Therefore, unless we first know evil, we shall be unable to know good. But Epicurus did not see this, nor did any other, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is in like manner taken away; and that no traces of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in enduring and overcoming the bitterness of evils. And thus, for the sake of a slight gain in the taking away of evils, we should be deprived of a good, which is very great, and true, and peculiar to us. It is plain, therefore, that all things are proposed for the sake of man, as well evils as also goods" (Chapter 13, translated by William Fletcher 1886).

Next week we will return to our normal sequence, and get back to Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 42 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious adoration of them.

What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than discover the knowledge of the Gods.

XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more worthy of the country of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?

But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.

Quote from Root304

I found much fruit in the notion of "bounded recursion" to describe that indeterminancy and waveform happens within a relatively short range of possibilities.

I think that's a very useful way of looking at passages like Diogenes of Oinoanda saying that Epicureans agree that there is a flux, but it is not so fast or indeterminate that it cannot be perceived by our natural faculties. Waveforms or other motions can be very fast, but if they "oscillate" within a bounded area they they are readily perceivable as within a pattern.

Quote from Don

iistening to some fine music, and enjoying quality local brews.

Ah those sensual pleasures!

Along the same lines of deprecating the senses, Joshua, this quote from Cicero's ON DIVINATION:

Quote

"Moreover, divination finds another and a positive support in nature, which teaches us how great is the power of the soul when it is divorced from the bodily senses, as it is especially in sleep, and in times of frenzy or inspiration. For, as the souls of the gods, without the intervention of eyes or ears or tongue, understand each other and what each one thinks (hence men, even when they offer silent prayers and vows, have no doubt that the gods understand them), so the souls of men, when released by sleep from bodily chains, or when stirred by inspiration and delivered up to their own impulses, see things that they cannot see when they are mingled with the body. And while it is difficult, perhaps, to apply this principle of nature to explain that kind of divination which we call artificial, yet Posidonius, who digs into the question as deep as one can, thinks that nature gives certain signs of future events. Thus Heraclides of Pontus records that it is the custom of the people of Ceos, once each year, to make a careful observation of the rising of the Dog-star and from such observation to conjecture whether the ensuing year will be healthy or pestilential. For if the star rises dim and, as it were enveloped in a fog, this indicates a thick and heavy atmosphere, which will give off very unwholesome vapours; but if the star appears clear and brilliant, this is a sign that the atmosphere is light and pure and, as a consequence, will be conducive to good health.

"Again, Democritus expresses the opinion that the ancients acted wisely in providing for the inspection of the entrails of sacrifices; because, as he thinks, the colour and general condition of the entrails are prophetic sometimes of health and sometimes of sickness and sometimes also of whether the fields will be barren or productive. Now, if it is known by observation and experience that these means of divination have their source in nature, it must be that the observations made and records kept for a long period of time have added much to our knowledge of this subject. Hence, that natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius into his play of Chryses, seems to show very scanty apprehension of the laws of nature when he speaks as follows:

This comes from Cicero's "On Divination" (Loeb), and it would be perhaps useful to get some practice thinking about how this kind of thinking seems to attract some people and how an Epicurean would have responded to it:

Quote

The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:

"'If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs — otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination.'

Quote from Don

I don't think that's what Cassius is saying either, but I want to make it clear that - from what I read here in this text and elsewhere - Epicurus is not endorsing the "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" lifestyle of the ἄσωτος (Read the quote from my commentary on that word below). Did Epicurus engage in drinking, revelry, etc.? Sure, I got no problem with that. Did he go on binges of drinking to find himself hungover and nauseated? Definitely not, as far as I'm concerned.

Good point that the same question pops up here. I think (as you say) that both you and I *DO* endorse the pleasures of sex, rock'n'roll, and (sometimes) drugs So we could never accept an interpretation that these are blanketly forbidden. As you said, it's the overindulgence in these, or any other pleasure, even ice cream, that is the problem.

So the real problem is that the sentence as translated has a truncated structure that leaves it ambiguous in English as written, and it demands commentary, or else it will be exhibit number one - which it is what it has become - for those who make Epicurus out to be an ascetic.

Also: While I do think it is most clear to a modern reader to add in the "only," if we put the issue in a clearly philosophical context, such as the heap analogy, then the "only" isn't strictly necessary.

A heap "is not" any of the individual grains of sand that compose it. That can also be said as "A heap is not only the individual grains of sand that compose it, the heap is the combination of the grains of sand." I think that's the Epicurean position on the sorites question, and the reason for him saying that he would not know the good *without* the sensual pleasures. If someone understands that then the discussion we're having right now never comes up. But that's the problem, people are not thinking in terms of the sorites/heap issue. They are thinking generally from their preconceived Platonic/Humanist perspective that sensual issues are "bad," so they jump to conclude that that is what Epicurus is saying.

So I would say that it's not strictly necessary to say "Pleasure is not only the pleasures of sensuality and of the profligate...." because if you realize the the term "pleasure" is meant conceptually, then you automatically read into the sentence an understanding that the concept of pleasure is not identical with any individual pleasure -- you understand that as a matter of logic just like you understand that a heap is not the same as its parts. But very few ordinary people think that way, so they probably need the "only."

The real erroneous interpretation in my view is not that of adding in the "only," but in failing to see that the sentence structure makes clear that the blanket term "pleasure" is not identical with *any* particular pleasure. Once that is established then the meaning can be communicated in many ways. So I would say that the main error to be avoided would be any reading that separates "sensual pleasures" out of a list of "approved pleasures" as very many commentators today are doing. That interpretation sounds like "Pleasure does not include the pleasures of sensuality or the profligates," which I would maintain is clearly wrong.

Yes Epicurus was different from the Cyreniacs, but he was not different because he subtracted sensual pleasures from a list of approved pleasures, he was expanding the Cyreniac list of pleasures to include experiences that they did not consider to be pleasure.