Posts by Cassius

I will repeat the caveat that i hope everyone constantly remembers:

I'm not representing that I have everything figured out, and I welcome challenges and disagreements (at least when stated constructively )

The benefit that the podcast is providing, as Joshua also states in Episode 241, is that it is very helpful to challenge oneself to articulate these issues precisely. Unless you do get pretty deep in the weeds (another term Joshua used today) then it can sometimes be hard to see how important some of these issues are.

And this thread is a good example too - starting out talking about a Stoic chart, but now wrestling with some extremely deep conceptual issues that need to be resolved before we can adequately construct an alternative presentation.

I perceive that where we are in the discussion is a question that has to be answered before we can delete the "does it concern virtue?" and replace it with a question relating to "Pleasure." This dual perspective on Pleasure, as both a category and a particular experience, has to be understood before one can see that "absence of pain" is being used by Epicurus as a term that is an EXACT equivalent of "pleasure," and not a separate and unique category that some set out as so unique and perceptive that even Buddhists and Stoics would envy. I would say more confidently here in August of 2024 than every before that the truth is nothing of the kind. "Absence of pain" is simply a way of extending the definition of pleasure to ALL non-painful experiences, just as "gods" are defined as living beings who are blessed and incorruptible, and just as "the highest good" is defined to be "the standard by which we are bound to test all things by, but the standard itself by nothing."

"Pleasure" can only be understood as deserving of its place in the first rank of any "choice and avoidance" chart by understanding it in this wider way of: "all experience which is not painful." The problem is that we are so conditioned to see "pleasure" as "sex drugs and rock and roll" and therefore "bad," that we are intimidated away from putting the word "Pleasure" in its rightful position as the keystone of the whole analysis.

Quote from Julia

pleasure & pain: not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences. When undistorted by judgements of others (religion, society, …) and undistorted by scarring life experience (eg "fear of joy" as is possible in PTSD), pleasure is the set of fundamental experiences which humans by nature find agreeable (joy, relief, …) and pain is the set of fundamental experience which humans by nature find disagreeable (physical-pain, grief, …). (Moving away from pain is called avoidance. Moving towards pleasure is called play.)

What I am focusing on as potentially objectionable - depending on how one reads this sentence, is that I think it would be inappropriate if a reader where to say that "pleasure" cannot refer to an individual experience, but it always used as a "category' term to abstractly stand for the whole "set" of experiences.

I am emphatically agreeing that the word "pleasure" *can* be used that way, and at times *is* used that way by Epicurus (for example in formulations such as "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain," but I am ALSO saying that the word "pleasure" can be used to refer to a single experience, e.g., "Eatine peas today at lunch was a pleasure."

I am really focusing mainly on the "not fundamental units of experience themself." So as to be more clear I would prefer to reword that as:

pleasure & pain: These terms can be used to describe BOTH fundamental units of experience themselves, AS WELL AS innate categories of fundamental experiences, depending on the context of the discussion.

And then I would reword the rest of the paragraph in a way consistent with that.

I feel sure I should be making the same comment as to desire, when I read this:

Quote from Julia

desire: a fundamental unit of experience (cannot be divided into smaller experiences; is not made up of smaller units); by being fundamental in this way, it is simultaneously something we somehow just know (like "sweet taste", "feels warm") and yet very hard to define, to pin down with other words

But I confess I am losing track of some of the original detail of the thread as it started out. Maybe there is some reason that you are focusing on desire and pleasure as categories, and maybe you are putting the particular pleasures and the particular desires aside for some reason, but if so, I think that makes me want to emphasize the point of the podcast even more strongly.

These words - gods, good, pleasure, desire -- can be viewed equally correctly as either "concepts" standing for a particular class, or individual particular examples of experience within that particular class. Either viewpoint can be correct and useful and is valid, but it's essential to be clear as to whether you are talking about a class or a particular.

If you're NOT careful, then you run into this trouble that plagues Epicurean philosophy today: "Absence of pain" can be confused as referring to a particular experience that nobody can adequately define outside of a particular context, and thus a great source of confusion, rather than being seen as a definition of the "limit of quantity of pleasure" in which context it is a very useful and helpful definition.

Same with desire: If you view desires solely as a "group," and imply all desires should be minimized or eliminated, then you are on the straight path to Stoicism or Buddhism or worse. But if you take the common sense approach that desire is also a term that can be used to refer to many individual experiences, some of which are very healthful and beneficial and some of which are more like a disease and damaging, then you'll be able to productively realize that many desires are to be encouraged and pursued, while many others are to be suppressed.

Quote from Julia

pleasure & pain: not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences. When undistorted by judgements of others (religion, society, …) and undistorted by scarring life experience (eg "fear of joy" as is possible in PTSD), pleasure is the set of fundamental experiences which humans by nature find agreeable (joy, relief, …) and pain is the set of fundamental experience which humans by nature find disagreeable (physical-pain, grief, …). (Moving away from pain is called avoidance. Moving towards pleasure is called play.)

OK when stated as in post 36 quoted above (I added the emphasis on the first part), I have to state a reservation, particularly on the statement that pleasures and pains are "not fundamental units of experience themself, but innate categories of fundamental experiences."

I think the terms "pleasure" and "pain" are in fact properly used both to refer to "categories of experiences" as well as "particular experiences," and we have to be clear which perspective we mean when we discuss them.

This issue of the multiple meanings of words such as "good" and "gods" is largely the issue that ended up being the topic of our podcast Episode 241. Coincidentally, before reading this thread, I had just added an insert to assert that the discussion of the way Epicurus was approaching defining his terms before discussing particulars should be taken to refer to "pleasure" and "the limit of pleasure" as well.

If anyone gets a chance to listen to that discussion please let us know if you agree or disagree, either in this thread or preferably the episode thread, where it will probably be more findable in the future.

This episode turned out to have a different focus than was expected when I picked a preliminary title referring to atoms, so I've re-titled it to refer to what was actually discussed. This change occurred because the major focus turned out to be a comment Joshua introduced last week about a link between the way Epicurus approaches the subject of both "the gods" and "the good."

I should also note that I added the material which appears from 16:15 to 18:54 was an extension of the previous several minutes of recording that I added after the main recording was completed. Therefore the lack of any comment from Joshua or Kalosyni about that material is attributable mainly to the fact that they didn't hear that when we first recorded. As usual the merit or lack of merit of that section is entirely on me, so don't blame them for failing to correct me if that section is absolutely off base. (If anyone is tempted to go straight to 16:15 to start listening, I would warn that it would be difficult to evaluate that segment without hearing Joshua's discussion relating this back to last week, which starts close to the very beginning of the podcast.)

Lucretius Today Episode 241 - A Common Thread Between The Epicurean View Of "The Gods" and "The Good" - is now available:

Episode 241 will be posted before the end of today. In the meantime, I want to note a point that Joshua brought up right at the end of the episode, which boils down to the point that:

- taking the position "I don't accept anything without evidence to support it" is a good logical position to take as a general rule to avoid mistakes.

- however relying on that general rule may not be nearly helpful to obtaining confidence and therefore happiness as being able to say "I have looked thoroughly into this subject and based on what I have found I am confident that X is true and Y is not true.

I took the time to post this also in part because Joshua also reminds us at the end of the episode about Epicurus' emphasis on the importance of studying infinity and its implications, and i think those two points go hand in hand as core aspects of the Epicurean approach to the issue of divinity.

Julia I agree with the thrust of most of your post but as to this I am not completely clear on what you are saying:

Quote from Julia

In my opinion, getting fancy with "desire"/"desirable" and "pleasure"/"pleasurable" would be like getting fancy with emotion-words, like "happiness", or, more precisely, with experience-words, like "joy". When first grasping the word, it matters to be precise about the inner experience it refers to (eg something fun-but-forbidden may cause joy and guilt, pleasure and pain; it matters to delineate that honestly, precisely, without getting hung up on morals).

At the very least, as to pleasure, it seemed absolutely clear to Cicero, and I would say to Norman DeWitt and now to me also as the only logical way to read the texts, that Epicurus was in fact taking a very non-standard and radically different stance. He was redefining "pleasure" to include not only sensory stimulation but also all other experiences which are not painful, even if not normally considered by the majority of people to be included in pleasure. I see no other persuasive way to explain numerous statements by Torquatus, including his response to Chrysippus' "hand" argument.

I don't see you referring to that his expansion of the definition of pleasure in your comments so far. I think it's important to take a position on how Epicurus was using the word pleasure in a non-standard way to make any sense of many highly reliable texts, including but not limited to the Principle Doctrines and the letter to Menoeceus themselves.

The line from DeWitt that's right on point is from page 240 of his book:

Quote

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Discussion of how Epicurus refers occasionally to "god" but more often to "gods" causes me to think about this:

I presume it is pretty clear that in regard to "images," Epicurus was saying that "images" are constantly streaming away from all objects, some of which impact our minds and cause results through that impact. In other words, images are a constant stimulation to the mind and going on all the time.

However it seems that there is an intersection between "images" and "prolepsis," and that "prolepsis' is also considered to be a contact with reality. I am presuming that images involve one aspect, but not necessarily the only aspect, of prolepsis/anticipation.

I am not sure whether the plural of prolepsis is prolepses, so it will be more clear to ask the question referring to "anticipation(s)":

Is Epicurus saying that we have continuous "anticipations" of the gods going on essentially all the time, or is or was a single "anticipation" of the gods innate in us at birth or some early moment all that was needed to spur on the "believe that a god is blessed and imperishable" conclusion?

I'm trying to be more clear on the correct wording of describing what Epicurus was saying in English, keeping in mind that I think most of us agree that we do not consider prolepsis / anticipation to be an "opinion" or "conclusion" but rather some kind of "input" to an eventual conclusion.

And I am presuming that the data content of "images" is essentially in the "arrangements" of the atoms of the images, retaining the "shapes" of the objects from which they came, and it is our receipt of these invisible-to-the-eye arrangements/shapes that is being received by the mind and reported for further processing, just as the eyes are reporting "visible-to-the-eye" shapes and colors and brightnesses but not an opinion as to "what" is being seen.

So in referring to divinity or to justice, was Epicurus saying (1) that the anticipations involved are constantly being received, but are judged to be always consistent with blessedness and imperishability, or (2) that somehow a limited number of anticipations have been received in the past from which a single opinion of blessedness and imperishability has been reached in the mind?

Probably not a hugely important question but it would relate to the general interpretation of anticipation as a faculty. I presume that the answer is (1) and that in general we should be referring to conclusions about the gods or justice or anything else to be formed from anticipations in the plural rather than in the singular.

Martin I read the quoted part as saying that the important thing is to arrive at the point where the mental image associated with each word is absolutely clear to the person who is stating the formulation, not that the person stating the formulation has to accept the definition proposed by others. And I'd relate that to the discussion of the development of language and how different peoples arrive at different words and languages, because language is not handed down by a god or central authority, but by local people developing their own word assignments. In most cases you can and should, because it is most convenient, to use the commonly-established formulation. But the real objective is clarity and for the purpose of happy living, and when that means rejecting the majority definition, seems to me he is advocating rejecting it.

Gosh my typing is terrible. I've now changed "implicated" to "implication"

Quote from Godfrey

We've given a lot of effort to understanding what Epicurus meant by "pleasure;" the same effort needs to be applied to understanding what he meant by "desire."

Yes I agree and for the reasons I have stated. Buddhism and Stoicism have introduced poisonous presumptions in ordinary communication that "desires" are all of a single class, and that that class is to be eliminated as bad or even evil. That may or may not have been the case in 300 BC, but it is the case today, so when we talk about desires today there is a huge difference between ordinary issues of "wanting to accomplish a goal (any goal)" vs "passionate intoxicating ardent longing" which most everyone will agree is a thing to be avoided. (At the very least, most of us would agree that the "intoxicating" part is bad. I would be willing to defend "passionate ardent longing" depending on the context of what is being discussed. But at some point most of us will agree that there is a red line where desire that is intoxicating and gives no regard to other realities is dangerous and self-destructive.)

But to repeat the poison in the air is the idea that Epicurus would agree with the Buddhists and Stoics and other ascetics and agree that all desire is to be eliminated, and I would say that is an implication that should never go unchallenged.

Anybody who wants to can save this message and with my blessings slap me every time i am participating in a discussion about things in which we firmly believe the existence of, without ever having seen or heard or touched or tasted or smelled them directly, if I fail to make sure that we site ATOMS as a prime example of such a thing! I am afraid I failed to do so at least in at one spot in this episode so I will have to use every method I can to try to do better!

Well we made a little more progress in today's episode, rather than spending most of the time on a single sentence, but we did go back over the implications of Joshua's theorizing about the parallels in logical structure between Torquatus' explanation of Epicurus' views on the 'highest good' and Velleius' explanation of Epicurus' views on the nature of a 'god.' I will get this episode edited and up over the next several days as the issue involved goes to the general issue of definitions now being discussed in a parallel thread over the nature of 'desire' and Epicurus' use of words in non-standard ways. We've begun to move forward in the podcast discussion a little past this topic, but next week we'll probably touch on it again as I want to suggest that the same issue Joshua is observing as to "the good" and "gods" probably also applies to "pleasure," in my view. There are more implications of what Joshua is suggesting than we have yet fully discussed.

Quote from Julia

"What is desire?" reminds me of how important it is to stick closely to ordinary language, to not redefine things but to remain as close to everyday speech as possible.

To this we are going to have to compare a series of text references that show that while Epicurus felt it important to be clear, he did not think it was important, and in fact was willing to radically redefine, that to which ordinary words are used to refer.

I think it is clear from the texts for example that he used "gods," and "pleasure," and even "virtue" in ways radically different than common usage, and so he was not willing to accept terminology that is used in everyday speech.

For example he said:

Letter to Herodotus: "First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning. [38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen."

--- I do not believe this means that we use words in a way that conforms to ordinary usage in all cases, but overrridingly that we are clear, by stating our terms, even when others disagree with us:

VS29. For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many. Note 29 Translation by C. Yapijakis, Epicurean Garden of Athens, Greece. Bailey: “In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.”

And we know from repeated complaints from Cicero that Epicurus used words (such as pleasure and prolepsis) in new ways that no one had done before, which was such a great source of controversy that Cicero's complaints are unmistakeable that he was in fact actually doing that.\

So with "desire" as much as "pleasure," it will be necessary for us to take a position on exactly what Epicurus was referring to. This would be at the root of the controversy we continually have over whether Epicurus was attempting to "eradicate all desire" as Buddhists or Stoics would argue, or whether it was only particularly harmful desires (those that cannot possibly be attained or clearly can be expected to bring more pain than pleasure) to which he was advising caution.

Same question will apply to use of the word "desire" in the entire topic of "natural and necessary *desires."

But I presume there that everyone is taking the position that desire is *all* choice and avoidance and not limited to "passionate longing"

I am looking forward to input from our Greek Expert Team on this topic!

I know it makes sense to me that the question of what will happen based on any decision is intuitively the right way to look every question.

Whether VS71 was intended to be targeted at passionate intoxicating desires, such as love which is extensively addressed by Lucretius, is a separate but very related issue.

"VS71. Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?"

I do not view that as referring only to, or primarily to, "passionate longing."

So what do we think the context supports as to the intent of VS71?

I just checked wikipedia and several dictionary sites which are similar:

Quote

Desires are states of mind that are expressed by terms like "wanting", "wishing", "longing" or "craving". A great variety of features is commonly associated with desires. They are seen as propositional attitudes towards conceivable states of affairs. They aim to change the world by representing how the world should be, unlike beliefs, which aim to represent how the world actually is. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them. For this to be possible, a desire has to be combined with a belief about which action would realize it. Desires present their objects in a favorable light, as something that appears to be good.

I am out of time to continue but it seems to me that there is a wide variety of intensities that can be encompassed in the word, and probably that is something to focus on whether we have any agreement.

If desire is forced into the box of "passionate longing" then we have one issue. If "desire" is used as a stand-in for "anything I wish to do" then we have an entirely different set of results.

i still detect there is ambiguity about the way the relationship between 'desire' and 'choice and avoidance' is being discussed here.

Does everyone agree that "I desire to brush my teeth right now" is a perfectly acceptable ordinary English equivalent of "I choose to brush my teeth right now"?

The point is that we can use

desire = the object of desire

and we can also use

desire = choose

So as to the discussion of whether desire is the motivator or not, it seems to me it should always be clear that what you are talking about as the "motivator" is the "reward" and not the initial willpower "choice" to pursue the reward.

That's all i will add at the moment but this gets into the whole problem of considering words like "virtue" as "ends in themselves" or "something to do because it produces pleasure."

There are lots of things in life that i can identify as "desirable" but would never choose to pursue because of the costs involved. But that doesn't mean that i discount them as being desirable, or fail to hold in my mind the knowledge that they are desirable. It just means that we always have lots of alternative possibilities from which we have to constantly choose between according to the consequences of what actions we take.

So the phrasing "desire is the motivator" can be correct or incorrect depending on what definition is being given to "desire."

One statement made in that article caught my eye:

Quote

Similarly, System 1 encourages us to see things dualistically, meaning we have trouble thinking of the mind and body as a single unit. This tendency emerges quite early: young children, regardless of their cultural background, are inclined to believe that they have an immortal soul – that their essence or personhood existed somewhere prior to their birth, and will always continue to exist.

I tend to doubt that that statement is true as a general tendency apart from the conditioning of religion / culture / upbringing. I would doubt that children raised in nature, who quickly get exposed to the cycle of life with the animals they see around them constantly being born and dying, would have any problem seeing for themselves that they too are part of the same cycle.