Posts by Cassius

"A philosophy which values life, rather than seeks to extinguish it, will seek to intelligently pursue pleasure,"

---- writing that helps me focus on the time issue. I don't think you can value "life" without implying that you also value "the continuation of life over time." Since we only have "the now" and we don't have total control over the future, it seems to me that there is inherently going to be a "desire for time" element in valuing life that is not eliminated by saying "I'm satisfied with what I have already experienced. "

There's got to be a way to articulate a philosophically proper perspective in which you are both (1) satisfied that you have lived well so far, but you also (2) possess a desire for the continuance of that life without that desire for continuance being construed as pain or anything that is negative.

I think we've talked about in the past as well that the issue of "variation" in the sense of unlimited time producing no "greater" pleasure, but only variation, does not imply that variation itself is not valuable or desirable. All of us know by experience that variation IS valuable and desirable. So it's not that variation over time isn't desirable, because it is. The point has to be more the philosophical one that variation cannot make "pure pleasure" (in the sense of total absence of pain) "more pure," and variation cannot make "total absence of pain" more "total."

"Life as most everyone lives it is unsatisfactory, filled with misery, pain, unfulfilled desire, etc."

Thanks for that - yes I want to be accurate - and I think your description of the Buddhist position makes it worse from an Epicurean perspective than what i described. They do not offer a positive view of pleasure as the remedy to that problem, but essentially nothingness - the death of desire.

So don't let me go too easy on it!

The remedy to misery, pain, and unfulfilled desire is NOT to end desire, nor to minimize desire, nor to define desire out of existence, or to wish ourselves out of existence. A philosophy which values life, rather than seeks to extinguish it, will seek to intelligently pursue pleasure, which specifically includes those desires for the pleasures of the senses that these other philosophies focus their time on condemning.

I do agree that we don't want to turn this into an expose on Buddhism (we've gone through most of that already) but there's a reason why anyone who seeks to suppress desire and pleaure is relevant, and the issues have to be confronted head-on.

The Discussions focused on Buddhism are here:

Epicurus vs. Buddha and the Buddhists

Including particularly this thread:

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RE: 2022 Epicurus vs Buddhism Compare and Contrast Thread

Of the ancient Indian philosophies of Ājīvika, Ajñana, Buddhism, Chārvāka, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Samkhya, Vaisheshika, Vedanta, and Yoga, we'll find the closest companion to Epicureanism in Chārvāka. Early Buddhism is most closely related to the Indian school of Ajñana, from which Pyrrhonism developed, so, in general, I don't think that comparisons between early Buddhism and Epicurean philosophy are helpful. They are dissimilar and historically unrelated.

In terms of physics, Epicureanism…

Eikadistes

January 27, 2022 at 10:02 PM

Still working on this week's podcast but should have it out shortly.

In the meantime, I think we failed to include (so far) this citation to Virgil which is highly appropriate to a discussion of Epicurus' attitude toward "fate" --

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari

Happy is he who is able to know the causes of things,

And who has trampled beneath his feet all fear,

Inexorable fate, and the din of the devouring underworld

-Publius Vergilius Maro

Thank you for the kind words GnothiSeauton and hope you find it useful!

I suspect there is another analogy to pursue here too:'

The Religionist/ Virtue-ethics / anti-hedonists crowd has an inherent antipathy to pleasure. A major tactic that they use is to narrow the definition of pleasure to focus only the sensual pleasures, which they find easiest to disparage, and so they make arguments that imply that the term "pleasure" consists only of "sex, drugs, and rock'n'roll" which they believe are easily caricatured as leading to disastrous results.

The Buddhists (who are really part of the first crowd but who are more honest about their antipathy to pleasure) do the same thing with desire. Unlike the Stoics and western religions which aren't so willing to come right out and preach "life is suffering," the Buddhist team isn't satisfied with attacking pleasure, they want to attack life itself in the form of the desire to remain living. So they narrow the definition of desire so as to focus only on the desires that are most intoxicating and in many cases impossible, and that allows them to disparage *all* desire and make arguments that imply that the term "desire" consists only of those desires that frequently lead to disastrous results.

So I think that the key to resolution of this seeming paradox is to take a wider view of desire, just like Epicurus takes a wider view of pleasure, and to resist the manipulation of definitions of important terms so that a philosophy based on the desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain becomes impossible.

This is a very interesting discussion. I can't think of a lot more to add at the moment as I type this other than to emphasize that we need to explore it a lot further.

Perhaps too this is a place for discussion of the implication of some of what the Epicureans had to say about divinity. Even if (or especially if!) gods are considered to be thought constructs, what do our expectations of the life of a god tell us about what we should extrapolate to be the best life for ourselves. Would gods have no desires, or simply no "unmeetable" desires, or no lusts that intoxicate them, or what?

I am concerned that we may be mixing our monotheistic modern Judeo-Christian views of omnipotence into thinking that Epicurus would have thought that gods have no desires because they can magically create anything they want. I doubt that is something that Epicurus would have thought, so I think we need to be sure to steer clear of any implication that gos are supernaturally "above" things like desire.

So the germ of a thought here is that perhaps "desire" as a general category is something that is part and parcel of even our best extrapolation of the best life. If so, "desire" as a general category of human activity would by no means be inherently painful either in practice or in theory.

It is certainly tempting to take the position that if you have "desire" then that means you are "lacking" something, and that therefore all "lack" is felt as pain. However the implications of that position seem so far-reachingly negative (or are they?) as to be irreconcilable with Epicurus' approach that continuing to be alive is a fundamentally desirable thing.

But it's a position that we want to argue more confidently than our current discussion seems to allow. And I am not sure there is anything more important in Epicurean theory for us to address than the implications of this question. It wraps up a LOT of issues in a single package.

From the Torquatus section of Book One of On Ends:

(4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

(5) But just as we are elated by the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the memory of former evils; wise men have the delight of renewing in grateful remembrance the blessings of the past. We have the power both to obliterate our misfortunes in an almost perpetual forgetfulness and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories of our successes. But when we fix our mental vision closely on the events of the past, then sorrow or gladness ensues according as these were evil or good.

----

Being elated by the anticipation of something seems to me to be part and parcel of "desiring" it.

Quote from Joshua

What I am suggesting is that 'desire' is a word that we use to describe one particular kind of pain, just as 'headache' is a word used to describe another particular kind of pain.

Yep, I would definitely agree that it can be used that way.

But can it not ALSO be used in a way that is entirely positive and pleasurable, in which the pleasure of anticipation and preparation for the experience are every bit as enjoyable as the experience itself?

I think it can be used both ways. Where I see the Buddhists (or similar viewpoints) at fault is that they presume that the word desire can only be used to describe suffering, because at a very fundamental level they view life as inherently suffering.

Epicurus seems to me to be the opposite. Epicurus views life as inherently pleasurable, and it only ceases to be pleasurable when some specific pain intervenes.

I think Post 8 is the right direction, parsing the exact meaning of the word "desire" and examining the context in which the desire occurs. As with everything else, it's not like there's some ideal form labelled "desire" floating out there in the atmosphere somewhere with a "good" or "bad" label attached to it.

In fact I would ask this:

Is there anything that is ALWAYS Pleasurable except PLEASURE? I would say no.

Is there anything that is ALWAYS painful except PAIN? Again I would say no.

At this very high level it seems to me like *everything* else, including desire, is going to be contextual, and needs to be seen as a tool for achieving pleasure or avoiding pain.

And if that is the case then as Kalosyni says, any particular desire, and in fact desire in general, must be seen as something that has to be judged in context.

And that would also lead to the conclusion that too little desire can be every bit as bad a thing as too much desire.

And that's something that I strongly think is the case, and strongly think is a widespread problem with common modern discussion of Epicurean philosophy.

The tone of many generalist articles on Epicurus on the internet too often rings of suppression of desire that has more akin to Buddhism or Stoicism. It seems to me that what Epicurus taught was to look to what a particular desire brings, rather than viewing desire itself as bad or painful.

Quote from Don

didn't articulate any definitive response

Well I think this and most all other questions get resolved something like this:

1 - Because there are no supernatural forces or absolute forms to tell us otherwise, we've chosen to use the word "pleasure" as the ultimate term to describe all that is desirable in life, including all forms of desirable experience, mental or physical or any other adverb or adjective anyone would like to apply as a qualifier. The single word "Pleasure" includes them all.

2 - We should desire to continue to live so long was we can reasonably expect that the pleasurable experiences in our life will outweigh the experiences that are non-pleasurable (which means painful). This "calculation" is a totally subjective judgment in our own minds. We can make general statements about the way most people tend to think (most people tend to like vanilla ice cream) but no one has supernatural or absolute "moral" authority to make decisions for any other adult.

3 - You can argue about children and other edge cases but we're talking about adult responsible people in this analysis. That's why it is also important to acknowledge that from the Epicurean perspective all actions are not deterministic, and that it is proper for us to praise some things and blame others. You also have to consider the rules of society here, and what is illegal and legal, but no one should confuse the standard of "what society says is ok" with a standard of "right vs. wrong."

4 - Hard questions exist, such as cases where (1) we might choose not to intervene to save their lives, but if we did so we wouldn't forgive ourselves and thereafter suffer overriding mental pain, or (2) we face incurable highly painful disease or even pain from old age, or (3) any similar extreme situation where the outcomes are beyond our control, and the only option we have to stay alive would entail mental or physical torture that we don't think we could endure.

4 - In my view it seems pretty clear that the only way to make decision in cases such as listed in (3) is for we ourselves to make our best estimate of all of the consequences that each choice entails. Then we ourselves have to decide whether any future pleasures (of any kind) we might experience would be worth the expected pains (of any kind) that would come from our choice of action. There are no supernatural gods, no future reward or punishment, and no absolute rules which tell us what to decide - we have to make that decision ourselves.

I think that's the general rule Epicurus is setting out, and that's why alarm bells start going off in my mind whenever I hear anyone emphasize "tranquility" or "simple pleasures" --- or emphasize the reverse, "excitement" or "luxuries" -- that would override the general rule.

The general rule has to be clear or else there's no way to avoid confusion when we actually have to make these kinds of decisions.

Never heard of Artemus Ward - thank you - interesting story! Challenging time to have specialized in comedy!

As an aside I think it's a useful technique for learning Epicurean philosophy to offset against each other two or more reliable citations that on the surface seem to conflict with each other, and then explain how they can be reconciled.

Lots of issues can be addressed that way.

Good points Don. And I think this begins the trip toward asking "under what circumstances -if any - do mental or emotional concerns (pains) outweigh what some would focus on the "simple pleasures that are almost always available to us."?

That's the challenge to articulate, I think, because while the wise man will (almost?) always have more reason for joy than for vacation, we will also sometimes die for a friend.

Reconciling those perspectives is doable I think but requires articulation as I think the question bothers significant numbers of people.

It would be highly interesting to read something in depth on Twain's ultimate religious views. There's clearly very much in his viewpoint and manner of expression that is Epicurean - adjacent.

And yet there seems to have been a failure to take a few steps further that would have made him more consistent from an Epicurean point of view. I don't know why he failed to go a little further and it would be an interesting study to explore why. As an example maybe in the end he saw himself more as an "entertainer" than a real "social reformer" or "phllosopher." I haven't read nearly enough of his overall work to have a basis for a firm opinion.

This subject came up briefly in the Wednesday Zoom last night and I could not even remember the name of the book or work by Twain that we discussed some time ago as being arguably Epicurean-adjacent, and Joshua was awol ( ) and could not remind me!

So here it is -- something that would definitely fit into a discussion of this topic -- What Is Man?

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RE: Episode 210 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 17 - Self-Approval As Pleasure

This episode will be released later this afternoon. In the meantime, one of the topics we discussed was the issue of "self-approval" as discussed by Mark Twain in his essay "What Is Man?"

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/70/70-h/70-h.htm

Cassius

January 20, 2024 at 1:21 PM

Definitely questions of what is actually "Epicurean-adjacent" vs "the camel of virulent anti-Epicureanism has his nose under the tent" are always of interest.

We had several good conversations in our Wednesday night Zoom tonight, and one of them stemmed from a nearby discussion started by Kalosyni:

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RE: Why Minimizing All Desire Is Incorrect (And What To Do Instead)

Yes Joshua has in my mind quoted the best citation that can be raised in support of the proposition that all desires should be limited: ""If you wish," said he, "to make Pythocles rich, do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

And you can add in the statement about how when we are in no pain we have no need of pleasure.



BUT in response to those there are very many good arguments that those statements are contextual, and that life and pleasure are desirable, and those…

Cassius

December 4, 2024 at 7:52 PM

Rather than add this question to that thread, however, I think it's useful to consider this question separately because it does not just relate to natural vs necessary desires, it also requires us to consider explicitly the relationship between "mental" desires vs. "purely physical" desires.

(The state motto of New Hampshire, for those who aren't from the USA, is "Live Free or Die." )

How would Epicurus advise someone who was confronted with the choice that is contained in that slogan?

Let me say at the outset that I think a proper analysis of this question will consider the relationship between "physical" pleasures and "mental" pleasures. That's the way this relates to the "simple pleasures" question.

Some people will point out that it is very easy to obtain the natural and necessary "purely physical" desires which keep us alive, so we should not be concerned with "psychological desires" such as "being free,"

This is not an easy distinction to articulate, but one text that is potentially related is referenced by Torquatus in On Ends:

Quote from On Ends

XVII. The doctrine thus firmly established has corollaries which I will briefly expound.

(1)The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain.

(2) Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and therefore I allow your contention that any Epicureans who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and I am aware that many do, though not those who can speak with authority); but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations.

So with that as background, the question for discussion is: "How Would Epicurus Analyze The Slogan "Live Free Or Die"?" as an ethical guide?

Yes Joshua has in my mind quoted the best citation that can be raised in support of the proposition that all desires should be limited: ""If you wish," said he, "to make Pythocles rich, do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

And you can add in the statement about how when we are in no pain we have no need of pleasure.

BUT in response to those there are very many good arguments that those statements are contextual, and that life and pleasure are desirable, and those those general principles override the contextual instances in which impossible desires necessarily lead to more pain than pleasure.

This is an excellent discussion to pursue in great detail.

Quote from Matteng

Yes the natural / necessary desires are of the highest value.

Depending on the contextual meaning assigned to the word "value," I don't think that can be sustained as a foundational Epicurean rule.

Yes you need them to live, but that does not mean necessarily that they are "most pleasant." Epicurus clearly states in his letter that the wise man is not going to seek the longest life, but the most pleasant.

And he also states that sometimes we will choose to die, as for a friend, or when we are sure that the pain of our future life will make living on not worthwhile in terms of pleasure.

So I think more work needs to be done on stating that most accurately in Epicurean terms.

Quote from Patrikios

Also, the stark finality of death described in points 8-10, while generally aligned with Epicurean thought, might be slightly oversimplified.

That's an interesting observation - I wonder what kind of nuance on "stark finality" the chatbot thinks exists?

Like I said I am a great fan of Mark Twain, but as I look back again I read that section as even more off the mark:

....and the presence of a deep content and unbroken satisfaction in that hundred million years of holiday which I look back upon with a tender longing and with a grateful desire to resume, when the opportunity comes

You don't read that as implying both (1) some kind of awareness and contentedness while being dead, and (2) the desire to resume that experience (of death) later when he dies?

While it's clear that Epicurus doesn't hold there to be any pain in death, nor is there any kind of pleasure whatsoever in death, and death is not a thing to be welcomed, except when one faces pain for which there is no other remedy.

Do you see that differently?

I agree that there is some echoing of taking a devil-may-care attitude toward death that is consistent with Epicurus, but doesn't this cross a line and imply or in fact flatly express that death should flatly be viewed as a desirable experience?

"....when the opportunity comes"?

Welcome GnothiSeauton!