Posts by Cassius

In regard to the opening of Lucretius referring to interaction between Mars and Venus, I know personally that I've always associated the allusion to mean something like "Venus - good / Mars - bad." However I now see that the original Greek mythology behind their relationship appears to be more subtle, with Venus being at one point in love with Mars, and that they were sometimes cooperative in ancient artwork.

I've collected several references, and I'm starting this thread to discuss whether there are subtleties in this relationship which would give us a deeper understanding of Lucretius' depiction of their relationship. I would especially appreciate comment by Elli or others who are more well-read on Greek mythology.

Ares & Aphrodite - Ancient Greek Vase Painting

https://www.theoi.com/image/K9.1Ares.jpg

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century AD. Archaeological Museum of Naples

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century…

www.meisterdrucke.us

https://www.meisterdrucke.us/kunstwerke/1260px/Roman_-_Representation_of_Ares_and_Aphrodite_accompanied_by_loves_playing_with_the_weapo_-_%28MeisterDrucke-946356%29.jpg

This wikipedia article in particular is helpful:

"Aphrodite The Warlike"

Aphrodite Areia (Ancient Greek: Ἀφροδίτη Ἀρεία) or "Aphrodite the Warlike" was a cult epithet of the Greek goddess Aphrodite, in which she was depicted in full armor like the war god Ares.^[1] This representation was found in Sparta and Taras (modern Taranto). There were other, similarly martial interpretations of the goddess, such as at her Sanctuary at Kythira, where she was worshiped under the epithet Aphrodite Urania, who was also represented as being armed. The epithet "Areia", meaning "warlike", was applied to other gods in addition to Aphrodite, such as Athena, Zeus, and possibly Hermes.^[1]

Aphrodite Areia - Wikipedia

https://ancientrome.ru/art/img/7/7684.jpg

Welcome to Episode 287 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

Today we close in on the ending of Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's argument that all we should face pain "like a man," focusing most of his attention on soldiers and military analogies. This week, Cicero turns his attention to examples of wise men facing pain, and he begins to summarize his argument. We'll pick up with Section XXV.

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/66733199/media

Maybe there's a "preprint" available somewhere that we can search for....

Episode 286 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Confronting Pain With Reason Rather Than With 'Virtue.'"

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/66658711/media

Due to a quirk in the forum software I am not sure that everyone gets notified when a new "blog" article is published. I suspect many people navigate by looking to see what new threads are posted, so this thread is for purposes of being sure people are aware of her latest article:

Blog Article

Fanaticism and the Danger of Dogmatism in Political and Religious Thought: An Epicurean Reading

PD 40: “As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.”

The 21st century bears not only the marks of technological progress and communicative speed; it also carries the heavy shadow of resurgent fanaticism, religious…

Elli

June 19, 2025 at 11:15 AM

Excellent contribution Bryan! So given that Epicurus was likely aware of this statement by Aristotle, which tracks the reasoning of Cosma Raimondi, by the way, what do we make of Diogenes Laertius' and Cicero's statements which seem to stake Epicurus out on the opposite position?

At the moment i am still of the opinion that Epicurus DID say something about the wise man still being happy while under extreme pain, given the statements of Diogenes Laertius and Cicero to that same effect.

I personally then am inclined to conclude that this is going to be more evidence that Epicurus was using words in non-standard ways, and that he did the same to happiness as he did to pleasure and virtue and gods. Clearly if Epicurus held himself to be happy in the midst of last-phase kidney disease, then he is working with a definition of happiness that does not exclude extreme pain. Aristotle and Cosma Raimondi may think that makes no sense, if they are focusing solely on the "stimulative pleasure" side of happiness, but given that Epicurus was expanding the scope of the word "pleasure" I think it's entirely possible that he in fact considered himself to be "happy" and expected his students to understand why.

And that's where I am on "crying out" too. Yes it makes total sense that Epicurus or anyone else would "cry out" when under extreme pain. But on the other hand I do not think it would make sense for Epicurus to compose a book of "Lamentations" to devote his mind to wailing or waxing at length on how much pain he was in.

Leading me to conclude that the best interpretations are probably:

(1) Epicurean happiness does not totally exclude the experience of great pain (mental and bodily). We'll certainly do what is possible to avoid that, but we will bear it by deeming our pleasure to outweigh that pain up until the moment we deem it time to "exit the stage" (because we have rationally concluded that the future will be unavoidably worse);

(2) An Epicurean like any other person going to "cry out" when under torture, but as long as his actions are within his control, an Epicurean won't wail and gnash teeth and compose length lamentations about the pain of life. And in fact an Epicurean will plan ahead to the extent possible to make sure that he does not degenerate into an out-of-control condition before taking events into his own hands.

Ok. You're proposing about 15 acres.

Don this subject came up in the zoom last night. Do we have any indication whatever to your knowledge as to the size of the garden in terms of acres? Kochie was thinking pretty large, and it would probably be enlightening - if there is any basis for it - to start making clear the "size," just as the "location" is significant.

Quote from Rolf

Any suggestions for audio readings?

Joshua's response to this is my view too.

Were it not for the Charlton Griffin rendering on Audible, this forum might well not exist. It was *the* turning point for me in my decision to devote more time to studying Lucretius. I'd rank the Dewitt book up there in the same category of major influences, but it turns out that I needed the motivation of hearing Lucretius read in Griffin's booming voice to really motivate me.

I can't recommend the Griffin audio (which is a reading of the Rolfe Humphries translation) highly enough.

And as a comment on the Humphries verse rendering, I've found that one the best for me too. Even his rending of the title: "The Way Things Are" strikes me as the best "tone" to reflect how forceful Epicurean philosophy can be.

Don is correct. I think most people would agree that the current leading translation by one of the foremost leading scholars is Martin Ferguson Smith's Hackett Publishing version. You can find that lots of places inexpensively.

I know you're looking for a printed edition so I won't focus on the three we have here.

Also check here, and let's add further longer comments there to add to that discussion:

Versions of the Text of Lucretius

Quote from DaveT

I'm reminded of Thomas Jefferson's language in the American Declaration of Independence that we are entitled to the "Pursuit of Happiness". It's not a static state

I think that's exactly right! Certainly happiness can be used to refer to a feeling that exists in the moment, but also happiness can be more of an evaluative judgment as well, and it's important to distinguish which one we are talking about.

Yes that's the interesting part. Regardless of Laertius, CR pretty clearly had Cicero, and Cicero clearly says that Epicurus held that the wise man can be happy when in the bull. Did CR simply not believe him?

And there's a note in the Martin Davies' introduction to the letter to the effect that CR was reputed to be something of an expert in Cicero.

It would be interesting to look at the Latin / Italian of CR's original letter.

Quote from Don

Even if the wise one is under torture - stretched on the rack, he is experiencing eudaimonia."

I recall in my college philosophy class that the professor generally translated that as having a "good spirit."

It seems like the usage in English of "happy" over time has changed, but regardless of that there's no doubt that a normal person today hearing the word "happy" is going to understand at first glance something much different than what was being talked about by Epicurus and the others as well.

Having a good spirit would also appear to be something of an idiom even then - certainly Epicurus did not consider there to be anything supernatural involved in it, regardless of what Socrates might have implied about having a "daemon" talking to him.

What does that lead to? Probably to the continuous need for up-front and early discussion of what "happiness" really means when describing Epicurean philosophy, just like explanations are needed for "pleasure" and "gods" and "virtue."

Epicurus has probably given us the best example possible by writing that letter on his last day. That makes it unmistakeable that happiness does not require total absence of and separation from pain.

That's another very good observation about reading things together. Which takes us back to some degree to the related question of "How did Cosma Raimondi get this wrong?". Is this point Don just made what he failed to appreciate?

I might recombine these two threads given that they may be more closely related than I anticipated, but for the time being I'll keep them separate and just crossreference. Cosma Raimondi is probably an example of the interpretation problem, but the problem is much bigger than him.

And I think the same mistaken estimation of Epicurus ' views of "happiness" is why Cosma Raimondi apparently failed to recognize that Epicurus was taking the same position as the Stoics took, albeit with drastically different definitions of the term "happiness."

It's going to take a lot of adjustment in the minds of many people who think that Epicurus' highest priority was to exclude every pain from life, and that their way to happiness is to live minimally and ascetically so as to never let any pain intrude.

Instead, it appears to me that the fragments we have remaining on this issue point the way to seeing that Epicurus fully recognized that all pain cannot be removed from life in practice, and that in fact he was prepared to find happiness even during periods of great mental and physical pain.

We all know that it was important to Epicurus to emphasize that the goal is happiness rather than "virtue," but this understanding blows a hole in the superficial analysis that happiness is to be found in finding some kind of ambiguous "absence of pain." It points to a much deeper analysis of how pleasure and pain form the basis of happiness. As Diogenes of Oinoanda said, the question is not "what is the means to happiness" but "What is happiness?" And many writers on Epicurus have never really articulated what happiness really means and how it doesn't equate to "absence of pain."

Quote

Fragment 32:

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Quote from DaveT

I've followed this discussion, but I don't understand why discussions of human behavior in extremis (at the point of death) are relevant to the average person. It sounds like argument for argument's sake. I don't intend to be argumentative, but why should we care how a person's prior state of happiness affects them moments before death? Is that supposed to prove anything about the value of living well?

I think your question helps point to the answer. I agree, the Epicureans would NOT have engaged in an in extremis debate unless for the sake of making a larger point. Nor do i think Cicero would. There are deeper issues at stake about the meaning of happiness and under what terms, if any, it can be lost.

Here's the section of Part 2 of Tusculan Disputations to which I am referring. Cicero says that making certain sounds can be helpful at times, but his criticism seems to be against extended "lamentation." Of course the part of the claim he that we avoid lamentation because it is "noble" to do so is largely inadmissible in Epicurean terms, but there are practical implications as well that are more acceptable. At any rate, this context might help explain what the issue is all about.

The key part: For as the engines you throw stones or darts with, throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing, the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them.

More context:

Quote

For the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as burdens are more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if we give way; so the soul by exerting itself resists the whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed, that it cannot support itself. And if we consider things truly, the soul should exert itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally regarded in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or dastardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and above all things we must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sinking of their spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the throwing out of these groans, and the blow comes the stronger.

II-XXIV.¶

What! they who would speak louder than ordinary, are they satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue, or stretching the common organs of speech and utterance? the whole body and every muscle is at full stretch, if I may be allowed the expression, every nerve is exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus Antonius touch the ground when he was speaking with vehemence for himself, with relation to the Varian law. For as the engines you throw stones or darts with, throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, running, or boxing, the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence—if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weakness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give any ease, it still should be considered, whether it were consistent with a brave and resolute man. But, if it does not ease our pain, why should we debase ourselves to no purpose? for what is more unbecoming in a man than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with respect to pain is not confined to it; we should apply this exertion of the soul to everything else. Is anger inflamed? is lust excited? we must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms; but since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great use to consider with all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be too often repeated) and very much inclined to what is honourable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is nothing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honourable conduct, it is that such dangers are supported in war, and that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or if they are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the least step from their honour. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rushing into the battle. But the honourable character and the glory of the death which they were seeking, made all fear of death of little weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left his country triumphing over the Lacedæmonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain.

Thanks Don, that's the kind of analysis we need. At this point I'm still not 100% convinced either way, though. Certainly the wise man is more affected by his emotions than others are, but i'm not sure it follows automatically that the wise man will cry out in pain, or for how long.

Not that i am a wise man, but I know I say "ouch" when I get hit with a paper cut or something unexpected.

Maybe the issue is the subtlety of "lament" or "groan" in the sense of long extended "woe is me" wailing, which is what Cicero seems to be focusing his criticism on in Tusculan Disputations in a discussion that seems to involve funeral rites. While it's natural to "cry out" when we get a sharp pain without prior warning, it's probably not a good idea to "wail" or "lament" continuously when your gout flairs up for hours or days or weeks at a time, or when you are mourning the loss of a loved one.

At the moment that direction is probably the way I would slice the issue. Exclamations for brief and unexpected pain, but after a time you get control of yourself and focus the mind on overcoming the pain.

I see that I started a thread on this six years ago but it did not get developed. This is a question that we discussed in the podcast recorded on 6/15, so if anyone has any comment on whether Yonge could be correct, let me know and I will record some new commentary before the podcast is released.

It appears that the translators other than Yonge seem to take the position that Epicurus said that the wise man WILL cry out under torture, but it's not 100% clear to me that it's beyond doubt that that's what Epicurus would have said.

It seems to me that there is a strong analogy between being under torture and being under the extreme pain of kidney disease, and we know that Epicurus took the time to say that he was still happy while in that condition. But there's nothing recorded as to Epicurus himself groaning or crying out from pain.

Now Cicero himself says that there are times when you are exerting yourself that you will groan/cry out, much in the way that athletes do, so I can see that one angle on this is that it makes sense to groan or cry out when that accomplishes something. But on the other hand if it accomplishes nothing but giving vent to pain/fear/frustration, then I could see it having negative effects on yourself and your friends around you.

I can see as a general rule that it makes sense to say that a truly happy man does not lose his happiness just because he is experiencing severe pain for a time. But it seems to me much harder to state a general rule of "no" or "yes" as to whether or not to groan cry out.

Should we consider the possibility that Yonge has it right and the others have it wrong?

I'd especially appreciate the help of our usual Greek researchers such as Bryan and Don and @Eikadistes on this question.

in a related question, there's a conflict in the translators about the Bull of Phalaris and crying out in pain. Let's deal with that here:

Thread

Does The Wise Man Groan and Cry Out When On The Rack / Under Torture / In Extreme Pain?

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/695/

Cassius

October 28, 2019 at 9:06 AM