Posts by Cassius

So I can keep track of it I have added an easier-to-read format of it here. This is the version I will be updating going forward:

Good luck Don. Always good to try when there is any hope of success. Here is a summary of the major arguments that appear scattered in many places on this site:

"Why It Is Incorrect to Say Epicurean Philosophy Is Primarily About 'Absence of Pain'"

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"For this reason we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." -- Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus

The Claim and Why It Matters

The claim that Epicurean philosophy is "primarily about the absence of pain" — that the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state free from disturbance — is one of the most consequential misreadings in the history of philosophy. It transforms a vigorous, life-affirming system into something that looks, in practice, indistinguishable from the Stoic, Buddhist, or ascetic counsels that Epicurus directly opposed.

The arguments against this reading are numerous, mutually reinforcing, and grounded in the primary texts. They are collected here in condensed form.

Argument 1: There Are Only Two Feelings — Absence of One Is Presence of the Other

This is the most fundamental argument, and it dissolves the apparent contrast between "pleasure" and "absence of pain" entirely.

• Epicurus taught that Nature has given every living creature exactly two internal feelings: pleasure and pain.
• These two are exhaustive and mutually exclusive — there is no third state between them.
• If pain is absent, pleasure is present — not by convention or definition, but because there are only two options and one of them is gone.
• "Absence of pain" and "presence of pleasure" are therefore two ways of describing the same condition, not two different things.

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"The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined." -- Diogenes Laertius, Book X, 34

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"Surely anyone who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain." -- Torquatus in Cicero, On Ends 1.38

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"I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too." -- Torquatus in Cicero, On Ends 2.16

• The practical consequence: Saying the Epicurean goal is "absence of pain" rather than "pleasure" is like saying the goal is "not being in darkness" rather than "being in light." The two phrases pick out the same state from opposite directions. The choice to emphasize the negative formulation is a rhetorical one, not a philosophical one — and it is a rhetorical choice that consistently misleads general audiences toward passivity and minimalism.

Argument 2: The Letter to Menoeceus Cannot Be Read Through a Single Sentence Torn From Context

The passage most often cited as evidence for the "absence of pain" reading is this one:

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"When we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality... but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." -- Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus

This sentence is real — but reading it in isolation while ignoring everything around it is a fundamental error of method. The Letter to Menoeceus as a whole says the opposite of what the "absence of pain" reading requires:

• The letter opens by stating that philosophy leads to happiness — not tranquility, not absence of pain, but happiness.
• The letter explicitly declares that "pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life" and "the first good innate in us."
• The contested passage is not Epicurus saying "I don't mean pleasure; I mean absence of pain." It is Epicurus clarifying that "pleasure" in his usage is broader than physical stimulation of the body — it includes freedom from bodily pain and mental disturbance as genuine pleasures, not as replacements for pleasure.
• The letter closes with the vision of the wise man living "like a god among men" — a life of full positive pleasure, not minimal disturbance.

Reading one sentence against the grain of the entire letter is precisely the kind of selective citation that produces the misreading. The rule applies here as everywhere: a single passage, read in isolation, cannot overturn the consistent testimony of the whole.

Argument 3: Principal Doctrine 3 Is a Targeted Response to a Specific Philosophical Opponent — Not a Summary of Epicurean Ethics

Principal Doctrine 3 states:

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"The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

This doctrine has been taken as definitive proof that Epicurus reduced the goal of life to the mere absence of pain. That reading mistakes the context entirely.

• PD3 is the third in a deliberate sequence of responses to the three most powerful ancient arguments used to attack pleasure as the goal of life:
  • PD1 answers the argument from divine punishment: a truly blessed being has no interest in rewarding or punishing humans.
  • PD2 answers the argument from fear of death: death is the end of all sensation, so neither good nor evil follows it.
  • PD3 and PD4 answer the argument from Plato's Philebus: that pleasure cannot be the highest good because it has no limit and therefore can never be complete.
• Plato's challenge was: pleasure can always be increased; it is never finished; a thing that cannot be completed cannot be the highest good.
• Epicurus's answer (PD3): pleasure does have a limit — the limit is reached when all pain is removed, because at that point there is no more pain to displace. The cup is full. What Plato said could never be complete is in fact complete.
• What PD3 is not doing: It is not saying that the content of a good life is merely the absence of pain. It is establishing that the measure of fullness — the philosophical limit that answers Plato — is the removal of pain. The content of the full life remains what Epicurus stated throughout all his writings: the pleasures of taste, hearing, sight, friendship, philosophy, memory, and anticipation.
• The analogy: PD3 tells us the cup is full when it reaches the brim. It says nothing about what fills the cup. Those who read PD3 as defining the Epicurean goal have confused the measurement of fullness with the content being measured.

Argument 4: Epicurus Stated Explicitly What He Could Not Conceive the Good Without

There is no ambiguity about this:

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"I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form." -- Epicurus, in Diogenes Laertius, Book X

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"For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man." -- Epicurus, as quoted by Cicero, Tusculan Disputations

• These are not the words of a man who thought the good life consisted in a passive neutral state free from disturbance.
• These are the words of a man for whom the positive content of pleasure — vivid, sensory, active, varied — is inseparable from what "good" even means.
• A philosophy whose goal is "primarily absence of pain" would not generate statements like this. A philosophy whose goal is genuine, active, positive pleasure would — and does.

Argument 5: The Ancient Witnesses Are Unanimous That the Goal Is Active, Vivid Pleasure

Both friendly and hostile ancient sources understood Epicurus to be teaching active pleasure, not passive absence of disturbance:

• Torquatus (Cicero's Epicurean spokesman): "Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?"
• Diogenes of Oinoanda (carved in stone for all passersby): "I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a fine anthem to celebrate the fullness of pleasure."
• Cicero (a hostile critic, which makes his testimony all the more telling): "[The Epicureans said] that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures" — the Latin is unambiguous: plena et conferta voluptatibus, a life full and crammed with pleasures.
• Torquatus again: "The wise man is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains."

A philosophy primarily about "absence of pain" would not be described by its ancient advocates and critics alike as a philosophy of numerous, vivid, crammed-full pleasures.

Argument 6: The Friendship Argument — Why "Minimize Pain" Cannot Be the Prime Directive

This argument is practical and penetrating. Frances Wright's A Few Days In Athens captures it clearly:

• Deep friendship is one of the greatest pleasures Epicurus identified.
• Deep friendship inevitably ends in grief for one of the parties — grief that is among the sharpest pains available to human experience.
• A person whose goal was primarily to minimize pain would rationally avoid deep friendship, moderate every attachment, guard against every commitment that might later hurt.
• The Epicurean does the opposite — pursues friendship gladly, deliberately, and without reservation — because the pleasures of shared life, mutual support, and being truly known vastly outweigh the cost of eventual grief.
• The pain of grief is accepted willingly as the price of the pleasure that made it possible.

The conclusion: If "absence of pain" were the prime directive, Epicurus would counsel against deep friendship. He counseled the opposite — calling friendship "the greatest of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life." The Epicurean goal must be stated as the maximum of pleasure, not the minimum of pain. These are not the same thing, and the difference shapes every practical choice.

Argument 7: "The Goal of Life Is Absence of Pain" as a Standalone Phrase Is Liable to Systematic Misinterpretation

Even where the phrase is technically defensible (because of the two-feelings doctrine), it consistently misleads:

• Most people who encounter "the goal is absence of pain" without full context will interpret it as recommending a passive, neutral, featureless state — essentially philosophical nothingness.
• The phrase echoes Buddhist and Stoic counsels of detachment and desire-suppression, and listeners draw exactly that connection — the opposite of the Epicurean position.
• The Epicurean texts warn explicitly against this misuse. The correct approach is to lead with pleasure as the positive goal and introduce the equivalence with "absence of pain" as secondary clarification, not as the primary summary.
• Presenting the Epicurean goal as "absence of pain" to a general audience without full explanation produces a picture of Epicurus as an ascetic minimalist — the precise opposite of what Torquatus described and what Diogenes of Oinoanda carved into stone.

Argument 8: The "Limit" Is Not the Goal — The Full Cup Model

The appropriate analogy - as used in the opening of Lucretius Book Six - is that of a "full cup" or "full vessel" which makes the relevant distinction precisely:

• The limit of pleasure (where pain is fully removed) is the measure of whether the cup is full — it is the criterion of completeness.
• The content of pleasure (the varied, vivid, active pleasures that fill the cup) is what the good life actually consists of.
• Confusing the measure of fullness with the content is like saying a feast is "primarily about not being hungry." Not being hungry is what a completed feast achieves — but the feast consists of food, company, and enjoyment, not of the absence of hunger.
• The full cup cannot be made fuller — but it is full, not empty.

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"[T]he Epicureans said that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures." -- Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius 10.23

A crammed-full cup is not a description of an "absence of pain" philosophy. It is the description of a philosophy of positive, active, abundant pleasure — guided by reason to ensure the cup is sound and the pleasures genuine.

Argument 9: The Three Distorting Traditions That Produced This Reading

The "absence of pain" reading did not arise from careful study of the full panoply of available texts. It arose from three cultural filters that have operated on Epicurus for centuries, all pushing in the same direction:

• The Stoic filter: Stoics found it useful to read Epicurus as a failed Stoic — someone whose ataraxia was essentially Stoic apatheia in different language. Domesticating Epicurus as a philosopher of tranquility served the Stoic agenda.
• The religious filter: For traditions that regard pleasure as morally suspect, reading Epicurus as a philosopher of inner peace (rather than pleasure) makes him theologically more comfortable. The cost is misreading him.
• The Humanist filter: Modern Humanism's emphasis on rational self-restraint and the subordination of appetite to principle makes the "tranquility" reading of Epicurus more acceptable than his actual teaching. Again, comfort is purchased at the price of accuracy.

All three filters consistently distort the reading of Epicurus in the same direction: away from pleasure (which sounds too bodily, too individual) and toward tranquility (which sounds elevated and dignified). All three produce an Epicurus who is no longer recognizably Epicurean.

Argument 10: The Historical Record of Epicurean Lives Contradicts the Ascetic Picture Entirely

If Epicurean philosophy were primarily about the absence of pain — about minimizing desire, withdrawing from engagement, and seeking a passive featureless calm — we would expect to find this reflected in the lives of the Epicurean leaders themselves. We find the opposite at every turn.

Epicurus's own life and property:

• At his death, Epicurus held extensive property — the Garden, his house inside the walls of Athens, and other holdings — and bequeathed them formally by will to continue the school's work.
• The Garden was not a remote rural hermitage. It stood on the Dromos, the most traveled ceremonial thoroughfare in Athens — the main road from the Dipylon Gate to Plato's Academy, thirty-nine meters wide in places, used for the great Panathenaic procession and by travelers, merchants, diplomats, and students daily. Epicurus was not hiding. He was on the main road.
• At the gate of the Garden, Epicurus posted an explicit public welcome: "Hospes hic bene manebis, hic summum bonum voluptas est" — "O Guest, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure." He advertised the philosophy on one of the busiest roads in the ancient world and invited every passerby in.
• Epicurus maintained correspondence with friends and followers across the entire Greek world — not a small isolated community but an extensive network.
• He hosted regular meals and dinners, enjoyed wine, engaged in philosophical conversation as a positive pleasure, and is documented as owning slaves and managing the substantial finances of a large and active school.
• Not a single ancient source describes Epicurus as ascetic, minimalistic, or withdrawn from the city and its life. The description of a recluse in a sealed private retreat is, as the evidence establishes, a fiction.

No Epicurean leader of the ancient world is famed for asceticism:

• Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Colotes, and the other early Epicurean leaders were active, engaged participants in philosophical debate — writing polemical works, corresponding with opponents, building institutions.
• Philodemus (1st century BC) lived and worked in the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum — one of the grandest private estates in the Roman world — as the philosophical associate of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, the father-in-law of Julius Caesar and a man of enormous wealth and political influence. A philosopher whose goal was "absence of pain" in the minimalist sense would not be living in a villa of extraordinary luxury surrounded by one of the largest private libraries of antiquity. Philodemus also wrote prolifically — dozens of surviving works — precisely to bring Epicurean philosophy to the educated Roman public.
• Diogenes of Oinoanda (2nd century AD) spent his personal fortune commissioning a massive stone inscription — covering the entire wall of a public stoa in his city — so that every passerby could read the Epicurean philosophy for free. He states his reason explicitly: he wanted to spread the benefits of philosophy as widely as possible before his death. This is the action of a man who understood his goal as the active promotion of the fullest possible pleasurable life for others — not of a man who thought the goal was passive withdrawal.
• Torquatus and Cassius Longinus, the most prominent Roman Epicureans of the late Republic, were men of the first political and military rank. Cassius organized the conspiracy against Caesar from Epicurean philosophical conviction. Neither resembles an ascetic minimalist by any stretch.

Epicurean leaders actively recruited outsiders:

• Epicurus himself wrote extensively and distributed his works to friends and strangers across the Greek world — the explicit purpose being to share the philosophy and bring others to live well.
• Philodemus's entire career was oriented toward making Epicurean philosophy accessible to Roman intellectual and political society — the opposite of sectarian withdrawal.
• Diogenes of Oinoanda carved philosophy into stone for all who pass by — Greeks and non-Greeks alike, as he states explicitly. His inscription was a form of philosophical outreach without parallel in the ancient world.
• The Epicurean school's warm communal culture — the birthday celebrations of Epicurus, the letters of philosophical friendship, the welcoming of women and slaves as full participants — was explicitly designed to draw people in, not to wall them out.

Epicurean sympathies in the courts of the powerful:

• Antiochus IV Epiphanes, the Seleucid king whose court had Epicurean sympathies, established a Gymnasium in Jerusalem — the institutional center of Hellenistic philosophical culture — not a monastery.
• Empress Pompeia Plotina, wife of Trajan and one of the most powerful women in Rome, was a documented and devoted Epicurean. Her personal letter to Hadrian begins: "How greatly I favor the school of Epicurus you know full well, my lord." She intervened successfully to change Roman law governing the Epicurean school's succession in Athens. Upon her death, Hadrian deified her and built temples in her honor. The Epicurean school's most prominent imperial patron was a woman at the center of Roman power — not a recluse.

The friendship argument as lived practice:

• Friendship — demanding, deep, reciprocal, grief-risking friendship — was not a theoretical value for these leaders. It was the organizing principle of how they lived. Epicurus's deathbed letter to Idomeneus celebrates friendship. Philodemus's philosophical work on frank speech (parrhesia) is organized entirely around the practices of genuine friendship within philosophical community. Diogenes of Oinoanda's inscription is itself an act of friendship extended to strangers.
• Friendship of this kind is neither minimalistic nor ascetic. It requires investment — of time, attention, emotional vulnerability, practical resources — and it generates the kinds of experiences that make "absence of pain" a grossly inadequate description of what the Epicureans were living.

The verdict of the historical record: Not one of the known Epicurean leaders — Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Philodemus, Diogenes of Oinoanda, Torquatus, Cassius Longinus, Pompeia Plotina — lived a life that could honestly be described as organized around minimizing stimulation or withdrawing from engagement. Every one of them was active, connected, productive, and committed to bringing others into the philosophy. The ascetic minimalist picture is a later distortion, not a historical reality.

Summary: What the Texts Actually Say

Conclusion

Saying that Epicurean philosophy is "primarily about the absence of pain" is wrong in multiple independent ways simultaneously:

1. It violates the two-feelings doctrine — absence of pain simply is pleasure.
2. It reads a single clause of the Letter to Menoeceus against the plain meaning of the whole letter.
3. It treats PD3 as a summary of Epicurean ethics when it is a targeted response to a specific philosophical opponent.
4. It contradicts Epicurus's own explicit statements about what he could not conceive the good without.
5. It is flatly contradicted by every ancient witness, friendly and hostile alike.
6. It produces practical counsel (minimize attachments, avoid risk of grief) that Epicurus explicitly rejected.
7. It misleads general audiences by suggesting something like Buddhist or Stoic detachment — the precise opposite of what Epicurus taught.

The Epicurean goal is a life full of positive pleasure — crammed full, as the ancient testimony puts it — pursued wisely so that the pleasures are real, lasting, and uncontaminated by the greater pains that foolish pursuit would bring. Absence of pain describes the same state from the negative side, because where pain ends, pleasure begins — but this logical equivalence should never be mistaken for an endorsement of the empty cup over the full one.

The goal is fullness. Not emptiness.

Also (and there are many other arguments) it is not proper to take a single sentence and not consider it in the context of the full analysis of pleasure as to whether it has a limit, which is what Plato had argued in Philebus. The main reason to consider the total removal of all pain to be the limit of pleasure of pleasure is that unless you can logically define a limit for pleasure, pleasure can always be made better by adding more.

The citations from Plato and Seneca that document this argument about pleasure from the opposing side are in the "Full Cup" article here on the site.

Because he is ignoring the well documented point, stressed by Torquayus as well, that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and that the absence of one is the presence of the other.

He is talking as if less pain is something different and better than more pleasure when in fact they are exactly the same thing.

Thanks to Eikadistes for this link -

The Methods of Ethics, by Henry Sidgwick--The Project Gutenberg eBook

This thread is for discussion of >>

File

No Politics*

"Epíkouros did not ban slavery, but he did free slaves. He did not reform jail, but he did post bail. He did not legalize women’s choices, but he did publish female voices. He did not manage the State, but he did transfer his estate..."

Eikadistes

May 18, 2026 at 6:25 PM

Since the terms psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism are of great interest to some, and those terms appear to originate with Henry Sidgwick, it's probably helpful to have a thread on who Sidgwick was and what he was doing with his categories, and why.

Clearly there is relevance between the thought of the Utilitarians vs Epicurus. I personally consider Utilitarianism to have been a dead end and misapplication of Epicurus' philosophy, but there's always something to learn from history.

The following is an excerpt from Wikipedia

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Sidgwick summarizes his position in ethics as utilitarianism "on an Intuitional basis".^[10] This reflects, and disputes, the rivalry then felt among British philosophers between the philosophies of utilitarianism and ethical intuitionism, which is illustrated, for example, by John Stuart Mill's criticism of ethical intuitionism in the first chapter of his book Utilitarianism.

Sidgwick developed this position due to his dissatisfaction with an inconsistency in Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, between what he labels "psychological hedonism" and "ethical hedonism". Psychological hedonism states that everyone always will do what is in their self-interest, whereas ethical hedonism states that everyone ought to do what is in the general interest. Sidgwick believed neither Bentham nor Mill had an adequate answer as to how the prescription that someone ought to sacrifice their own interest to the general interest could have any force, given they combined that prescription with the claim that everyone will in fact always pursue their own individual interest. Ethical intuitions, such as those argued for by philosophers such as William Whewell, could, according to Sidgwick, provide the missing force for such normative claims.

For Sidgwick, ethics is about which actions are objectively right.^[11] Our knowledge of right and wrong arises from common-sense morality, which lacks a coherent principle at its core.^[12] The task of philosophy in general and ethics in particular is not so much to create new knowledge but to systematize existing knowledge.^[13] Sidgwick tries to achieve this by formulating methods of ethics, which he defines as rational procedures "for determining right conduct in any particular case".^[14][15] He identifies three methods: intuitionism, which involves various independently valid moral principles to determine what ought to be done, and two forms of hedonism, in which rightness only depends on the pleasure and pain following from the action. Hedonism is subdivided into egoistic hedonism, which only takes the agent's own well-being into account, and universal hedonism or utilitarianism, which is concerned with everyone's well-being.^[13][14]

As Sidgwick sees it, one of the central issues of ethics is whether these three methods can be harmonized with each other. Sidgwick argues that this is possible for intuitionism and utilitarianism. But a full success of this project is impossible since egoism, which he considers as equally rational, cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism unless religious assumptions are introduced.^[14] Such assumptions, for example, the existence of a personal God who rewards and punishes the agent in the afterlife, could reconcile egoism and utilitarianism.^[13] But without them, we have to admit a "dualism of practical reason" that constitutes a "fundamental contradiction" in our moral consciousness.^[11]

Metaethics

Sidgwick's metaethics involve an explicit defence of a non-naturalist form of moral realism. He is committed to moral cognitivism: that moral language is robustly truth-apt, and that moral properties are not reducible to any natural properties. This non-naturalist realism is combined with an ethical intuitionist epistemology to account for the possibility of knowing moral truths.^[16]

Esoteric morality

Sidgwick is closely, and controversially, associated with esoteric morality: the position that a moral system (such as utilitarianism) may be acceptable, but that it is not acceptable for that moral system to be widely taught or accepted.^[17]

Bernard Williams would refer to Sidgwickian esoteric utilitarianism as "Government House Utilitarianism" and claim that it reflects the elite British colonialist setting of Sidgwick's thought.^[18]

Philosophical legacy

According to John Rawls, Sidgwick's importance to modern ethics rests with two contributions: providing the most sophisticated defence available of utilitarianism in its classical form, and providing in his comparative methodology an exemplar for how ethics is to be researched as an academic subject.^[19] Allen Wood describes Sidgwick-inspired comparative methodology as the "standard model" of research methodology among contemporary ethicists.^[20]

Despite his importance to contemporary ethicists, Sidgwick's reputation as a philosopher fell precipitously in the decades following his death, and he would be regarded as a minor figure in philosophy for a large part of the first half of the 20th century. Bart Schultz argues that this negative assessment is explained by the tastes of groups which would be influential at Cambridge in the years following Sidgwick's death: Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophers, the remnants of British idealism, and, most importantly, the Bloomsbury Group.^[21] John Deigh, however, disputes Schultz's explanation, and instead attributes this fall in interest in Sidgwick to changing philosophical understandings of axioms in mathematics, which would throw into question whether axiomatization provided an appropriate model for a foundationalist epistemology of the sort Sidgwick tried to build for ethics.^[22]

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That's a great opening email. You are very welcome here!

RoseQuartzAxolotl (that's quite a user name!) tells us this:

Hello Cassius and all!

I'm 34 and I live in the Chicagoland area with my husband and our Shetland Sheepdog. I work on the systems side of education.

I grew up fairly conservative and fundamental Christian, and it took a long time to undo that knot. I've long considered myself an atheist/agnostic in my adult life, but as I enter my middle age years and leave my (relative) "youth" behind, I've looked for answers to existential and practical questions: What is the meaning of my life without religion? What set of ethics do I believe to guide my life? What legacy will I leave behind? How do I navigate this world "alone" without belief in divine intervention or an afterlife? Etc etc.

I had quickly come across Epicureanism a few years ago and I remembered it while reflecting on these questions. As I continue to delve deeper, I continue to find great truth. It's like every time I read a new (to me!) text, I laugh because I think "Aha! Finally some sense in this world!" and I feel I relate to Metrodorus when he fell to his knees after hearing Epicurus speak, feeling he had uncovered the secrets of the universe, so-to-speak. But I am not trained in philosophy at all! I received an earth science degree and most of my humanities classes revolved around arts, art history, and modern foreign language so I never even took a philosophy 101 class. I am trying not to be too intimidated by my current lack of knowledge in both philosophy AND the ancient. I remind myself learning has no age limit, the brain is extremely elastic even well into old age, and the only way to achieve the pleasure of competence is to push through the temporary pain of feeling like a fool. :p I am interested in applying Epicurean principles to modern life, learning more about how the ancient followers structured their day-to-day lives, how these principles can help modern mental health issues (alongside science, not instead of), etc. And just learning more in general!

I wanted to specifically join this forum as my husband does not seem to be nearly as thrilled as I am to discuss an ancient school of philosophy LOL. So for now, this will suffice as my Garden Community.

I appreciate your time! Please let me know if there's anything else I need to provide or questions I need to answer. Have a good day everyone!

Welcome RoseQuartzAxolotl

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 24 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion.

Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards and associated Terms of Use. Please be sure to read that document to understand our ground rules.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be assured of your time here will be productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you already have.

You can also check out our Getting Started page for ideas on how to use this website.

We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

I cross-posted with Bryan and just now see his #12

Quote from Bryan

This is contrasted (Academica 2.142) with "a different judgment exists for Epicurus – who thinks all judgment is established in the senses, in the acquaintance with things, and in pleasure"

This sentence covers a lot but I would think it would be true thaL

"judgment is ESTABLISHED in the senses" means more like "judgment is validated by or is tested against the perceptions of the senses , the anticipations, and the feelings."

With the key point being as in the other citations that judgment takes place in the MIND, not in any of the three categories of faculties, and this is where a major difference arises from the Stoics, who believe that some sensations are "true" and others "false" and that apparently some sensations are so "clear" that the wise man can recognize the true ones as true and the false ones as false, if he is really good at dialectic and syllogisms.

Ok we just finished recording and I am not sure that we hit your precise point Patrikios but I think you will be pleased with this episode and we can come back to that next week. The section we are in is very deep and what you are raising is definitely a part of that.

So it seems I've been repeating the Epicurean formulation "all sensations are true" for many years without fully appreciating that some people (the Stoics) say that some sensations are true and others are false.

I think I've tended to flip back and forth between the Skeptic view that NO sensations are true and the Epicurean ALL sensations are true without realizing that the Stoics tried to maintain that some sensations in themselves are true and others are false.

To me, specifically identifying the Stoic view and comparing it to the Epicurean view is very helpful.

I can't find a good authoritative page I can screen clip but at the hazard of it being wrong here is chatgpt:
VII.46 is where Diogenes is summarizing Stoic epistemology. The Greek wording varies slightly by edition, but the key line containing katalepsis is essentially:

Quote

κατάληψιν δέ φασιν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ

A fairly literal translation:

Quote

They say that katalepsis is assent to a cognitive impression.

Here is a word-by-word interlinear layout:

A more natural English rendering:

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“They say that apprehension consists in giving assent to a cognitive impression.”

Now to your specific concern: the form you wanted is not dictionary-form κατάληψις, but:

κατάληψιν

That ending -ιν marks the accusative singular form. Greek dictionaries list the nominative:

κατάληψις → katálēpsis

So the morphology is:

• κατάληψις = nominative (“apprehension”)
• κατάληψεως = genitive (“of apprehension”)
• κατάληψιν = accusative (“apprehension” as object)

The Stoic chain being described here is:

φαντασία → κατάληψις → ἐπιστήμη

• impression
• cognitive grasp
• knowledge

That sequence becomes particularly important for Epicurean comparisons because Epicureans accepted sensory impressions as criteria but rejected the Stoic notion of a special “cognitive” impression guaranteed by nature.

Here's the Perseus link from which we can look for variations of katalepsis:

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ Ζ

Apparently katalepsis is in here somewhere:

Lives of the Eminent Philosophers/Book VII - Wikisource, the free online library

45. The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things.

An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended.

A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax. 46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.

Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it.^[27] Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind’s assent to impressions. 47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers.

48. Overhastiness in assertion affects the actual course of events, so that, unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness; and in no other way will the wise man approve himself acute, nimblewitted, and generally skilful in argument; for it belongs to the same person to converse well and to argue well, to put questions to the purpose and to respond to the questions put; and all these qualifications are qualifications belonging to the skilled dialectician.

Such is, summarily stated, the substance of their logical teaching. And in order to give it also in detail,^[28] let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers. These are his words:

49. “The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.”

50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise Of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take “impression” in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object.

51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. Of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.

Thanks Don. By the time of DL he'd have been inundated by the Stoic v Skeptic debate and surely would have compared Stoic vs Epicurean views on prolepsis. "A sort of" presumably indicates parallels but not exactly the same (?)

I want to go looking for where DL describes Zeno's version o this in the Stoic section, but haven't got there yet.

For comparison, the key section of Diogenes Laertius 12:

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Diogenes Laertius Ten

I'll quote here the HICKS version just to highlight how the underlined part is a very critical section to look at closely. Bailey and Yonge say here that "he says the same thing" instead of "his own statements" so they plant the presumption that Epicurus agrees with "the Epicureans generally." This Hicks version does not convey that same conclusion. Whether it is correct to say that Epicurus agrees with "the Epicureans generally" is the central question. But if it was so certain that Epicurus agreed, why was it necessary to write that reference distinguishing "the Epicureans generally" at all?

31

They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things. Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations to be also standards. His own statements are also to be found in the Summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Sovran Maxims. Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom.

This short section from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Ancient Greek Skepticism" is also right on point:

ii. Attack on the Stoics

In general, the Stoics were the ideal target for the skeptics; for, their confidence in the areas of metaphysics, ethics and epistemology was supported by an elaborate and sophisticated set of arguments. And, the stronger the justification of some theory, the more impressive is its skeptical refutation. They were also an attractive target due to their prominence in the Hellenistic world. Arcesilaus especially targeted the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, for refutation. Zeno confidently claimed not only that knowledge is possible but that he had a correct account of what knowledge is, and he was willing to teach this to others. The foundation of this account is the notion of katalêpsis: a mental grasping of a sense impression that guarantees the truth of what is grasped. If one assents to the proposition associated with a kataleptic impression, i.e. if one experiences katalepsis, then the associated proposition cannot fail to be true. The Stoic sage, as the perfection and fulfillment of human nature, is the one who assents only to kataleptic impressions and thus is infallible.

Arcesilaus argued against the possibility of there being any sense-impressions which we could not be mistaken about. In doing so, he paved the way for future Academic attacks on Stoicism. To summarize the attack: for any sense-impression S, received by some observer A, of some existing object O, and which is a precise representation of O, we can imagine circumstances in which there is another sense-impression S’, which comes either (i) from something other than O, or (ii) from something non-existent, and which is such that S’ is indistinguishable from S to A. The first possibility (i) is illustrated by cases of indistinguishable twins, eggs, statues or imprints in wax made by the same ring (Lucullus 84-87). The second possibility (ii) is illustrated by the illusions of dreams and madness (Lucullus 88-91). On the strength of these examples, Arcesilaus apparently concluded that we may, in principle, be deceived about any sense-impression, and consequently that the Stoic account of empirical knowledge fails. For the Stoics were thorough-going empiricists and believed that sense-impressions lie at the foundation of all of our knowledge. So if we could not be certain of ever having grasped any sense-impression, then we cannot be certain of any of the more complex impressions of the world, including what strikes us as valuable. Thus, along with the failure to establish the possibility of katalepsis goes the failure to establish the possibility of Stoic wisdom (see Hankinson [1995], Annas [1990] and Frede [1983/1987] for detailed discussions of this epistemological debate).

In today's episode I want us to take the time to read Wikipedia's definition of "kataleptsis" as I think it's going to help us to keep this in mind as we proceed further:

Katalepsis - Wikipedia

The current version is relatively short and straightforward so I'll memorialize it here. I note that it's kind of funny and illuminating that the main way the term "cataleptic" has come down to us today is the medical use of describing "pathological bodily rigidity":

Quote

Katalepsis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For pathological body rigidity described with the same word, see Catalepsy.

Katalepsis (Greek: κατάληψις, "grasping") is a term in Stoic philosophy for a concept roughly equivalent to modern comprehension.^[1] To the Stoic philosophers, katalepsis was an important premise regarding one's state of mind as it relates to grasping fundamental philosophical concepts, which was followed by the assent, or adherence to the truth thus understood.

According to the Stoics, the mind is constantly being bombarded with impressions (phantasiai).^[2] Some of these impressions are true and some false. Impressions are true when they are truly affirmed, false if they are wrongly affirmed. Cicero relates that Zeno would illustrate katalepsis as follows:

He would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and say "A visual appearance is like this"; next he closed his fingers a little and said, "An act of assent is like this"; then he pressed his fingers closely together and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of katalepsis, which it had not had before); but then he used to apply his left hand to his right fist and squeeze it tightly and forcibly, and then say that such was knowledge, which was within the power of nobody save the wise man.^[3]

Katalepsis was the main point of contention between the Stoics and the two schools of philosophical skepticism during the Hellenistic period: the Pyrrhonists and the Academic Skeptics of Plato's Academy. These Skeptics, who chose the Stoics as their natural philosophical opposites, eschewed much of what the Stoics believed regarding the human mind and one's methods of understanding greater meanings.^[4] To the Skeptics, all perceptions were acataleptic, i.e. bore no conformity to the objects perceived, or, if they did bear any conformity, it could never be known.^[5]

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