Posts by Cassius

This is probably too deep in the weeds to be of immediate use, but since I found it, here is a philosophy professor's attack on a book which is apparently well-thought-of by the website that published the attack on Epicurus:

https://fitelson.org/dembski.pdf

What is of immediate relevance is being articulate with the allegation that Epicurus' views of the nature of the universe have been refuted by modern physics and no longer serve as a sound basis for arguing against intelligent design.

We ought to be able to state Epicurus' position clearly and show that it is neither refuted nor no longer relevant to the "creationist" argument.

And in that respect I think the monkeys and typewriters will serve to illustrate the proper (and improper) way of looking at "randomness" as an aspect of Epicurean physics.

Quote

But new discoveries seem to have finished what the Big Bang theory started. It is becoming increasingly undeniable that the building blocks of life are far too unlikely to emerge by chance even in a universe as large and old as ours.

For a long time, Epicurus’ version of the universe seemed probable to many. After natural philosophers realized how vast the universe really was, and again after the existence of atoms was confirmed, Epicurus seemed to be vindicated. But now, we have discovered that however vast the universe may be, it is finite, and its size does not hold a candle to the vast improbability of the miracle that is life. After more than 2,000 years, the original foundation of materialist naturalism in Western thought seems to be crumbling. The question is: how long will it take for the worldview built on that foundation to crumble too?

So what IS this guy's point? Is he arguing for intelligent design? A quick scan of the website "about" section does not make clear the site's orientation.

OK I guess the site does contain clues:

This link originally came up through a Google search, so that's how I found it.

Quote from TauPhi

In our universe we don't have infinity of possible creations. As far as matter is concerned, the variety of atoms is strictly limited by universal laws governing the universe. Since we have limited building blocks types and constrains in the form of universal laws which have to be obeyed, the universe is not a place where anything goes.

I think that is an excellent point and it is where I (intuitively) think Epicurus is coming from.

In addition, we have no reason to think, and therefore we should not think, that there are "other universes" in which there are an infinitely larger number of infinite types of atoms that do in fact create an "anything goes" environment.

I *think* that takes us back to the article, and what I perceive to be a point of the article, which I read as asserting that Epicurus was advocating for an "anything goes" universe, when in fact he was not.

Now maybe this sentence does not say that .....

"Since the universe is infinite, there are enough opportunities for every possible arrangement of atoms to occur eventually, even the most unlikely. Our world, and the life on it, is one of those unlikely (but eventually inevitable) arrangements."

.. but I would say it comes awfully close to saying that, and that it would be better to be clear that Epicurus's argument against intelligent design does not end up being an "anything goes" universe.

One of the sections of the letter to Herodotus that has always seemed to me of closest relevance to issues like this is the following (Bailey translation). I've highlighted a couple of phrases that seem particularly of note.

[74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

[75] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others. And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men’s natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.

[76] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

[77] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements. But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men’s souls. Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

(This last highlighted section being referenced, if I recall correctly from the AA Long article on Chance and Natural law, as indicating that as to non-intelligent beings there is in fact a major aspect of necessity/determinism, in that the atoms can only combine in ways that are consistent with their natures, and that while there are an infinite NUMBER of atoms, there are not infinite TYPES of atoms, but in fact a limited number of types, as indicated in the first highlighted area.)

Ok Joshua and others, we now have an intersection of two discussions: (1) On the Nature of the Gods, and (2) The Monkey Typewriter Theorem! We'll work to answer this by next Sunday!

Quote from Wikipedia

One of the earliest instances of the use of the "monkey metaphor" is that of French mathematician Émile Borel in 1913,^[1] but the first instance may have been even earlier. Jorge Luis Borges traced the history of this idea from Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption and Cicero's De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), through Blaise Pascal and Jonathan Swift, up to modern statements with their iconic simians and typewriters.^[2] In the early 20th century, Borel and Arthur Eddington used the theorem to illustrate the timescales implicit in the foundations of statistical mechanics.

Looks to me like we're making good progress and will be able to unwind this question here:

Post

RE: New Article Attacking Epicurean Physics: "Science Versus the Oldest Anti-Intelligent Design Argument "

[…]



So what IS this guy's point? Is he arguing for intelligent design? A quick scan of the website "about" section does not make clear the site's orientation.



OK I guess the site does contain clues:





This link originally came up through a Google search, so that's how I found it.

Cassius

May 13, 2024 at 4:14 PM

Welcome to Episode 229 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which is often not the same as presented by many modern commentators. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and one of the best places to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here. The text which we include in these posts is the Yonge version, the full version of which is here at Epicureanfriends. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of Velleius' arguments against the existence of supernatural gods will be here.

Today's Text

These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why did he annex a mind to water?

It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?

Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to mortality?

XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it.

Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.

Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world?

Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.

Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place.

Quote from Martin

The formation of life on Earth had similar odds.

Since we're setting up all sorts of good questions to ask, I am not sure that I would intuitively agree with this either. The whole idea that the universe consists of "truly random" events seems to me to be very questionable, and that the better alternative view is (as I interpret Epicurus, maybe incorrectly) that the world is the result of natural un-designed combinations of atoms with fixed natures (suitable seeds) (but not truly "random" in the sense of all combinations being possible) which therefore limits the possibilities and disposes toward some results more than others.

Given that life exists on Earth, we know that the possible combinations leading to life are non-zero (out of "nine" planets, in fact, one has life). So I would think that the "chances" of repetition of things that we know to exist is far greater than the chance of occurrence of things that we intuitively grasp have never existed in our experience (monkeys have never in our past duplicated Shakespeare).

I'll be the first to admit that these questions are not easy to answer, but almost certainly they were grappled with by the ancient Epicureans, so we should grapple with them too.

....And after reading those articles I am as confused as ever! It appears that the assumptions involved in the words setting up the sentence are going to determine the "answer."

Here's one:

Infinite monkey theorem in popular culture - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

More to the point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_monkey_theorem

Ok that's a great way at getting at the question. If I need to revise the statement then I certainly will -- have you seen a discussion of this issue that explains the background?

My first reaction to this new article is that the view ascribed to Epicurus ("Since the universe is infinite, there are enough opportunities for every possible arrangement of atoms to occur eventually, even the most unlikely. Our world, and the life on it, is one of those unlikely (but eventually inevitable) arrangements.") is not what Epicurus really said. That quoted sentence does include the word "possible," but I don't gather that he is using "possible" in the same way as did Epicurus or Lucretius.

While the lead-in that there was no intelligent design for the entire universe is certainly true, it appears to me that this is going to be one of those examples of not scrutinizing the meaning of "random" closely enough, and winding up with an "anything is possible given enough time and space" which is not what Epicurus or Lucretius said.

Rather, as Lucretius said, "[62] When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion, who showed her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of gods nor thunderbolts nor heaven with threatening roar could quell: they only chafed the more the eager courage of his soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast bars of nature’s portals. Therefore the living force of his soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming walls of the world and traversed throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable universe; whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into being; in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary mark."

So as I understand this issue in Epicurean terms, certain things are possible, and others are impossible, no matter how much time or space are involved. Donating an infinitely large number of typewriters to an infinitely large number monkeys for an infinite time will NEVER produce the complete works of Shakespeare.

Probably lots to discuss here over time - this writer is far to eager to "bench" Epicurus.

Science Versus the Oldest Anti-Design Argument | Evolution News

Translation: Everything that exists was made not by intelligent design, but rather by the random arrangement and rearrangement of atoms.

evolutionnews.org

While I don't know that this article addresses the question directly, my go-to article on chance and randomness in Epicurean theory is:

File

Long: "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism"

Long: "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism"

Cassius

June 28, 2019 at 8:52 AM

And this quote below (as well as the title "Science" vs.....) is why I reject the blanket benediction of the word "science" (without reference to the specific who and how and why and explanation of the "science") as well as the idea that the "big bang" answers anything. As Epicurus asked his teachers, What existed before the "big bang? Where did the big bang come from? And what about the space beyond that which is currently observeable?"

Quote from "A Crumbling Foundation" (?)

But the old fallback is not as reliable as it once seemed. The first crack was the discovery of cosmic expansion, just a few decades after Darwin proposed his theory. After more than two thousand years of Epicurean influence, and contrary to the assurances of mainstream physicists at the time, it turned out that the universe was not eternal, and probably not infinite. That meant it was no longer a given that any improbability could be explained by the sheer size and age of the universe.

I'm now getting concerned that Don won't live long enough to see the Moon and/or Mars colonized, so I better keep up my posts in this forum so that we keep track of the technology and coax it along!

I don't want that last comment of mine to sound snippy. I got interrupted in writing it and meant to add reference to the fact that this issue happens over and over and as much in the ethics and canonics as in the physics. Epicurus' enemies were only too happy to take his comments out of context and make them appear ridiculous, so we always need to be on the lookout for alternate explanations of things that appear incorrect, to see if the error is really in Epicurus or in the interpretation.

Sometimes of course Epicurus is definitely wrong, but generally any errors are in precise application due to lack of information and technology, while the general reasoning behind the scenes is (and remains) valid.

Episode 228 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available, with Velleius asking: "What Woke The Gods To Create The World?"

Quote from waterholic

It shouldn't be hard to accept that in an otherwise remarkable body of knowledge there are mistakes and misunderstandings

Nor is it appropriate to accept from unfriendly sources an interpretation that makes an opinion appear erroneous when an alternate interpretation from friendly sources which makes the interpretation accurate is available.

Mentioned by Joshua (quoting Greenblatt) as Lucretian-inspired in this week's episode:

Primavera (Botticelli) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Right - by no means are we special. We are on the same continuum as the worms and as the gods, and though we naturally aspire to live as long as we can live pleasurably, and we hope the same for future generations, we don't control the universe and events that are unforeseen or out of our control definitely take place. What I think you're talking about is in my mind mainly a tone issue and I agree with your perspective that let's call it "human exceptionaiism" is not at all valid. That said, under just about every theory of the gods that we accept to be valid, our goal should be to dodge every last one of those meteorites for as long as we can do so pleasurably.

But since we are good Epicureans, we think along the line of Epicurus in providing for the school and for Metrodorus' children after his death, and of Diogenes of Oinoanda in instructing future generations currently unborn, right?

Fr. 3
[And I wanted to refute those who accuse natural science of being unable to be of any benefit to us.] In this way, [citizens], even though I am not engaging in public affairs, I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, and in an endeavour to prove that what benefits our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.
And so, having described the second reason for the inscription, I now go on to mention my mission and to explain its character and nature.
Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep) moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.

Quote from Twentier

Possible: that which is consistent with our senses.

Impossible: that which contradicts our senses.

But is that sufficient to deal with matters which we at any particular point we have not seen in the past, but which do not contradict the physics of what we have seen in the past, such as men flying? How do we know the limits of physics in situations that have not been tested?

Branching off from here, it would be productive to discuss the question, from Epicurus' point of view,*** what determines the possible and the impossible? What distinguishes between the two?

To get the discussion started I would suggest that the *only* thing that distinguishes the possible from the impossible is the properties and combinations of matter and void, and that there are no (1) divine / supernatural, or (2) purely logical, limits between the possible and the impossible.

Agree? Disagree? More to the story? If so, what?

And of course what I hear in the back of my mind in this question is Paul accusing the "pagans" of being "slaves to the weak and beggarly elements."

That's a derogatory way of stating it, but in fact do not the elemental particles and their combinations, and the elemental particles alone (which includes all the circumstances in which they may combine) determine what is possible?

---

*** Epicurus' point of view being the appropriate starting point here on the forum, rather than necessarily the end, of the discussion.