Posts by Cassius

While we may want to extend the time frame of the Monday night meeting, and set it up for Principal doctrines of other introductory material (as if the PD's can be fully appreciated by a brand new beginner!! ) that isn't going to solve our need for something to offer people who can't make our eastern-US centered time zone.

I'm pretty much ready to commit to a regular early-Sunday-afternoon session, which would be workable for most of the Western Hemisphere, because I really want to expand our forum participation into Europe. Even if many of our current participants aren't able to make it, I'm ok with starting largely from scratch with just a few people as we did in the past with our earlier meetings.

So let me figure out which weekend makes sense to get started, and we'll see what we can put together.

Referenced in today's episode as to the end of Lucretius Book VI and the Thucydides version:

Quote

it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.

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RE: Thoughts On What Lucretius Might Have Considered For The Ending of Book Six - A Comparison Chart of Thucydides and Lucretius

Joshua has me thinking about this subject again due to his post about the plague. Rather than put this note in that thread and disrupt the chain of thought, I will add this here:

If in fact the point of the ending is related to the point that the citizens of Athens who lived through the Plague were thereby freed from their religious superstitions (as Emily Austin suggests), it strikes me that the famous lines from Virgil might actually fit at the very end of the poem too.

Felix qui potuit rerum…

Cassius

January 15, 2023 at 7:10 PM

Quote from Godfrey

but that seems to put desire in quite pleasurable company..... But it seems worth pointing out.

Excellent point Godfrey!

I left out an important point in my prior point when I was talking about no matter how the word is translated.

What I should have said there is that I think Bailey ended up calling it concept instead of preconcept because what Diogenes Laertius is describing (at least it seems to me) is clearly conceptual reasoning, which I gather you and I both think is very distinct from prolepsis.

Which means that I am siding with DeWitt's analysis of this section from Diogenes Laertius, and I think Diogenes Laertius is wrong in describing this process as prolepetic.

DeWitt sees conflict between Diogenes Laertius' understanding of prolepsis:

Quote

And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept.

.... vs Velleius' (Cicero's) explanation of prolepsis in "On The Nature of The Gods":

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“Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men is there but possesses untaught some ‘preconception’ of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgment.

.... and DeWitt thinks Velleius' explanation is more consistent with Epicurus' use of the term,

So I'm going at present with the view that what DL is explaining is not prolepsis but ordinary conceptual reasoning, involving comparing one opinion against another. In contrast what Velleius is explaining is something "nature-imprinted" and "without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed." This latter statement seems to me to describe something that deserves to be considered as "canonical."

I would distinguish that from: "I've seen five cows and horses now I have a picture in my mind to which I am going to attach the name 'cow' and 'horse' (or any number of other words in other languages). Certainly that's related to how the mind words, and I would say that prolepsis is involved in even getting the mind working, but by the time you are talking about "cows" and "horses," and we apply those words when we see other animals, you are in my view in the realm of comparing opinions against each other, and i think we agree that opinions are not preconceptions.

Quote from Don

I believe Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans were firmly rooted in physical reality. When you say "concepts" I hear "Platonic ideals that exist outside the physical world." And the word that he uses is consistent for pleasure - hedone - although different words for pain are sometimes used to juxtapose against pleasure.

I think the issue here is that I distinguish firmly between "ideal forms" which are a fantasy that does not exist, and "concepts" which is basically a definition or a picture in our minds or other product of rational thinking.

I think that concepts are what Diogenes Laertius is referring to when he says (Bailey):

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[33] The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’

Now I know that we debate whether the word used there should be "concepts" as Baily does it or "preconcepts," but regardless of word choice here I think this description involves considering something and forming an opinion about it, and this is a process that very definitely does happen. It's also a process that I don't think anyone argues is the same as Plato's ideal forms.

So I would say that conceptual reasoning based on concepts is an important part of Epicurean philosophy, and that just as "man" can refer to men in general, or to John Brown of Virgina, "pleasure" can refer to pleasure in general or it can refer to a particular feeling in a particular context. Yes, the reason that it makes sense to refer to a particular feeling as pleasure is because we feel it to be pleasurable, but it is also valid and important to abstract into the single word "pleasure" all possible examples of pleasurable feelings so that we can discuss pleasure conceptually and understand that it is "Pleasure" and not divine will or ideal forms that constitutes the highest good.

Quote from Don

I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.

At least for now, I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here, although this paragraph I quoted really doesn't express the point in issue. I of course agree with your view of please and pain and feelings. I just also believe that the same words can also be used as concepts to denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain), and I think that Epicurus is using it both ways in different contexts as needed.

For example i think references to "limit of pleasure" are conceptual. Of course we can prove our concept is accurate by looking to the feelings, and that's why it all makes sense. But the "limit of quantity of pleasure" does not in my mind describe a "particular feeling." I would say that it describes a conceptual total that differs in every way between individuals other than in the conceptual way that it excludes all pains. I see the word "happiness" much the same way - it is certainly possible to "feel happy" but judging a life to be "happy" or "not happy" is mainly a conceptual categorization.

Quote from Don

I find the pose of the Boscoreale pig surprisingly similar to the Herculaneum pig.

agreed and I hadn't noticed that myself. But I am not sure there is much variation in the appearance of pigs(?)

Quote from Julia

Generally, I don't like letters or numbers to be used as symbols. There's too much room for misinterpretion, jokes, etc. I'm not even sure I fully endorse the pig as a symbol. Is Horace the only textual evidence for that? I know the statue is from Herculaneum. T

There's also the Boscoreale cup with the pig at Epicurus' feet, plus the leaping pig from herculaneum, which is probably one of the most definitive connecitons. -

Quote from Godfrey

desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

Quote from Don

Completely, 100% agree with this!!

My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.

I am coming around to the position that this is basically the general and ultimate answer to the question. Desire is neither painful nor pleasurable by definition/necessity. There are certain kinds of desires that we can generalize to more frequently lead to more pain than pleasure, and vice versa, but those desires themselves aren't by definition painful or pleasurable.

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

The feeing of pleasure and pain weighs in on everything, especially in the way Epicurus says that you are always feeling, and expands the meaning of pleasure to encompass all feeling that isn't painful,

But only the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.

Quote from Cassius

Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

Joshua, that's why I included the parenthetical in this sentence. Happiness is a concept so close to pleasure that it's hard or impossible to separate it. There are also going to be things close to pain that aren't the same word but inseparably linked.

For this discussion to make sense i think we have to decide whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.

It gets to looking like a word game, but in the end this is the kind of thing you have to do to communicate.

This week we are going to try to get from Section 42 to the end of Part 1 at Section 49. That means we're going to go very quickly through Cicero's lengthy tails of the deaths of great men from the Roman and Greek past, and focus on any remaining philosophical arguments.

If you see anything in sections 42 to 49 that you'd like to be sure we cover, please be sure to add it to this thread.

Welcome to Episode 280 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in philosophy, with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

1. Is Death An Evil? (Cicero says no and Epicurus says no, but for very different reasons)
2. Is Pain An Evil? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
3. Does the Wise Man Experience Grief and Fear? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
4. Does the Wise Man Experience Joy and Desire? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
5. Is Virtue Sufficient For A Happy Life? (Cicero says yes, Epicurus says no)

As we found in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods," Cicero treated Epicurean Philosophy as a major contender in the battle between the philosophies. In discussing this conflict and explaining Epicurus' answers to these questions, we will deepen our understanding of Epicurus and how he compares to the other major schools.

Today our plan is to wrap up the highlights of Cicero's remaining arguments on death in Part 1, starting with Section XLII.

--------------------------

Our general discussion guide for Tusculun Disputations is here: https://epicureanfriends.github.io/tusculundisput…lish/section:12

And a side-by-side version with comments is here:

EpicureanFriends SideBySide Commentary on TD

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/66091857/media

Yes that is what I am asking. It's clear that in many cases a thing that is painful or pleasurable in one situation is the opposite in another situation. Eating the first cup of ice cream when you are hungry is pleasurable. Eating the 100th cup in a continuous sequence is likely painful.

Things which bring pain in one circumstance can bring pleasure in another.

Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

In other words, is "desire" itself a painful feeling that always has its root in pain, or is desire like ice cream, something that is neither intrinsically painful or pleasurable, but which can be painful or pleasurable depending on circumstance.

Episode 279 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "On Dying Before One's Time"

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/66000553/media

I see this as a significant difference in perspective:

Quote from Don

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain.

Quote from Joshua

Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.

And while I am not ready to state a final formulation myself, I do see my question in the latter light: It's true that pleasure is a feeling, but it is also true that "pleasure" is a word signifying a concept, and we have to be able to deal with both perspectives.

"In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

Cicero Book 2, Section 9:

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IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet?

But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of appetites,—some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus. However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he [pg 138] speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom appetites30 dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own degrees fearlessly.

The Aulus Gellius defense of Epicurus is at the link below, but it does not concern natural and necessary desires.

Gellius • Attic Nights — Book II

This is Torquatus in Book 1, Section 13. I need to find Cicero's criticism:

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And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error, and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find any limit to, or any moderation in them.

This question has come up at least once or more in the past, but I cannot find the prior discussions. If I find them later I will add links to this post.

This came up tonight in our Wednesday Zoom, whether as a general rule all "desire" should be viewed as painful.

We had a close split of opinion on this, so no matter whether the answer is "Yes" or "No," we have some discussion that needs to take place. From an Epicurean perspective, I feel sure that this question has a firm answer, though at present I think I could argue either side equally. So that tells me there's work to be done on this.

The "Yes" camp argument can be summarized for now as something like: All desire indicates a wish that is unmet, and an unmet wish is painful, therefore all desire is painful.

The "No" camp argument is something like "desires can in fact be enjoyable, as on Christmas Eve for presents the next day, and it is only when I desire is in fact unmet and unmeetable that a desire is generally painful."

Also in considering the answer I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

Quote from Rolf

The classifications are like priorities.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I started to just click "like" and move on, but on second thought I am not sure this - even with the rarely caveat - does not just restate the problem. *Are* these classifications priorities, or are they just predictions of the relative cost in pain?

I wanted to make an exception for "those things necessary to remain alive," but even that isn't absolute -- Don't we sometimes give our lives for a friend?

The "rarely, if ever" helps, but isn't that the question you are asking? What is the rule that allows you to know when those exceptions would apply, other than that this is a personal decision involving the way you personal estimate the final outcome in terms of net pleasure of all kinds over net pain of all kinds?

As a generalization I think we all can see that the classification makes sense. However you're asking the right question -- when do the exceptions apply, to to know that you have to know what *really* is the overriding analysis. I don't think we find the ultimate analysis here in this classification alone. The ultimate question is always going to be the external consideration of expected result that isn't stated in full just by stating the classes, or by stating that those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

Maybe another way of stating this is that the Epicureans never stated that the ultimate goal of life is "the pleasures achieved through natural and necessary desires." The goal is "pleasure," and the reason there can be no qualification is that everyone's situation is going to be different. Is it possible to generalize? Yes, definitely. But generalizing is not the same as a hard and fast rule, even of "priorities." I think Don and maybe others have given good examples of the exceptions (such as "holding your breath to dive to get out of the cave" or whatever.)