I wanted to highlight this section:
"God began by first marking them out into shapes by means of forms and numbers.
As to posts like this one I don't think the reaction icons do justice. Maybe the thank you is best so that's what I will use but I do think enthusiastically that all these issues need to be drawn out!
Yep that works, and this link takes you to the English
It sure would but Don that link doesn't work for me.
I like Perseus for a lot of reasons but I also like having my own standard PDF for security reasons. It bothers me that the full Jowett available more easily on Archive.org. I thought it was in the past (?) Also, the text in the old editions s often annotated in creative ways. Actually I don't know what Jowett's reputation really is. I recall my college professor sort of joking about him as the authority but I don't know if that's true or not, or if Jowett has a reputation for being unjustifiably opinionated.
I do see that Jowett's editions have very very long introductory summaries which might be useful in themselves, especially for word searching.
Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893) is one of the most well-known translators of Plato into English. His translations, first published in the late 19th century, were widely influential and helped popularize Plato’s works among English-speaking audiences. However, his reputation as a translator is mixed.
Chatgpt:
While Jowett’s translations remain influential and readable, many scholars prefer more recent translations that strive for greater accuracy and fidelity to the Greek text. Translations by scholars such as Thomas G. West, G. M. A. Grube, C. D. C. Reeve, and John M. Cooper (who edited Plato: Complete Works) are often recommended for academic study.
In summary, Jowett’s translations are valuable for their literary quality and historical significance, but they should be read with awareness of their interpretative nature and potential biases.
This is readable and has line numbers. The pages are a little thin, but they do hold up to writing and highlighting: Link
I didn't click on this link immediately so i didn't realize it was to a printed version.
I guess in addition to that we need a link to something public domain at Archive.org in PDF - presumably a Jowett translation (?) - that has line numbers and potentially annotations. An older Loeb edition?
A quick search of Archive.org has not been productive. It looks to me that for best word-searching ability we need a single PDF containing all of Jowett's edition of Plato's dialogues, which was apparently in seven volumes, with the last version being a third edition. It's well over a hundred years old so should be freely available.
Strangely there does not seem to be a free older Loeb edition -- possibly because the Jowett pre-dated that and was considered the gold standard (?)
I also see a Thomas Taylor edition but I don't know the reputation of that.
Further notes:
Archive.org seems to be damaged from its problems last year. The older Jowett editions which ought to be public domain are not downloadable easily, which chatgpt points to this edition which is much newer.
I will check Hathitrust - not productive.
It appears that the Online Libreary of Liberty has the full Jowett Series.
This appears to be a master link from which the full set can be assembled.
This is great stuff Bryan - keep it coming!
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Here are two generic references in Book 5 that perhaps holds open the possibility that such stories might be true, but definitely doesn't say that they are:
[324] Moreover, if there was no birth and beginning of the earth and sky, and they were always from everlasting, why beyond the Theban war and the doom of Troy have not other poets sung of other happenings as well? whither have so many deeds of men so often passed away? why are they nowhere enshrined in glory in the everlasting memorials of fame? But indeed, I trow, our whole world is in its youth, and quite new is the nature of the firmament, nor long ago did it receive its first-beginnings. Wherefore even now certain arts are being perfected, even now are growing; much now has been added to ships, but a while ago musicians gave birth to tuneful harmonies. Again, this nature of things, this philosophy, is but lately discovered, and I myself was found the very first of all who could turn it into the speech of my country.
[338] But if by chance you think that all these same things were aforetime, but that the generations of men perished in burning heat, or that cities have fallen in some great upheaval of the world, or that from ceaseless rains ravening rivers have issued over the lands and swallowed up cities, all the more must you be vanquished and confess that there will come to pass a perishing of earth and sky as well. For when things were assailed by such great maladies and dangers, then if a more fatal cause had pressed upon them, far and wide would they have spread their destruction and mighty ruin. Nor in any other way do we see one another to be mortal; except that we fall sick of the same diseases as those whom nature has sundered from life.
[351] Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them, which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter, whose nature we have declared before; or that they are able to continue through all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched nor suffers a whit from assault; or else because there is no supply of room all around, into which things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may leap apart, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow. But neither, as I have shown, is the nature of the world endowed with solid body, since there is void mingled in things; nor yet is it as the void, nor indeed are bodies lacking, which might by chance gather together out of infinite space and overwhelm this sum of things with headstrong hurricane, or bear down on it some other form of dangerous destruction; nor again is there nature of room or space in the deep wanting, into which the walls of the world might be scattered forth; or else they may be pounded and perish by any other force you will. The gate of death then is not shut on sky or sun or earth or the deep waters of the sea, but it stands open facing them with huge vast gaping maw. Wherefore, again, you must needs confess that these same things have a birth; for indeed, things that are of mortal body could not from limitless time up till now have been able to set at defiance the stern strength of immeasurable age.
[380] Again, since the mighty members of the world so furiously fight one against the other, stirred up in most unhallowed warfare, do you not see that some end may be set to their long contest? Either when the sun and every kind of heat have drunk up all the moisture and won the day: which they are struggling to do, but as yet they have not accomplished their effort: so great a supply do the rivers bring and threaten to go beyond their bounds, and deluge all things from out the deep abyss of ocean; all in vain, since the winds as they sweep the seas, diminish them, and so does the sun in heaven, as he unravels their fabric with his rays, and they boast that they can dry up all things, ere moisture can reach the end of its task. So vast a war do they breathe out in equal contest, as they struggle and strive one with another for mighty issues; yet once in this fight fire gained the upper hand, and once, as the story goes, moisture reigned supreme on the plains.
[396] For fire won its way and burnt up many things, all-devouring, when the resistless might of the horses of the sun went astray and carried Phaethon amain through the whole heavens and over all lands. But, thereupon, the almighty father, thrilled with keen anger, with sudden stroke of his thunder dashed high-souled Phaethon from his chariot to earth, and the sun, meeting him as he fell, caught the everlasting lamp of the world, and tamed the scattered steeds, and yoked them trembling, and so guiding them along their own path, replenished all things; so forsooth sang the old poets of the Greeks: but it is exceeding far removed from true reasoning. For fire can only prevail when more bodies of its substance have risen up out of infinite space; and then its strength fails, vanquished in some way, or else things perish, burnt up by its fiery breath.
[411] Moisture likewise, once gathered together and began to prevail, as the story goes, when it overwhelmed living men with its waves. Thereafter, when its force was by some means turned aside and went its way, even all that had gathered together from infinite space, the rains ceased, and the strength of the rivers was brought low.
It makes sense to split, because Atlantis is a distracting introduction (which I brought up) but it is not address by Epikouros, who is focused instead on the restrictive geometry that Plato assigns to the elements.
It may be distracting to the original topic, but I won't be surprised if over time it turns into a popular thread. 
In book 14, Epicurus appears to interpret the Timaeus literally.
And that (including what parts of Timaeus?) is what I am definitely looking forward to hearing about!
Bryan if it makes sense NOT to split these threads we can add them back together.
Two questions that occur to me are whether any of these referenced writers are known to have been sympathetic to Epicurus, or were all of them of other schools? Also, are any of the references in Lucretius to the development of civilizations and/or destruction of worlds relevant to this story?
But the main aspect that I think would be interesting to discuss would be whether the Epicureans would have interpreted the Atlantis story as an example of Plato weaving ridiculous tales, in a way related to his cave analogy or discussion of ideal forms?
From the wikipedia article:
Some ancient writers viewed Atlantis as fictional or metaphorical myth; others believed it to be real.[30] Aristotle believed that Plato, his teacher, had invented the island to teach philosophy.[21] The philosopher Crantor, a student of Plato's student Xenocrates, is cited often as an example of a writer who thought the story to be historical fact. His work, a commentary on Timaeus, is lost, but Proclus, a Neoplatonist of the fifth century AD, reports on it.[31] The passage in question has been represented in the modern literature either as claiming that Crantor visited Egypt, had conversations with priests, and saw hieroglyphs confirming the story, or, as claiming that he learned about them from other visitors to Egypt.[32] Proclus wrote:
As for the whole of this account of the Atlanteans, some say that it is unadorned history, such as Crantor, the first commentator on Plato. Crantor also says that Plato's contemporaries used to criticize him jokingly for not being the inventor of his Republic but copying the institutions of the Egyptians. Plato took these critics seriously enough to assign to the Egyptians this story about the Athenians and Atlanteans, so as to make them say that the Athenians really once lived according to that system.
The next sentence is often translated "Crantor adds, that this is testified by the prophets of the Egyptians, who assert that these particulars [which are narrated by Plato] are written on pillars which are still preserved." But in the original, the sentence starts not with the name Crantor but with the ambiguous He; whether this referred to Crantor or to Plato is the subject of considerable debate. Proponents of both Atlantis as a metaphorical myth and Atlantis as history have argued that the pronoun refers to Crantor.[33]
....
Other ancient historians and philosophers who believed in the existence of Atlantis were Strabo and Posidonius.[37] Some have theorized that, before the sixth century BC, the "Pillars of Hercules" may have applied to mountains on either side of the Gulf of Laconia, and also may have been part of the pillar cult of the Aegean.[38][39] The mountains stood at either side of the southernmost gulf in Greece, the largest in the Peloponnese, and it opens onto the Mediterranean Sea. This would have placed Atlantis in the Mediterranean, lending credence to many details in Plato's discussion.
The fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus, relying on a lost work by Timagenes, a historian writing in the first century BC, writes that the Druids of Gaul said that part of the inhabitants of Gaul had migrated there from distant islands. Some have understood Ammianus's testimony as a claim that at the time of Atlantis's sinking into the sea, its inhabitants fled to western Europe; but Ammianus, in fact, says that "the Drasidae (Druids) recall that a part of the population is indigenous but others also migrated in from islands and lands beyond the Rhine" (Res Gestae 15.9), an indication that the immigrants came to Gaul from the north (Britain, the Netherlands, or Germany), not from a theorized location in the Atlantic Ocean to the south-west.[40] Instead, the Celts who dwelled along the ocean were reported to venerate twin gods, (Dioscori), who appeared to them coming from that ocean.[41]
I want to pursue Atlantis further, but that would divert this thread so I'll split that off 
So let's take up Atlantis here:
The inclusion of all void and all space as something everlasting makes sense and is consistent with Epikouros, who says that only the (1) void and (2) atoms are whole, unchanging, natures. The Whole is everlasting, but always changing.
The addition of the "change" factor to "eternally the same" is an interesting thing to think about.
Does change in "location" constitute change? If so, atoms are constantly moving, and in that sense, void is constantly relocating.
So atoms and even may move or at least change location, but does the fact that something moves constitute always being in a state of "becoming?"
The whole approach of thinking that something is not real unless it is totally unchanging in every respect smacks of being bogus and the ultimate problem. However before you can be sure the approach is bogus you have to understand what is being asserted.
Sounds like Diogenes of Oinoanda was on exactly the right track:
Fr. 5
[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?
Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.
Anyone want to suggest an edition that is both readable and has line numbers?
Bryan also the quote that starts off the basic assertion of your post is:
First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.
(that gutenberg page does not have line numbers so I need a better source.
Hard to find a more clear statement than that to the effect that what the senses present to us is not real at all! It never really "is."
Whereas to Epicurus it is exactly the reverse, that which we cannot sense is nothing to us.
Also Bryan thanks for posting that reminder of the purpose of the thread.
I agree it's very important for everyone (and not just for purposes of our book review) to have a working knowledge of the basic assertions of Timaeus.
This is the source (or part of the source) of the story of Atlantis, so it's interesting for lots of reasons.
A first start would be an outline of the basic topics covered in it. Jowett's introduction is far too long to serve as a general introduction to tell us what to expect is relevant to Epicurus. Anyone have a topical outline of the subjects? We need to develop one from an Epicurean perspective.
For Epíkouros the closest we have to a realm of (1) what always is, is the whole natures (ὅλαι φύσεις) of the atoms and the void,
Bryan it seems like lately I came across in Lucretius a list of three things with unchanging natures, and the list was atoms, void, and something to the effect of "the universe as a whole." It struck me at the time that that would be an important cite to remember so of course I've forgotten it, but I will see if I can find it.
Not that it's necessarily super important, but it seems to go with your observation.
UPDATE: I think this is what I was remembering:
Lucretius Book 3 around 806 (Bailey) (I added the 1, 2, and 3)
Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, (1) because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter whose nature we have declared before; or (2) that they are able to continue throughout all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched, nor suffers a whit from assault; or (3) else because there is no supply of room all around, into which, as it were, things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may scatter, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow.
Kalosyni I think we need to encourage more people to develop handouts. Do we have a section on the forum devoted to Handouts or Brochures? If not, let's set one up somewhere under "Activism" thanks!
Additional from Marcus Aurelius, Diogenes Laertius Book VII (on Zeno of Citium), and Seneca:
Marcus Aurelius, Book IV: 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship of reason.
Marcus Aurelius, Book I: 8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason….
Marcus Aurelius - In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance.
Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno: 100. The reason why they characterize the perfect good as beautiful is that it has in full all the "factors" required by nature or has perfect proportion. Of the beautiful there are (say they) four species, namely, what is just, courageous, orderly and wise; for it is under these forms that fair deeds are accomplished. Similarly there are four species of the base or ugly, namely, what is unjust, cowardly, disorderly, and unwise. By the beautiful is meant properly and in an unique sense that good which renders its possessors praiseworthy, or briefly, good which is worthy of praise; though in another sense it signifies a good aptitude for one's proper function; while in yet another sense the beautiful is that which lends new grace to anything, as when we say of the wise man that he alone is good and beautiful. 101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term "good" has equal force with the term "beautiful," which comes to the same thing. "Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good." They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. Of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent).
And Athenaeus the epigrammatist speaks of all the Stoics in common as follows:[22] O ye who’ve learnt the doctrines of the Porch And have committed to your books divine The best of human learning, teaching men That the mind’s virtue is the only good! She only it is who keeps the lives of men And cities, – safer than high gates and walls. But those who place their happiness in pleasure Are led by the least worthy of the Muses. Diogenes Laertius Book VII
Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. Diogenes Laertius Book VII
Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another’s ills. Delight is the mind’s propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue. Diogenes Laertius Book VII
“And yet what reason is there that he should provide a living? For if it be to support life, life itself is after all a thing indifferent. If it be for pleasure, pleasure too is a thing indifferent. While if it be for virtue, virtue in itself is sufficient to constitute happiness. Diogenes Laertius Book VII
Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.
In the process of putting together this episode I listened to Joshua's presentation several times, and i want to repeat how good I think it is. If you missed it on the livestream, be sure you catch this podcast version. it's a very deep subject, and to some extent it's easier to absorb if you focus on loistening to what is being said in the quotations, especially to those from Plato and from Lincoln near the end of the episodes. Joshua as talked about some of these themes in the past but I think this presentation brings them together in a way that really drives them home. So thanks again Joshua!
