Posts by Cassius

Don that has me thinking too about another comment that was made tonight, I think by Tau Phi to Kalosyni, that in her example of thinking about a "jacket," that -- even for the same person - a "jacket" might one day be natural, might another day be necessary, and another day (possibly) be unnatural or unnecessary.

In other words, that virtually any single concrete desire we could name (excepting only extreme examples like "world dictator" or the like) might migrate between the categories based on circumstances.

If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?

i put together this chart to assist in conversation in our Monday zoom discussion about this topic. My summary of each answer is brief and no doubt grossly inadequate to what the speaker had to say, but I think the variation in answers might be good food for thought as the discussion continues. No doubt each person was thinking something different, especially as I explained the question, but the fact that the result of the Yes/No question was almost evenly split indicates that the answer does not seem to be obvious to everyone..

As Tau Phi asked me, my own answer to the first two columns would be "Pleasure / No," but like everyone else I would have explanation for each answer (and that's what we are discussing in this thread.).

One thing I will say about it is that it strikes me that there is a connection between thinking it is a good idea to (1) categorize all feelings into two categories and (2) categorize all desires into four categories. There's no necessity that we do either, and we could have chosen to come up with many categories, but it makes good sense to reduce them as far as reasonably possible, and it provides a useful framework for analysis.

I would see this as Epicurus being both practical and philosophical at the same time.

Following up on Don's last comment, there seems to me to be an important issue in how we approach:

PD29. Among desires, some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

as against -

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

As I see it, Torquatus was able to take a dogmatic and literalist position on the argument that when you're not in pain you're in pleasure, because it's definitional - virtually mathematical - that when one is absent the other is present.

But when referring to PD29 he talks in terms of profitability or suitableness or usefulness (depending on the translator) which seems to me a more "practical" basis for the analysis.

[45] I ask what classification is either more profitable or more suited to the life of happiness than that adopted by Epicurus? He affirmed that there is one class of passions which are both natural and needful; another class which are natural without being needful ; a third class which are neither natural nor needful; and such are the conditions of these passions that the needful class are satisfied without much trouble or expenditure ; nor is it much that the natural passions crave, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount; and it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit to false passions.

Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

Now I certainly think that both doctrines ( "pleasure is the absence of pain" and the "classification of the desires" ) are both practical and useful, it seems to me that the first is more clearly a definitional choice that derives from logic (it's clearly possible to break pain and pleasure into subcategories, so it's by intelligent choice that we reduce them to two). The classifications of desires are are also matters of choice, but it's harder to see because in the case of the terms "pleasure" and "pain" we all know that there are many different types of pleasures and pains. In the case of "necessary desires" however, we jump more readily to the idea that there's only a short and definable list of what is "natural" and "necessary."

Actually as I am writing this I am talking myself into a somewhat different view from where I started...... I am now liking the natural and necessary classification more, if we can link it to the same kind of broad analysis as pain and pleasure, and resist the temptation to think that there's a strict absolute list. Maybe the necessity to analyze and understand the two separate classification systems in the two different doctrines complements each other!

I want to add this: The only way it would make sense to conclude that you would never pursue anything other than natural and necessary desires would be to believe that as a matter of natural law or some other necessity or flat guarantee, that pursuing anything other than natural and necessary desires is guaranteed to lead to more pain than pleasure.

It does not appear to me that there are any grounds of necessity on which that can be argued to be the case, or that there are any such that statements in Epicurean philosophy. In contrast, the starting point is the statement that all pleasures are desirable, but some will bring more pain than pleasure. It seems to me a stretch to say that there is any flat list that always must be followed to the exclusion of the general rule, even if there are generalizations, such as excessive pursuit of sex or romantic love, that can be made as a warning against that course.

The only way there could be such a flat list would be if there were supernatural gods, or ideal forms, or some other mechanism that guaranteed such a result. Otherwise it's up to us to analyze our own circumstances to determine what is likely to result for us.

Kalosyni's search for an explicit definition is a good way of looking at the problem, but I think part of the answer will be that while all sorts of explanations can be given, a major part of any correct explanation is that no explicit flat list that applies to everyone can be given.

Note: Just in case I am not being clear with the term "flat list," I mean "flat" in the sense of evenly and explicitly applying to everyone at all times in all places and in all circumstances. So a "flat list" would be an explicit list of do's or "don'ts" that always applies without any exception whatsoever.

So Epicurus would tell everyone to buy a single black jacket when they reach 18 or full height, and never buy another one until that one falls into rags? As a matter of principle, why would anyone using the NNUU formula do more than that?

Because you like different colors? That's unnecessary.

Because you like different styles? That's unnecessary.

Because you don't like to look at worn threadbare clothing? That's unnecessary.

And on and on...

How does the classification itself lead to any other result?

My point is that the classification itself standing alone is useless or even harmful, just like "pleasure is the absence of pain" can be destructive, without other overriding information.

In one case, the additional information that is needed is that there are only two feelings, which means that the absence of one is the presence of the other. In this case, the additional information is that all pleasure is desirable and worthy of choice if it brings more pleasure than pain, therefore you will never think of limiting yourself only to desires that are "necessary and natural," especially since you also know that there are no supernatural gods or ideal forms that require everyone to follow a prescribed list of what is "natural" or "necessary" for them.

New jackets in many (but not all) cases are going to bring more pleasure than pain. Thus the "principle of the classification" (as Torquatus says) explains that "unnatural and unnecessary" can be expected to cost more in pain.

I'd say the classification system was not intended to be a hard and fast rule philosophical rule, but a tool, almost like a price predictor or cost estimator - a way of predicting how much pain to expect from an action so that you can then decide if the pleasure will be worth it. The future isn't certain and we disdain fortune-telling, but that doesn't mean we don't need a practical way of predicting what will happen from pursuing alternative choices.

And as a rule of prediction, it works very well - "nothing could be more useful...." per Torquatus. So it's very productive to use the classification system to predict the costs of your pleasures. But the overriding rule is to seek out more pleasure than pain using the cost estimator, not to use the cost estimator as an end in itself.

So I would also analogize this classification system to "virtue," which is necessary to consider in order to obtain happiness, but which is not the end in itself. Both "virtue" and this classification system can be very destructive if taken out of context and put into the place of the end rather than of the means.

As a tangential comment Eikadistes, I also perceive a tendency in the "fourth leg" argument to conclude that the assignment of a word to a particular thing (the grasping part, i gather) involves a little more steering by nature than I think is consistent with Epicurus.

As I read the discussion of language and civil society in Lucretius, it seems to me that the real stress is on "these developed naturally rather than being given by supernatural gods," rather than "nature leads us to associate certain words with certain things" or "nature leads us to a proper word choice" or "nature leads us to a proper system of government." I see both those as a "trial and error" process in which there are lots of different languages, and lots of different systems of government, that can all be equally consistent with "nature."

I have a lot of respect for some who argue that there's a fourth leg, and clearly Diogenes Laertius says that "the Epicureans generally" (I think is the phrase) embraced the fourth leg. But to the extent that these other Epicureans deviated from Epicurus I think they were mistaken in doing so. The whole thing sounds to me like an improper attempt to reconcile with Stoicism.

I look forward to Don and Bryan and anyone else fluent in Greek commenting on this. But your conclusion Eikadistes I continue to share: There are three legs of the canon, and they can be counted on because they do not involve opinion - i.e., they are never true or false, they just are.

An operation of the mind which involves an opinion that is true or false (as would appear from your cite) cannot properly be thought of as a test of truth. That would be testing one opinion against another opinion.

I suspect that the "fourth leg" position comes about from people knowing that comparing opinion against opinion is an important part of reasoning, and that's absolutely true. But that isn't the way you get back to and test opinions against raw data - you have to have a starting point which is not itself an opinion - you have to have a "yardstick." And opinions are not given to us by nature such that we can consider them to be a baseline yardstick.

Quote

I always have trouble with DeWitt's footnotes since they are in such small text, but it's on page 30 of his book:

For this ambitious program of expansion the school was prepared as no Greek school had ever been or ever would be. Not only was every convert obligated to become a missionary; he was also a colporteur who had available a pamphlet for every need. "Are you bloated with love of praise? There are infallible rites," wrote Horace, "which can restore your health if only you will read a pamphlet three times with open mind," "Send him a pamphlet," cried Cicero in the senate-house, taunting the Epicurean Piso about the ambition of his son·in·law Julius Caesar. Could better evidence be cited to prove that Epicureans were pamphleteers?

Good post Don.

Quote from Don

Maybe Epicureans would be on the street corner handing out leaflets? But where do we point them?

I wonder what the pamphlets that Cicero referred to in his day said at the end to address "Do You Want To Know More?"

No problem Don I figured you were preoccupied. Rolf has raised some good questions so credit to him for helping us look at this with fresh eyes.

Kalosyni's post is a good summary of the practical reasons why you would pursue the course advised by Epicurus.

I also want to add another consideration to my posts above. I would argue that people who focus on understanding the philosophy are naturally going to want to proceed to understand and apply the practice, but people who focus on "practice" are far more likely to never proceed any further, and rather quickly drift away, if they do not put equal or greater focus on the philosophy. I would wager that's the largest explanation for the percentage of those who come through the forum and don't hang around very long.

Also, I see the natural and necessary question as very similar to the "pleasure = absence of pain" question. Both are on their face very easy for someone to think they understand, but if you do not know the philosophic background of both then you're going to apply them superficially and never understand the deeper meaning. I'll never accept that anyone can make sense of "pleasure = absence of pain" without the context of knowing that there are only two feelings, and so the equation is a mathematical equivalency. There's absolutely no way to grasp a definite meaning for "absence of pain" without that background, and that's why the Stoics and Buddhists who pay visits to Epicurus love to talk about the formula superficially but never explain it further.

In the case of "pleasure = absence of pain" there is therefore a pretty quick and direct context which can be explained, and someone set on the right path, pretty easily. You tell them that they are equivalent because there are only two possibilities when you are alive, and that means absence of one means the presence of the other.

In the case of the "natural and necessary desire" formula, I don't think most of us (including me) can easily give a short pithy logical explanation of why - just as "pleasure = absence of pain" doesn't lead to general asceticism and minimalism - the "natural and necessary desire" formula doesn't also lead to general asceticism and minimalism. What Kalosyni and others have give above is a "clinical" reason for the conclusion, but a philosopher is never going to abandon the field of philosophy, and we need the "logical" side too.

Think about PD10 - Epicurus has already said that if the life of a profligate - which presumably embraces all sorts of unnatural and necessary desires - actually brought happiness, we would have no complaint with it. That's an example of embracing the logical conclusions of one's philosophy. Is part of the background that Epicurus has already said that success is the measure of the theory, not any particular tool, so we would never interpret "natural" and "necessary" in an absolute way? Because surely if we were to pursue nothing but unnatural and unnecessary desires, and we were one of those rare success stories, Epicurus would say "I have no complaint with you - you have reached the goal."

So it seems to me we need to think about "What is/are the background premises that explain this saying?" so we can give people the full picture early in their reading.

The best I've come up with is the Torquatus explanation that the whole natural/necessary thing is simply pointing out that exotic pleasures (just as is over-devotion to romance/sex) are difficult or impossible to get without excess pain, while the more ordinary and indeed natural and necessary are generally (not always) easy to get without excess pain.

It's very possible there are other and better ways of explaining it, such as Kalosyni's but for purposes of clarity it needs to be short and hard-hitting, just as is the observation that there are only two feelings.

Remember what Frances Wright has Epicurus say in his debate with Zeno:

‘Tell us not that that is right which admits of evil construction; that that is virtue which leaves an open gate to vice.’ This is the thrust which Zeno now makes at Epicurus; and did it hit, I grant it were a mortal one."

I would say that we should not through lack of logical diligence present the natural and necessary desires formula in a way that leaves an open gate to vice. And I would call excessive frugality/asceticism/minimalism a "vice" - so we shouldn't leave an open door to it.

I think these two statements are important, and I could probably find one from Godfrey and Kalosyni and others to the same effect. There are legitimately several approaches to Epicurus - including at least (1) clinician and another (2) as a "philosopher."

Quote from Don

At the risk of muddying waters, I'm not sure looking for the "logical" reasons behind Epicurus' categorization of desires is as fruitful as it may sound. My perspective veers more toward seeing Epicurus as an observational researcher of the natural world and synthesizing those observations into workable practical applications for real people.

Quote from Titus

I would like to say yes, but this is just a theoretical yes as I consider the classification of desires as a guidance tool for choosing priorities. In this sense, the category of natural and necessary desires is something that has to be of number one priority to us.

Again I think both are valid approaches and they are a large part of what we need to continue to do here at the forum. At the moment I'm thinking that it's important to emphasize both and not leave either unappreciated, similar to how both Menoeceus AND Herodotus are important.

Clearly Epicurus thought enough of the natural and necessary distinction to refer to it in both the letter to Menoeceus and the Principle Doctrines. If one wanted to debate priorities, one side could note that this formula comes before even the detailed discussion of pleasure in the letter to Menoeceus, but on the other hand it comes rather late (29) in the Principal Doctrines.

One could also argue that he who focuses only on the logic misses some of the practical usage, while he who focuses only on the practical uses is powerless against the forces of the world which deny him the practice of pleasure.

I think everyone here at the forum does a good job of keeping both in perspective, but I am equally confident that outside the forum, the elevation of the practical application to the preeminent role is a major problem that needs to be tackled. So I'll admit much of what I write tends to be aimed at preparing arguments for external audiences, or those who aren't familiar with Epicurus and who need to know what to prioritize in their initial reading. But in the end, both the focus on practice and the focus on theory are needed as they depend on each other.

At this point in the conversation I would point back to Rolf's original question:

Quote from Rolf

I can acknowledge that I enjoy unnecessary pleasures and wish to pursue them, but logically speaking, why exactly should we not aim to fulfil only our necessary desires?

Titus and Godfrey, in your answers, did you address this question specifically? Do you agree that you can pursue only necessary pleasures and reach 100% pleasure (or happiness)? If you can pursue only necessary pleasures and reach the target, why would you pursue any others than those which are easiest to obtain?

Quote from Titus

I know Cassius' is fighting the image of the minimalist frugal Epicurean who lives on bread and water but I would like to see more sensitivity as to why there is a category of"unnecessary desires" in the first place.

I think that's a good question, and to make it even broader, why does any part of this categorization exist in the first place? Is it a logical part of explaining "the nature of things" like atomism or a position on gods or life after death or that pleasure is the goal of life? Or is it a "tool" question such as the analysis of virtue, to be applied properly only after the others are adequately understood?

I can definitely see that there are many people who are convinced that reckless pursuit of power and fame and riches who need to revise their goals so as to drop those which are most destructive to them. But while we are helping them see the right way to approach that question, we need to avoid stating things in a loose way that is logically confusing to those who are closely trying to follow the logical consistency of the philosophy. We shouldn't fight our way out of claims of supernatural or absolute right and wrong only to turn around and fall victim to interpretations that there is a strict list of "natural" and "necessary" that applies to everyone.

Many of us have observed before that what is "necessary" and "natural" in one time and place is totally unnecessary and (again depending on your definition) unnatural in another.

So I suppose what I am saying ultimately is that the full explanation of the natural and necessary approach must include the observation that natural and necessary are relative to time and place and other circumstances, and are not to be interpretation as a call to absolute frugalism/minimalism. And that's how I read the Torquatus explanation, which points to the "principle of the classification" (some things are harder to get than others) as being the important thing) rather than assigning a specific absolute meaning to any category.

We talked about this part but not sure we ever quoted it:

Quote

[127] ....We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life.

I would say that both Titus and Godfrey are working well within the "practical" paradigm that makes sense.

The danger is (and this is the way that I read Rolf's question) is that it is easy to take the discussion and arrive at Rolf's question: "Why should I seek more than bread and water and a cave?"

That's where a strict and over-literal interpretation of the texts could lead someone to answer "You wouldn't."

And the starting point of discussing the philosophy is getting past those foundational issues. Neither Godfrey nor Titus have for a moment (as far as I know) entertained the idea of living in cave. Both are highly accomplished people who would not trade their past lives for life in a cave.

But for those who ask the logical philosophical question (and I think everyone should, as would any child being taught Epicurean philosophy) there needs to be a logical answer, and that answer most generally is "You would pursue more than the life in the cave because X, Y, and Z., as exemplified by Epicurus himself, who certainly did not stay in a cave all his life."

Let me give my take on "Why not the best?" and why I don't see it as distinctly American:

I am reading Greek philosophy as engaged in just that search: "What is the best way of life?" because why would someone want other than the best that is available to him? If there is in fact a god, or life after death, I certainly want to conform to that god and live forever in bliss. I think most people of any nationality would see things that way, though I concede there may be some who don't.

But then the question is "What IS the best way of life, and that is where the debate about gods and life after death and ideal forms and the rest comes in.

Epicurus says that the best is "a life of pleasure." and so we go from there learning how best to pursue the life of pleasure.

But the starting point is identifying the goal before talking about how to achieve it, and most of the philosphical warfare is over "what is the goal?"

Quote from Rolf

at the end of the day Epicurean ethics comes down to using prudence to maximise the ratio of pleasure to pain, with much of the rest being tools to help one do this. Would you agree with this evaluation (oversimplified as it may be)?

Yes I would agree that that is good summary of the situation. The conclusion is that it's not supernatural gods/ideas that tell us the best way to live, but the faculty of pleasure, and the rest is either the leadup to the conclusion (through study of nature / atomism) or the way to pursue pleasure practically. That's what all the virtue stuff is - virtue is the necessary tool for living plesurably, but it's a "tool" not a set of absolute standards.

Quote from Rolf

On that note, I’d probably say to such as a stoic that it is important to remember that boredom and regret, too, are pains. They must be factored in when deciding on which pleasures to pursue.

Yes boredom and regret are pains. But given that the Stoics don't consider pain to be important and that only virtue is important, I don't know that any argument on pleasure ever makes much headway with them.

Something else:

In discussing DeWitt's analysis of extending the meaning of pleasure to all that is not painful, I think DeWitt drives the ball right up to the goal line, but I am not sure he scores the touchdown.

Likewise, I think that Cicero allows Torquatus to explain the point of absence of pain in a relatively complete way, and we'd be much worse off if we didn't have this, but he still doesn't let Torquatus drive the point home with force. He never lets Torquatus give a fully adequate closing argument on why men who say they are without pain are at the height of pleasure, or why the host pouring wine is at an equal state of pleasure as the guest drinking it.

My view of the situation is that in order to drive the point home forcefully, you have to vigorously argue the "why" of the Epicurean perspective, and that goes back to the main fight - with supernatural religion.

DeWitt could explain Epicurus' position and say that men would be better off if they thought this way, but in his time and place as a college professor he could launch the kind of frontal attack against religion that Frances Wright did in the final chapter of "A Few Days In Athens."

And Cicero wasn't going to do Epicureans the favor of preserving their full arguments in his own work. You have to piece it together from "On the Nature of the Gods" and "On Ends" and others.

Some people who come to the realization that Epicurus was simply extending the name of pleasure to all life that is not painful are going to think that Epicurus was "cheating" or "playing word games" and they are going to walk away disappointed.

I think that's why so many people also find Lucretius disappointing - they want more ethics and less atoms.

But I think the truth is that Lucretius' presentation IS Epicurean philosophy at its core, because when you try to talk someone who is not an Epicurean into being an Epicurean, you don't start off with pleasure and pain. You start off with explaining that the universe is not supernatural, and that there are no absolute truths, and THEN you go on to show that pleasure and pain are all that nature gives us to decide how to live.

The point I am trying to make is that Epicurus did what he did for a very good reason - because the world then and now is populated by charlatan priests and philosophers who are trying to use their supposed privileged knowledge to manipulate other people. And the proper response to that is to go right back at them, as did the Epicurean in Lucian's essay who stood up to Alexander the Oracle Monger, And equally or more bad are the Academic Skeptics who say that no knowledge is possible in the first place and we have to just drift through life never being confident of anything except that the person who stands up for himself is a danger to skepticism.

So in the end I see "natural and necessary desire analysis" as a good suggestion for living pleasurably, but surely most people of any background religious or otherwise can understand that point, so, as I see it, it's not uniquely Epicurean or central to the philosophy.

But you are right to struggle with it because you need to be comfortable that you have an explanation for where it fits in.

Otherwise, just like "pleasure is the absence of pain," you'll end up with an absolutely harmful construction of Epicurean philosophy that I would advise you to run from as fast as you can. Because buried in the "always be satisfied with only what you need to stay alive, and never try for anything more" viewpoint is Buddhism and Stoicism and JudeoChristianity and worse.

I agree with that analysis and I think that's probably why there's the separate reference to desires necessary for life and necessary for happiness.

Further, I agree with you that the natural and necessary analysis is not as clear in our texts as it should be, and it's not something I focus on. I think Torquatus gives a reasonable explanation as to why it exists, as a tool of analysis, but it strikes me as rather obvious and so not something I find that important. The getting to 100% and then the rest being variation is important for logical reasons, but to me this natural / necessary division is not as much philosophical as it is practical advice. It's good practical advice too - if you need need help to see that the harder pleasures to obtain come at higher cost.

I don't think you're missing something obvious however. This analysis is a prime tool used by the Stoics to argue that Epicurus was a minimalist, so it's a major thing to fight over. Yes it can be read to mean "you should be satisfied when you have just enough to keep you alive." But was it interpreted by Epicurus himself that way? No, so it's either not meant in that way, or Epicurus was a hypocrite. I don't think he was a hypocrite, so I think it was meant in the practical way of meaning "Watch out if you go for the more difficult pleasures in life, because that may cause more pain that it's worth. There's a lot of pleasure available in things that are easier to get, but jt's up to you to decide what's best for you. And he of all people - driven as he was - would have known that if you forgo something that you really want to do then that regret can be among the most painful.

So part of the problem also is that we don't have much elaboration on this point in the texts, but in my view we have more than enough to know how *not* to interpret this passage.