Posts by Cassius

Although not dealing directly with Zeno, as we discuss this issue we'll want to refer back to this prior thread from Bryan on "The Covered Father":

Post

The Covered Father

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not…

Bryan

March 2, 2024 at 9:43 PM

Interesting thoughts Twentier. I don't have anything to add to your thinking at the moment, but this phrase in particular sparked my interest:

Quote from Twentier

but, the total sum of immortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases

Are we sure that that is part of the theory? If so, why?

Is there something more going on to explain that, or is that exclusively a deduction from the view that if a class exists, then it exists and infinite number of times, and if so then "infinity never decreases" and so "the total sum of mortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases"?

Today a friend referred me to an essay by Isaac Asimov entitled "The Relativity of Wrong" with which I was not previously familiar. It contains of Socrates which seems right in line with the Epicurean perspective. Even more than that, it contains an analysis of what it means to be "right" or "wrong" that I think is probably also very consistent with Epicurus' perspective. Here's a good summary of the point from Wikipedia ("In the title essay, Asimov argues that there exist degrees of wrongness, and being wrong in one way is not necessarily as bad as being wrong in another way")

I don't know anything about this website that has a copy other than that it comes up first when one searches for the author and title) but here it is in easy to read form. (Let me expand my caveat - I haven't vetted any of these websites I am linking to - I just see on their face that they address this topic.)

The Relativity of Wrong by Isaac Asimov

Looks like it can also be read here: https://skepticalinquirer.org/1989/10/the-relativity-of-wrong/

There's also a copy on Archive.org

Some criticism of the article here.

Seems to me to be an enjoyable article and well worth reading.

We can probably take this article as key material:

Zeno’s Paradoxes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Zeno’s Paradoxes

First published Tue Apr 30, 2002; substantive revision Wed Mar 6, 2024

Almost everything that we know about Zeno of Elea is to be found in the opening pages of Plato’s Parmenides. There we learn that Zeno was nearly 40 years old when Socrates was a young man, say 20. Since Socrates was born in 469 BC we can estimate a birth date for Zeno around 490 BC. Beyond this, really all we know is that he was close to Parmenides (Plato reports the gossip that they had a sexual relationship when Zeno was young), and that he wrote a book of paradoxes defending Parmenides’ philosophy. Sadly this book has not survived, and what we know of his arguments is second-hand, principally through Aristotle and his commentators (here we draw particularly on Simplicius, who, though writing a thousand years after Zeno, apparently possessed at least some of his book). There were apparently 40 ‘paradoxes of plurality’, attempting to show that ontological pluralism—a belief in the existence of many things rather than only one—leads to absurd conclusions; of these paradoxes only two definitely survive, though a third argument can probably be attributed to Zeno. Aristotle speaks of a further four arguments against motion (and by extension change generally), all of which he gives and attempts to refute. In addition, Aristotle attributes two other paradoxes to Zeno. Sadly again, almost none of these paradoxes are quoted in Zeno’s original words by their various commentators, but in paraphrase.

1.1 Ancient Background

Before we look at the paradoxes themselves it will be useful to sketch some of their historical and logical significance. First, Zeno sought to defend Parmenides by attacking his critics. Parmenides rejected pluralism and the reality of any kind of change: for him all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason and revelation. Not surprisingly, this philosophy found many critics, who ridiculed the suggestion; after all it flies in the face of some of our most basic beliefs about the world. In response to this criticism Zeno did something that may sound obvious, but which had a profound impact on Greek philosophy that is felt to this day: he attempted to show that equal absurdities followed logically from the denial of Parmenides’ views. You think that there are many things? Then you must conclude that everything is both infinitely small and infinitely big! You think that motion is infinitely divisible? Then it follows that nothing moves! (This is what a ‘paradox’ is: a demonstration that a contradiction or absurd consequence follows from apparently reasonable assumptions.)

I would say that I think your post illustrates how two of the most important things to do at the very start is:

1 - Get rid of every implication and every attribute we think we know about gods except that they are (1) living beings, (2) live totally happy lives, and (3) are deathless.

2 - Then consider everything after that to be a matter of lesser importance, on which you can come up with some reasonable theories, but can't be sure about the details. That's just like the stars and other things in the sky where you don't have much evidence. You can come up with possibilities that are consistent with basic physics, and harmonize with point 1, but there you have to be satisfied with multiple possibilities rather than single certainties.

As Velleius put it in the nature of the gods, it's Point 1 that is essential and the place where you can really stop. Point 2 may be helpful to some people, but not to others, and we don't have enough information to be totally sure how things really are. So if we go into Point 2 we really have to be careful about the limits of what we know and what we don't.

Point 1 is the part we can be sure about based on the reasoning given:

Quote

XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

Going that far gets you to the point where you are certain that there is no need to live in dread of gods.

Going further into Point 2 gets you more into matters of "curiosity" rather than what you really need to know, and takes you into areas where you are "directed partly by nature and party by reason" where the conclusions are less certain. And there you get into areas where "waiting" and multiple possibilities are going to be the best you can do, and you start talking then about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" because you just don't have any more detail.

Quote

For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason.

Thanks for that exhaustive treatment Twentier!

Robert we have a lot of former Buddhists here, so you might find this subforum interesting, especially if you find yourself wanting to discuss points of comparison.

But to you (and all new people) who just get starting reading the forum, please feel free to post questions or comments in any section as you are getting started, and don't worry about waiting to try to read everything before you post.

This isn't like a computer tech forum where the standard answer to basic questions is RTFM. We have some basic materials or locations to which we can point you, but more than that our participants enjoy going through basic points with "newer" people. Doing that regularly helps us sharpen our own understanding and reminds us of the basic points, rather than staying deep in weeds, as we can tend to do when we're discussing some history or translation or textual issue. The basic points always need to be our primary points of discussion.

I have posted above the text of section 27, which is where we will go next when we resume the text, but I wanted to memorialize too that -- as we discussed on Wednesday night -- there is more to say about the take-home aspects of Zeno's paradoxes, so we will probably start the episode by covering that.

.... Which means we will need to do some more preparation on exactly what those "take-home" points are!

Welcome to Episode 244 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXVII. This, I perceive, is what you contend for, that the Gods have a certain figure that has nothing concrete, nothing solid, nothing of express substance, nothing prominent in it; but that it is pure, smooth, and transparent. Let us suppose the same with the Venus of Cos, which is not a body, but the representation of a body; nor is the red, which is drawn there and mixed with the white, real blood, but a certain resemblance of blood; so in Epicurus’s Deity there is no real substance, but the resemblance of substance.

Let me take for granted that which is perfectly unintelligible; then tell me what are the lineaments and figures of these sketched-out Deities. Here you have plenty of arguments by which you would show the Gods to be in human form. The first is, that our minds are so anticipated and prepossessed, that whenever we think of a Deity the human shape occurs to us. The next is, that as the divine nature excels all things, so it ought to be of the most beautiful form, and there is no form more beautiful than the human; and the third is, that reason cannot reside in any other shape.

First, let us consider each argument separately. You seem to me to assume a principle, despotically I may say, that has no manner of probability in it. Who was ever so blind, in contemplating these subjects, as not to see that the Gods were represented in human form, either by the particular advice of wise men, who thought by those means the more easily to turn the minds of the ignorant from a depravity of manners to the worship of the Gods; or through superstition, which was the cause of their believing that when they were paying adoration to these images they were approaching the Gods themselves. These conceits were not a little improved by the poets, painters, and artificers; for it would not have been very easy to represent the Gods planning and executing any work in another form, and perhaps this opinion arose from the idea which mankind have of their own beauty. But do not you, who are so great an adept in physics, see what a soothing flatterer, what a sort of procuress, nature is to herself? Do you think there is any creature on the land or in the sea that is not highly delighted with its own form? If it were not so, why would not a bull become enamored of a mare, or a horse of a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin prefers any shape to its own? If nature, therefore, has instructed us in the same manner, that nothing is more beautiful than man, what wonder is it that we, for that reason, should imagine the Gods are of the human form? Do you suppose if beasts were endowed with reason that every one would not give the prize of beauty to his own species?

Thanks for introducing yourself Robert! We look forward to hearing more from you!

Lucretius Today Episode 243 - "From "All Sensations Are True" to Reasoning By Similarity And Analogy" - is now available:

The episode should be released later today. One thing that Joshua brings up tangentially is a reference to Zeno's paradoxes - specifically as to whether Achilles could outrun the tortoise if the tortoise had any head start at all.

In our current context, the important of that is the question of what Zeno was advocating and why. Was he really asserting that Achilles cannot outrun a tortoise? Or was he making the opposite point, and expecting us to make the obvious deduction, that what we see must be taken as more real and more important than what a logical formula divorced from the senses might say?

I don't know that we have discussed that enough, and even if we have in prior conversations, this is a classic challenge to the senses that it would benefit us to highlight somewhere on the forum more so than we do now.

Perhaps all of his 'paradoxes' need the same treatment, the the tortoise one is maybe the best well known.

I would say there is no doubt but that what you are talking about in terms of a "internal existing working model of how the universe operates" is an important aspect of our lives. And I would say there is no doubt but that prolepsis is involved in the formation and operation of that. It might be going too far to say that they are exactly the same thing, but I'd agree that they are closely related.

I feel much the same way on each of your points Matteng. If you are so inclined to make comments here while you are reading the book, I feel sure those would be helpful to the group. The charge of "lack of engagement with society" is in my view not at all warranted, but it has been very damaging to the wider acceptance of Epicurean philosophy and needs to be dealt with aggressively. No self-respecting healthy young person is going to be willing to embrace Epicurean philosophy if they think that doing so requires them to withdraw from the world and "live in a cave." I think most of us here share our disagreement with that charge, to the extent that it seems ridiculous even to talk about the charge as if it were serious, but it certainly is a serious one and much work needs to be invested in driving it away as in VS46:

VS46. Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

Thanks Godfrey! I think pulling these sentences out goes in the same direction. If these stand alone:

Quote

Relative predicates do not have the same status as things said not relatively but in accordance with something’s own nature. Nor does the one kind truly exist but the other not. So to expect them to have the same attributes, or the one kind to exist but the other not, is naive.

... even that is prettty confusing to me but "things said not relatively but in accord with something's own nature" must refer to "gold" and "stone" or such otherwise "real objects" (presumably?)

And I think you are right on point here too, and the "surprise" you mention is why this is so important -- "events" DO seem to be being given the same status of significance to us as "material objects":

Quote from Godfrey

I'm a little surprised by that, because I would think that his position would be that "larger" and "smaller" would just be "events," and therefore not real. At least they would not be material; he seems to be saying that an event is real, even if not material.

If I am reading all this correctly then this reinforces the point that I think a lot of people kick back against, or even refuse to entertain the possibility of --- that the emphasis on dreams during sleep and the visions of madmen as being 'real' are part and parcel of a total overhaul of ways of thinking, in which Epicurus is doubling down that we must consider everything that affects us as being "real" rather than being caught up in the game being played by lots of people (Stoics then and now, lots of others today too) that we shouldn't consider the things that affect us as being "real" unless they have a flesh and blood or fully material existence.

There's a lot at stake in the issue of whether we should require "reality" to have a physical existence in order for us to consider it to be real and to exclude everything that does not possess material existence as "fantasy"

Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy?
Caught in a landslide, no escape from reality...

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Here is the part of Dr. Sedley's commentary that appears right after the quote that is included under "Part 1" in the post above. Explaining or giving examples of the the last underlined sentence below (especially as to "relative predicates") would be particularly helpful.

Quote

The opponents can be seen to draw heavily on Platonic dialectical materials in order to launch their attack on the reality of values, in particular in their contrast between the universally agreed determinate nature exhibited by minerals and the cultural relativity of values. As one might expect of the New Academy, this sceptical argument borrows its materials freely from the text of Plato (Phaedrus, 263a, cf. also Euthyphro, 7b-d, Theaetetus, 172b). More remarkable is how Polystratus, in his reply, appears himself to draw inspiration from Plato – a strategy with all the more ad hominem force when directed against Plato’s own self-declared successors. Plato had indeed never intended by this contrast between minerals and values to impugn the reality of the latter, any more than he had meant to infer from the relativity of large(r) and small(er) to their unreality. On the contrary, at Sophist 255c he had presented an exhaustive division of beings (ὄντα) into absolute and relative, a bicategorial scheme which became formal Academic doctrine under his second successor Xenocrates (F15 Isnardi Parente 2 ). Much the same stance as Plato’s own is developed by Polystratus as a rebuttal of the contemporary Academy. He resourcefully points out that the mere existence of an ontological difference between the two categories does not entail that one or other of them will fall short of reality. Anyone who thinks otherwise, he ingeniously adds, could as easily argue that, since such relative predicates as beneficial and harmful manifestly are part of the structure of reality, it must be the non-relative items such as minerals that are unreal!

As we prepare this week's recording for broadcast it looks like I may need to do some particular slicing in regard to the time we spent on David Sedley's "Point 1" as to Ontological argument in the post immediately above. The argument apparently revolves around the alleged differences between two classes, which appear to be(1) a class that includes "relative terms" vs (2) a class that includes gold and stones.

Apparently the difference between these two classes was being used by the Skeptics to argue that the senses are not real, but Sedley says that the Epicurean was able to turn the argument on its head and use it to show that the argument could just as well prove the reverse.

What is not so clear to me is which class the skeptics were saying was "real," and why. Seems I have read that Plato held that the "idea" of a horse is real, but individual horses 10 feet in front of us we can't be sure of. It therefore may be that the Skeptics were arguing that the relative terms are real, but the gold and stone or not. And in particular, there is something going on about how people perceive the same thing differently under different circumstances. But what's not clear on quick reading is whether what is being perceived differently are the relative terms or the solid objects. And it's even less clear how the argument could be turned on its head to show allegedly the opposite position. But then maybe the reason it's not clear has something to do with how the argument can be used for either side of the question.

If anyone has time to look at this part of the article and attempt to place the argument in simpler terms that would be great. i intend to take a look at this over the next several days to be sure that the podcast discussion that we release doesn't conflict with our best reading of this fairly tricky subject.

Thank you MaiTaiNye! It's seems pretty clear you are real person so take your time and look around and comment further whenever you're ready.

I haven't had a chance to read this one yet, but looks directly on point with our discussion here in this forum:

Happiness despite Mortality: Epicurus' Preparation against Death and Pain in Cic. Tusc. 5.88f

A a close reading of Cic. Tusc. 5.88f., which draws on well known source texts to set out Epicurean reasons why death and pain are no impediments to perfect…

www.academia.edu