Posts by Cassius

Although this book is written from a Stoic perspective, it is so representative of the dominant Stoic-infused modern view of Epicurus that we may want to review it at least briefly next on the podcast, after we complete "On The Nature of the Gods." It contains a lot of commentary on Epicurean philosophy in the form of referencing "pleasure," which we can productively use to unravel where Seneca might be accurate from the larger sections where is is probably inaccurate in his characterization of Epicurus.

I plan to make some notes as I review this and wanted to start with two explicit mentions of Epicurus. I am underlining the parts I would challenge. The quote below from from the Gutenberg edition, translated by Sir Roger L'Estrange.

In this first excerpt from Chapter XV, I submit we see illustrated a strong example of Seneca turning Epicurus into a Stoic. There are no known examples of actual Epicureans construing pleasure in real life following this ascetic model (eating only for hunger, drinking only when thirsty, seeking the end of eating and drinking as "satiety," or categorizing all non-ascetic pleasures as "an evil cause" or lumping them into terms like "sloth, gluttony, and lust." Nor would I submit that the ancient Epicureans would ever have admitted that a proper interpretation of Epicurus makes him appear to be "in womanish dress."

Quote from From Chapter XV

225 - "Happy is that man that eats only for hunger, and drinks only for thirst; that stands upon his own legs, and lives by reason, not by example; and provides for use and necessity, not for ostentation and pomp! Let us curb our appetites, encourage virtue, and rather be beholden to ourselves for riches than to Fortune, who when a man draws himself into a narrow compass, has the least mark at him. Let my bed be plain and clean, and my clothes so too: my meat without much expense, or many waiters, and neither a burden to my purse nor to my body, not to go out the same way it came in. That which is too little for luxury, is abundantly enough for nature. The end of eating and drinking is satiety; now, what matters it though one eats and drinks more, and another less, so long as the one is not a-hungry, nor the other athirst? Epicurus, who limits pleasure to nature, as the Stoics do virtue, is undoubtedly in the right; and those that cite him to authorize their voluptuousness do exceedingly mistake him, and only seek a good authority for an evil cause: for their pleasures of sloth, gluttony, and lust, have no affinity at all with his precepts or meaning. It is true, that at first sight his philosophy seems effeminate; but he that looks nearer him will find him to be a very brave man only in a womanish dress."

In this second excerpt specifically mentioning Epicurus, from Chapter XVI, the underlined par (at least as translated "the wise man will bear all injuries) sounds like an almost Jesus-like "turn the other cheek" directive. Instead, it's much more likely to be a reference to PDO4, which is not an excuse for "bearing" all injuries and doing nothing about them, but a statement that pain is short if intense, manageable if long, and always ultimately escapable if truly intolerable. Most of this is Seneca just being a normal Stoic and posturing that virtue allows someone to rise above whatever may happen to him, but his reference to Epicurus obscures what it is that Epicurus is talking about.

Quote from From Chapter XVI

Epicurus will have it, that a wise man will bear all injuries; but the Stoics will not allow those things to be injuries which Epicurus calls so. Now, betwixt these two, there is the same difference that we find betwixt two gladiators; the one receives wounds, but yet maintains his ground, the other tells the people, when he is in blood, that it is but a scratch, and will not suffer anybody to part them. An injury cannot be received, but it must be done; but it may be done and yet not received; as a man may be in the water, and not swim, but if he swims, it is presumed that he is in the water. Or if a blow or a shot be levelled at us, it may so happen that a man may miss his aim, or some accident interpose that may divert the mischief. That which is hurt is passive, and inferior to that which hurts it. But you will say, that Socrates was condemned and put to death, and so received an injury; but I answer, that the tyrants did him an injury, and yet he received none. He 236 that steals anything from me and hides it in my own house, though I have not lost it, yet he has stolen it. He that lies with his own wife, and takes her for another woman, though the woman be honest, the man is an adulterer. Suppose a man gives me a draught of poison and it proves not strong enough to kill me, his guilt is nevertheless for the disappointment. He that makes a pass at me is as much a murderer, though I put it by, as if he had struck me to the heart. It is the intention, not the effect, that makes the wickedness. He is a thief that has the will of killing and slaying, before his hand is dipt in blood; as it is sacrilege, the very intention of laying violent hands upon holy things. If a philosopher be exposed to torments, the ax over his head, his body wounded, his guts in his hands, I will allow him to groan; for virtue itself cannot divest him of the nature of a man; but if his mind stand firm, he has discharged his part. A great mind enables a man to maintain his station with honor; so that he only makes use of what he meets in his way, as a pilgrim that would fain be at his journey’s end.

Again, these are just a couple of instances where Epicurus is mentioned directly. There's a lot more to say about this book and how it contributes to making Epicurean philosophy almost unrecognizable, and how Seneca's version of Epicurus is unfortunately what prevails today.

I was reorganizing the forum dedicated to comparing Epicurus to non-Epicurean philosophers, and in doing so I assigned names of the respective major players in each group to the title of the forum. For example, I added the name Aristippus to what was formerly the "Epicurus vs Cyreniacs" forum.

When I came to "Scientism" I did not find a suitable name to associate with the term, as it seems to be a largely negative term that few people seemingly would want to identify with. However the following sections of the Wikipedia article as of today (7/20/24) contains some good information about what the controversy is about, so it seems worth memorializing it here in case it were to be for some reason unavailable later:

Scientism

Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.^[1][2]

While the term was defined originally to mean "methods and attitudes typical of or attributed to natural scientists", some scholars, as well as political and religious leaders, have also adopted it as a pejorative term with the meaning "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)".^[2][3]

Overview

Francis Bacon has been viewed by some scholars as an early proponent of scientism,^[4] but this is a modern assertion as Bacon was a devout Anglican, writing in his Essays, "a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."^[5]

With respect to the philosophy of science, the term scientism frequently implies a critique of the more extreme expressions of logical positivism^[6][7] and has been used by social scientists such as Friedrich Hayek,^[8] philosophers of science such as Karl Popper,^[9] and philosophers such as Mary Midgley,^[10] the later Hilary Putnam,^[10][11] and Tzvetan Todorov^[12] to describe (for example) the dogmatic endorsement of scientific methods and the reduction of all knowledge to only that which is measured or confirmatory.^[13]

More generally, scientism is often interpreted as science applied "in excess". This use of the term scientism has two senses:

• The improper use of science or scientific claims.^[14] This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply,^[15] such as when the topic is perceived as beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to the claims of scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. This can be a counterargument to appeals to scientific authority. It can also address attempts to apply natural science methods and claims of certainty to the social sciences, which Friedrich Hayek described in The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) as being impossible, because those methods attempt to eliminate the "human factor", while social sciences (including his own topic of economics) mainly concern the study of human action.
• "The belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry",^[16] or that "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective"^[11] with a concomitant "elimination of the psychological [and spiritual] dimensions of experience".^[17][18] Tom Sorell provides this definition: "Scientism is a matter of putting too high a value on natural science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture."^[19] Philosophers such as Alexander Rosenberg have also adopted "scientism" as a name for the opinion that science is the only reliable source of knowledge.^[20]

It is also sometimes used to describe the universal applicability of the scientific method, and the opinion that empirical science constitutes the most authoritative worldview or the most valuable part of human learning, sometimes to the complete exclusion of other opinions, such as historical, philosophical, economic or cultural opinions. It has been defined as "the view that the characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences are the only source of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they alone can yield true knowledge about man and society".^[21] The term scientism is also used by historians, philosophers, and cultural critics to highlight the possible dangers of lapses towards excessive reductionism with respect to all topics of human knowledge.^{[22][23][24][25][26]}

For social theorists practising the tradition of Max Weber, such as Jürgen Habermas and Max Horkheimer, the concept of scientism relates significantly to the philosophy of positivism, but also to the cultural rationalization for modern Western civilization.^[13][27] Ernesto Sabato, physicist and essayist, wrote in his 1951 essay Hombres y engranajes ("Man and mechanism") of the "superstition of science" as the most contradictory of all superstitions,^[28] since this would be the "superstition that one should not be superstitious". He wrote: "science had become a new magic and the man in the street believed in it the more the less he understood it".^[28]

Definitions

Reviewing the references to scientism in the works of contemporary scholars in 2003, Gregory R. Peterson^[29] detected two main general themes:

• It is used to criticize a totalizing opinion of science as if it were capable of describing all reality and knowledge, or as if it were the only true method to acquire knowledge about reality and the nature of things;
• It is used, often pejoratively,^[30][31][32] to denote violations by which the theories and methods of one (scientific) discipline are applied inappropriately to another (scientific or non-scientific) discipline and its domain. An example of this second usage is to term as scientism any attempt to claim science as the only or primary source of human values (a traditional domain of ethics) or as the source of meaning and purpose (a traditional domain of religion and related worldviews).

The term scientism was popularized by F. A. Hayek, who defined it in 1942 as the "slavish imitation of the method and language of Science".^[33]

Mathematician Alexander Grothendieck, in his 1971 essay "The New Universal Church", characterized scientism as a religion-like ideology that advocates scientific reductionism, scientific authoritarianism, political technocracy and technological salvation, while denying the epistemological validity of feelings and experiences such as love, emotion, beauty and fulfillment.^[34] He predicted that "in coming years, the chief political dividing line will fall less and less among the traditional division between 'right' and 'left', but increasingly between the adherents of scientism, who advocate 'technological progress at any price', and their opponents, i.e., roughly speaking, those who regard the enhancement of life, in all its richness and variety, as being the supreme value".^[34]

E. F. Schumacher, in his A Guide for the Perplexed (1977), criticized scientism as an impoverished world view confined solely to what can be counted, measured and weighed. "The architects of the modern worldview, notably Galileo and Descartes, assumed that those things that could be weighed, measured, and counted were more true than those that could not be quantified. If it couldn't be counted, in other words, it didn't count."^[35]

In 1979, Karl Popper defined scientism as "the aping of what is widely mistaken for the method of science".^[36]

In 2003, Mikael Stenmark proposed the expression scientific expansionism as a synonym of scientism.^[37] In the Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, he wrote that, while the doctrines that are described as scientism have many possible forms and varying degrees of ambition, they share the idea that the boundaries of science (that is, typically the natural sciences) could and should be expanded so that something that has not been previously considered as a subject pertinent to science can now be understood as part of science (usually with science becoming the sole or the main arbiter regarding this area or dimension).^[37] According to Stenmark, the strongest form of scientism states that science does not have any boundaries and that all human problems and all aspects of human endeavor, with due time, will be dealt with and solved by science alone.^[37] This idea has also been termed the myth of progress.^[38]

Intellectual historian T. J. Jackson Lears argued in 2013 that there has been a recent reemergence of "nineteenth-century positivist faith that a reified 'science' has discovered (or is about to discover) all the important truths about human life. Precise measurement and rigorous calculation, in this view, are the basis for finally settling enduring metaphysical and moral controversies." Lears specifically identified Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker's work as falling in this category.^[39] Philosophers John N. Gray and Thomas Nagel have made similar criticisms against popular works by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, atheist author Sam Harris, and writer Malcolm Gladwell.^[40][41][42]

Welcome to Episode 238 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," where the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defends the Epicurean point of view. Last week we left off right at the very end of section 19, and we will pick up there and continue into section 20.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus ἰσονομία; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.

XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment.

The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?

Hence first arose your Εἱμαρμένη, as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? Then follows your μαντικὴ, in Latin called divinatio, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.

Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.

Happy Birthday Charles ! We've missed you - hope you are doing well!

Happy Birthday to Charles! Learn more about Charles and say happy birthday on Charles's timeline: Charles

Thank you Bryan!

And in regard to Kalosyni's

Quote from Kalosyni

Just thinking about practical applications.

I have two comments at the moment:

1 - ALL of these discussions lead to practical conclusions!

and

2 - Since you asked for it, I will raise the stakes:

- Is it not possible that Epicurus was considering his "infinity of mortals is matched by an infinity of non-mortals" (to the extent that is a satisfactory translation) as relevant to comparison of pleasures?

In other words, if all things that exist have an infinite number of counterparts, and infinity of x is the same number as an infinity of y -- does that not have relevance to consideration of "complete" or "pure" pleasure, in the sense that an infinity of the pleasure of eating watermelon is the equilvant of an infinity of being King of Persia.

PD09 relevant here perhaps?

These are quick rough thoughts that will need a lot of sharpening, but in the end I will be surprised if there is NOT an implication of the principles of infinity to the principles of pleasure.

Might this not partially explain why it would be so clear to Epicurus that "total absence of pain" equals "the highest pleasure"?

Thank you Don! That will give us a foundation for dealing with the Latin references, because just the differences between Yonge and Rackham we've seen already indicate that there's a lot of speculation going on about the implications.

The whole issue of limits and absence of limits seems fundamental to everything and carry over from physics to ethics and probably to canonics as well. I would think that Lucretius and people writing in the Latin period understood what was going on and are largely reliable, but the further away we get from people who had access to the wider set of texts the less I would trust the translations.

This is going to feed also into the differences in the way "ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeat," is viewed by Rackham as "match and counterpart," vs. Yonge's "everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part."

And on the issue of whether infinity leads to an infinite number of identical things, or simply an infinite number of "like" things, we'll need to scrutinize the words referencing the concept of "like" and "unlike."

Ok this one is up. Note that we recorded this Sunday morning, before many of our recent conversations on isonomia and infinity, but I think the result is pretty current with recent postings.

Episode 237 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we explore isonomia and the implications of infinity!

OK maybe I misinterpreted your post above -- I was thinking you meant that the Epicureans did not think that there was no limit to the amount of distance you could travel in any direction.

These would be the key sections from Lucretius (Bailey Edition) supporting the conventional view that Epicurus held that the universe is limitless in size in all directions.

[951] But since I have taught that the most solid bodies of matter fly about for ever unvanquished through the ages, come now, let us unfold, whether there be a certain limit to their full sum or not; and likewise the void that we have discovered, or room or space, in which all things are carried on, let us see clearly whether it is all altogether bounded or spreads out limitless and immeasurably deep.

[958] The whole universe then is bounded in no direction of its ways; for then it would be bound to have an extreme point. Now it is seen that nothing can have an extreme point, unless there be something beyond to bound it, so that there is seen to be a spot further than which the nature of our sense cannot follow it. As it is, since we must admit that there is nothing outside the whole sum, it has not an extreme point, it lacks therefore bound and limit. Nor does it matter in which quarter of it you take your stand; so true is it that, whatever place every man takes up, he leaves the whole boundless just as much on every side.

[968] Moreover, suppose now that all space were created finite, if one were to run on to the end, to its furthest coasts, and throw a flying dart, would you have it that that dart, hurled with might and main, goes on whither it is sped and flies afar, or do you think that something can check and bar its way? For one or the other you must needs admit and choose. Yet both shut off your escape and constrain you to grant that the universe spreads out free from limit. For whether there is something to check it and bring it about that it arrives not whither it was sped, nor plants itself in the goal, or whether it fares forward, it set not forth from the end. In this way I will press on, and wherever you shall set the furthest coasts, I shall ask what then becomes of the dart. It will come to pass that nowhere can a bound be set and room for flight ever prolongs the chance of flight. Lastly, before our eyes one thing is seen to bound another; air is as a wall between the hills, and mountains between tracts of air, land bounds the sea, and again sea bounds all lands; yet the universe in truth there is nothing to limit outside.

[984] Moreover, if all the space in the whole universe were shut in on all sides, and were created with borders determined, and had been bounded, then the store of matter would have flowed together with solid weight from all sides to the bottom, nor could anything be carried on beneath the canopy of the sky, nor would there be sky at all, nor the light of the sun, since in truth all matter would lie idle piled together by sinking down from limitless time. But as it is, no rest, we may be sure, has been granted to the bodies of the first-beginnings, because there is no bottom at all, whither they may, as it were, flow together, and make their resting-place. All things are for ever carried on in ceaseless movement from all sides, and bodies of matter, are even stirred up and supplied from beneath out of limitless space.

*Loeb here has* [998] Lastly, one thing is seen before our eyes to be the limit of another; air separates hills and mountains air, earth bounds sea and contrariwise the sea is the boundary of all lands; the universe, however, has nothing outside to be its limit.

I need to know exactly what Aristotle said, but I could see Epicurus agreeing that the 'concept of infinity" is a mental construct only, while at the same time holding that the number of atoms actually existing is uncountable and extends without limit or boundary out into space "forever."

I see the javelin example as highly useful - it illustrates that the limit is in US, not in the reality of space or atoms, because "if we could live forever" we could go on throwing the javelin outward, and counting atoms, forever and ever.

I am not sure you can square that with the "javelin" example in Lucretius, Don. Can you?

Editing is coming along -- this should be out no later than tomorrow - hopefully sooner.

In the meantime, this part of section 19 (book one) is clearly one of the sections that is most critical - here is the Rackham version, with the focus on "that in the sum of things everything has it's exact match and counterpart."

Here is Rackham's Latin:

It looks to me like that is a rendering of a section of "ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeat," so Rackham's "match and counterpart" is as open to question as is Yonge's "everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part." In this instance Yonge's "answering" may be a better rendering of "respondeant" than Rackham's "exact match or counterpart." The decision we make on what words to use is going to greatly influence one's conclusion on what is being said. What would seem most likely for an Epicurean to be thinking in terms of "answering" or "corresponding?" We know the basics of Epicurean physics and canonics which cannot be violated in answering the question, so what are the possibilities?

This is a line at which we'll want to train our best big guns of Latin translation expertise!

All of the perspectives you've expressed in the last several messages Tau Phi, are fine if they work for you, but as you say and know - they are not Epicurean perspectives. Would that the world were filled with people like you, but it's not. It's filled with "lost" people who are in the grip of supernatural religion, and unable to think their own way out of it, just like they were in the time of Lucretius and the time of Diogenes of Oinoanda, not to mention the time of Epicurus.

Epicurean philosophy was then, and can be today, an organized method of bringing answers to such people. If there are individuals like you who don't need its help, and can do it on your own, then that's all to the better for you, but it does nothing for the large numbers of the "hearts in darkness" that Lucretius was talking about in his poem.

Not everyone has to participate in the kind of organized activity that the ancient Epicureans were engaged in, but at the same time, if some don't, then the same patterns of deception and manipulation will go on and on and on and never be challenged. Maybe you see it differently, but to me it is in the nature of things that lone individuals, especially lone individuals who focus on retreating into their own gardens, can do little or nothing to change that situation. And of course I'm not at all referring to you as retreating into your own garden, but referring to the allusion often applied to the ancient Epicureans, which I will never admit to be true. The ancient Epicureans were part of an organized campaign, not lone rangers.

That's the value Epicurus saw in putting together a team and a community, and the same thing holds true today. People have to work together to accomplish anything, and to accomplish things they have to be aware of the situation around them. Again, I would wish that the world were full of Tau Phi's, but there are far too few of them. The great majority fit the description of the people Diogenes of Oinoanda referenced on his wall. They won't and can't think through a system of philosophy for themselves, and they will forever be at the mercy of the organized manipulators if those who know better don't step up to help them.

i guess we'll just have to agree to disagree on our assessment of the general situation and how to deal with it. No one is ever going to force you to accept any position of Epicurus with which you don't agree, but just like in the ancient world the teachings of Epicurus formed the basis of the "movement," and that's where this forum and our organized activities needs to remain focused.

Quote from TauPhi

As of now, infinity of the universe (among other infinities) is neither obvious nor easy to understand (or prove) to humanity.

Probably they were neither obvious or easy in the ancient world either, and that was a large part of the undertaking of studying and applying Epicurean philosophy. I don't recall Epicurus or Lucretius of Diogenes of Oinoanda implying that the philosophy was easy -- the closest I recall in the texts to calling it easy or simply was Cicero making a similar comment, and that's in his own words in a statement I'm happy to consider to be one to take with a grain of salt.

But it makes sense to me that Epicurus would start out personally motivated with an interest in where the universe came from and then continue to the end of his life seeing the importance of that conveying that very same issue to others. If you're going to wrestle people out of the jail of supernatural religion you're going to need to replace "god" with something, and "atoms" is only a part of the picture. The rest of the picture as a whole requires "infinity" to be plausible and persuasive to people of normal intelligence - and people of normal intelligence shouldn't be asked to accept "trust the scientists" or "trust the mathematicians" any more than they accept "trust the priests" as an explanation.

In fact, I would say that the implication of what Epicurus has stated that we should do - MOST OF ALL -- is that we should study the principles of infinity and take them to be correct. We should not consider them to be "mind-blowing' at all, but they should be second nature and taken to be as obvious and easy to understand as anyone for the past 2000 years has taken the incorrect "In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth...":

Quote from Epicurus Letter to Pythocles

All these things, Pythocles, you must bear in mind; for thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand what is akin to them. And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details. But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.

Quote from kochiekoch

The bottom line is, all this stuff is hypothetical, and may not be real at all, but it's mind blowing to contemplate.

Difficult perhaps, but not for that reason something that we should not do. In fact the "recommendation" or "command" that we do spend our time considering it is probably one of the most clear "recommendations" that Epicurus gives. Lots of the other material ends up being "Choose what makes the most sense in terms of pleasure and pain in your own situation." In this case, he's giving a flat statement to students that this is something we should definitely do. I am on board that this is a much-neglected aspect of Epicurean philosophy that needs to be dramatically elevated in focus.

Quote from Godfrey

Then there's Nietzche's eternal recurrence. I'm not too familiar with it, but it seems to me that this was just a thought experiment and not a serious proposal of the way things are. But I could be wrong on that.

Yes apparently there is a question as to whether he believed this himself or not. And some quick googling links "eternal recurrence" to the STOICS, of whom he generally disapproved, so that's another mark against it. It seems that the Stoic version may have been based on their ideas of fate/necessity, so they may have seen it as inevitable from that point of view, which Epicurus would reject. We need a lot more detail on both Nietzche's version and the Stoic version.

Quote from kochiekoch

But you might end up with infinite multiverses too, all with different laws of physics, so infinity is the limit!

Whenever I hear "multiverse" my blood runs cold, especially with references to "different laws of physics." Apparently "multiverse" needs closer definition too, and anyone who wants to explore that is welcome, but it's not likely to be me. I am firmly in the camp that "universe" should be taken to mean "all that exists" - and if that's what the word means then fine, but I see no reason to change the traditional meaning of "everything." But the "different laws of physics" is a showstopper too, from an Epicurean perspective, it seems to me. Sure different circumstances lead to different outcomes, but that's different circumstances, not different "laws of physics."

At the moment I am thinking that:

1 - "Infinity on the downside" (infinite divisibility) is a total dead end. That kind of thinking leads to the "it's impossible to walk across the room" which we observe to be nonsense.

At the opposite extreme, on the "up-side":

2 - Infinity meaning "different laws of physics" and "anything goes" and anything is possible" is also a non-starter. By definition this is postulating something that we have never seen, and for which we have no evidence, and you might as well start postulating pink elephants on the other side of the moon, and supernatural gods. All that is a total non-starter in Epicurean terms.

The most interesting questions to me seem to be along the lines stated above, including:

1. Whether infinity means that any combination of atoms which *is* possible does in fact happen,
2. Whether any combination which does happen, happens and infinite number of times.
3. Whether the swerve of the atom, or something like irrational numbers / fractals / fibonacci sequences, should make us expect that "classes" of "like" events will happen an infinite number of times, like snowflakes or grains of sand, but that recurrence in IDENTICAL ways should not be expected.

These are basic questions that would have occurred to Epicurus, and the texts maybe already indicate in fact *did* occur to Epicurus, and which we can use to shed light on how to reconstruct our interpretation of what Epicurus in fact taught.

Notes on directions to research to look for proper ways to reconstruct basic Epicurean reasoning on infinity:

1. Wikipedia: Infinity
   1. Philosophical nature of infinity.
      1. Anaximander - first Greek to propose the universe to be infinite. Mostly right?
      2. Anaxagorus - first Greek to propose infinite division - Mostly wrong?
      3. Aristotle - rejected actual inflnity but allowed potential infinity?
         1. In Book 3 of the work entitled Physics, written by Aristotle, Aristotle deals with the concept of infinity in terms of his notion of actuality and of potentiality. Physics 207b8 It is always possible to think of a larger number: for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite. Hence the infinite is potential, never actual; the number of parts that can be taken always surpasses any assigned number.
      4. John Locke - in common with most of the empiricist philosophers, also believed that we can have no proper idea of the infinite. They believed all our ideas were derived from sense data or "impressions," and since all sensory impressions are inherently finite, so too are our thoughts and ideas. Our idea of infinity is merely negative or privative. "Whatever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration, or number, let them be never so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, without ever completing the idea, there we have our idea of infinity... yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration, that idea is very obscure and confused, because it is made up of two parts very different, if not inconsistent. For let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number, as great as he will, it is plain the mind rests and terminates in that idea; which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression."  Essay, II. xvii. 7., author's emphasis --- Mostly wrong (?)
2. Especially Likely to lead to something fruitful?
   1. Georg Cantor
      1. The concept of the existence of an actual infinity was an important shared concern within the realms of mathematics, philosophy and religion. Preserving the orthodoxy of the relationship between God and mathematics, although not in the same form as held by his critics, was long a concern of Cantor's.^[71] He directly addressed this intersection between these disciplines in the introduction to his Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, where he stressed the connection between his view of the infinite and the philosophical one.^[72] To Cantor, his mathematical views were intrinsically linked to their philosophical and theological implications – he identified the absolute infinite with God,^[73] and he considered his work on transfinite numbers to have been directly communicated to him by God, who had chosen Cantor to reveal them to the world.^[5] He was a devout Lutheran whose explicit Christian beliefs shaped his philosophy of science.^[74] Joseph Dauben has traced the effect Cantor's Christian convictions had on the development of transfinite set theory.^[75][76]
      2. Debate among mathematicians grew out of opposing views in the philosophy of mathematics regarding the nature of actual infinity. Some held to the view that infinity was an abstraction which was not mathematically legitimate, and denied its existence.^[77] Mathematicians from three major schools of thought (constructivism and its two offshoots, intuitionism and finitism) opposed Cantor's theories in this matter. For constructivists such as Kronecker, this rejection of actual infinity stems from fundamental disagreement with the idea that nonconstructive proofs such as Cantor's diagonal argument are sufficient proof that something exists, holding instead that constructive proofs are required. Intuitionism also rejects the idea that actual infinity is an expression of any sort of reality, but arrive at the decision via a different route than constructivism. Firstly, Cantor's argument rests on logic to prove the existence of transfinite numbers as an actual mathematical entity, whereas intuitionists hold that mathematical entities cannot be reduced to logical propositions, originating instead in the intuitions of the mind.^[78] Secondly, the notion of infinity as an expression of reality is itself disallowed in intuitionism, since the human mind cannot intuitively construct an infinite set.^[79] Mathematicians such as L. E. J. Brouwer and especially Henri Poincaré adopted an intuitionist stance against Cantor's work. Finally, Wittgenstein's attacks were finitist: he believed that Cantor's diagonal argument conflated the intension of a set of cardinal or real numbers with its extension, thus conflating the concept of rules for generating a set with an actual set.^[10]
      3. Some Christian theologians saw Cantor's work as a challenge to the uniqueness of the absolute infinity in the nature of God.^[6] In particular, neo-Thomist thinkers saw the existence of an actual infinity that consisted of something other than God as jeopardizing "God's exclusive claim to supreme infinity".^[80] Cantor strongly believed that this view was a misinterpretation of infinity, and was convinced that set theory could help correct this mistake:^[81] "... the transfinite species are just as much at the disposal of the intentions of the Creator and His absolute boundless will as are the finite numbers.".^[82] Prominent neo-scholastic German philosopher Constantin Gutberlet was in favor of such theory, holding that it didn't oppose the nature of God.^[8]
      4. Cantor also believed that his theory of transfinite numbers ran counter to both materialism and determinism – and was shocked when he realized that he was the only faculty member at Halle who did not hold to deterministic philosophical beliefs.^[83]
      5. It was important to Cantor that his philosophy provided an "organic explanation" of nature, and in his 1883 Grundlagen, he said that such an explanation could only come about by drawing on the resources of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz.^[84] In making these claims, Cantor may have been influenced by F. A. Trendelenburg, whose lecture courses he attended at Berlin, and in turn Cantor produced a Latin commentary on Book 1 of Spinoza's Ethica. Trendelenburg was also the examiner of Cantor's Habilitationsschrift.^[85][86]
      6. In 1888, Cantor published his correspondence with several philosophers on the philosophical implications of his set theory. In an extensive attempt to persuade other Christian thinkers and authorities to adopt his views, Cantor had corresponded with Christian philosophers such as Tilman Pesch and Joseph Hontheim,^[87] as well as theologians such as Cardinal Johann Baptist Franzelin, who once replied by equating the theory of transfinite numbers with pantheism.^[7] Although later this Cardinal accepted the theory as valid, due to some clarifications from Cantor's.^[8] Cantor even sent one letter directly to Pope Leo XIII himself, and addressed several pamphlets to him.^[81]
      7. Cantor's philosophy on the nature of numbers led him to affirm a belief in the freedom of mathematics to posit and prove concepts apart from the realm of physical phenomena, as expressions within an internal reality. The only restrictions on this metaphysical system are that all mathematical concepts must be devoid of internal contradiction, and that they follow from existing definitions, axioms, and theorems. This belief is summarized in his assertion that "the essence of mathematics is its freedom."^[88] These ideas parallel those of Edmund Husserl, whom Cantor had met in Halle.^[89]
      8. Meanwhile, Cantor himself was fiercely opposed to infinitesimals, describing them as both an "abomination" and "the cholera bacillus of mathematics".^[41]
      9. Cantor's 1883 paper reveals that he was well aware of the opposition his ideas were encountering: "... I realize that in this undertaking I place myself in a certain opposition to views widely held concerning the mathematical infinite and to opinions frequently defended on the nature of numbers."^[90]
      10. Hence he devotes much space to justifying his earlier work, asserting that mathematical concepts may be freely introduced as long as they are free of contradiction and defined in terms of previously accepted concepts. He also cites Aristotle, René Descartes, George Berkeley, Gottfried Leibniz, and Bernard Bolzano on infinity. Instead, he always strongly rejected Immanuel Kant's philosophy, in the realms of both the philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics. He shared B. Russell's motto "Kant or Cantor", and defined Kant "yonder sophistical Philistine who knew so little mathematics."^[91]